ISLAMIC HISTORY AND CIVILIZATION

STUDIES AND TEXTS

EDITED BY

ULRICH HAARMANN

VOLUME 15

THE 'ANCIENT SUPREMACY'

Bukhara, Afghanistan and the Battle for Balkh, 1731-1901

BY

J.L. LEE

E.J. BRILL
LEIDEN · NEW YORK · KÖLN
1996

The paper in this book meets the guidelines for permanence and durability of the Committee on Production Guidelines for Book Longevity of the Council on Library Resources.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Lee, Jonathan L.
The "ancient supremacy" : Bukhara, Afghanistan and the battle for Balkh, 1731-1901 / by J.L. Lee.
p. cm. — (Islamic history and civilization. Studies and texts, ISSN 0929-2403 ; v. 15)
Includes bibliographical references (p.) and index.
ISBN 90040103996 (alk. paper)
1. Balkh (Afghanistan)—History. 2. Asia, Central—History.
I. Title. II. Series.
DS374.B28L44 1996
958.1—dc20 95-49300
CIP

Die Deutsche Bibliothek – CIP-Einheitsaufnahme

Lee, Jonathan L.:
The "ancient supremacy" : Bukhara, Afghanistan, and the battle for Balkh, 1731-1901 / by J.L. Lee. - Leiden ; New York ; Köln : Brill, 1996
(Islamic history and civilization ; Vol. 15)
ISBN 90-04-10399-6
NE: GT

ISSN 0929-2403
ISBN 90 04 10399 6

© Copyright 1996 by E.J. Brill, Leiden, The Netherlands
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher.

Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by E.J. Brill provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910 Danvers MA 01923, USA.
Fees are subject to change.

PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS

IN MEMORY OF MY FATHER
Leonard Lee, of the Sudan Railways (1904-1967)

The King who has not wisdom in himself, nor wise man for his counsellor,
Authority's sceptre will curtail and dominion crumble from its base.
For he, unable to discern, what tyranny or justice is,
The world into a desert turns, the fount of justice, a Sarāb.*
(Jami, *Salman and Absal*: adapted from Fitzgerald's translation)

*There is a pun on the word *sarāb*. *Sarāb* was the name of the camel of Basūs which gave rise to a war between Arab tribes in pre-Islamic times known as *Harbī Basūs*. There is a common Arabic expression, *ash'am min sarāb*, more disastrous than *sarāb*' (Steingass). *Sarāb*, is also the Persian word for 'mirage'.

CONTENTS

List of Maps; Plates; Town Plans, Sketches & Drawings ix
Preface xi
On 'Turkistan', 'Afghan Turkistan', 'Lesser Turkistan' .. xxxi
Sources and Their Evaluation xxxiv
Acknowledgements xliv
A Note on Transliterations xlvi
Abbreviations xlviii
Dates 1
I The Land and Its Setting 1
II. The Origin of the Balkh Appanage, 1220-1722 14
III. Nadir Shah Afshar, Haji Bi Ming and Ahmad Shah Durrani, 1722-1772 62
IV. From Jan Muhammad to 'Ali Yar Khan, 1772-1829 92
V. 'Abd al-Mu'min Khan and Mizrab Khan, 1829-1845 130
VI. Hukumat Khan, 1845-1862 206
VII. Muhammad Husain Khan, 1862-1876 282
VIII. Afghan Rule and Dilawar Khan, 1876-1884 359
IX. Muhammad Husain Khan, 1884-1888 445
X. Muhammad Sharif Khan, 1888-1892 530
XI. Aftermath, 1892-1901 594

Appendices
I. Glossary 603
II. Units of Currency, Distances, Weights and Measures 610
II. Amirid Rulers of the Chahar Wilayat 613
i. Afshars of Andkhui
ii. *Beglarbegi*s of Sar-i Pul
iii. *Hakim*s of Shibarghan
iv Mingids of Maimana
IV. Genealogies of Chingizid-Amirid Dynasties of Balkh 616
i. Tuqay-Timurids of Bukhara and Balkh
ii. Manghits of Bukhara
iii. Afshars of Andkhui

iv. *Beglarbegis* of Sar-i Pul
v. *Hakims* of Shibarghan
vi. Mingids of Maimana
vii. The Gauhari *Ishans* of Qarshi and Balkh
viii. Qataghanids (Qunduz and Khulm)
V. Genealogies of the 'Chiefs' of the Chahar Aimaq 626
i. Jamshidi Chiefs
ii. Qal'a-yi Nau Hazara Chiefs
iii. Firozkohi Chiefs
iv. Taimani Chiefs
VI. Durrani (Abdali) Amirs of Afghanistan, 1747-1901 634
VII. Afghan Governors of Balkh, *c.* 1780-1895 635
VIII. Afghan Residents and Governors of Maimana 636
IX. Official Correspondence, the 'Turkistan Atrocities': 637
i. *Translation of a letter from Sayyid Diwan Muhammad, Munshi to the British Agency in Kabul*, 13th July 1889.
ii *Colonel R. Warburton, Political Officer in the Khyber, to Sir H.M. Durand*, 21st July 1889.
iii. C. L. Griesbach, *Memorandum on the disposal of the Turkistan prisoners by the Amir*, 13th August 1889
iv. *Extract from a letter of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India to His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its Dependencies*, Simla, 10th September 1889.
v. *Extract from Translation of a letter from His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its Dependencies to the address of His Excellency the Viceroy*, 30th. September 1889.
X. Key to Footnoted Records in the India Office Library ... 648
i. Annual Files, Collections and Series.
ii. Key to Abbreviations of News Letters, etc. in the Political and Secret Department Files.
Bibliography 654
Index 666

Maps

1. Area Map: Central Asia.
2. Afghanistan and Surrounding Countries.
3. Afghanistan.
4. Balkh and Lesser Turkistan.
5. Maimana and the Chahar Wilayat.
6. The Hazhda Nahr (Eighteen Canals) of Balkh.
7. Map to illustrate the operations between Samur and Géok Tépé.
8. Plan of the environs of the fortress of Denghil Tépé.

Plates

I. The *Arg* of Maimana, seat of the Mingid Dynasty; Niedermeyer, 1916.
II. Maimana, view from Arg with *Ziyarat* of Saif al-Muluk, foreground; Niedermeyer, 1916.
III. Maimana, general view of city from the Talash Khan Hills; Niedermeyer, 1916.
IV. Maimana, celebrating Nauroz at entrance to *Arg*; Rybitschka, 1916.
V. Imam Sahib, Maimana, tombstone of unknown Mingid Khan; Lee, 1978.
VI. Maimana, *Madrasa* founded by Mizrab Khan Ming; Lee, 1978.
VII. Shibarghan, view from the *Arg*; Niedermeyer, 1916.
VIII. Mazar-i Sharif, *Ziyarat* of Ishan Sudur and Ishan Uraq; Lee, 1993.

Town Plans, Sketches & Drawings

1. Maimana; drawing by Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan, 1883.
2. Maimana, town plan; Grötzbach, 1949.
3. Maimana, town plan; Grötzbach, 1973.
4. "Daolatabad fortress, looking S.W.;" Peacocke, 1886.
5. "Fort Maruchak;" Durand, 1885.
6. Sar-i Pul, town and suburbs; Jebens, 1975.
7. Sar-i Pul, town and bazaars; Jebens, 1975.
8. Shibarghan, bastion and entrance to *Arg*; Stuckert, 1943.
9. Shibarghan, sketch of bazaar and *Arg*; Stuckert, 1943.
10. Shibarghan, town plan; Stuckert, 1943.
11. Shibarghan, town plan; Grötzbach, *c.* 1975.
12. "Andkhoi, town and fort;" Durand, 1886.
13. Andkhui, town plan; Grötzbach, 1979.
14. Aqcha, sketch of *Arg*; Stuckert, 1943.

PREFACE

On, or around, 10 July 1892, a small contingent of poorly-armed irregular cavalry, led by the head of a minor province in north-western Afghanistan, mutinied. The rebellion was quickly snuffed out by the Afghan army and the leaders of the uprising imprisoned or executed. At the time, the revolt was deemed hardly worthy of notice outside of the country. True, the subsequent edition of the official *Gazetteer of Afghan Turkistan* (1907, xxviii, 221-2) devoted a paragraph or so to the incident, but in the ensuing decades historians of Afghanistan were too occupied with matters they considered of greater moment to bother with the suppression of a motley band of recalcitrant Uzbek horsemen. Yet the brief and abortive rebellion of Muhammad Sharif Khan Ming, *Wali* of Maimana, marked the final, despairing attempt to seize back a modicum of autonomy from the Afghan government by the last representative of a dynasty which had once held sway over a country larger than Switzerland.

Muhammad Sharif Khan's defeat, and the overthrow of his line which resulted, terminated some two and a half centuries of Mingid domination of Balkh. Even more importantly, from the point of view of Central Asian history, the downfall of this dynasty signalled the end of what the Amir of Afghanistan, 'Abd al-Rahman Khan [1880-1901], called the 'Ancient Supremacy';[2] that is, the epoch of Chingizid sovereignty over the *wilayat*, or appanage, of Balkh which dated back to the second decade of the thirteenth century.

Prior to Balkh's incorporation into the state of Afghanistan, every ruler of the province, with a few, short interregna, all claimed to be descendants, however distant the degree, of the great Mongol conqueror, Chingiz Khan. Though the capital of the Chingizid empire lay on the other side of the Amu Darya river, either in Bukhara or Samarkand, according to ancient tradition the province of Balkh was ruled by the heir apparent to the throne. As such, Balkh played an important part in the fortunes of the various Turco-Mongol dynasties which

[2] *Remarks made by the Amir after his Departure from Peshawar*, 14 April 1885, India Office Library & Records, Secret Letters and Enclosures from India, L/P&S/7/44, 219-40 (255); henceforth, SLEI:44, etc.

arose as a consequence of the conquests of Chingiz Khan. As far as the Mingids of Maimana are concerned, the ancestor of Muhammad Sharif Khan, Uraz Bi, who probably founded this dynasty, received his letters patent from the famous Tuqay-Timurid prince and future Khan of Bukhara, Nazr Muhammad Khan [1611-1651], some three centuries before Ahmad Shah Durrani, the 'Father of Afghanistan', established his people's independence on the wreckage of the Safawid Empire.

At the time of Uraz Bi Ming's appointment, the territory which today is referred to as Afghanistan, far from being a homogeneous nation state, was the region where three great empires met. Balkh, as we have already noted, was the appanage of the Tuqay-Timurid *sultan*, or prince, Nazr Muhammad Khan which, in turn, was but a part of the Chingizid empire which dominated the whole of Central Asia. In the west, Herat was under Safawid Persia, although sovereignty over the region was the subject of a long-standing and bitter dispute between the Shah and Nazr Muhammad Khan. In the east, Kabul, the present capital of Afghanistan, was a northern outpost of the Mughal Empire, whilst Qandahar, the homeland of the future Durrani Afghan monarchy, was the subject of another protracted disagreement between Safawid and Mughal rulers.

The governmental systems of Safawid Persia and Mughal India were pyramidal, autocratic and centralised; the ruler, or *padshah*, upholding an Oriental variation of the Divine Right of Kings and being regarded by his subjects as the Shadow of God on earth. In stark contrast, Chingizid rule, as represented by the Tuqay-Timurids of Balkh and Bukhara, was rooted in Turco-Mongolian tribal tradition and was the antithesis of the *padshahi* system. Power was devolved outwards and downwards from the centre to such an extent that a district *amir*, or provincial commander, had at his disposal far greater powers than his Safawid, Mughal or, subsequently, Afghan, counterpart who was obliged to refer even quite small matters to the *padshah* for approval or adjudication. The Chingizid system of devolved authority, furthermore, was deeply rooted in the consciousness of both subject and ruler and when, on the infrequent occasions a Khan or appanage holder tried to institute reforms more in line with the Indo-Persian model, he very soon came unstuck and was eventually obliged to restore the ancient order by sultans or the amirs who resented the interference of 'central' government in provincial affairs. As the centuries went by, the position of Supreme Khan was thus

increasingly limited to a paternal, ceremonial and honorific role. The Khan's presence was essential to legitimatise the active Khan's authority, but the former had little to do with the daily running of the empire. In this respect, the Supreme Khan would have found many similarities between his position and that of a modern European monarch.

By 1892, however, the three great, rival empires of Central Asia had passed away and the map of Central Asia had been redrawn to such an extent as to be unrecognisable to someone of the previous generation. The Mughal Empire had imploded and been absorbed into British India. The Safawid rulers had been dealt a death blow by the transient but bloody career of Nadir Shah Afshar, out of the ashes of whose ephemeral empire the Qajar dynasty emerged to rule over a truncated and weakened Persia. The Chingizid dominions north of the Oxus had gradually broken up into small, mutually-hostile, Khanates and were picked off one-by-one by the expanding power of Tsarist Russia, though the Manghit dynasty of Bukhara retained a modicum of internal authority until early into the next century. South of the Amu Darya, the appanage of Balkh had been renamed 'Afghan Turkistan' and was governed by the Afghan Amir of Kabul, an ardent advocate of *padshahi* monarchical theory. The once-great princely appanage had been reduced to an impoverished and dispirited backwater of the newly-created state of Afghanistan. The Chingizid amirs, on whom the mantle of power had fallen in the wake of the breakdown of Tuqay-Timurid authority, had been deposed and had either been executed or died in ignominy in the foul gaols of Kabul. Their wealth had been confiscated, their lands distributed amongst colonists, whilst the city-states over which they once held sway were governed by southerners appointed by the Amir himself. It is the tumultuous and sanguine history of the demise of this 'Ancient Supremacy' which is the subject of this work.

When it comes to what, for want of a better term, we may call the 'Battle for Balkh,' one searches in vain through the extensive corpus of western histories of Afghanistan and Central Asia for any systematic treatment of the decline and fall of Chingizid rule in Central Asia, primarily because this epoch is eclipsed by the wider struggle between the two great European Imperial powers of the day, Britain and Russia, for control of Central Asia. By the last decade or so of the eighteenth century, the East India Company had extended its authority westwards and northwards to the borders of the Punjab. As a

consequence, Britain's interest in things Central Asia revolved exclusively around the issue of how best to protect India's north-western frontier from periodic invasion by the Afghan Amirs. Within living memory, Nadir Shah Afshar had not just crossed the Indus but had actually sacked Delhi and although his empire had fallen apart on his death, Ahmad Shah Durrani had assumed the mantle of a *mujahid,* or holy warrior, and had made repeated forays into the Punjab to fight the infidel Sikhs and Marathas. Following the death of Timur Shah b. Ahmad Shah, however, this threat receded with the outbreak of a protracted civil war over the issue of succession which eventually led to the break-up of the Afghan realms into a number of semi-independent city states.

Almost as soon as the Afghan threat had subsided, the authorities in Calcutta had further reason to worry about the security situation on the north-west frontier, for following Napoleon's successes in Egypt, it was feared that the French Emperor would try and emulate the conquests of Alexander the Great and attack India overland through Persia and Qandahar. By 1815, the French threat, too, had dissipated, only to be replaced, a decade or so later, with Russo-phobia, precipitated by Tsarist military and political successes in the Caucasus, Caspian and Kazakhstan. Unlike the Afghan and French 'problem', however, the Russian threat did not go away. Instead, as the century unfolded, it increased until this single issue dominated British foreign policy. In order to protect India from Russian invasion and subversion, from the middle of the 1830s Calcutta abandoned its support of Persia and sought instead an alliance with the Afghan Amir of Kabul. As a consequence of this shift in policy, British interests became increasingly more intertwined with the fluctuating fortunes of the Afghan Amirs and eventually led to the creation of the buffer state of Afghanistan which, it was believed, would be the bulwark by which Russian power and influence was held in check. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that British historians of this era gave priority to issues related to Russian-British rivalry, known as the 'Great Game', and Anglo-Afghan relations. The other side of the coin was that it was not in British interests to examine too deeply the awkward issues of the pre-Durrani situation of Central Asia and particularly the embarrassing claims of sovereignty made by Persia and Bukhara over certain of the regions which Britain was determined to include in the state of Afghanistan.

Not only so, but it has to be remembered that the homeland of the Afghan (i.e. Pushtun or 'Pathan') tribes lay south of the Hindu Kush, on either side of the Khyber and Bolan Passes, and consequently histories of Afghanistan written in the colonial period concentrated on developments this region to the detriment of what was deemed to be 'provincial' affairs. Furthermore, up until the second half of the present century, those individuals who were regarded as authorities on the area were more often than not the very people who had either formulated or implemented Britain's Central Asia policy and thus, to one degree or another, their publications contain an element of imperial polemic. Indeed, publication was the most important medium through which officials in one or other of the branches of the India administration, were able to justify the ways of government to man as well as immortalise their own, or others', part in redrawing the map of Central Asia. Western scholars in the present, post-colonial age, have merely inherited this ideological mantle and even in the present post-colonial era, historical studies on Afghanistan and Central Asia still tend to be variations on the 'Great Game' theme.

This world view means that the criteria used by such historians to evaluate the significance, or otherwise, of internal developments in Afghanistan and Central Asia is based on whether or not such-and-such an event is considered to have some direct or indirect bearing on British strategic interests or throws more light on Anglo-Afghan or Anglo-Russian relations. The pages of such studies are full of diplomatic (and undiplomatic) exchanges between London, Calcutta, Kabul and St. Petersburg, or in-depth discussions about the political aspirations of powerful individuals amongst the ruling clique in the Afghan capital how they were disposed, or not, as the case may be, towards Britain, Russia or Persia, and the various methods Britain employed to impose its will on the Amirs of Kabul. The net result is that the imperial historical tradition which still permeates modern scholarship, is obsessed by a narrow-minded, Cartesian view of the last two centuries of Central Asian history. It is as if the peoples of the region, from the Amir to the night soil cleaner, only existed when British eyes deigned to look upon them.

Consequently, certain periods of Afghanistan's chequered history have been mulled over *ad nauseam* whilst other eras have either been totally ignored or simply passed by Elphinstone's mission to the court of Shah Shuja' in 1808; European (and particularly British) exploration of Central Asia; the various Anglo-Afghan Treaties; Russian

advances in Central Asia; the Persian sieges of Herat and the several frontier commissions; are all given pride of place. Above all, the 'romantic' story of the First Anglo-Afghan War [1838-1842] has captured these historians' imagination and the saga of this Central Asian Dunkirk has been retold and reworked countless times in the course of the last century and a half. During the same period there has been but a single study of the reign of Ahmad Shah Durrani written by a European (Lockhart 1938). The story of Dost Muhammad's meeting with Alexander Burnes in 1838, the Amir's subsequent flight, imprisonment and eventual surrender to Sir William Macnaughten, have been told again and again, yet the period of more than a decade between Dost Muhammad Khan's reinstatement following the disasters of the First Anglo-Afghan War and his first treaty with Britain in 1855 is covered in the space of a few sentences or paragraphs. The reign of 'Abd al-Rahman Khan has inspired a considerable literature, whilst the reign of his son, Habibullah, during which there was a brief, but glorious, flowering of literary talent, has, until the present generation, attracted but little serious or systematic study (cf. Schinasi 1979).

Furthermore, the imperial world view produced the most extraordinary selectivity, even when writing about events which hold a central place in 'Great Game' folklore. Perhaps the best example of this 'pick-'n-mix' tradition is the Persian siege of Herat [1837-1838]. In the last century it provided a particularly choice opportunity for smug self-congratulation for it was an "Englishman,"[3] Lt. Eldred Pottinger, who, according to the conventional interpretation of events, single-handedly, kicked, bullied and harangued the defenders and their despotic overlords, Kamran Shah and Wazir Yar Muhammad Khan, into holding off the Persian assaults on the city.

The crucial part played by the Sunni Confederacy of Aimaq, Uzbek and Turkman tribes from Badghis, the Panjdeh oasis and the Chahar Wilayat, under the joint leadership of Muhammad Khan Hazara and Mizrab Khan Ming of Maimana, is rarely mentioned. Yet so serious a threat was this confederation to the Persian army's flanks, that the Shah was obliged to detach several thousand of his best soldiers under the command of arguably the best military mind in Persia, the Asaf al-Daula, Prince-Governor of Khurasan, and send them into the mountains of Badghis and the Tir Band-i Turkistan. It took the Persian column some four months to subdue these tribes

[3] Fraser-Tytler, 86; Pottinger was actually Irish.

during which time they suffered heavy losses of men and equipment. By the time Mizrab Khan Ming and Muhammad Khan Hazara had been brought to heel, the Asaf al-Daula was forced to go into winter quarters in Qal'a-yi Nau, for the Sabzak Pass was closed by snow. It was not until the spring that what was left of the Persian column finally rejoined the main army investing Herat. The loss of thousands of crack troops and most of the Persian cannon to the siege operations was undoubtedly far more significant for the survival of Herat than all the frantic bravery of Pottinger. Indeed, when Faiz Muhammad Katib, at the beginning of this century, wrote his account of the Persian invasion of Herat in his *Siraj al-Tawarikh*, he devoted as much space to the Asaf al-Daula's mauling in Badghis, as he did to the siege of itself.

Another flaw in the imperial histories, and one which is still perpetuated by contemporary scholarship, is the scant attention paid to the centuries prior to the election of Ahmad Shah Durrani as Amir of the Afghan tribes in 1747. When such works do attempt a contextual approach, they more often than not merely provide the reader with a shopping list of the various waves of conquests which have swept through 'Afghanistan'. The invasions of the Mongols, Timurids, Mughals, Shaibanids and Safawids, to name but a few, are portrayed as fragmentary, transitory happenings which can be dismissed in the course of a few pages. The 'Afghanistan period' of Central Asia, therefore, is never placed in a proper, organic relationship to the past and is thus uprooted from the soil out of which it grew.

Indeed, such histories are often marred by an underlying anachronism, namely, the presupposition that Afghanistan, as it was defined, say, by the end of the nineteenth century, existed as a homogeneous, distinct and independent nation-state at least as early as 1747. In fact, the name 'Afghanistan' was almost certainly a term coined by the English (Forster 1789) and was not in vogue even amongst officials in Calcutta until around the third decade of the nineteenth century. Regrettably, this world view has now been recycled back to the peoples of Afghanistan themselves through the media of western-sponsored school text books and European and American-trained Afghans. At a recent conference I attended, an eminent Afghan intellectual solemnly declared that Sultan Husain Baiqara, Zahir al-Din Babur, Timur Lang, the Herati poet Jami, amongst others, were 'Afghans'. This narcissistic view of Afghanistan has left us regrettably ignorant of internal developments in the region over the last three centuries.

There is one more, peculiarly European, perception of Central Asian historical geography underlying the colonial world view of the region and playing a significant part in determining the final frontiers of Afghanistan and the demise of the 'Ancient Supremacy' on either sides of the Amu Darya. All the members of the India administration had been brought up from an early age on a diet of Greek and Latin texts. Throughout the course of their education British civil servants, military officers and diplomats had been steeped in classical history and geography and saw India, Persia and the intervening lands through the eyes of Quintus Curtius, Ptolemy, Herodotus, etc. For such individuals, Balkh was not the Balkh of the Chingizids, nor was the Amu Darya the river which was the vein that ran through the heart of the Uzbek empire. Balkh was Bactria, the Tir Band-i Turkistan the Paropamisus mountains, the Amu Darya, the Oxus. It was the frontier which marked the border between civilisation and barbarism; a region which existed in suspended animation with the frame frozen in 326 BC, the point when the Achæmenid city of Bactra fell into the hands of the all-conquering Alexander the Great.

This present study is an attempt to break free from the shackles of this imperial and classical heritage and to write a history of one of the most important regions of Central Asia from a fresh perspective. As such, I trust it is not too presumptuous to claim that this work is possibly the first post-colonial history of Central Asia and Afghanistan and one, I hope, which will oblige the next generation of scholars to re-examine conventional approaches not just to the region's past but, more importantly, to its present. As part of the unconventional approach I have adopted, the architecture of the book has been deliberately built not around the reigns of the Amirs of Afghanistan but the rise and fall of the Ming dynasty of Maimana, the last and probably the most ancient amirid state of the former appanage of Balkh.

In order to establish proper historical, political and cultural context and continuity for the nineteenth-century struggle for Turkistan, the first two chapters have been devoted to the pre-Durrani epoch of Turco-Mongolian supremacy over a region which, from the dawn of human history, has played a vital role in the religious, political and social life of what is now referred to as Central Asia. In the third chapter, I have devoted considerable space to an analysis of the nature of Afghan-Uzbek relations during and immediately after the conquests of Nadir Shah Afshar. Having thus set the scene, the remaining chapters contain the unfolding saga of the protracted and bitter

struggle between Kabul and Bukhara for control of Balkh and the effect this had on the peoples of the appanage, socially, economically and politically. At the same time it has not been possible to exclude the part played by outside forces, such as Persia, Russia and, above all, Britain, in the subjugation of Balkh to the Afghan Amirs. However, unlike the imperial tradition which I have so criticised above, neither London, Calcutta or even Kabul are the study's *terminus a quo*; they are its *terminus ad quem*, for the impetus for the annexation of Balkh came not so much from Kabul as from Calcutta.

During the latter half of his reign, Dost Muhammad Khan (d. 1862), almost by accident, found himself in the position to be the major beneficiary of British Central Asian policy, a situation that he and his successors, not unnaturally, exploited to the utmost extent. Though Dost Muhammad Khan had made a brief incursion north of the Hindu Kush prior to the First Anglo-Afghan War, it was only following his return to Kabul, in the wake of the British withdrawal in 1842, that he was able to exert actual, direct authority over Balkh. Over the decade which followed his reinstatement, the Amir consolidated his authority by bringing more and more of the Afghan tribal areas south of the Hindu Kush under his sway. By the end of the 1840s, Dost Muhammad Khan was in a sufficiently strong position to contemplate the invasion and annexation of Balkh.

Britain, during this same period, was strangely indifferent to the extension and consolidation of the Amir's power. Certainly it was not for the lack of intelligence, for the L/P&S/5 series in the India Office Library are full of reports submitted by clandestine news writers and secret agents about Dost Muhammad's proceedings. In an earlier generation, the authorities in Calcutta would have rightly been extremely concerned to observe that a ruler, whom a few years previously Britain had felt obliged to depose and exile, was yearly becoming ever more powerful. If this was not enough, at the same time that the Amir had sent his armies northwards to annex Balkh, the ruler of Kabul also openly sided with the Sikhs in their war with the East India Company. Not unexpectedly, therefore, following the defeat of the Sikhs and the annexation of the Punjab and Peshawar which followed hard on its heels, there was panic in the Afghan capital as Company troops were expected to continue their advance through the Khyber, take control of Kabul and overthrow Dost Muhammad Khan. The East India Company army, however, halted south of the Khyber, the memory of the recent disastrous retreat from Kabul in 1842 still being

fresh in everyone's mind, and within a matter of five years, Calcutta and Kabul, far from being at loggerheads, were actively pursuing rapprochement. Thus, Dost Muhammad Khan was left alone to pursue his own policy of colonial annexation and in the following five years succeeded in seizing control of Qataghan and the Balkh-Aqcha axis.

The next important stage in the 'Afghanisation' of the appanage came in 1855, when Dost Muhammad Khan signed the first of what was to prove a series of treaties between Afghanistan and Britain and formally ended nearly two decades of mutual suspicion. Britain, however, had no intention of securing peace by surrendering control of the Khyber Pass or returning Peshawar to the Amir, nor did Dost Muhammad Khan insist on this as a pre-condition for the establishment of peaceful relations, even though the city held an important and emotional place in the hearts of all Pushtuns. Instead, during the negotiations of 1855 and for the remainder of the century, Britain cynically supported the Kabul rulers' campaigns to incorporate the province of Balkh into a Greater Afghanistan. In doing so Britain cleverly killed several birds with one stone.

There is at least a *prima facie* case to support the contention that Calcutta encouraged the Afghan annexation of Balkh as compensation for the loss of Peshawar. At the same time, Britain achieved a major policy objective, namely, the establishment of a friendly, British-reliant power on the banks of the Oxus, whilst dealing a mortal blow to Chingizid power by cutting the lands of the 'Ancient Supremacy' in half. In the south, meanwhile, British occupation of Peshawar and control of the North-West Frontier and Baluchistan, ensured that Afghan solidarity was undermined; the Pushtun tribal heartlands being under British suzerainty, whilst, north of the Khyber, the Muhammadzais were forced to become dependent on British military and financial aid as they tried to hold together a country in which Pushtuns represented considerably less than 50% of the population. Afghanistan is thus the classic, most successful and longest-surviving example of the British Imperial strategy of 'Divide and Rule'.

As far as Dost Muhammad Khan was concerned, probably as early as his 'surrender' to Sir William Macnaughten in 1840, he realised that in many matters his interests were identical with the British and there was a great deal of advantage to be gained by not flogging the long-dead Peshawar horse. The appanage of Balkh, after all, had a much greater annual revenue than the North-West Frontier and was potentially far easier to control. The province was mostly flat, or

undulating plain, rather than a maze of narrow, twisting valleys and high, inaccessible mountains, which realised a very considerable revenue from its agriculture, mercantile and cottage industries. At the same time, by incorporating the Chingizid appanage into an enlarged Afghanistan he could, to some degree, pay Bukhara back for the personal insult he had received in 1840, when he had been imprisoned by Nasrullah Khan Manghit.

Thus, even at a relatively early period in Anglo-Afghan relations we can detect the roots of the theory which, later in the century, was to blossom into the debate about a 'Scientific Frontier' for India, that is, the extension of British influence, either by direct conquest or via a proxy, to the south bank of the Oxus. The origins of this concept can, in fact, be traced to the period just before and during the First Anglo-Afghan War. In response to the flight of Dost Muhammad Khan beyond the Hindu Kush, political officers such as Burnes, Pottinger, Arthur Conolly, Todd and Lord, urged on their superiors the necessity of extending the power of the East India Company's quisling, Shah Shuja' al-Mulk, up to the Amu Darya and thus prevent the fugitive Amir recruiting an army from the population of Lesser Turkistan. These political officers supplied Calcutta with a considerable corpus of 'evidence', based on highly selective and dubious historical precedent, to justify such annexation, though following the disasters of 1841-42, nothing came of these plans. The generations of politicians who followed in these political officers' footsteps, however, relied heavily on these reports and so perpetuated the myths that had been created in the late 1830s and early 1840s. In the latter half of the century, when the argument about the 'natural' and 'scientific' frontiers of India were raging in London and Calcutta, it was the 'evidence' of Burnes and his contemporaries which was cited as justification for considering the appanage of Balkh as part of Afghanistan and drawing the frontier of the country along the course of the Oxus river.

Apart from being in the front line of the 'Great Game' the province of Balkh played a vital, though understated, role in determining the course of internal Afghanistan's history. It was usually from Balkh where pretenders to the Kabul throne made their bid for power, wooing the indigenous rulers to their side with promises of restored autonomy which were more often than not broken once the usurper had taken Kabul. Amirs, ousted from their throne by a more powerful rival or by invasion, inevitably sought refuge beyond the Hindu Kush. During the civil war between Amir Sher 'Ali Khan and the family of

his elder brother, Muhammad Afzal Khan [1862-1868], it was the decision of the Afghan governor of Balkh to change sides, coupled with the support of the local amirs, which tipped the balance in favour of Sher 'Ali Khan and forced the Afzalids into exile in Samarkand. In 1868, it was the refusal of the Wali of Maimana to surrender to 'Abd al-Rahman Khan which bought Sher 'Ali the necessary time to secure Qandahar and march on Kabul. It was the governors and people of Badakhshan and Balkh who, in 1880, welcomed 'Abd al-Rahman Khan from his exile, thus providing the Sardar with a strong power base from which he was able to successfully persuade the British authorities in Kabul to recognise him as Amir of Afghanistan over the heads of Sher 'Ali Khan's sons who had by far the strongest claim to Dost Muhammad Khan's throne.

The reign of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan [1880-1901] is rightly regarded by scholars as the most important of any Afghan Amir of the century, though, as I have argued in this work, for all the wrong reasons. His reign is also crucial in the long, drawn out battle for supremacy in Balkh, for it was under this Amir that the last vestiges of Chingizid rule was exterminated. In pursuit of his policy of centralisation of power, modelled on the government of his life-long hero, Peter the Great of Russia, 'Abd al-Rahman Khan eradicated all forms of autonomous or devolved governmental systems, not just in Afghan Turkistan, but throughout Afghanistan. Consequently, since it was during the reign of this Amir that the Mingid dynasty of Maimana and, indeed, all the other amirid dynasties of Lesser Turkistan, was finally brought to an end, the death of 'Abd al-Rahman Khan in 1901 provides a natural terminus for this work.

Though the reign of 'Abd al-Rahman Khan was an unmitigated disaster for the ordinary citizen of his country, as far as Britain was concerned, there was every reason for self-congratulation, for by the end of his reign Calcutta could 'justly' claim to have achieved its long-standing goal of an enlarged, unified and pro-British Afghanistan. According to the British version of events (hotly disputed by the Amir himself), they had succeeded in placing 'Abd al-Rahman Khan on the throne and wedding his fortunes to their own. In return, the Amir had ceded control of Afghanistan's foreign relations to Britain. During his reign, Russia and Britain jointly agreed to demarcate the northern border of Afghanistan on the Amu Darya and the Amir's government, chronically corrupt, inefficient and inept was

more or less totally reliant on British rupees and munitions to stay in power and suppress frequent rebellions.

The reign of 'Abd al-Rahman Khan is another of those eras of Afghanistan's history which, though having been been much discussed, is still permeated with the imperial historical perspective. One of the consequences of British policy during the reign of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan, and one which has serious implications for objective scholarship, was that Britain kept Afghanistan in political and ideological quarantine. No representative of a 'western' or potentially hostile power was allowed to enter the country without specific permission and only then after they had undergone security clearance by the authorities in Calcutta or London. In the case of British citizens and officials who visited the country, anything which they sought to publish about their experiences was subject to the most rigorous censorship and anything deemed to be harmful to British interests was excised. Other works, considered as either too outspoken or independently-minded, were suppressed and filed away as 'strictly confidential', thus ensuring that only the officially-approved version of events reached the general public.

Such a policy was not difficult to implement for, after all, these erstwhile authors were invariably employees of one or other branch of the Indian administration and did not wish to risk their career or blot their copybooks. Britain's virtual monopoly on what was, or was not, published about 'Abd al-Rahman Khan's government put its government in the position to manipulate and exploit public opinion about the state of affairs in the country for its own ends. To make matters worse, 'Abd al-Rahman Khan, never one to pass over the opportunity for self-glorification and self-promotion, made sure that his role as saviour of India's Northern Frontier was immortalised with the publication of the English version of his autobiography (Sultan Muhammad Khan 1900) which is still the stock-in-trade of the Neo-Great-Gamers of our generation.

Whilst published works reinforced, supported and endorsed Britain's publicly-proclaimed 'policy success,' a small coterie of senior ministers and civil servants who had access to the *wakil,* or native agents', reports from Kabul, Qandahar and various other cities in and around Afghanistan, were acutely aware that the reality of the Amir's reign was the opposite of the public facade. Behind the bland histories, self-justifying biographies and press releases, there are the voluminous, Political and Secret Department Annual Files in which one

can discover the extent to which the British government managed to pull the wool over the eyes of both the general public and scholars. Amongst other things, these files reveal that from early on in the Amir's reign, certain senior government officials and advisers were deeply concerned at 'Abd al-Rahman Khan's tyrannical proceedings. Indeed, some senior advisors, General Roberts of Qandahar amongst them, urged the administration to depose the Amir. In the end, however, the authorities were not prepared to risk the *status quo* 'merely' for humanitarian considerations. In this respect, nothing much has changed over the last hundred years or so.

The promotion of the Amir as the great reformer who created the framework of 'modern' political institutions in Afghanistan is probably the most lasting legacy of the imperial media manipulation. The P&S records, again, provide considerable evidence to support the claim that bureaucratic departments existed in name only and even senior officials were powerless to do the least thing without the Amir's specific approval. By the middle of 1888, provincial administration (with the exception of Sardar Ishaq Khan's in Balkh which paid only nominal allegiance to Kabul and was fated to suffer severely later the same year as a consequence) had virtually ground to a halt. Governors of the remotest provinces were obliged to refer even the smallest item of business to Kabul for the Amir's signature or run the risk of disgrace or execution.

The India Office Records not only provide new insights into the real state of affairs in respect of the Amir's government, but also reveal the true state of the Amir's mental and physical health. Up until recently it has been assumed by both Afghan and western scholars that 'Abd al-Rahman Khan suffered from occasional bouts of 'gout' which gave him occasional pain and discomfort in his legs and arms. This diagnosis, however, can be dismissed for we now know that for much of his reign 'Abd al-Rahman Khan suffered from one or more acute and chronic diseases which caused him not just prolonged and exquisite physical suffering, but affected his sanity to such an extent that, had the truth been known, he would have doubtless been overthrown or forced to abdicate his throne. Furthermore, we know that British officials were well aware of the seriousness of the Amir's illness as early as 1885, though they probably did not realise that 'Abd al-Rahman Khan's state of health was affecting his mind.

This crippling illness was at least partly responsible for 'Abd al-Rahman Khan's paranoid, autocratic and despotic style of

government. Unfortunately, true to form, Britain, decided that rather than use her overwhelming political, economic, and financial influence to require the Amir to pay some attention to humanitarian issues, she would sweep the whole problem discretely under the carpet. The reason for this was an open secret amongst the senior ranks of officials in Calcutta and London. Had the true magnitude of the Amir's atrocities been known, the public outcry that would have ensued might well have have brought down the government or, at the very least, obliged the administration to do a hasty about-turn. Indeed, Britain could well have been forced to undertake a further, costly intervention in Afghanistan that might have resulted in the permanent annexation of the southern parts of the country to the Indian Empire.

Finally, however, even Calcutta was forced into taking some action, following the defeat of Sardar Ishaq Khan in 1888 and the purges which followed. By the spring of 1889, news of the 'Turkistan Atrocities' began to filter across the Amu Darya into Russian Turkistan and was duly passed down the line to St. Petersburg. The Russian government, seizing the propaganda opportunity with both hands, expressed its deep concern to the British. Given Russia's own human rights record in Central Asia, it was very much a case of the pot calling the kettle black.

Queen Victoria, having read the dispatches from the Russian capital, intervened and expressed her anxiety that Britain appeared to be supporting such a brutal regime. The Viceroy was, therefore, requested to obtain accurate information from inside the country and when it was evident that the situation was far worse than even the Russian government was claiming, Calcutta was forced to address a mild rebuke to the Amir. However, 'Abd al-Rahman Khan's reply dismissed such reports outright, claiming they were rumours put about by Russian agents and enemies of state.

Having done his job, the Viceroy took the matter no further, instead he convinced himself that the Amir had adopted a more humanitarian policy towards the population of Afghanistan. Since, in reality, the killings continued very much as they had before, British officials eventually created a myth to justify the mayhem, convincing themselves, and the world at large, that the Amir's 'firm' and 'decisive' rule was actually beneficial for the peoples of Afghanistan. Such an approach may seem peculiar, but it has to be borne in mind that it was the same nation and generation that convinced itself that 'caning maketh man' and that castor oil was a panacea.

The true story of the years of terror runs like a stream of crimson through two decades of news letters issuing from the native agents in Kabul, Qandahar, Herat and Turkistan. The secret history of what a senior British official termed the 'Reign of Terror' contained within these India Office diaries reveals the extent to which Britain's foreign policy 'success' was achieved only at the price of the blood of the peoples over whom the Amir wielded absolute and untrammelled power. During the course of twenty-one years, 'Abd al-Rahman Khan probably had as many as 100,000 persons judicially executed, whilst hundreds of thousands more perished from hunger, forced migrations, epidemics, or died as a result of the numerous campaigns which the Amir conducted against various ethnic, tribal and sectarian interests. The fear that the Amir's atrocities engendered was a shadow which fell across the lives of everyone in Afghanistan. From the heir apparent to the water-carrier no-one was exempt from what the Kabulis called the 'Power that Walks in Darkness.'

The down-playing of this unpleasant aspect of 'Abd al-Rahman Khan's reign is a tradition which has been maintained by scholars over the last hundred years, probably because the nature and extent of the atrocities committed throughout the Amir's reign do not fit easily into the conventional view of 'Abd al-Rahman Khan as the 'Founder of Modern Afghanistan.' Yet it is impossible to properly evaluate his reign without addressing head-on this whole, sordid issue. It is like writing a history of the Stalinist era of the USSR, without any references to the purges, the gulags, collectivisation, the forcible relocation of ethnic groups or the decimation of the Soviet intelligentsia which was the by-product of his policies, or discussing Germany's Third Reich whilst ignoring the Holocaust. Whilst the Amir's 'achievements' are constantly reworked and expanded by successive generations of academics and journalists, for the peoples of Afghanistan, from the Ishaqzai tribesmen of Badghis province, to the descendants of the amirid dynasties of Lesser Turkistan, from the tribal chiefs of Nuristan, to 'Abd al-Rahman Khan's own descendants, it is the atrocities which dominate the folk memories which have survived from this era. Issues deemed of paramount importance to western scholars and British politicians, such as the Panjdeh Crisis, the Frontier demarcation, etc., have long been forgotten. It is not just that the ordinary citizens of Afghanistan found themselves the sacrificial goat in a predominantly European game of *buzkashi*, it is impossible for us to obtain a proper perspective on the present, tragic,

bloodshed in Kabul without being aware of how deeply rooted is the bitterness which was 'Abd al-Rahman Khan's 'greatest' legacy to Afghanistan.

Hence, I have taken my life into my hands (perhaps literally) and in Chapter X tried to address an issue which I am acutely aware still arouses strong emotions both inside and outside Afghanistan. I have endeavoured to do this difficult task in as an objective a manner as possible, given the gruesome nature of the subject matter. Since this study is built around the fate of the province of Balkh, the 'Reign of Terror' is examined primarily in relation to Afghan Turkistan and, specifically, the period immediately after the defeat of Sardar Ishaq Khan's rebellion in 1888. I have felt it important, however, for the sake of balance, to place the 'Turkistan Atrocities' in a wider, national context. In doing so, the suffering of the people of Balkh, terrible as they were, are seen not as unique or an aberration, but 'merely' the latest in a series of brutal purges which affected all the peoples of Afghanistan to one degree of another. For the Amir conducted a number of very similar repressions in many parts of the country during his reign, repressions which showed no regard for race, language or creed.

There is, therefore, little justification, for any one ethnic group to claim that they had been singled out by 'Abd al-Rahman Khan. To do so is to not just to do themselves and their fellow-countrymen a disservice, but is pointless in the extreme. After all, what use is it to indulge in gruesome comparisons, claiming that one's own wound is longer, deeper or more painful than one's neighbour or trying to prove one's point by reopening the scar tissue to see who bleeds more copiously. Not that there is any justification either, for following the British example and simply bury one's head in the sand, pretending that such things never happened. Far better for all concerned, and for the good of the nation as a whole, for neighbours to bind each others wounds and thus stem the haemorrhage once and for all.

'Abd al-Rahman Khan was a master of 'Divide and Rule', playing the racial and sectarian cards again and again for his own ends in total disregard of what he would bequeath his country. By the time of his death in 1901, the races of Afghanistan, who had over the millennia established a reasonable *modus vivendi* with their neighbours in a region which, historically, is highly multi-ethnic, had become alienated not just one from the other but, in many cases, been forcibly displaced from their ancestral lands and dumped down in environments that

were both alien and hostile. Their sufferings produced a lasting distrust, even aversion, to centralised government, its idiosyncratic ordinances and, in particular, its local representatives, nearly all of whom come from distant parts of Afghanistan and represented different cultures. Indeed, over the course of the last hundred years there have been numerous cases of governors in various provinces of Afghanistan resorting to interpreters in order to communicate with the people they ruled. It is not surprising, therefore, that tribes and ethnic groups who had been subject to such persecution and dislocation became insular, isolationist and ethnocentric. Given the appalling sufferings they had endured, it was the only way to preserve what was left of their decimated culture, language and traditions.

In one way, to end the present work with the death of 'Abd al-Rahman Khan is to end with anticlimax and pathos, for our history breaks off at a time when Afghanistan was at one of the lowest and saddest points in its history. I make no apology for this, for this study is about the demise of the 'Ancient Supremacy' and it would be impertinent to try and manufacture a happy ending *à la* Barbara Cartland. By 1901, Afghan Turkistan, as the wilayat of Balkh was called by this time, was but a shadow of what it had been under Nazr Muhammad Khan and the Tuqay-Timurids.Successive waves of invasion, pillage and war combined with swingeing taxation and a series of decimating plagues had brought the province to its knees and its population to the brink of destitution. 'Abd al-Rahman Khan had closed the north and north-western frontiers to trade with disastrous consequences, for the region had traditionally sold its grain surplus and other produce such as leather, karakul and cattle, to Russian Turkistan, Panjdeh, Khiva and Merv. In the following century, following the emergence of Soviet power, even the right to exploit the waters of the Amu Darya for irrigation was denied the people living on the Afghan side of the frontier. Neither was the discovery of huge gas reserves near Shibarghan turned to the benefit of the peoples of the region, nor indeed, for the country as a whole.

There is one further issue which does not seem to have been highlighted in most scholarly works on this era. During the course of the formation of Afghanistan and the redrawing of the map of Central Asia to suit European requirements, a great deal of the material culture of the region was irrecoverably lost. Indeed, the very subject matter of this work, namely, the decline and fall of the amirid dynasties of Balkh, in itself, is sufficient evidence to justify this claim.

Other examples of this cultural impoverishment include: the virtual eradication of the ancient Kafir religion, along with its temples and unique wood carving; the exodus of other religious minorities, such as the Armenians, Hindus and Jews, from Afghanistan precipitated by discriminatory legislation and the changes in their *dhimmi*, or protected religious minority, status in violation of Islamic law. Many of their religious buildings, such as the Armenian Church in Kabul and the synagogues of Maimana, Balkh and Herat, were either destroyed or fell down through neglect. Probably the most appalling act of cultural vandalism in the last century, however, was perpetrated not by Afghans but by British engineers who, in 1885, demolished the Timurid *mussala* of Gauhar Shad in Herat.

In the present century, many of the old citadels of the Balkh appanage, which were physical reminders of the 'Ancient Supremacy' and some of which certainly dated back to the Bronze Age, were 'modernised'. The old, covered bazaars, too, were destroyed. In Maimana's case, the Timurid(?) bastion(s) of the Mingid citadel along with the shrine of Saif al-Muluk was demolished as part of a redevelopment programme and replaced by a faceless tea house and a cinema showing turgid Indian films in a language none of the viewers understand.

Even despite such irredeemable losses to Central Asia's material culture, not everything was destroyed, but the present study has brought home to me how little, in fact, is actually known about social and artistic developments in the region during the epoch of European imperialism. Much of Western scholarship has concentrated either on the cultural heritage of the pre-Durrani period or the study of modern social, anthropological or artistic trends and the period covered by this book has tended to fall between two stools. In this context, the gaps in our knowledge are profound. How little do we know about the social or internal, political structure of, say, the Kafir or Chahar Aimaq tribes? We know virtually nothing about the role played by Central Asian Sufi Orders and their *pir*s in resisting both internal and external imperialism. Nor are we at all well informed about theological and philosophical developments in Central Asia during the heyday of Western imperialism and how the various religious leaders, whether Sufi, Sunni or Shi'i, responded theologically to the so-called 'Christian' domination of a region which, since the days of the Arab conquest, had been one of the great heart lands of Sunni Islam. Or what about the influence of sectarian-millennialist movements such as Babism and the Ahmadiyya? How profoundly ignorant we are of the

music, poetry, calligraphy and manuscript illumination of this age, or of developments in religious, vernacular and public architecture.

From the evidence of my own eyes, I cannot subscribe to the generally-held view of western scholars that all significant architectural, artistic and literary activities ceased with the collapse of the Safawid, Mughal and Timurid empires. There is evidence to show that a strong tradition of manuscript illumination, in the Timurid style, was maintained at least in the Shibarghan area well into the nineteenth century. A number of fine calligraphers, including a grandson of Ishan Saiyid Uraq, were working in Mazar-i Sharif and Balkh at the turn of the present century. Ghulam Muhammad Mosawar b. 'Abd al-Baqi Mingbashi of Maimana (b. 1873) was not just Court artist to Amir Habibullah, but was undoubtedly one of the most eminent artists of Central Asia. Amongst other things, he was one of the first citizens of Afghanistan to study European art at first hand.

There are scores of religious and private buildings on either side of the Amu Darya, dating from probably the late eighteenth century to the early twentieth century, which boast the most exquisitely carved pillars and painted (lacquered?) ceilings. Yet no art historian, to my knowledge, has undertaken a study of these wonderful expressions of vernacular architecture. The court robes and banners of the Turkman and Uzbek Khans and amirs bear silent but eloquent testimony to the fact that the last century was one of the great eras of Central Asian embroidery, whilst the 'collectability' of Turkman carpets of the same period gives the lie to the nineteenth-century European stereotype of the Turkman as ruthless, slave-trading barbarians.

Undoubtedly there will be those who will criticise the somewhat fragmentary nature of parts of this narrative, but such is the nature of the sources available to me that it would have been difficult to approach this subject in any other manner. As I have pointed out above, virtually nothing has been written on 'internal' and 'regional' developments in Afghanistan and Central Asia during the period of the 'Great Game'. I have considered it important, therefore, to publish as much information as possible in the hope that other scholars, more erudite and better qualified than myself, will be stimulated to pursue further particular lines of enquiry which I have only been able to touch on in the present study.

In order not to make the work even more voluminous (as well as to keep down the cost of publication) I have assumed that the reader is familiar with certain events in Central Asian and Afghan history, such

as the First and Second Anglo-Afghan Wars, which are well documented. Such events are featured only when their inclusion is important for continuity or context, or when the sources throw new light on these particular incidents. In order to avoid falling into the trap of those traditional historians whom I have been so harsh on above, I have given equal weight to 'internal' developments in Balkh as to the various battles between government forces and the 'Turkistanis'. Above all, I have endeavoured to write the book in as readable a narrative style as is possible, given the complexity of the subject matter. I leave it to the reader to judge whether I have succeeded in any, or all, of these aims.

On 'Turkistan', 'Afghan Turkistan', 'Lesser Turkistan', etc.

During the Durrani epoch of Balkh's long history, a variety of different designations were used by indigenous and European sources to describe the region. In the middle of the eighteenth century Persian sources at the Afghan Court tended to refer to the wilayat by the usual 'southerner' designation of 'Turkistan' (i.e. 'The Land of the Turks') whilst references to 'Balkh' could mean either the city or the whole province. When British and European sources began to be interested in the region, during the first half of the nineteenth century, they followed the southern tradition and favoured the term 'Turkistan', though some authors preferred the mediaeval name, 'Tatary'.

As the century unfolded and as a consequence of British promotion of a Greater Afghanistan, officials became increasingly uncomfortable about the designation 'Turkistan.' For not only could 'Turkistan' be deemed, historically, to include the countries on both sides of the Amu Darya, thus giving credence to Russian claims that Maimana and other city-states of the Chahar Wilayat ought not to be considered as part of Afghanistan, but it implied that sovereignty over the Balkh appanage lay not with the Afghans but with the 'Turks', that is, the Uzbeks and, to a lesser extent, the Turkmans.

Eventually, in 1869, Sir Henry Rawlinson in his famous *Memorandum on the Frontier of Afghanistan*, recommended that for political purpose Britain should no longer use the term 'Turkistan' but 'Afghan Turkistan'. Following this recommendation, new maps of Afghanistan were published and from this point onwards the term

'Afghan Turkistan' was adopted as the official designation of the appanage in all official communications and publications. As a corollary, the territory which lay north of the Oxus was referred to as Russian Turkistan since, from 1868 onwards, the Amir of Bukhara was a feudatory of the Tsar.

Despite this change, however, British native *wakil*s, news writers and other secret agents still used the traditional and vernacular terminology and more often than not refer to it as 'Turkistan' or 'the province (*wilayat*) of Balkh'. To make matters even more confusing, the Amirs of Afghanistan and officials in Kabul tended to use these more familiar terms too. Moreover, Katib and other official historians of the Afghan Court writing at the beginning of this century, sometimes refer to the appanage as 'Lesser Turkistan'. Finally, Sir Henry Rawlinson in his memorandum suggested, as an alternative, the use of 'Cis Oxus Territory'; though this term is only rarely used in official correspondence and was quickly dropped, presumably because it was too much of a mouthful and it was more or less impossible to translate into Pushtu or Dari.

I have followed McChesney (1991) in translating the term *wilayat-i Balkh* as 'appanage of Balkh', especially in the earlier chapters when Afghan power was confined to south of the Hindu Kush and the region was still part of the Chingizid Khanate of Bukhara. On occasions I have used the terms 'the province of Balkh' and 'Balkh province' as synonyms. In the later chapters of the work, when the wilayat, to all intents and purposes, was partitioned between two, rival, states, I have employed the designation 'Lesser Turkistan', to designate the whole region of the former appanage of Balkh as it relates to its amirid rulers and the indigenous population. 'Afghan Turkistan' refers to that part of the former appanage which, at that point in time, was under the authority of the Afghan governor in Balkh and where district governors and other senior officials were appointed by the Amir in Kabul or the Afghan governor of Balkh. 'Lesser Turkistan', therefore, encompasses a somewhat wider area than 'Afghan Turkistan,' since the former would include semi-independent regions, such as Maimana, Panjdeh, etc. where the Afghan writ did not run. In a few cases, for stylistic purposes, I have used 'Cis Oxus' as a synonym of Lesser Turkistan. 'Balkh district' is used to differentiate the local, district government of Balkh from the whole wilayat.

As a general rule, the Afghan army stationed in Afghan Turkistan is referred to as the Balkh army, since to designate central

government garrisons and forces the 'Turkistan Army', as both British and Persian sources tend to do, is extremely confusing. The regular Afghanistan army in the province consisted of troops recruited more or less exclusively from Kabul, Qandahar, Herat and Jalalabad with only a very few regiments, mostly irregular cavalry, recruited from the indigenous population of Afghan Turkistan. In order, therefore, to distinguish between Afghan government forces and those of the native, amirid rulers of the province, I have decided, with some reluctance, to use the rather cumbersome terms 'Turkistani' and 'Turkistanian'. Both terms can be justified on the basis that they appear frequently in contemporary Persian sources, the *wakil* diaries and even in official communications between the British and Afghan government. Unfortunately, in the present day, the use of these terms is open to considerable misunderstanding and misrepresentation, since they are used in quite a different sense by ultra-nationalist and secessionist groups (mainly Diaspora communities in Turkey, Pakistan, Europe and America), who advocate a kind of Central Asian Panturkism. I would like to stress, therefore, that by adopting these terms I am using them exclusively in the nineteenth-century sense, and their adoption in no way implies support for, or bias towards, these modern nationalists.

In this respect, it is worth noting that 'Turkistan' is not an indigenous name, but was originally a term adopted by 'outsiders' and southerners to describe the appanage. Nor was, or is, the wilayat of Balkh, the sort of mono-cultural and mono-linguistic bloc which this term implies. Apart from Uzbek, Turkman and a few smaller Turkic communities of Kazakh, Uyghur, etc., the province of Balkh has always included, and still does, a sizable minority of Persian-speaking peoples (*farsiwan*s, Tajiks, Hazaras and Aimaqs mainly) as well as religious minorities (Jews and Hindus), all of whom played their part in the battle for Balkh. There was a small Pushtu-speaking population in Badghis, Balkh and Aqcha as early as the third decade of the eighteenth century, and probably before. There is strong evidence that many of the long-established Afghan families (including the descendants of the original Afghan garrison left in Balkh and Aqcha by Ahmad Shah Durrani) were just as opposed to Muhammadzai annexation of the wilayat as the Uzbeks, Aimaqs, Hazaras, Turkmans, etc. Thus to portray the struggle between the Afghan Amirs and the peoples of Lesser Turkistan as a battle for Uzbek national self-determination is not just ethnologically inaccurate, it is almost certainly

an anachronism. It is to fall into the trap, regrettably so prevalent in the post-colonial world, of confusing nationality and citizenship with ethnicity.

Sources and Their Evaluation

This book is the outcome of some sixteen years of research. The project began in the summer of 1977, when I was appointed as Fellow of the British Institute of Afghan Studies (now the Society of South Asian Studies) to study popular religious culture in northern Afghanistan. Unfortunately, within a matter of months after commencing the project, the political situation in Afghanistan deteriorated to such an extent that it became more and more difficult to obtain official permission for field work north of the Hindu Kush. The end came in July of 1978, a few months after the Taraki *putsch*, when a local teacher near Maimana, who had helped with the research and opened his home to me, was briefly detained and questioned by the authorities in Faryab. Though my work was officially sanctioned by the government in Kabul, the unco-operative attitude of the local administration, coupled with concern that people I interviewed were at risk of arrest, or even worse, forced me to return to Kabul with very little prospect of ever returning. By the summer of that year, I had made four separate field trips to Balkh and Faryab. All told, during 1977 and 1978, I spent a total of some three or four months in Northern Afghanistan. I had previously been to the area (Bamiyan, Balkh and Samangan) during my time as a student in Kabul university (1975-76).

In the course of the field work, I visited a number of important shrines in Samangan, Balkh and Faryab provinces and attended the *janda bala*, or pole-raising, ceremony at the shrine of 'Ali b. Abi Talib in Mazar-i Sharif at the Persian New Year festival of *Nauroz* (21 March 1978). During the spring and summer of 1978, I travelled extensively through the district (*wulswali*) of Gurziwan and the mountains and valleys of the Tir Band-i Turkistan which lie between the Seven Valleys (Haft Darra) of Gurziwan and the northern watershed of the Murghab river. At the same time, I interviewed a number of elders (*rish safed*; *aqsaqal*), village heads (*qariyadar sahib*) local

historians, teachers and mullahs, particularly in Maimana and Gurziwan.

In 1988, the Society for South Asian Studies kindly awarded me a travel grant to conduct a number of interviews amongst the refugee community of Peshawar and, more recently (1993, 1994), I have been fortunate (some may say, mad) enough to have returned to Afghanistan. Relevant material from my most recent visits, particularly a series of interviews with Saiyid Mohai al-Din Gauhari, great-grandson of Ishan Saiyid Uraq, has been incorporated into the work. Finally, a number of exiles from northern Afghanistan living in the USA and Britain have provided me with a useful means for cross-checking certain facts.

On my return to Britain in 1981, my research continued on a part-time basis, mainly in the India Office Library and the Political and Secret Department files (L/P&S) in particular. The wealth of information contained in these records eventually led me to work my way consecutively through every volume of the L/P&S/5, 7, and 9 series, starting from 1830 and ending at the death of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan in 1901. Every reference to events in Afghan Turkistan that could be found in the myriad of secret agents' reports, *wakil* diaries, military and intelligence memoranda, field surveys, etc., was recorded and subsequently sorted on a year-by-year basis. In addition I have used the following series of India Office Records: Proceedings (P); Military (L/P&S/17); Memoranda (L/P&S/18); European Manuscripts (MSS Eur); Political and Secret Department Library (L/P&S/19, 20) and what, in the 1980s, was referred to as *Miscellaneous* and *Additional Records* of the L/P&S/20 series (some of these records have been recently recatalogued).

This work is based primarily, though not exclusively, on the information contained in the original *wakil* diaries and agents' reports of these L/P&S series, records which still remain one of the most important primary source for the history of Central Asia in the last century. Unfortunately, financial and family constraints meant that I was unable to pursue my research in the National Archives in Delhi, though I have used some of the grants generously awarded for the research by the British Academy and the Society for South Asian Studies, to commission research in the National Archives and cover the cost of reproduction of specific records and files in Delhi.

A number of points need to be made regarding the sources in the Political and Secret Department collection in the India Office Library.

Scholars who have used these records in the past have tended to rely on the more easily-accessible and well-catalogued *Memoranda* Series (L/P&S/18) and other historical summaries which the P&S department began to produce from the 1860s onwards. Another source commonly used is monthly précis of events referred to as the *Trans-Frontier Journal* or *Journal of Political Events on the W. and N.W. Frontier*. Starting from about the middle of the 1870s, the *TFJ* series was inaugurated by the Political and Secret Department in response to the ever-increasing volume of intelligence items arriving on a monthly basis not just from news writers in Kabul, Qandahar, Herat and Mashhad but also from political officers stationed in Peshawar, Baluchistan, Gilgit, etc. They were specifically designed to provide senior members of the administration with the information they needed without wading through scores of individual reports.

In respect of the *Memoranda*, *TFJ*, *Epitome*, and similar précis series, the Indian and British governments tended to treat them as primary sources and whenever a senior member of the administration required information on Central Asia, Afghanistan, the Frontier issue, etc., it was to these records that they turned. With one notable notable exception (Yapp 1980), scholars have tended to adopt the same view of the *Memoranda* series. These compilations, however, need to be treated with care for sometimes they distort the information which is contained in the reports of individual *wakil*s and agents. The *Memoranda*, *Epitomes*, *Summaries* and such like histories, were compiled in India by civil servants who had no first-hand knowledge of the region they were writing about. This lack of 'hands-on' experience is at its most evident in their transliterations of personal and geographical names which are frequently unrecognisable.

More subtly the sheer volume of intelligence reports, as well as the Political & Secret Department's method of filing individual records by date rather than by subject, deterred these desk historians from sifting through the welter of original reports in anything like a systematic manner. This was especially so since they were usually working against very tight deadlines. Consequently, the writer took short cuts and relied heavily on the previous generation of *Memoranda*, *Epitomes*, etc., and only made selective forays into the original diaries. Inevitably they tended to regurgitate any misinterpretations or distortion of the original *wakil* diary or agent's report that were latent in these earlier *Memoranda*.

Furthermore, there is some evidence to suggest that some civil servants when they were commissioned to write a historical memoranda took the opportunity afforded by the commission to prefer sources which agreed with their point of view. There was also a tendency to bend with the prevailing political wind, or find facts which endorsed the known views or political outlook of departmental superiors, the Viceroy, etc. Uncomfortable facts which went against the grain were sometimes omitted, *wakil* diaries quoted selectively or paraphrased in such as way as to reinterpret the information.

The *TFJ* series have a better claim to accuracy since they were composed a matter of weeks after reports of events reached India. However, the *TFJ* suffer from similar problems to the *Memoranda* series, though to a much lesser degree. They are an excellent starting point for scholars, but it is essential to avoid the temptation to treat either *Memoranda*, *Epitomes*, etc, or the *TFJ* as pristine, primary sources and it is necessary to refer backwards to the original *wakil* diaries to obtain the real picture.

During the formative period of British relations with Afghanistan up to the middle of the 1850s, officials in Calcutta gave precedence to certain well-known authorities often to the exclusion of others. Mountstuart Elphinstone (1809) and Alexander Burnes (1834; 1843; *Political, Geographical and Commercial Reports and Papers, 1835-37*), in particular, were held in high esteem. Yet however remarkable Elphinstone's work was, both his published book, *Account of the Kingdom of Caboul* and the secret reports on his mission filed in the P&S records, rely heavily on intelligence acquired during a few short week's residence in Peshawar. Elphinstone himself never set foot on the other side of the Khyber, let alone in Kabul, Herat, Qandahar or Balkh.

In the case of Burnes, there is more reason to justify the claim that he was an 'authority'; after all, he spent a considerable amount of time living and travelling in Afghanistan and Turkistan. However, when one compares his information with other contemporary sources, the faith which scholars have placed in Burnes, is shown to be somewhat misplaced. Major D'Arcy Todd, a Royal Engineer, who at the time of Burnes' famous journey to Bukhara was attached to the British Embassy in Tehran, wrote a scathing critique of Burnes' *Military Memoir* and cast serious doubt on his fellow-officer's credibility and conclusions. Todd accused Burnes of plagiarising earlier sources for his information and dismissed what military intelligence he had

acquired during his travels as being so vague as to be useless. Todd's critique, though, was discretely filed away and quickly forgotten. After all, it would have been extremely embarrassing if such observations had been made public, especially when the individual being criticised had recently been awarded the Royal Geographical Society's prestigious Gold Medal for his 'pioneering' exploits and had been wined and dined by the cream of London Society, including government ministers and royalty!

Later in the century, the writings of Ferrier (1857;1858) and Vambery (1863;1873) were elevated to a similar cult status and were, indeed still are, quoted extensively. Once again, contemporary reports and news letters from native agents in the L/P&S/5 series indicate that such trust in these authorities is misplaced. Indeed, in Ferrier's case, it is very doubtful whether he ever travelled further north than Herat.

Whilst certain individuals' were basking in the glow of fame and popularity, others were inexplicably ignored. By far the most important account of the state of Afghanistan prior to Moorcroft's travels of 1824-25 was the survey conducted, ironically at the behest of the East India Company, by Ghulam Sarwar [1793-95]. Utilising Afghan government archives and backing up his research with an extended residence in what was then known as the Kingdom of Kabul, Ghulam Sarwar's report is hardly mentioned by his successors and by the time of the First Anglo-Afghan War it seems to have been completely forgotten. Had his report been more widely known, some of the issues regarding the northern frontier of Afghanistan might have been seen in quite a different perspective. But then, as I have already pointed out, officers like Pottinger, Lord, Todd and Burnes had their own particular agendas in this regard and Ghulam Sarwar's survey would have been a very large fly in the ointment.

As far as European exploration is concerned, Edward Stirling, William Moorcroft, Major Taylor, Lewis Pelly, and Carl Ludwig Griesbach, to name but a few, were generally neglected. A number of major surveys by native agents also suffered from this arbitrary selectivity. We have already mentioned Ghulam Sarwar's report at the end of the eighteenth century. In the following century, the surveys of Mir Izzat Ullah, *Travels in Central Asia,* 1812-13 (finally published in 1871) and Munshi Faiz Bakhsh's travels in Afghanistan and Central Asia from 1865 to 1872 suffered a similar fate.

After all that has been said about the *Memoranda* series, I am aware that the *wakil* diaries and native agents' reports in L/P&S/5,7, 9 are themselves translations of documents written in Persian, Urdu, Hindustani, etc., the originals of which are not available in the India Office in London. Even if they were, it would take another decade to work through these documents and compare them with their English translations. Fortunately, the English versions of *wakil* reports were thoroughly checked against the original prior to circulation to officials, though there are occasional obscurities in the English text (mainly geographical and proper names) which suggests certain imperfections in the translation.

It is well known that British officials tended to express considerable irritation at the quality of information that native agents' and successive Kabul *wakils* provided (for a list of the *wakils* and native agents in Kabul see, Hall, 16, 56). Anyone ploughing through the *wakil* diaries every so often will come across irate and quite undiplomatic notes scribbled in the margins. Though there were occasions when such comments were justified, particularly after the replacing of Mirza 'Ataullah Khan [1885-1891], as the Kabul news writer, the criticism of the native *wakils* is, in my judgment, much overstated and this attitude is more a reflection of the colonial prejudice that 'natives' could not be trusted to pass on information accurately without exaggeration or embellishment, than an objective assessment of the quality of intelligence these individuals provided. It is important to bear in mind that part of the administration's tetchiness in this matter is due, to some degree at least, to the failure of successive Indian administrations to persuade the Amirs of Afghanistan to allow British officers to be stationed in strategic places around Afghanistan.

The work of a native news writer in Afghanistan was not an easy one. The Afghan administration, especially under the paranoiac regime of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan, tried its best to prevent the *wakils* acquiring any information other than that which issued from official sources. The house where the agent lived in Kabul, for example, was frequently closely watched. Any Afghan visiting the residence, or found to be passing on information, risked imprisonment and even death.

Successive Amirs tried to bribe the news writers, or otherwise influence the contents of their reports, with varying degrees of success. Dost Muhammad Khan was a master of what we would call nowadays, disinformation. On one occasion, for example, the Amir's

rumour mill was so successful that Calcutta was convinced that a Persian army had arrived before Herat when, in fact, no Qajar troops had crossed the frontier. During the 'Turkistan Atrocities' of 1888-91, the mayor (*kotwal*) of Kabul, Parwana Khan, resorted to a crude form of psychological warfare. He caused the gallows on which the Turkistan prisoners were being brutally put to death to be erected on the parade ground within full view of the news writer's house, thus forcing the agency servants not just to witness the executions but to carry on their duties with the screams of the dying echoing in their ears. When all else failed, the *dak*, or courier, could always be waylaid en route to Peshawar, the contents of the diplomatic pouch read or destroyed and the blame for the 'outrage' attributed to local tribesman beyond the reach of the Amir's writ.

Despite these considerations far too much has been made of the restrictions the native news writers had to face. By and large the *wakil*s and other native secret agents, many of whom risked their lives to keep the British government informed of events beyond the Khyber, did an extraordinary job and far more credit should be given to them for working in circumstances which any British officer would have found intolerable. When one compares the information about events in Afghanistan which issued from the native *wakil*s, local agents, spies, etc. with the same incidents as recorded by Persian histories such as Katib's *Siraj al-Tawarikh*, Khafi's *Padshahan-i Muta'akhirin-i Afghanistan* or the accounts of European explorers and surveyors, it is remarkable how accurate the *wakil* diaries are even in the fine detail.

From the end of the First Anglo-Afghan War in 1842, until the Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1855, intelligence from Afghanistan was acquired in a very *ad hoc* and unsatisfactory way. A number of pro-British Afghans in Kabul, Jalalabad and Qandahar, continued to send irregular reports of events in the country. Sometimes these reports contain intelligence which is, to say the least, of dubious authenticity. However, since these secret agents worked in complete ignorance of each other, by comparing individual letters from different news writers, one is able to make reasonable judgments about the authenticity of individual items. From 1856 the diaries of the official *wakil*s can usually be cross-checked with intelligence which continued to be provided by these clandestine sources. Even though there was an official native agent in Kabul, the British intelligence service continued to recruit local people as unofficial news writers (including, at one

point, the Wali of Maimana himself) and commission secret exploration of the region, in order to establish independent sources of information. The existence of these 'stringers' and spies is thus extremely useful as a control. Futhermore, the British *wakil* in Mashhad and the Embassy in Tehran reported news of events in Afghanistan, especially in Herat, Badghis and Afghan Turkistan. Thus the L/P&S/9 series provides a further source of comparison and information.

Ironically, the series of reports which are consistently the most inaccurate and untrustworthy is the *Peshawar Confidential Diary* (PCD) that commenced in the middle of the 1870s. Compiled under the direct supervision of the British Political Officer stationed in this outpost of the Raj, the *PCD*s were based on information gleaned from merchants coming down the Khyber and general bazaar sources. As such, the P*CD* was far more guilty of reporting what was derogatorily referred to as 'bazaar gossip' than the Kabul *wakil*. Not surprisingly, the *PCD* frequently gets its facts wrong, sometimes quite spectacularly.

In the present study, I have endeavoured, wherever possible, to base the history on the *wakil* news letters, and/or the original, uncensored, manuscript (or transcript) journals of intelligence agents, political officers, surveyors, etc., filed in L/P&S/5, 7, 9; Proceedings (*IFPC*) or European Manuscripts. This does not preclude, or exclude, reference to the *Memoranda* series, *TFJ*, etc. In some cases it has been impossible to locate the original news letter, journal, etc. and I have been forced to rely either on the official, censored version or the published journal. As well as noting the locations of individual papers, journals and surveys in the footnotes, I have included with the bibliography a list of the most important reports, journals, papers, maps, gazetteers, etc. and their full India Office, British Library or Public Record Office location.

As far as the P&S records are concerned, for the sake of easy access to the individual record, where a folio and/or page number is given, this invariably refers to the internal pagination of the individual volume itself and not to any officially-indexed system. The folio number is usually written in blue (occasionally red) on the top right-hand side of the folio. Just to confuse matters, however, some of the volumes for some reason have two quite different numbering systems. Individual P&S volumes, however, frequently do not have any pagination. Where this occurs I have fallen back on using the India

Office's official register number. In the case of the P:IFPC series, this appears at the top of the individual record, in the case of the L/P&S/5, 7 & 9 series at the front of the individual batch of records filed for that day. The index number generally stands on its own and acts as a sort of internal subject divider. On occasions the same number can include a number of related reports. The early L/P&S/5 series have tagged dividers inserted in the individual volumes. Where such divisions exist I have given the number of the 'enclosure' first and followed it by the individual record number (e.g. encl. 5., no. 12). I have generally found the annual indexes to be of some help, but mainly in identifying whether a particular report was ever filed and where.

It is worth noting here, for any future scholar intrepid, or foolhardy, enough to venture into the Political and Secret Department Records (a single volume of L/P&S/5 can contain between 1,000 to 2,000 folios and to sift through just one year's records may require reading as many as twenty such volumes), that there are two major *lacunae* in the L/P&S/5 *wakil* diary series.

The first was occasioned by the chaos into which the administration was thrown during the period of the Indian Mutiny (1857-58). This, unfortunately, is an important period in the history of Afghanistan since the Amir of Bukhara was actively pursing an anti-British alliance with Dost Muhammad Khan. However, most of the intelligence reports on Afghanistan and Central Asia for this period eventually turned up in Calcutta and were filed in an *ad hoc* manner in later volumes of the L/P&S/5 series, not according to the date that the particular report was written, but according to the month and year when these records finally reached in the filing clerk's in-tray.

The second *lacuna* occurs from about 1860 to 1870; a period when the Political and Secret Department was being 'reorganised'. Fortunately, duplicates of the *wakil* diaries, agent's reports, etc. can be found in the annual files of *Proceedings, Indian Foreign (Political) Consultations* (P:IFPC).

Despite many enquiries, I have not been able to trace the whereabouts of a number of important records, manuscripts, journals and surveys. Apparently the 'B' series of the P:IFPC, including the 'Frontier' and 'Foreign' files, were never brought to England after Independence and some of them even appear to be missing from the National Archives collection in Delhi. Though I have tried to correspond with

the Suvey of India in Simla regarding these missing files and other records, I have been unable to elict any response from them.

Amongst the important manuscripts I have failed to locate are, in chronological order: parts of Edward Stirling's original journal of his travels through Badghis, Afghan Turkistan and Kabul in 1825; Arthur Conolly's private diary of his journey from Kabul to Khiva via Bamiyan, Chakhcharan, Maimana and Bala Murghab in 1840; Eldred Pottinger's journal of 1839 containing an account of his journey from Herat to Kabul through Maimana, Sar-i Pul, down the Balkh Ab river to Bamiyan;[4] Merk's uncensored *Report on the City of Maimana* (1885), which is missing from L/P&S/7 volumes for 1885/6; the *Military Report on the Hazarajat*, written in *c.* 1880 and which is mentioned in the *Records of the Intelligence Party*, and, perhaps most important of all, the extensive collection of photographs, sketches, maps and journals of Carl Ludwig Griesbach which was the outcome of his work with the Afghan Boundary Commission in 1885/6. Notes about these missing records appear in the appropriate place in the text.

A number of Persian sources have been used. Mahmud b. Ibrahim al-Husain's *Tarikh-i Ahmad Shahi* has thrown a good deal of light on the life of Haji Bi Ming of Maimana, whose military alliance with Ahmad Shah Durrani in 1751 was so misrepresented both by the Amirs and British political officers in the following century. Faiz Muhammad Katib's *Siraj al-Tawarikh*, Mirza Ya'qub 'Ali Khafi's *Padshahan-i Muta'akhirin-i Afghanistan* and Sultan Muhammad Khan *The Life of Abdul Rahman Khan, Amir of Afghanistan* (a translation of the *Pand Nama*) have all provided a useful source for comparing individual events with the information in the P&S records. Chapters One and Two have drawn on Raverty's translation of Juzjani's *Tabakat-i Nasiri* and Minorsky's translation of the early, and anonymous geography, the *Hudud al-'Alam*. I have drawn extensively on Raverty's unpublished seven-volume manuscript in the India Office collection, entitled *The History of Heri or Herat*, a work which quotes extensively from Mahmud b. Amir Wali's *Bahr al-Asrar*, an important source for the history of the Tuqay-Timurids and the reign of Nazr Muhammad Khan in particular. Unfortunately, Raverty's *Herat* is extremely frustrating for the scholar since it is almost impossible to know when he is quoting verbatim from a contemporary source and when he is either paraphrasing the manuscript or just

[4] Though Pottinger's original maps have survived in the IOL collection.

expressing a personal opinion. However, since the first two chapters of this work are designed primarily as a survey to provide a context for the subsequent chapters, I have not felt obligated to spend long hours reading the appropriate sections of the India Office's copy of the *Bahr al-Asrar*. Furthermore, the recent publication of Professor McChesney's important book, *Waqf in Central Asia*, has made the task of writing these early chapters that much easier.

Acknowledgements

This book owes its genesis to the British Institute of Afghan Studies (now the Society for South Asian Studies) which, in the summer of 1977, decided to appoint a young graduate as Fellow for the year. Since that day, the Institute has continued to support this, and other projects that I have undertaken, both financially and in every other way for which I am extremely thankful. I trust that the publication of this work will justify their faith in the project.

In this regard, I must particularly acknowledge my debt to Ralph Pinder-Wilson, FSA, the Director of the British Institute during my time in Kabul and former President of the Royal Asiatic Society, whose friendship and support has been a constant encouragement over the last fifteen years, and to Warwick Ball and his wife, Wendy.

My thanks also goes to the British Academy who, for several years, have awarded me a grant from their Small Personal Grant fund to cover some of the expense of research and writing up.

Many other scholars have contributed in various ways. Particular thanks are due to Dr Shirin Akiner, Dr. David Morgan, Dr. Richard Tapper and Prof. Malcolm Yapp of the School of Oriental and African Studies of London University and Prof. C.E. Bosworth of Manchester University's Department of Middle Eastern Studies who, in various ways, have provided important direction and facilitated the research. Prof. R. D. McChesney of New York University has been instrumental in suggesting possible lines of enquiry regarding the earlier period of Balkh's history and kindly sent me copies of *Armaghan-i Maimana* and his draft translation of the *Siraj al-Tawarikh*.

It is impossible to list everyone from Afghanistan who has helped with this research, but my special thanks go to the people of Balkh, Mazar-i Sharif, Maimana and Gurziwan who went out of their way to facilitate my research and travel during a difficult time in their country's history. Though the research and writing may be mine, at the end of the day, it is their history and it is offered to them as a small token of thanks for many memorable days spent in northern Afghanistan.

Special thanks are due to the *qariyadar sahibs* of Darra-yi Zang, Darra-yi Shakh, Ghulbiyan, Khwaja Ghor, Hastomin and Laulash who went beyond the call of mere duty to provide transport and guide me on my journeys through the Tir Band-i Turkistan. My Afghan counterpart, Zia Mujadidi, also deserves special mention for his diplomatic skills in dealing with government officials. The house of 'Agha-i Shirin' of Balkh was, for a while, my second home and other members of his extended family in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Britain have, over a period of many years, facilitated my research and provided many memorable meals of *pilau, ashak* and *kijari qurut*.

'Abd al-Ra'uf Nafir of Wunchalat, on two separate occasions in 1978 and 1989, spent time talking to me about the oral history of Maimana. Ergeš Uçkun of the Chopandaz Society of New Jersey kindly sent me information he had accumulated over the years. More recently, Saiyid Mohai al-Din Gauhari of Mazar-i Sharif and his sons provided details of his family's history of Ishan Uraq. Toriyalai Razaqyar, head of Balkh's Department of Information and Culture; Mir Rahmatullah Rahmati, Head of the Teachers' Training College, Balkh and a descendant of Mir Husain Khan Ming of Maimana; 'Abd al-Karim Bahman Toghali of Balkh University; Muhammad Salih Razaq formerly of Kabul University's Faculty of Literature, all provided information on the history of the region and facilitated my enquiries during my most recent visit to Mazar-i Sharif (1993), much of which has been incorporated into the work during the latter stages of writing up.

As far as the library research is concerned, particular thanks are due to staff of the India Office Library and Records; the School of Oriental and African Studies' Library; the Public Record Office; the National Register of Archives; the British Library; the Royal Geographical Society; Sheffield University Library and the Brotherton Library, Leeds, who have all gone out of their way to assist me in my enquiries. The National Archives of India have frequently undertaken searches of their records on my behalf and have always been most helpful, efficient and diligent. Dr. Bucherer-Dietschi of *Bibliotheca*

Afghanica provided me with information about early photographs of Maimana; Dr. Ingeborg Thalhammer sent photographs of Maimana and other material; the Geographische Institut, Tübingen University, kindly supplied copies of maps of northern Afghanistan.

This book was prepared using Multi-Lingual Scholar™ software, a product of Gamma Productions Inc., Santa Monica, CA 90401, USA and their sponsorship and technical support is gratefully acknowledged.

A number of other individuals have made an important contribution to the successful outcome of this work. Bruce Wannell, Ishaq Nigargar and Masuda 'Azizi helped significantly with the translation of Persian histories. My cartographer, Graham Reed, has done a superb job with the maps and genealogical charts.

Copyright Acknowledgement

Unpublished Crown Copyright documents, maps and drawings in the British Library and India Office Records appear by the kind permission of the Controller of Her Majesty's Stationery Office.

A Note On Transliterations

In the course of this work technical terms, personal and place names from a number of languages and dialects have been used. These include terms derived from Arabic, Persian, Afghan Dari, Russian, Anglo-Indian and Turco-Mongolian languages. Since, nowadays, the *lingua franca* in the northern provinces of Afghanistan is Dari, a dialect of Persian, I have generally rendered Perso-Arabic words and commonly used Turkic words in their Dari equivalents. The use of diacritical marks and under or overstrikes have not been used in the text unless absolutely necessary, for it has not been the convention in studies of Afghan history during the Durrani period to use such diacriticals (e.g. Dupree: 1978). I would refer the purist to Prof. McChesney's comments on this subject (1991, xiii-xv) which I fully endorse. Full transliterations of technical terms, names and places have been provided in the glossary, genealogical tables, indexes and maps.

Transliterations of Persian technical terms, place names, etc. have been based on the system of transliterations used by the British Insitute of Persian Studies' *IRAN* journal. The following simplifications and modifications have been made to accomodate differences in pronunciation between Arabic/Iranian Persian and Afghan Dari:

ص، س، ث = s

ت ، ط = t

ذ ، ظ ، ض، ز = z

و as a consonant = w

Dari has four additional vowels: two long, two short. The long vowels are represented by ō (و) and ē (ي) respectively; the equivalent short short vowels by 'o' and 'e'.

Certain commonly-used Arabic, Persian and Turkic terms and titles (e.g. *qizilbash*, *khan*, *mullah*, *Amir*, *shah*, etc) have not been italicised. The same applies with Anglo-Indian words which are now part of the English language, e.g. bazaar, Raj, rupee and technical terms such as *wali*, *sultan*, *amir*, etc. which recurr at frequent intervals.

In the case of *amir*, where this word appears on its own with the first letter capitalised, it invariably refers to the Durrani rulers of Afghanistan. When it is not capitalised, it refers to Uzbek, Turkman, Aimaq or Tadjik military and political commanders in the Balkh appanage.

The Turkic words *bek*, *beki* are rendered by *beg*, *begi*. Russian transliterations have followed the system used by the British Museum. Where geographical names have been Russified, I have reverted to the venacular form (e.g. Kulab not Kulyab; Shahr-i Sabz not Shakhr-i Sabz). Commonly-accepted transliterations of well-known geographical names such as Samarkand, Tashkent, have been retained.

Familiar transliterations of geographical names (Samarkand, Herat, Peshawar) have been retained for the sake of simplicity and ease of identification. However, where the colloquial pronunciation of place names differs significantly from their written equivalents I have preferred the written forms; e.g. Shirin Tagab not Shirin Tagau; Chahar Shanbeh not Charshambe. In the case of Afshar (a district in Kabul), I

have retained the colloqiual form since it is so well known, rather than pedantically transcribing it as Abshar.

Abbreviations

i. Abbreviations: Libraries and archives referred to in text, notes and bibliographies

BL	British Library
BL, MSS	British Library, Manuscripts
BL, OP	British Library, Official Publications
HMSO	Her Majesty's Stationery Office
IOLR	India Office Library and Records (for key to individual records and reports in the IOLR, see, Appendix X)
NAI	National Archives of India
RGS	Royal Geographical Society
RGS(A)	Royal Geographical Society Archives
PRO	Public Record Office
SOAS	School of Oriental & African Studies
WIHML	Wellcome Institute for the History of Medicine Library

ii. Abbreviations: journals and periodicals referred to in notes and bibliographies

AF	*Afghanica*
AFG	*Afghanistan (Gratz)*
AFK	*Afghanistan (Kabul)*
AG	*Annnales de Geographie*
AS	*Afghanische Studien*
BJRL	*Bulletin of John Ryland Library*
BMJ	*British Medical Journal*
BSOAS	*Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*
CAR	*Central Asian Review*
CR	*Calcutta Review*
EJ	*Explorers Journal*
EW	*East and West*
GRA	*Geographical Review of Afghanistan*

GJ	*Geographical Journal (Royal Geographical Society)*
GRA	*Geographical Review of Afghanistan*
IRAN	*Journal of the Institute of Persian Studies*
JESHO	*Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*
JIH	*Journal of Indian History*
JRAS	*Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*
JRASB	*Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal*
JRAS (Bombay)	*Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Bombay*
JRSAA	*Journal of the Royal Society for Asian Affairs*
NFA	*Neue Forschungen in Afghanistand*
QR	*Quarterly Review*
PRGS	*Proceedings of Royal Geographical Society*
SI	*Studia Iranica*

iii. Abbreviations: works of reference referred to in main text

CHI	*Cambridge History of Iran*
EI	*Encyclopaedia of Islam*
SEI	*Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam*

iv. Other abbreviations

A. I.	Anglo-Indian
app.	appendix
chap(s)	chapter(s)
col., cols	column(s)
D.	Dari (Afghan Persian)
encl., encls	enclosure(s)
fol., fols	folio, folios
g.	gramme(s)
in.	inches
kg.	kilogrammes
km., kms	kilometre(s)
l., ll.	line, lines
m.	metre(s)
ms, mss	manuscript(s)
n. pag.	no pagination or folio number
no., nos	number(s)
pl., pls.	plate(s)
P.	Persian
Psh.	Pushtu

R., Rs.	rupee(s)
rcvd.	received
Scrtry.	Secretary
vol., vols	volume(s)

Dates

In chapters One and Two, *Anno Hijra* dates (AH) are followed by AD equivalent e. g. 127/743. In subsequent chapters, unless given as above, all dates are *Anno Domini* (AD). The length of individual reigns, governorships, etc. appear within square brackets thus: [1811-1825]. Rounded brackets are used for dates of birth and death, e.g. (1805-1895).

CHAPTER ONE

THE LAND AND ITS SETTING

> [Alexander] taught the Arachosians to till the soil, and persuaded the Sogdians to support rather than slay their parents.... He induced the Indians to accept Greek gods, and the Scythians to bury rather than eat the dead.... He planted Greek institutions all across Asia, and thus overcame its wild and savage way of living.... Greekness was marked by excellence, but wickedness was the way of the barbarians (Plutarch, *De Alexandri Magni Fortuna aut Virutut,* quoted Holt, 25).

The region of Afghanistan, which in the last century was referred to as Lesser Turkistan or, by the British, as Turkistan or Afghan Turkistan, consisted roughly of the modern (pre-1990)[1] administrative provinces or *wilayat*s, of Faryab, Juzjan, Balkh, Samangan, Qunduz and Baghlan. The Uzbeks and other Chingizid rulers who preceded the Afghan Amirs, however, referred to the area as the province or appanage of Balkh. During the five hundred years or so of Turkic domination of the area, the boundary in the west was usually drawn on the Murghab river and in the south included the hill forts north of Bamiyan, such as Kahmard and Saighan. The term Afghan Turkistan, or Turkistan, is of very recent vintage and was coined by Afghans and taken up by the British, as a convenient way of describing a region which had previously been ruled by one or other Turkic dynasty.[2]

The Balkh region has played a vital role in the economic, cultural and religious life of Central Asia for thousands of years and is one of the cradles of world civilisation. Even today the area is one of the most economically important regions of Afghanistan. During the reign of the Afghan Amir, Zahir Shah [1933-1973], most of the country's hard currency earnings were derived from the export of the re-

---

[1] President Najibullah (overthrown, 1992) changed the provincial boundaries of Faryab and Juzjan province, though I have not been able to acquire any map which shows these administrative changes. Andkhui was removed from Faryab and placed in Juzjan and, apparently, a separate province based on Sar-i Pul was created.

[2] Of even more recent vintage is the name *Wilayat-i Shamal-i Afghanistan* ('Northern Province of Afghanistan'), a term used by General Dostam and his administration to avoid the accusation that he has declared *de facto* independence from Kabul. Since the fall of President Najibullah, many local people began to refer to the area as Khurasan (not to be confused with the Persian province of the same name). According to eye-witness information, in the summer of 1992 there was a sign on the road to Balkh which said, in Persian, "Welcome to Khurasan."

sources of the area; karakul sheep and their skins; leather; carpets, *gilims* and *namads*; rice; wheat; grapes and raisins; pistachios; melons and other produce. It also boasts extensive oil, gas and coal reserves, though, apart from the gas field at Shibarghan, little has been done to exploit these resources. Gold has been panned on the upper Amu Darya for centuries and the mining of Badakhshan's lapis lazuli and rubies dates from a very early period.

Up until recent times, when Mazar-i Sharif gradually became the most important urban centre in Lesser Turkistan, Balkh had been the political and economic heart of the province for millenia. Many centuries before the conquest of Bactria by Alexander the Great in 328 BC, the Achæmenid satrapy was an important agricultural and commercial district, whilst the antiquity of its capital, Bactra, identified by scholars as being on the site of present city of of Balkh,[3] was recognised by Arab geographers who referred to it as 'The Mother of Cities' (*Umm al-Bilad*) (Holt, 28-9, 35-41). Others referred to it as *Balkh al-Bahiyya*, 'Balkh the Beautiful' (Le Strange, 420). Situated

[3] Despite surveys by a number of archaeologists and several excavations, very little evidence of the Achæmenid/Græco-Bactrian city of Bactra has never been uncovered (Ball i, 99-101) and there must be some doubt that the modern settlement of Balkh was the site of Achæmenid Bactra/Zariaspa. Quintus Curtius records that the Bactrus River (modern, Balkh Ab) flowed alongside its walls and that it was situated beneath mount Parapomisus (Holt, 16). By any stretch of the imagination, this description could never be applied to the modern city of Balkh, which lies in the middle of a desert and at the extreme tip of the delta created by the Balk Ab canal system. Curtius's description, rather, suggests that Bactra was located much further south, near the mountains and where the Balkh Ab river is still fast-flowing; that is where the Hazhda Nahr canal network begins, rather than where the waters finally disappear into the desert and marshes. Given that the shrine of Anahita at Zariaspa (see text, below) probably represented a personification of the canal network and embodied the fertility which they brought to the whole region, it would make far more theological sense to site the main temple to the spirit of the Hazhda Nahr where the canals are drawn off from the Balkh Ab river. Such a site is know to exist, though, as far as can be ascertained, no serious survey has ever been conducted in this area. A few miles south of where the Balkh Ab breaks out from the Koh-i Alburz, between the settlements of Chashma-yi Shafan and Boyni Qara, there is an area of rolling plain (*dashl*) and lows hills (*chul*) in which lies a very extensive archaeological site. So large is this site, that it is the only artificial feature to shows up on satellite photographs of Afghanistan (cf. Ball i, sites 186, 596, 138 and ii, 82).

Barthol'd, 77 says that the Arab armies destroyed the complex of Nau Bahar and built a new city two *farsangs* from the old site, though later the areas of former occupation were built on. Even the 'Abbasid mosque of Haji Piyada (Noh Gunbad) is situated more than a mile to the south of the present town of Balkh, which would suggest that, since the arrival of the Arab armies the main centre of population in the area had moved yet again. Faiz Bakhsh, on the word of Mutawakil b. Amran, *qazi* of Balkh, reported that Balkh had been destroyed 23 times in its history, Faiz Bakhsh, "Report on Badakhshan, Balkh and Bokhara, 1865-69," 1872, India Office Library & Records, *Enclosure to Secret Letters from India*, L/P&S/7/270, fols 152-90 (pp. 1-2) (henceforth ESL/270, etc.). Subsequent page references to this report are to the internal pagination and not the record folios.

strategically across intersection routes of the Silk Road, caravans and merchandise from China, the Indian subcontinent, Persia, the Mediterranean basin and other regions of the Eurasian continent, passed through its gates, making the city not just one of the most important urban trade centres of the ancient and mediæval world, but a centre where peoples of diverse races and creeds met, intermingled and exchanged not just goods,but ideas.

From an early period Balkh earned renown for the fertility of its soil and the extensiveness of its agriculture which, in turn, enabled it to sustain a substantial population. Yet from a purely climatic point of view, everything would seem to be against such a development. Cut off from the Indian monsoons by the high mountain ranges to the south and over one thousand miles from the nearest sea, the region has very little rain. What precipitation there is, falls mainly during February, March and April, after which the temperature in the plain rises sharply, reaching a mean of over 38° C by June (Dupree 1978, Chart I, 15-18). During the hot season, dust storms (*khak bad*) sweep out of the sandy deserts which lie south of the Amu Darya, whilst in the winter Siberian winds make the area very inhospitable.

In the mountains to the south, however, the precipitation is higher and, from about November to March, snow falls to the depth of several metres on the high peaks. In the spring the thaw sets in and, as the snow gradually melts, it releases water into hundreds of small valleys. These streams eventually converge to form rivers such as the Ab-i Maimana, the Balkh Ab, the Kokcha and other north-flowing rivers, or run south into the Murghab which flows westwards through the Tir Band-i Turkistan, then dog-legs north until it eventually loses itself in the sands of the Merv oasis.

Water conservation is enhanced by the geological structure of the ranges which make up the northern flanks of the Hindu Kush. A number of limestone plateaus, the most spectacular of which is the Tir Band-i Turkistan, preserve the melting snows in underground caverns that act as natural reservoirs and pour forth a constant supply of water into the rivers even during the height of summer. Often the outpourings from these subterranean caves give rise to spectacular waterfalls, such as those in the valleys of Zang and Shakh in Gurziwan. This same tableland has been deeply eroded by the fast-flowing streams and is bisected by thousands of narrow, winding, river valleys. These ravines provide natural shade for the streams which twist and turn on

the valley floors, preserving them from the high summer temperatures and reducing surface evaporation.

Between the limestone plateau and the plain proper, lies a third geological feature which contributes markedly to the region's fertility. This consists of a belt of high, loess dunes, or *chul*, which have been deposited at the base of the mountains by the strong winds blowing out from the Central Asian steppes. This fine, wind-blown loess, the result of erosion of ice-age moraines, is one of the most fertile of soils. The heavy snows in the mountains to the south, combined with the water-holding properties of the limestone tableland, produce a high water table in these dunes throughout the year, allowing the cultivation of wheat on a very large scale indeed. In places such as Gurziwan, huge surpluses of grain are produced each year from such dry land farming (*lalmi*) on these undulating hills, making them the mainstay of the region's agriculture and food supplies.

From a very early period, human skill and ingenuity have exploited these natural advantages provided by the perennial rivers to turn the region into one of the agricultural heartlands of Central Asia. Wherever a river valley widens out sufficiently for cultivation, settlements have grown up, tapping the waters of the stream to grow wheat, walnuts, pistachios,[4] mulberries and vegetables. In the spring, when both the *chul* and the mountain slopes are clad in fresh, green grass, horses, sheep and cattle are taken out and fattened on their steep slopes. Where the rivers break out from the constrictions of the mountains proper into the plains, larger settlements have taken root and, since the river valleys were also conduits for trade and communications, places such as Maimana, Sar-i Pul, Qunduz and Balkh, evolved into a network of fortified towns which, in turn, became regional capitals or city-states in their own right. The location of these settlements was strategic for other reasons, for they controlled complex networks of irrigation ditches, on which the agriculture of the plains depended, as well as providing power to drive mills and water for the population to drink.

The most famous and extensive of these irrigation networks is that drawn off from the Balkh Ab, known as the Hazhda Nahr, or 'Eighteen Canals' (Map 6). As the Balkh Ab emerges from the narrow gorge in the Koh-i Alburz, a series of artificial ditches carry water,

[4] In the eighth century AH, Badghis was renowned for pistachio forests of such vast extent that Mustawfi recorded that, "many make their livelihood for the whole year round by what they can gather here at harvest time, and it is indeed a wonder to behold" (Le Strange, 415).

not just to Balkh, but to scores of other settlements and towns, which extend like a fan from Mazar-i Sharif in the east to Aqcha in the west. Though we are not sure how extensive the Hazhda Nahr system was in pre-Islamic times, we do know that by the late seventeenth century of the Christian Era, two hundred and seventy one separate villages depended on the system. Unfortunately, at present, the canal system has fallen into neglect, partly as a result of government apathy and partly due to the recent troubles, and many of the smaller canals have silted up. The evidence of hundreds of *tells* and other ruins throughout the plains of Balkh, suggests that, in an earlier period, the Hazhda Nahr was much more extensive and its population a great deal higher (McChesney 1991, 22-6).

The Achæmenids had an almost religious devotion to maintaining the Hazhda Nahr, (Tarn 1980, 102), indeed, the patron goddess of Bactra, Ardvi Sura Anahita, she of a thousand arms, is reckoned to be a personification of the canal system and the spirit of Bactria's other great water course, the Oxus. Although the Persian Empire was eventually swept away by the Greeks, the engineering and administrative skills needed to keep the system operative were passed down from generation to generation, and from dynasty to dynasty, for the survival of the region depended on the proper maintenance of the canal network. In turn, the administration of the system, which revolved around maintaining a delicate balance between nature's provision and human need, gave rise to an elaborate bureaucracy, which managed the precious resource and ensured an equal distribution of water to each village. In the course of time, hereditary priest-governors arose who controlled both the religious and economic life of the region. Following the conquest of Balkh by the Arab armies in the early eighth century of the Christian Era, the skills of the Barmakid clan, the administrators of the temple complex of Nau Bahar, or, more accurately, Nava Vihara, and owners of extensive estates,[5] were quickly put to good use by the conquerors. Under the 'Abbasids, this family rose to hold the position of *wazir*, the highest administrative post in the Empire.

[5] The Barmakids owned vast estates, eight farsangs long and four farsangs in width. They claimed to be the descendants of Sasanid administrators (Barthol'd, 77, 197).

Maimana

The modern town of Maimana is the provincial capital of the wilayat of Faryab and occupies a site of considerable, strategic importance. Situated at the extreme north-western tip of the Tir Band-i Turkistan, at the northern gateway to the Badghis corridor, the town commanded one of the main caravan routes between Persia, Herat and the cities on either side of the Amu Darya. Maimana was also an alternative trade route between the Indian sub-continent and Central Asia, as well as still supplying more local markets in Ghor and the Hazarajat. Before the demarcation and closure of the Russian-Afghan border towards the end of the last century, caravans from Merv and Khiva used to pass through its gates *en route* to Balkh or Kabul. Even today, it remains an important overnight halt for trade between Balkh and Herat.

Though Maimana was to play a crucial part in the struggle against the Durrani Amirs during the last century, its military importance was recognised many centuries earlier. For millenia, the Badghis corridor has been one of the main conduits for invading armies, whether Arab or Persian forces marching against Balkh, or Central Asian Hordes sweeping out of the northern steppes to overrrun the fertile agricultural lands of Khurasan. We know, from objects recovered from the citadel mound, that a fortified settlement of some sort existed on the present site of Maimana by the late second century BC, and its foundation probably dates back to the early Iron Age (Ball i, 178; Ramchandran & Sharma 1956).

Indeed, the very name, Maimana, is rooted in antiquity. According to the Arab geographer, Yaqut, when the Arab armies arrived in the eighth century AD, they discovered a large Jewish population living in the area, which apparently had been re-settled there following the destruction of Jerusalem by Nebuchadnezzar in 586 BC (Le Strange, 424;*Hudud al-'Alam*, 330ff.). The town thus became known as 'The City of the Jews'. However, Yaqut claims that as the Arab colonists began to settle down, they were increasingly uncomfortable referring to the settlement as Al-Yahudiyya, Al-Yahudan[6] or Jahudan al-Kubra.[7] The opposition of the Medinan Jews to Muhammad's message was still fresh in the Arab colonists' minds and it was deemed to be a name of reproach and bad luck (Le Strange, 424). The town was

[6] 'City of Jews'.
[7] 'The Great Jewry'.

therefore given the Arabic name, *maimana*,[8] meaning 'good luck,' 'prosperity' or 'auspicious'.[9]

Despite this change of name, however, the indigenous population continued to use variations of Al-Yahudiyya throughout the early Islamic period and it is this name, rather than that of Maimana, which the anonymous, locally-born, author of the *Hudud al-'Alam*, uses in his tenth century geography (*Hudud al-'Alam*, 107, 335).[10] According to another authority, in the Achæmenid period Maimana was called Nisak-i Miyanak (*Hudud al-'Alam*, 335; Modhi 1915). The other centres of population in the region, which came to be known as the Chahar Wilayat, Andkhui, Shibarghan and Sar-i Pul, are all mentioned in early Arab geographies (Barthol'd, 79-80; *Hudud al-'Alam*, 108-10; Le Strange, 423-26).

From the Stone Age to the Arab Conquest

There is evidence that the northern slopes of the Hindu Kush and the Tir Band-i Turkistan were centres of considerable human activity from pre-historic times. Lithic and ceramic material dating from the Middle Palæolithic to late Neolithic/Bronze Ages, have been discovered in caves and open air sites near Belcheragh and Sarchakan, south-east of Maimana (Ball i, 105, 116; Dupree 1970). Excavations by Dupree at Aq Kupraq in the Balkh Ab river valley, uncovered some twenty thousand tooled flints (Ball i, 38), evidence that from the Middle to Late Palæolithic the valley was an important centre for the manufacture of flint instruments. Some evidence of early attempts at sculpture in the same area were also uncovered (Dupree 1978, 260-2; Barger 1939).

[8] Major H. G. Raverty, *The History of Hiri, or Herat, and its Dependencies*, 7 vols, 1902(?), IOLR, MSS Eur. C.83-89, v(i), 1698, translates *maimana*, as 'right-hand', which is an alternative etymology of the Arabic word (cf. the English word, 'sinister'). He claims the name originated in the thirteenth century AD, following the Mongol conquest when eight Arlat *mings*, or *hezaras*, i.e. military units of one thousand men, were located in the area. The tribes of this contingent constituted the right wing, or hand, of Chingiz Khan's army, from which the settlement derives its name. It is highly improbable, however, that the Mongols would have used an Arabic word, in preference to a Turko-Mongolian one, to describe what was, primarily, a military cantonment and the usage must be earlier than Raverty claims.
This was the etymology universally used by informed local sources interviewed in Maimana in 1977 and 1978, who were doubtless familiar with the mediaeval geographers such as Muqaddasi, Yaqut and Ibn Hawkal.
[9] Compiled in 372/982-3, the author was a native of Guzganan.

According to the epic of the *Shah Nama*, the area between Balkh and Herat was the scene of the great struggle between Afrasiyab and the son of Kai Ka'us, Siyavakhsh, in the 'War of the Twelve Champions' (*Davazda Rakh*) (*Hudud al-'Alam*, xxv; Mohdi, 10-11). Some authorities state that Guzganan, from which the modern district of Gurziwan derives its name (Map 5),[11] was the place where Arish's arrow fell to delineate the border between Iran and King Isfandiyar (*Hudud al-'Alam*, xxv-xxxi, 330). Although Tir Band-i Turkistan is the most commonly-used local designation of the mountain range lying between the Murghab and the plains of Lesser Turkistan, it is not known whether the word *tir* ('arrow') in this name has any connection with this legend.

It was in Bactria where Zoroaster is believed by many scholars[12] to have found a base for the propagation of his dualistic philosophy after Vishtaspa, the ruler of the region, gave the Iranian prophet sanctuary (Boyce i, 274-5). By the time Zoroaster appeared on the scene, it would seem that an indigenous cult based around a female deity, the personification of the Hazhda Nahr and Oxus, was already well entrenched. Following the Achæmenid ruler, Artaxexes II's, patronage of the goddess Anahita, the cult of the Bactrian deity appears to have gradually been subsumed into the worship of Ardvi Sura, 'The Undefiled' (Boyce i, 72; iii, 280; Herzfeld ii, 516; Tarn 1980, 102). Anahita's temple of Zariaspa, or Azar-i Asp, with its extraordinary and

[11] Gurziwan is both a town and a district on the northern slopes of the Tir Band-i Turkistan. The former lies to the east of the district, in the Sar-i Pul river basin south of Khwal, whilst the latter lies south of the Shirin Tagab river to the south of Belcheragh. The area, now within the wulswali of Belcheragh, is sometimes locally referred to locally as the Haft Darra ('Seven Valleys'), since running through the district are the seven northward-flowing rivers of Feris, Khwaja Ghor, Badgah, Shakh, Zang, Takhra and Ghulbiyan. These seven streams converge north of Sarchakan where they form the Chashma-yi Khwab which, in turn, flows through a steep and narrow gorge, joining the Shirin Tagab at Belcheragh. The mediæval name of the area was Guzgan or, in Arabic, Juzjan, from which the modern wilayat of Juzjan (or Jauzjan) is derived. In the sources, this name sometimes appeared in the plural form as Guzganan (Juzjanan) which Minorsky in his notes to the *Hudud al-'Alam*, 329ff., derives from a word meaning 'walnuts' or 'walnut trees'; a product for which Gurziwan is still justly famous. Raverty i, 214, claims that the reason for this plural form was that there were two Guzgans, or, more accurately, the area was divided into two by the Murghab river.

During the last fifteen hundred years the boundaries of Guzgan have fluctuated a great deal. In the mediæval period it covered a much wider area than the present wulswali of Belcheragh, possibly stretching as far as Maimana to the west and Sar-i Pul in the east (Le Strange, 426). The present (1990) provincial borders of the wilayats of Faryab and Juzjan have little relation to the ancient boundaries of Guzgan(an).

[12] As well as in ancient Zoroastrian legend. However, Boyce iii, 125-8, later argues for the Sistan or Herat area as a more likely base for Zoroaster's preaching.

majestic golden image, was said to have actually straddled the Bactrus (Balkh Ab) river (Tarn 1980, 102, 114).[13]

Zoroaster himself is generally believed to have been killed in battle near Bactra, *c.* 522 BC,[14] whilst fighting on behalf of his royal patron (Zaehner, 33). Following the Greek conquest of the region, the invaders retained Anahita as the city-goddess and her crown of eight rays and a hundred stars appears on the coins of Demetrius (Tarn 1980, 115). During the early centuries of the Christian Era, Bactra became an important Buddhist shrine-city centred on the extensive monastic communities of Nau Bahar, or Nava Vihara (Barthol'd, 77; Bulliet 1976; Le Strange, 420).

The Alexandrine conquest of Bactria in 326 BC, marked the end of Achæmenid power in the area but not, as implied by the mythologisers of Alexander, such as Plutarch, the beginning of civilisation north of the Hindu Kush. For, although in the two centuries following the Hellenistic occupation, Greek culture and thought permeated all aspects of the civilisation, even to the extent of leaving its fingerprints on Buddhism, which had spread from its birthplace in the Gangetic plain north-westwards into Central Asia and from thence to China, the Achæmenid satrapies of Bactria and Sogdiana were already major centres of civilisation (Holt, 26-9). Indeed, far from being the bringer of democracy and civilised values, Alexander's occupation of Bactria, and in particular his campaigns against the Sogdians, was noted for its barbarity, decadence and despotism. Amongst the more notable 'excesses' committed by Alexander was the brutal mutilation and torture of Basus, the Achæmenid Pretender, the complete extermination of a Greek garrison and Alexander's aspirations to deification (Holt, 50-5).

By the early Christian Era, Persian culture and civilisation had reasserted itself once more under the Sasanids. In 1978 a fresco, dating from between the third and fifth centuries AD, was discovered near Ghulbiyan and probably marks the burial site of a Sasanid prince of the sub-province of Warushan (Grenet, Lee, Pinder-Wilson 1980; Grenet, 134-5).

[13] See, n. 3, above. The site of this temple complex has never been located. The temple of Ai Banum, which some have suggested was dedicated to Anahita-Mithra, actually had a canal flowing through the sanctuary (Boyce iii, 186-8).

[14] Though Boyce, i, 183-91, and *Textual Sources for the Study of Zoroastrianism* (Manchester 1984), argues for a much earlier, Bronze Age, date (*c.* 1400-1200 BC).

Following his defeat by the Arab Muslims under Ahnaf b. Qais in 31/651, Yazdagird III, the last Sasanian monarch, fled across the Murghab to Balkh. For a period of about ten years, he fought a losing battle with the Arab invaders. During this decade the western districts of the province of Balkh were turned into a vast battlefield, as two great cultures and religions battled for political and ideological supremacy. In the end, it was the Arab Muslim armies which prevailed. Yazdagird finally met his end at the hands of the slaves of a mill owner of Bala Murghab who unceremoniously dumped his carcass in the Murghab river, from where it was later recovered and buried with appropriate pomp.[15]

From Arab to Mongol, 651-1220

The arrival of the Arab armies brought not only Arab culture, but the new and evangelical religion of Islam, which eventually swept away all other religious systems in Bactria. However, though the arrival of Islam eventually led to the extinction of Zoroastrianism, Buddhism, Nestorian Christianity (Mingana 1925) and the indigenous pagan cults, the process of Islamisation was a long and difficult one. When the Arab armies first arrived in the region in the first Hijra century, they encountered fierce and desperate resistance from the pagan mountain tribes of Guzganan, Gharchistan and Ghor;[16] who quickly earned a reputation for their hardiness, obduracy and pugnacity.[17] Despite numerous attempts by successive Muslim governments to subdue and convert them, as late as the tenth century AD (fourth century AH), the mountain strongholds of Ghor and Gharchistan were still home to the largest pagan enclave in the Islamic world, (Le Strange, 416; *Hudud al-'Alam*, 110). Indeed, during the following century, Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni sent at least three expeditions into the area in an attempt to bring the population within the *Dar al-Islam*. His invasion met with greater success than those of his predecessors and, as each fortress fell, missionaries were appointed to the region to convert the population to Islam (Bosworth, 1977, ch. IX).[18]

[15] Raverty i, 186-91.
[16] Raverty i, 214ff., from Tabari.
[17] Raverty i, 214, 228, 298.
[18] In 1845, the French adventurer, Ferrier, claimed to have visited a remnant of this pagan enclave during his travels from Sar-i Pul to Daulatyar, but the authenticity of his report is questionable as is his report of a bas-relief somewhere in the region of Mirza Wulang; see Lee 1982,

Balkh and Guzganan played a major part in the 'Abbasid revolution. In 121/739 Yahya, the 'Abbasid Pretender, having slain the 'Umaiyid governor of Khurasan, fled to "Gawnganan" where he caused much trouble to the local governor for a number of years. Finally, in 127/743, at the village of "I-nu," Yahya met the son of the governor of Khurasan in the open field, was captured and crucified on the gates of "the city of Guzgan," which was more than likely Maimana (Barthol'd, 193; Wellhausen, 338).[19] Badghis and the mountainous region lying between the Murghab and Hari Rud rivers was also a convenient refuge for heretical and anti-establishment groups. In 149/765 Ashnas, *Ustad-i Shish* (or, *Sis*), laid claim to prophethood, revived the practices of the Fire-Worshippers and caused "vast depredations" in the region. He even succeeded in capturing the great fortress of Nairatu (Qal'a-yi Naraiman) in Badghis for a while, but was eventually subdued in *c.* 150/767 (Barthol'd, 198).[20] His daughter subsequently became the mother of 'Abdullah al-Mamun, the 'Abbasid Caliph.[21]

A more serious political and theological threat to the empire was posed by Hashim b. Hakim, who had been *wazir*, or chief minister, for a time to Abu Muslim, the great 'Abbasid propagandist. Born in Karez of Badghis,[22] Hakim declared himself to be the *Mahdi* and the reincarnation of the *Imamat*, that mystic, gnostic power which, in Shi'ism, is believed to be incarnate in the Imams. Claiming that mortals were unable to bear the light emanating from his face, Hakim donned a veil, which his critics alleged concealed the ravages of smallpox or syphilis, and earned for himself the nickname of *Al-Muqanna'*, 'The Veiled One' (Barthol'd, 199).[23] From *c.* 160-166/776-782, Al-Muqanna' had a considerable following throughout the region, as far north as Bukhara and Samarkand (Barthol'd, 200),[24] and put the government to a great deal of trouble with his raids. About a hundred years later, in 287/900, Abu'l-Bilal, a Karramiyya heretic from Gharchistan,[25] assumed the title of *Dar al-*

Bivar 1974, and below, ch. 6, n. 2.
[19] Or possibly, Anbar (Sar-i Pul). Raverty i, 349, says he was hanged on a gibbet.
[20] Raverty i, 56; ii, 411.
[21] Raverty ii, 415.
[22] Raverty i, 58. Barthol'd, 199 says he came from "the neighbourhood of Merve."
[23] Raverty i, 57; ii, 416ff. Raverty says the veil was of gold cloth and that Hakim's disfigurement was the result of being hit by an arrow in his eye. According to Barthol'd, the veil was green.
[24] Raverty ii, 417ff.
[25] The exact location and extent of the district, known in medival times as Gharchistan, is difficult to define. The region lay south of, and adjacent to, Guzgan(an) and probably en-

Anab ('Master of Punishment', or 'Martyrdom') and gathered some ten thousand followers around his banner until his rebellion was finally put down.[26]

From the late tenth century Guzganan was the centre of an important minor dynasty, the Farighunids, originally clients of the Samanids, who subsequently came under the sway of Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni, to whom they were related by marriage.[27] This dynasty claimed to be the descendants of the mythological Faridun, but little is known of their actual ancestry, except that the family had lived in Guzganan for many generations (*Hudud al-'Alam*, 5-6, 173-7). In 398/1007 Sultan Mahmud and the Farighunid ruler Abu Nasr b. Muhammad, defeated a Qarakhanid army at Charkhiyan, in the plains west of Balkh (Barthol'd, 273; *Hudud al-'Alam*, 177).[28] Some years later, in 407/1016, when Abu'l-'Abbas-i Ma'mun Farighun, the son-in-law of Sultan Mahmud, was killed by his own soldiers, Sultan Mahmud marched in person into the area, defeated the insurgents, put their ringleaders to the sword and entrusted the government of this frontier region to his Chamberlain, Yalangtush, ending Farighunid rule in Guzganan in the process (Juzjani 1970, i:85n). During Mahmud's reign Guzganan was used as a prison and place of banishment for state prisoners, including the Ghaznavid ruler's younger brother, Isma'il, who had dared to dispute Mahmud's succession following the death of their father, Sabuktagin (Barthol'd, 265; Juzjani 1970, i:232, 390, 394).[29]

The Farighunid dynasty was renowned for its patronage of the arts and its court became the resort of poets and scholars. The most famous surviving manuscript dedicated to one of these rulers is the anonymous geographical work, the *Hudud al-'Alam*, compiled by a resident of Guzganan in 372/982-3. According to this work, the Farighunid dominions encompassed Al-Yahudhan (Maimana); the present-day district of Gurziwan; Gharchistan; Talqan (of Badghis); Anbar (Sar-i Pul); Antkhudh (Andkhui); Usburghan (Shibarghan),

compassed all the tributaries and head waters which flow into the Murghab river. Ghor lay south of Gharchistan and was the name used to described the region which encompassed the feeder streams of the Hari Rud.

[26] Raverty ii, 702.

[27] One of Sultan Mahmud's daughters married 'Abbas-i Ma'mun Farighun.

[28] Raverty ii, 851ff. Minorsky in his notes to the *Hudud al-'Alam* says Abu Nasr may not have been Wali of Guzganan ("Gawngan") but, as the son of the then Farighunid ruler Abu'l-Haris, he had been made commander of the army sent to the aid of Sultan Mahmud.

[29] According to the *Tabaqat-i Nasiri* (Juzjani 1970:i. 81, 397), Isma'il was banished to the fort of Kalinyar of Juzjanan.

and Far-yab[30] (*Hudud al-'Alam*, 4-5). The area was very fertile, well-populated and prosperous. It was particularly noted for its walnuts; a crop which is still grown extensively in the valleys of Gurziwan.

Al-Yahudhan was the residence of the *malik* of Guzganan and nearby at Dar-i Andarra was a strongly fortified military camp. Antkhudh, though a place of cultivation, possessed "few amenities." Anbir was the capital of the principality of Guzganan and an important trading centre, noted particularly for leather. Shibarghan, apart from its "amenities and ... running water" was not the residence of any major political figure (*Hudud al-'Alam*, 107).[31]

It was over this idyllic, fertile region, that the Mongol Hordes broke like an irresistible tidal wave, sweeping aside the ancient order and changing forever the political and economic face of Balkh.

[30] In the pre-Mongol period, Far-yab was the most important fortress between Balkh and the Murghab. A debate still exists as to its exact location, but the ruins must lie somewhere between Maimana and Andkhui, probably in the area of Yangi Qal'a. Le Strange, 425 identifies it with Khairabad. In the late 1970s Frantz Grenet of DAFA reported extensive ruins in the area of the settlement of Shirin Tagab, which may be the site of Far-yab. It was destroyed by the Mongols and, although the name reappears in later centuries, the centre of trade and population shifted to Maimana. According to Tabari, the town of Far-yab was founded by Firun, the *marzbana* of Tukharistan. Raverty says the name Far-yab refers to lands, or tracts of land, watered by means of rivers, canals or *karez*.

[31] Wahidi 1977, 76 quotes the following couplet about the Farighunid period in Gurziwan from Furukhi (Browne ii, 124-9), a contemporary of Firdausi:

در دیار گوزگانان اندرین عهد قریب — چار چیز نامور کرد از پی مزدو ثواب

مسجد آدینه و عالی منار میمنه — صدرود سود یاب و جوی آب نو سراب

CHAPTER TWO

THE ORIGIN OF THE BALKH APPANAGE, 1220-1722

BALKH, a large and flourishing town which was formerly the residence of the Sasanian kings. In it are found buildings of the Sasanian kings with paintings and wonderful works which have fallen into ruins, called Nau-bahar. [It] is a resort of merchants and is very pleasant and prosperous. It is the emporium of Hindustan (*Hudud al-'Alam*, 108).

From the Mongol Invasions to Timur Lang, 1220-1381

The arrival of the Mongol Hordes changed the political, economic and ethnic face of the Balkh area and laid the foundation of half a millennium of Chingizid sovereignty over the region. In 617/1220 Chingiz Khan's armies crossed the Amu Darya to avenge the assassination of Mongol envoys at the hands of the Khwarazmian Shah, Muhammad Shah. Balkh, terrified by the Mongols' systematic massacre of cities which resisted their advance, surrendered unconditionally. The mobile Mongol army moved on swiftly through Badghis to Herat,[1] whilst Muhammad Shah ordered the strengthening of his northern defences: a series of impregnable hill forts in the mountains of Guzganan and Gharchistan (Juzjani 1970, i, 363).[2]

The following year, 618/1221, the Mongol army, having devastated Khurasan, returned to Balkh, which had rebelled, took the city by storm and systematically put over fifty thousand inhabitants of the city to death. The sacking of Balkh reduced this ancient metropolis into a heap of ruins (Le Strange, 421).[3] In December the Mongol army besieged Herat, which had also revolted and when it, too, eventually fell a further general massacre took place after which, according to Saifi's *Tarikh Nama-yi Herat*, "no head was left on a body, nor body with a head" (*CHI* v, 316).[4] Over the next three years one after another of the great mountain strongholds of Guzganan, Badghis and Gharchistan was systematically reduced by the Mongols, though often

[1] Raverty iii, 1147.
[2] Raverty iii, 1148ff.
[3] Raverty iii, 1150.
[4] Raverty iii, 1195.

at great cost to the invaders. Presumed to be impregnable, hill forts such as Nasr Koh of Talqan, Tuluk of Gharchistan, Walkh, Kalyun, Fiwar, Kadas (Qadis?), Ashiyar, Zang ('Rang'), Bandar ('Bindar'), Laghri and many others fell one after another to the invaders, their defenders slaughtered to a man and their ancient defences thrown down (Barthol'd, 455).[5]

The Mongols' systematic extermination of the urban population, combined with their scorched earth policy, which was primarily designed to prevent further rebellions, led to a massive depopulation of the once-populous regions of Herat and Balkh. It also produced severe famine as agricultural activity ground to a halt and the huge herds of sheep and cattle which, as well as providing food and clothing for the population were the main source of income for many, were either slaughtered or seized by the Mongols to feed their own hordes. What population remained after these human locusts had passed through was therefore left without either the means of subsistence or sufficient resources for future planting and breeding programmes. The ancient irrigation systems that had been the lifeblood of the Balkh plains and which had survived innumerable conquests, were destroyed, or fell into disrepair, leaving the desert to fill the vacuum. It is little wonder that Juzjani, the author of the *Tabaqat-i Nasiri*, who was an eyewitness of these terrible events, along with other Muslim historians, felt unable to describe the terrors of the invasions until many years had passed (see, Browne i, 427-34).[6] When, finally, he put pen to paper, the horror of what he had witnessed, still permeated his work.

> From the confines of Balkh and Shibarghan on the east to the neighbourhood of Dawighan on the west, a distance of about seven hundred and fifty miles as the crow flies, the few remaining people, for the period of a full year, had to sustain life on the flesh of dogs and cats and human beings, for this reason that the forces of Chingiz Khan had burnt all the stores, barns and granaries leaving not a grain of corn, and no cultivation whatever existed.[7]

For several decades following the Mongol devastations, cities such as Herat and Balkh were like ghost towns, whilst other important centres of trade, industry and agriculture, such as Talqan of Badghis and Faryab had been reduced to mounds of rubble and were doomed never to

[5] Raverty iii, 1182; iv, 1220-3.
[6] Raverty iii, 1202.
[7] Raverty iii, 1200, from the *Tabaqat-i Nasiri*.

rise out of the ashes. Even today, in areas such as Gurziwan, evidence of the extent of the Mongol devastations can be seen everywhere. Abandoned hill-forts, like the ones in Darra-yi Zang and Ghulbiyan, abound, along with substantial remains of what must have been considerable settlements, such as the site near the village of Darra-yi Shakh where the skulls and bones of the slaughtered defenders still litter the base of the site (Grenet, Lee, Pinder-Wilson 1980; Lee 1982).

Mongol antipathy to urban civilisation, which was rooted in their strongly pastoral, tribal and nomadic tradition, wrought immense changes in the demographic and economic life of the region. Under successive Chingizid governments, Badghis and Maimana were no longer regarded as important trade or agricultural centres, instead they became renowned for their "delightful and paradise-like meads and pastures"[8] which provided high-quality, all-year-round grazing and water for the Mongol war horses and their cattle. Later, Badghis was used by the Chingizid hordes as a safe haven beyond the Murghab, from where campaigns against Khurasan and Khwarazm could be launched, and the resurgence of more sedentary activity and urbanisation only really began again during the eighteenth century, some five hundred years later.

Chingiz Khan died in 624/1227 and his empire was divided amongst his sons, with Ögedei succeeding his father as the Great Khan. Under his more benign rule Khurasan and the Cis-Oxus territory was able to begin the slow process of recovery from the devastations of the earlier invasions (Barthol'd, 463-7). Herat, Badghis and parts of western Balkh eventually came under the control of the Kurt dynasty of Herat. This family were descendants of the Ghorid governor of Qaisar, Taj al-Din 'Osman-i Marghini, whose brother was wazir to the conqueror of Delhi, Sultan Ghiyas al-Din Muhammad (d. 599/1202-3) and initially governed the region as feudatories of the Chingizid Il-Khan (Browne iii, 160). When Taj al-Din died his son, Malik Rukn al-Din Abu Bakr, married the daughter of the Ghorid monarch. Their son, Shams al-Din, succeeded to Qaisar in 643/1245-6, participated in the invasion of India the following year, and was subsequently appointed to the governorship of Herat. His territory included Ghor, Qaisar, Firoz-Koh, Gharchistan, the Murghab and Far-yab as far north as the banks of the Amu Darya (Browne iii, 174-5).

[8] Raverty iv, 1382-3, from 'Abdullah al-Wassaf.

In the spring of 670/1270 Badghis was again overrun, this time by the Chaghatai amir, Baraq Khan, of the Golden Horde. His advance against Marichaq forced Tüshin, the younger brother of the Abaqa, the Il-Khanid ruler, to retire to Mazdaran. The Chaghatai warrior next seized Shibarghan and made Talqan of Badghis his headquarters for operations against Khurasan. Baraq's *ulus*, numbering some one hundred to one hundred and fifty thousand horsemen, spread themselves throughout the area and let their horses and cattle recuperate on the rich pasturelands (*CHI* v, 356-8).[9]

Baraq's invasion created something of a dilemma for Shams al-Din, caught as he was between the Chaghatais and the advancing army of Abaqa. In the end he withdrew to his fortress of Qaisar to await the outcome of the confrontation of the two warlords. In July 617/1270 the Chaghatai forces were soundly defeated on the bank of the Hari Rud and the victorious Il-Khan reconfirmed Shams al-Din Kurt as governor in Herat, though as a result of his equivocation he was never again completely trusted by his Mongol overlords (*CHI* v, 329-30).[10] In 677/1278-9 Shams al-Din was supplanted by his son, Rukn al-Din (d. 705/1305), and he retired to Qaisar, where he remained until his death in 704/1304 (Browne iii, 176).[11] Rukn al-Din in turn, was set aside by his son, Fakhr al-Din. He had been imprisoned for seven years by his father and was only released after the intercession of the Mongol general, Nauroz. Fakhr al-Din, in order to protect his territories in Badghis, allowed the Nikudari tribes, described by one source as "sanguinary, fearless and violent,"[12] to settle in the area and gave them freedom to raid Kohistan, Farah, Sigistan and Guzganan (Barthol'd, 'Juzarwan'). Their arrival led to a further reign of

vir

[9] Raverty iv, 1280. Raverty's history of the various Chingizid dynasties of Balkh relies heavily on the important, unpublished Persian manuscript, *Bahr al-Asrar fi Manaqib al-Akhyar* ("The Sea of Secrets Relative to the Virtues of the Most Excellent") of Mahmud b. Amir Wali of Balkh (born *c.* 1004/1595-6). This work, commissioned by Nazr Muhammad Khan, the Shaybanid-Timurid ruler of Balkh, was completed in 1050/1640. Footnoted references to Raverty down to Shah Jahan's invasion of Balkh are mainly taken from his translation of the appropriate sections of this manuscript. Two incomplete manuscripts of the *Bahr al-Asrar* exist, one in the India Office Library in London (presumably Raverty's copy) ms. no. 575; and one in the Oriental Institute, Tashkent (IVAN, ms. no. 1375). The Institute of Central and W. Asian Studies of Karachi has published a translation of the Travelogue (with Persian transcript) which is an account of Mahmud Balkhi's travels to India in 1033/1624, prior to receiving the commission from Nazr Muhammad to write his history, but the historical sections of this important manuscript have yet to be translated.

[10] Raverty iv, 1280, 1284.

[11] Raverty iv, 1329.

[12] Raverty iv, 1307.

terror for the people of the region as the Nikudaris pillaged agricultural settlements and carried away young children at will.[13]

Fakhr al-Din's support of these lawless tribesmen brought him into conflict with his Il-Khanid overlords. In 706/1306 he was forced to admit a garrison, and a governor was installed in the city to keep Fakhr al-Din under control. A short time later, however, he rebelled and put the Herat garrison to the sword with the consequence that in February of the following year Herat was again besieged. The death of Fakhr al-Din during this investment, combined with internal dissension amongst the Il-Khanid besiegers, facilitated a peaceful settlement of the dispute and under the governorship of Fakhr al-Din's brother and successor, Ghiyas al-Din, the boundaries of Kurt territory actually expanded (Browne iii, 176; *CHI* v, 401). By 713/1314-5 Kurt dependencies included Isfizar, Darra-yi Qal'a-yi Koh, Gharchistan and "Guzarwan."[14] The ravages of the Black Death gave Herat a further opportunity to expand Kurt borders and by 747/1346-7 Shibarghan and Andkhui (Indakhud) were included within its borders (Browne iii, 177).[15] The lawless Nikudaris were brought under a measure of central control, which, in turn, encouraged immigration and resettlement. Amongst those who arrived were the Arlat tribes, who established their camping grounds in "Guzarwan."[16] These military successes, however, were but the death throes of the dynasty, for the Kurts were soon to be swept away by the irresistible power of Timur Lang.

The Timurids, 1381-1501

Timur Lang (b. 736/1336) came from the Barlas tribe whose family were related to the Chingizids through marriage (*CHI* vi, 42-3). He spent the early part of his reign consolidating his hold on Transoxiana and his first major incursion south of the Oxus did not take place until 782/1381. Timur's primary objective in crossing the Amu Darya was to bring to heel the Kurt ruler of Herat, Ghiyas al-Din, who had shown every inclination to rebel (*CHI* vi, 47-8). However, before attacking the city, Timur sought the advice of Hazrat Ishan[17] Baba

[13] *Ibid.*

[14] Raverty iv, 1374.

[15] Raverty iv, 1380-3, 1436.

[16] Raverty iv, 1462.

[17] The title *Ishān*, or *ēshān*, as it is pronounced in Afghanistan, is synonymous with *saiyid* and is used frequently by Uzbeks, Turkmans and Tadjiks on both sides of the border to designate those who claim descent from the prophet Muhammad. The term is also used, more specifically, for *saiyids* who are *pirs* or *shaikhs* of one, or other, of the sub-sects of the Naqshbandi Order.

Wali, or Baba Sangu, of Andkhui (d. 787/1386) (McChesney 1991, 43; C. E. Yate, 347), an important Naqshbandi shaikh who was held in high esteem by Timur and his amirs.[18] Indeed, today Baba Wali's tomb, located north-west of the modern bazaar, is the most important shrine in Andkhui.[19]

In response to this request for guidance, Baba Sangu hurled raw meat at the head of Timur, an action which was interpreted as a sign of divine favour and ultimate victory. Fortified by the favourable augury, Timur laid siege to Herat whilst his son, Miran Shah, raided Badghis and around the Murghab, requisitioning fodder and cattle (Browne iii, 186-7).[20] When Herat finally surrendered in the following year, Timur ordered the walls to be pulled down and many of the city's artisans and scholars were forcibly transported to Shahr-i Sabz. Ghiyas al-Din, however, managed to survive as governor of Herat, at least for a few months, but was soon accused of planning a rebellion and Miran Shah was sent to replace him, thereby ending one hundred and thirty years of Kurt rule in Herat (*CHI* vi, 48).

[18] Under the Chingizid system of government an amir was a military commander, usually the head of a Chingizid tribe. In the nineteenth century, however, the same title was used by the Afghan rulers of Kabul. To differentiate, I have used lower case italics for the Chingizid amirs and capitalised the word only when reference is made to the Afghan Amirs of Qandahar and Kabul.

[19] In 1885, C. E. Yate and Munshi Allah Bakhsh of the Afghan Boundary Commission visited the Ishan's tomb. The interior wall of the shrine had an inscription which, unfortunately, they did not record. The dedicatory inscription on the latticed iron grill around the tomb, read:

"On the 20th. Zu'l-Hijja 1088 (13 Feb. 1678) ... during the reign of the Great Khan, Rahmatullah Khan, a much-respected Sirdar of Turkistan, the Hakim of Andkhui—may God protect him from the envious eyes!—the son of the gracious, the greater than the great, the late pardoned Niyaz Mahomed Khan Wali of Ummal Bulad ... the lattice-work of the blessed and sacred shrine of the Chief of Saints and Priests, Baba Sangu, the brave—may God make his grave happy and turn it into paradise!—was completely and safely finished."

The grave was later covered by a wooden frame erected "by the order of Alijah Amin-ul-Dulah, Mir Daulat Khan" in 1289/1872-3 (C. E. Yate 1888, 347-8). Mir Daulat Khan [1865-1904] was the last Afshar ruler of Andkhui. I am grateful to Erges Uçkun of the Chopandaz Society of New Jersey for his sketch of Andkhui and information on the Afshar dynasty. This inscription and latttice work has not, apparently survived and was probably removed during the reign of Nadir Shah [1929-1933] (*personal observation*, May 1995).

[20] Raverty iv, 1467-9. In 1885 Afghan Boundary Commission surveyors reported that tribes in the Miran area of Gurziwan claimed to have been placed in the the region by Timur. They numbered some twelve thousand families of "Uzbeks" (probably Chaghatais) drawn from six uluses (Maitland 1888, 231).

In the years that followed, Timur turned his attention to Persia and Asia Minor and in the process probably caused more devastation than the Mongols had a century and a half earlier. In 799/1397 Shah Rukh, another of Timur's sons, became governor of Khurasan with his capital at Herat and, in 806/1403-4, Timur, returning from his victories in the west and on his way to the *quriltai*, or tribal assembly, which was to lead to the invasion of China, passed through Badghis. At Chichaktu the local tax collector (*darugha*) was convicted of extortion and was hung. From there, Timur made a pilgrimage to the shrines in Andkhui,[21] which he had previously placed under the overall supervision of his personal spiritual adviser, Saiyid Baraka (d. 806/1404) (McChesney 1991, 43), and also made the journey to the tomb of Shaikhzada Bayazid (Sultan Abu Yazid Bastami)[22] near Aibak, before returning across the Amu Darya (McChesney 1991, 121).[23]

Following Timur's death in 807/1405 his grandson, Pir Muhammad b. Jahangir, succeeded him, but disputes over the succession were not long in surfacing and Timur's vast empire was torn apart by internecine feuds. Samarkand fell into the hands of another of Timur's grandsons, Khalil Sultan b. Miran Shah, who was later joined by Mirza Sultan Husain, a son of Timur's daughter. Following serious military reverses, Mirza Husain was forced to flee first to Andkhui and then to Shibarghan, where he was received well by Sulaiman. But an army was sent across the Amu Darya against him and he sought asylum with Shah Rukh in Herat, who had his rival put to death (*CHI* vi, 100).[24]

Shah Rukh, meanwhile, consolidated his own hold over the Cis-Oxus territory and appointed his young son, Ulugh Beg, as governor of Andkhui and Shibarghan, under the tutelage of an *ataliq*, Shah Malik (Browne iii, 386). Eventually Shah Rukh marched his army across the Amu Darya and, in May 1409 (811), entered Samarkand without opposition, Khalil Sultan having abandoned the area some time earlier. Ulugh Beg, with the assistance of his ataliq, was made governor of Transoxiana, Shah Rukh preferring to rule the empire from Herat (Browne iii, 381-2; *CHI* vi, 98-101).

During the reign of Shah Rukh, the Great Plague of 838/1435 caused the deaths of over one million people in Khurasan. In Herat,

[21] Baba Wali was dead by this time.
[22] See nn. 35, 36 and text for the link between the shaikhs and *ziyarats* of Andkhui and Aibak.
[23] Raverty iv, 1491.
[24] Raverty iv, 1495.

four thousand seven hundred persons died in a single day and in the four months and eight days that the plague raged in the city, a total of six hundred thousand people perished.[25] When Shah Rukh died, in 850/1447, general anarchy prevailed throughout the region, as the Black and White Sheep Turkman invasions and the continued civil war between the Timurid princes led to further dismemberment of the empire. Ulugh Beg succeeded his father, but his brief reign was a troubled one. Herat was seized by 'Ala al-Daula, a son of Baisunqur b. Shah Rukh but in the spring of 852/1448 'Abd al-Latif, Ulugh Beg's son, managed to defeat him and take control of Mashhad and Herat (Browne iii, 386-7; *CHI* vi, 106-7). 'Ala al-Daula fled to Shibarghan, then to Balkh and finally found refuge in Badakhshan (Browne iii, 388).[26]

Ulugh Beg's success was short-lived. As he returned from Herat to winter in Bukhara, he was first of all badly defeated by Abu'l-Qasim Babur, another son of Baisunqur, and subsequently by the Uzbeks, as he was fording the Amu Darya (*CHI* vi, 108). This series of embarrassing defeats was followed by the rebellion of his own son, 'Abd al-Latif, whom he had made governor of Balkh. Following his defeat near Samarkand in the autumn of 853/1449, Ulugh Beg voluntarily surrendered himself to his son who allowed him to depart on Hajj, though he ensured that his father never reached his destination (*CHI* vi, 108-9). 'Abd al-Latif's reign lasted all of six months before he too was assassinated and succeeded by 'Abdullah b. Ibrahim, another grandson of Shah Rukh. He, in turn, was opposed from Bukhara by Sultan Abu Sa'id, a grandson of Miran Shah, who defeated and executed 'Abdullah in 855/1451 with the help of the powerful Uzbek general, Abu'l-Khair Khan. Abu Sa'id managed to hold onto power for some eighteen years and in 858/1454 succeeded in regaining control of Balkh and Herat (Browne iii, 388; *CHI* vi, 111-2).[27]

The fall of these two strategic regions precipitated an invasion of Transoxiana by Abu'l-Qasim Babur, whose fortunes had revived following significant military successes in Khurasan. After besieging Samarkand in the summer of 856/1452 'Abu Sa'id agreed to recognise the Amu Darya as their mutual border. Following Abu'l-Qasim Babur's death in 861/1457 his son and heir, Mahmud, was forced out of Herat by another Timurid prince, Ibrahim b. 'Ala al-Daula, who

[25] Raverty iv, 1545-7.
[26] Raverty iv, 1587.
[27] Raverty iv, 1617-9.

himself was obliged to abandon Balkh by the arrival of Abu Sa'id and only managed to reach his capital of Herat by using the difficult mountain routes south of Gurziwan (*CHI* vi, 113).[28]

The fratricidal strife left the door open for an attack by Jahan Shah, the commander of the Black Sheep Turkman, who had carved out a territory for himself in Central Persia and Mesopotamia from the wreckage of Timur's empire. In 862/1458 he took Herat and assumed the rights of *khutba* and coinage, though a rebellion in Azerbaijan soon forced him to make peace with the Timurids. Under the terms of the treaty, Herat was returned to Abu Sa'id (*CHI* vi, 113-5). Abu Sa'id was finally captured and put to death by Uzun Hasan of the White Sheep Turkman in 872/1468, after he had foolishly tried to re-impose Timurid authority over these tribes (*CHI* vi, 115-7). His death led to further fragmentation of Timurid possessions. In April of that same year, Prince Sultan Husain b. Mansur b. Baiqara, entered Herat without a struggle and reigned for thirty seven years over Herat and Balkh (*CHI* vi, 121, 124).

Sultan Husain's peaceful succession was mainly due to the support he had received from Zain al-Abidun and his uncle, Muzaffar al-Din Pir Muhammad, the amirs of the Arlat tribes of Qaisar and Maimana.[29] Having secured Shibarghan and Balkh for Sultan Husain, the Arlats next defeated an army sent against them by Abu Sa'id's heir, Sultan Mahmud, who promptly fled, leaving the amirs free to invite Sultan Husain to take over control of Herat's affairs (*CHI* vi, 121-2). Some years later, in 875/1470, Sultan Husain Baiqara was himself forced out of Herat after Yadgar Muhammad, the Timurid assassin of Abu Sa'id, took his capital with the support of Uzun Hasan. Sultan Husain fled to Qaisar, where he strengthened his alliance with the Arlats by marrying a daughter of one of their chiefs, possibly Latif Sultan Aghacha of Chahar Shanbeh (Babur, 269). After rallying his forces in Maimana, Sultan Husain marched via Almar to Langar and, in a surprise night attack, recaptured Herat and put the drunken Yadgar Muhammad to death. From this point onwards, the descendants of Shah Rukh disappeared from the political arena (Babur, 260; *CHI* vi, 122).[30] Sultan Husain's victory, however, was not achieved without

[28] *Ibid.*

[29] According to Raverty some eight Arlat *mings* or *hazaras* had occupied this area since *c.*1220, following its conquest by Chingiz Khan, and had remained there from that time forth, Raverty v (i), 1698, 1707, 1725; v (ii), 1923.

[30] Raverty v (i), 1707-12.

cost; the Arlat amir, Pir Muhammad Mirza Sultan of Maimana, being killed during the course of the campaign (Babur, 260).[31]

The death of Yadgar Muhammad dashed Uzun Hasan's hope of dominating Khurasan and Sultan Husain wisely refrained from antagonising the Turkman. During Sultan Husain's long reign, stability and prosperity began to return to the Cis-Oxus area, which had been ravaged by decades of civil war and natural catastrophes. He proclaimed exemption from taxes for two years to all sub-districts and the towns and villages thereof, and the country which had lain neglected was brought under cultivation and began to flourish. Vale and hill were made to bloom, buildings erected, canals opened or repaired, and from Murghab to Merv-i Shah Jan, from Sarrakhs to Merv, the land was cultivated and grew prosperous.[32] Sultan Husain was also a noted patron of the arts. Among the many great artists and literary figures who flourished during his reign, were the poet, 'Ali Sher Nawa'i (b. 844/1441) and the miniaturist, Bihzad.

Another notable event during the reign of Sultan Husain Baiqara was the rediscovery, in 885/1480-1, of the uncorrupted body of 'Ali b. Abi Talib, the cousin and son-in-law of Muhammad, at Khwaja Khair (now Mazar-i Sharif), a small village on the Nahr-i Shahi canal, twelve miles east of Balkh. According to some sources, an earlier mausoleum, built by Sultan Sanjar, had been destroyed by the Mongol invaders (Barthol'd, 79; McChesney 1991, 26-36).[33] Despite overwhelming historical evidence which showed that, following his assassination by Kharijites in 40/661, 'Ali's remains had been interred at Kufa, Sultan Husain gave almost instant official recognition to the rival claims of Khwaja Khair and endowed it in an appropriately munificent fashion (McChesney 1991, 35, 39-45).[34]

[31] Raverty v (i), 1725, 1732.

[32] Raverty v (i), 1716, from the *Bahr al-Asrar*. Yate 1888, 349, claimed, on basis of local hearsay, that in 875-6/1470 a certain Niyaz Khan was granted the governorship of Andkhui by Sultan Husain in place of Shahbash Khan, a Chulash Turkman, and became the primogenitor of the Afshar dynasty of Andkhui, which lasted until the middle of the nineteenth century.

[33] The sources for the discovery of the grave of 'Ali in 530/1135-6 have recently been published and discussed in Prof. McChesney's study of the shrine of Mazar-i Sharif. See too, Faiz Bakhsh, *Badakhshan*, 10-11.

[34] As we have seen in chapter I, Balkh had had a long association in the popular mind as a cult centre. Achaemenid Bactra had been the focus of the worship of Anahita in her temple of Zariaspa and, later, Balkh was equally renowned for its Buddhist complex of Nava Vihara, or Nau Bahar. Though this shrine was destroyed in the reign of Caliph 'Osman (d. 35/655) (Barthol'd, 77), as late as the last quarter of the tenth century AD it is recorded that the ruins of Nau Bahar, including "paintings (*naqsha*) and other wonderful works (*karkird*)," were still visible (*Hudud al-'Alam*, 108). The refounding of the shrine to the Imam, therefore, could be construed as an attempt to justify long-standing cult practices associated with Balkh and the

Sultan Husain set aside as *waqf* all of the villages fed by the Nahr-i Shahi canal and appointed one of the Andkhui shaikhs,[35] Saiyid Taj al-Din, a descendant of Saiyid Baraka (d. 1404) the spiritual adviser of Timur Lang, as *naqib* and as shaikh, Shams al-Din Muhammad (McChesney 1991, 42-3), a descendant of Abu Yazid Bastami (d. *c.* 877/1472-3), the great Sufi saint whom Timur Lang had held in some veneration (Arberry, 100).[36]

The appointment of these two individuals to the dual guardianship of the newly-established shrine and *waqf*, demonstrated Sultan Husain's skilful manipulation of the discovery to unify disparate religio-political elements within his empire after decades of civil war. The naqib's lineage linked him directly with the first and second Shi'i Imams, whilst the shaikh's background would have satisfied the numerous followers of the mystical Orders. Sultan Husain's apparently uncritical acceptance of the authenticity of the shrine provided official, Sunni legitimacy. Thus the 'Alid shrine sought to transcend diverse and conflicting religious elements (McChesney 1991, 42, 44), a tradition which has continued down to the present, where the dual festivals of Nauroz and *Gul-i Surkh* ('Red Rose', or 'Red Flower')

Hazhda Nahr canal system, by linking the area with one of the most important religious and political figures of early Islam. This hypothesis finds support from the nature of the annual festival with which the shrine is inextricably linked. Despite being the presumed resting place of the Imam, the annual festival of Nauroz and the Janda Bala ceremony have nothing whatever to do with 'Ali, his martyred sons, Shi'ism nor, indeed, with any figure of Islamic history. Early in the morning of the first day of the Persian/Zoroastrian New Year, which always begins in Afghanistan at the equinox (21 March), a large pole (*janda*) is raised in the forecourt of the shrine, amid prayers for the success of the coming year's crops. Once erected, the pole becomes a focus of healing for the myriads of sick, crippled and mentally-afflicted pilgrims who congregate in the town during the festival.

[35] The Andkhui shaikhs were probably from the same family as the *saiyids* of the *ziyarat* of Charda Ma'sum that lies to the west of the Maimana gate and which C. E. Yate visited in 1885. He reported that, although three of the tombstones had no inscription, the others, belonging to four men, five women and two children, were all descended from 'Ali b. Abi Talib through the line of Husain. The earliest dated tomb was of Amir Saiyid 'Abd al-Matlab (889/1484) (Yate says 1472); the latest, that of "Hamidah Bano daughter of Saiyid Muhammad Kasim," gave the date of her decease as Shaban 984 (Oct./Nov. 1576) (C. E. Yate 1888, 348-9). Yate also reported that the shrine had a Kufic inscription on the interior walls but did not record it. Some of the names of the later Afshar dynasty of Andkhui, e.g. Ghazanfar Khan, also suggest an Imami influence in Andkhui and this may be one reason why a *saiyid* from the area was chosen as the first *naqib* of Khwaja Khair. The shaikhs of Andkhui had played an important part in Timur's conquest of Khurasan and Herat.

[36] There is an interesting link between Abu Yazid and the Mazar-i Sharif shrine. This saint, also known as Sultan Bayazid, is buried in Bastam in Khurasan but the shrine of Hazrat Sultan, between Aibak and Khulm, has "for centuries maintained a regional authority" as the burial place of this saint (McChesney 1991, 120-1). Both shrines are thus rivals to the historic burial places of these saints further west.

attract a huge following from all three sectarian traditions of Afghanistan.[37] During the forty days of Gul-i Surkh, Sunni, Shi'i and Sufi rub shoulders under the protection of a sacred truce with no one faction demanding, or claiming, exclusive rights over the shrine. This dual administration of the Mazar-i Sharif shrine continued probably at least into the second half of the sixteenth century, after which members of the Ansari family, descendants of Khwaja 'Abdullah Ansari of Herat (d. 481/1088) took over as *mutawallis*, or guardians, of the complex, and have maintained their hereditary rights over the shrine down to the present day (McChesney 1991, 41-2).

The rebellion of Sultan Husain's sons, and particularly Badi' al-Zaman Mirza in Balkh, weakened the northern frontier of Sultan Husain's territory, for although he managed to defeat his offspring in a battle near Belcheragh (902/1487)[38] and subsequently patched up their quarrel, the fragile unity of the rump Timurid empire was increasingly threatened by the propensity of the princes to resort to arms at the slightest provocation. Consequently, when the rising power of the Uzbeks finally decided to challenge Sultan Husain for supremacy, Timurid rule was quickly swept aside.

The Shaibanid Invasions, 1501-1526

Despite their name, the Uzbeks were not the direct descendants of the Mongol warrior, Uzbek Khan, ruler of the Golden Horde [1312-1340], though Shaibani Khan (b. 855/1451) himself was a Chingizid, being a descendant of Juchi through Abu'l-Khair Khan. Originally the term Uzbek was used by Chingizid historians to designate all the Turco-Mongol tribes of the White Horde and it was only much later that the term was equated with a dynasty, or used in its present ethno-linguistic sense. Claims that the Uzbeks were the early converts to Islam amongst the Chingizid armies, or that a

[37] In the spring of 1993, whilst fighting was raging between the various politico-religious factions in Kabul, people of all racial groups in Mazar- Sharif, including the newly-arrived refugees from Kabul, were keen to attribute the relative peacefulness of town to the presence of the shrine. That the *Rauza* is still regarded by the ordinary people of Afghanistan as a symbol of unification and integration in a country of such racial and sectarian diversity, is perhaps as fitting a tribute to Sultan Husain Baiqara and the Chingizids as one can find.

[38] "Pilah Chiragh," Raverty v (i), 1755. Badi' al-Zaman fled to the high passes and mountains to the south, "which it was impossible to descend, even on foot." The fleeing soldiers were forced to dismount from their horses and linked themselves together by using their turbans and kamarbands like ropes (Babur, 260; Erskine, 151).

genealogical link existed with Uzbek Khan, are myths of more recent vintage (see, McChesney 1991, 47-8; Erskine, 28, 235ff.).[39]

The Uzbeks had been enlisted by Abu Sa'id in his bid to bring the Timurid empire under his sole control, but the weakness of the Timurid princes and the state of almost constant civil war which prevailed in their empire, merely allowed the Uzbeks to become all-powerful. It was not long before Shaibani Khan seized control of parts of Transoxiana from the Timurids and established himself as an independent power. In 906/1501, having forced the young Zahir al-Din Babur out of Ferghana, Shaibani Khan took Samarkand (Babur, 146ff.) and within a matter of months most of Transoxiana had fallen into Uzbek hands. Shaibani Khan next turned his attention to the province of Balkh and attacked across the Amu Darya. Faced with such a formidable foe, Badi' al-Zaman quit the city, leaving it in charge of his young son. In order to avoid the Uzbeks, who were raiding and pillaging in the plains to the north, the Sultan took the difficult mountain route through Darra-yi Jauz, Gurziwan and Chichaktu. When he finally reached Herat, he begged his aged father to come to his aid,[40] but Sultan Husain procrastinated as to how best to respond to this latest threat to his dominions. Meanwhile, the amirs whom Badi' al-Zaman had left behind in Balkh took the opportunity to fight amongst themselves,[41] thus exposing the province to the tender mercies of the rampaging Uzbeks, who even succeeded, howbeit briefly, in occupying the strategic town of Qunduz (Babur, 242; Erskine, 226).

The main opposition to the Uzbek incursions came from Zahir al-Din Babur, the future Mughal ruler of Delhi, who tried his utmost to spur Sultan Husain into decisive action. But the elderly and infirm Timurid ruler failed to grasp the desperateness of his situation and merely offered Babur a defensive alliance between Mughal and Timurid. Babur, outraged at this feckless strategy, angrily retorted, "how could hope live in tribe or horde when a great ruler like Sultan Husain Mirza ... spoke, not of marching forth to meet the enemy, but only of defence against attack?" (Babur, 191).

[39] Afghan sources in the last century confused the issue even more by using 'Uzbek' to describe any sedentary, semi-urbanised, Turkic people in the former appanage of Balkh; a confusion which European writers and the Afghan Boundary Commission surveyors (1884-1886) compounded.

[40] Badi' al-Zaman had previously refused to help Babur against the Uzbeks (Babur, 138, 191, 242).

[41] Raverty v (i), 1780. Amir 'Osman, a Turkman, took advantage of the prince's absence to occupy Shibarghan.

Fortunately for Sultan Husain, the Uzbeks were not bent on permanent conquest, at least for the moment, and they retired across the river. Any hope that their incursion was an aberration, however, was dispelled when, in 911/1505, the Uzbeks returned with even greater violence, carrying destruction and devastation as far south as Far-yab and Maimana.[42] Balkh, too, was briefly occupied and Khurram Shah, the Uzbek amir's five year old son, who was related, on the female side, to Babur, was appointed as the new governor (McChesney 1991, 68-9).[43]

Having secured control of the provincial capital, the Shaibanids marched on eastwards, overrunning Badakhshan. Sultan Husain, finally roused to action, appealed to Babur who had recently captured Kabul. The Mughal ruler ordered his army to march to Herat through the mountainous Hazarajat (Babur, 295), but when they reached Kahmard a messenger arrived from Herat with news that Sultan Husain Baiqara had died.[44] Even though Babur had lost patience with the Timurid ruler over his refusal to confront the Uzbeks head-on, the Mughal ruler magnanimously recorded a glowing obituary of the last great Timurid in his memoirs. Despite this set-back, Babur continued his march, passing through the Ajar valley into the upper reaches of the Balkhab. At Saf Koh, intelligence was received that the Uzbeks were raiding around Sangcharak.[45] Qasim Beg was immediately sent against the invaders and defeated them soundly (Babur, 295). After a few days' rest in the meadows of Saf-Koh, which Babur spent in hunting wild sheep and goats, various tribal leaders came and pledged their support. The Mughal army then marched through Gurziwan, Almar, Qaisar and Chichaktu to Darra-yi Bum in the mountains of Badghis, where Babur began to levy taxes (Babur, 296).

Meanwhile, the two sons of Sultan Husain, more used to the good life than military campaigning, wasted valuable time gathering their forces at Herat before setting out for the Murghab. The loyal Arlat

[42] Raverty v (i), 1788.

[43] His mother was Khanzada Begum, a full sister of Babur, who had been forcibly married to Shaibani Khan after his successful conquest of Samarkand (Babur, 18).

[44] Raverty v (i), 1790-2. He died in May 1506.

[45] Babur, 295 has "San and Chah-yak", Erskine, 23, "San and Charek, not far from his line of route." Neither place can be identified as Charikar, as suggested by Beveridge in her note, since this is in the Koh Daman, many miles in the opposite direction, south of the Hindu Kush, and a region where the Uzbek writ did not run. Sangcharak, some 35 miles (55 kms.) east of Sar-i Pul, is much more likely, for it lay ahead of Babur's line of advance. The Uzbeks had been raiding in the Maimana-Shibarghan area for several years, thus an attack on a town near Sar-i Pul would be more likely than one on Charikar.

amirs of Badghis, Qaisar and Maimana, left to fend for themselves, had been badly mauled by the Uzbeks—'Abd al-Qasim, Shiram of Jalayar and Baba Khan b. Khwaja Jalal al-Din Mirak, all being killed in action against the invaders.[46] The Arlats, however, managed to repulse an Uzbek attack on Panjdeh and Marichaq and inflicted heavy losses on the enemy with the help of the "Khurasan light troops and ... Zu'n-nun Beg" (Babur, 296).

Zahir al-Din Babur and the two Timurid princes finally joined forces at Bala Murghab on 26 October 1506. Even as they greeted each other, the Uzbeks, under Haq Nazir, were over-running Chichaktu, a matter of forty miles from their camp, and Babur immediately asked for the Mirzas' permission to launch a counter-attack. However, as the Mughal ruler records, the Timurid princes were "afraid for their own reputation ... [and] ... would not suffer me to move" (Erskine, 242). Indeed, far from going onto the offensive, Sultan Husain's sons urged Babur to winter at Murghab, a proposal to which he assented, taking the opportunity that this afforded to go on pilgrimage to Herat. Later that winter, anxiety about his still-fragile kingdom forced Babur to return to Kabul over the snow-bound passes of Ghor and united action against the Uzbeks was thus fatally postponed (Babur, 308; Erskine, 242).[47]

When winter had passed Shaibani Khan, at the head of fifty thousand men, returned across the Amu Darya, seized Andkhui and marched against the Timurid camp at Baba Khaki (Erskine, 259). As soon as news of the Uzbek advance reached them, the Timurid army melted away. Sultan Husain's sons fled without offering even token resistance in defence of their father's splendid heritage. Only Mir Zu'ulnun Beg, the great general of Sultan Husain, fortified by mystical promises that he would be the instrument by which the Uzbeks would be defeated, made a final, suicidal stand against the oncoming hordes and was cut to pieces, along with a handful of his most devoted followers (Erskine, 274).[48] A few days later Shaibani Khan entered Herat and Timurid rule in Herat ended in a whimper. The sons of Sultan Husain and other members of the royal line either died later in battle against the Uzbeks or were captured and executed by Shaibani Khan. Only Badi' al-Zaman survived for any length of time, dying

[46] Raverty v (i), 1788ff.
[47] Raverty v (i), 1797.
[48] Raverty v (i), 1799.

some ten years later, an exile at the court of Shah Isma'il Safawi (Erskine, 260).

Following the fall of Herat, the Uzbeks continued their inexorable march eastwards and for a while it seemed as if they were destined to follow in the footsteps of Chingiz Khan and Timur Lang. However, despite conquering most of Khurasan and destroying many of the Chaghatai-Timurid amirs, Shaibani Khan met two serious reverses during 915-6/1509-10; firstly against the Kazakhs in Transoxiana and then, when he attempted to conquer the Hazara and Aimaq tribes of Ghor and the Tir Band-i Turkistan. Following this latter defeat and with winter approaching, Shaibani Khan ordered a general release for his troops, who had had many years of hard campaigning without any leave of absence to visit their homes. In effect, the Uzbek chief disbanded his army during the winter, a time when normally no campaigning took place (Erskine, 296). He had not reckoned, however, with the new ruler of Persia, Shah Isma'il Safawi.

Shah Isma'il had succeeded in conquering Tabriz, the capital of the White Sheep Turkman, in 906-7/1501 and ascended the throne with the title of *Shah* (*CHI* vi, 189ff.). The appeal of Badi' al-Zaman Mirza and the threat of Uzbek incursions into Khurasan were probably the main reasons why the Safawid monarch marched his armies east. His arrival near Mashhad caught the Uzbeks by surprise. Shaibani Khan, however, mustered what troops remained to him and marched out against Shah Isma'il, but the Qizilbash troops quickly overran the whole of Uzbek-held Khurasan and forced the remnant of Shaibani Khan's army to take refuge in Merv. A ruse by the Safawid ruler lured the Uzbeks out of the city into a trap and, on 2 December 1510, in a battle at Mahmudabad, some twelve miles from Merv, the Uzbek army was cut to pieces.

Shaibani Khan and five hundred of his closest followers, their line of retreat cut off, sought shelter in a large, high-walled cattle enclosure which had only one exit. Hard-pressed by his attackers, Shaibani Khan and his men tried to jump the wall and flee to the adjacent river. In their panic to escape certain death at the hands of the advancing Persians, they fell one on top of the other and in the mêlée which followed the Khan was smothered to death under a pile of falling, writhing bodies. When the battle was finally over, his body was recovered and his head presented to the victorious Shah Isma'il, who set the skull in gold and used it as a drinking cup. Shaibani Khan's body was dismembered and distributed to various parts of the Safawid Empire

for the amusement of the populace. When Merv fell into the Shah's hands shortly afterwards, every Uzbek man in the city was put to the sword and their women sold into slavery. Nor did the ordinary citizens escape the general massacre. Thus Shah Isma'il proved himself equal to any refinement of cruelty that Shaibani Khan and his Uzbeks had perpetrated (Erskine, 303).

The defeat of Shaibani Khan resulted in the dispersion of the leaderless Uzbek army and the loss of Balkh (McChesney 1991, 69). Some twenty thousand Mughal tribesmen, who had been obliged by the superior strength of the Uzbeks to ally themselves with Shaibani Khan, separated themselves from the fleeing Uzbeks and set out for Qunduz, where they offered their services to Babur in regaining control of Samarkand (Babur, 351; Erskine, 305). The Mughal ruler, unable to resist such an opportunity, marched north through the snow-bound passes of the Hindu Kush, took possession of Qunduz and attacked the Uzbek-held fortress of Hisar. Shah Isma'il, meanwhile, followed up his victory by taking Herat, which he conferred on Husain Beg Saleh, who proceeded to inflict enormous suffering on the Sunni population of the city and surrounding territories.[49]

The following spring (917/1511) Shah Isma'il arrived in Maimana, where he was met by the Uzbek governor of the town and a delegation of other chiefs sent by Taimur Sultan b. Shaibani Khan, who had marched to the banks of the Amu Darya to oppose the Safawid monarch's advance. Shah Isma'il, though he had pressing business in Azerbaijan and the Turkish frontier, forced the Uzbeks to recognise the Amu Darya river as the border of Safawid dominions (Erskine, 308-9). Balkh thus temporarily fell under Persian domination, under the governorship of Bairam Khan Karamantu.[50] At the same time, however, Shah Isma'il entered into an anti-Uzbek alliance with Babur and sent a body of troops, under his wakil, Yar Ahmad Khuzani, Najm-i Sani, to assist Babur in his operations against Samarkand, before returning to Herat (*CHI* vi, 125-7; Erskine, 309, 323).

In October 917/1511 Babur re-entered Samarkand in triumph, amid popular acclaim, but his reliance on the Qizilbash troops of Shah Isma'il, who showed partiality towards the minority Shi'i community and terrorised the Sunni inhabitants,[51] soon led to popular discontent with the Mughal ruler. The following year Babur was forced

[49] Raverty v (ii), 1822.
[50] Raverty v (ii), 1825.
[51] This included the extermination of the entire population of Qarshi.

to abandon Samarkand, following a defeat by the Uzbeks at Ghujduvan, in which the Qizilbash troops were cut to pieces. The Najm-i Sani was captured and subsequently executed, by the Shaibanids. Babur fled to Qunduz, hoping for a further opportunity to re-invade across the Amu Darya, but at the end of 919/1513, after suffering great privations due to famine which was raging in the area,[52] he abandoned any hope of regaining control of his native land and returned to Kabul, where he consoled himself with the conquest of India (Babur, 363; Erskine, 329). The Uzbeks, meanwhile, pushed home their advantage and, in the summer of 920/1513, briefly reoccupied Balkh, only to have it taken from them again by Div Sultan for Shah Isma'il (Babur, 363, 635 n. 2). Reinstated in Balkh, the Safawid governor proceeded to attack Andkhui, which had shown signs of discontent with his rule, and put the whole Sunni population of the district to the sword.[53]

The struggle between Uzbek and Safawid for control of Balkh, was complicated by the reappearance of Muhammad al-Zaman Mirza b. Sultan Husain Baiqara. He had been "in retirement" in "Pash" (probably, the *dasht*, or hill country) of Gharchistan, but still cherished the ambition to carve out for himself a kingdom from the ashes of his father's empire. In 923/1517 he attacked Balkh, which at the time was under the governorship of Ibrahim Chapuk, who appears to have been ruling the city for Shah Isma'il. Babur, who retained a strategic interest in the fate of Balkh, hearing of the Timurid prince's success, abandoned his campaign against Afghan tribes and marched north. His unexpected arrival before Balkh surprised both Sultan Muhammad al-Zaman and the Safawid governor, with the consequence that the Mughal army took the city and made Faqir-i 'Ali governor of the area. Muhammad al-Zaman Mirza fled to Darra-yi Gaz (Jauz?) of Gharchistan, pursued by the Mughals, who eventually captured him and brought the Sultan to Kabul (Babur, 463 n. 3; Erskine, 424).

Following Shah Isma'il's death in 930/1524 Uzbek armies once again crossed the Amu Darya and quickly retook the whole region north of the Murghab river and Hindu Kush mountains, though Badakhshan continued under the Mughals (McChesney 1991, 60). In the spring of 932/1526 Balkh finally fell, this time permanently, to the Uzbeks, aided by the defection of the Mughal governor of Qunduz. The fall of Balkh ended the three-cornered battle between Uzbek,

[52] Raverty v (ii), 1837-8.
[53] Raverty v (ii), 1837.

Safawid and Mughal, for the Cis-Oxus territory, which became the appanage of the Jani-Beg Chingizid clan, whose eponymous founder was a grandson of Abu'l-Khair Khan (McChesney 1991, 53, 66).

The Chingizid Appanage System

Since most, if not all, of the nineteenth century Turco-Uzbek 'Khanates' of what the Afghans referred to as Turkistan evolved from the system of government established by the Shaibanids, which in turn took its inspiration from the Mongol period, a brief account of the system of government under the Jani-Begids is necessary at this point, for one of the undercurrents in the subsequent conflict in Balkh was the whole issue of how the province was to be governed.[54]

The legitimate head of the Chingizid empire was a senior descendant of the great Mongol conqueror, who had the right of *sikka* and *khutba*, that is, the prerogative of having his name on the coinage and inserted into the Friday Congregational Prayer. He also commanded respect by virtue of his ancestry, age and position. To all intents and purposes, however, the Khan was only nominally the ruler of the empire. Real power lay with one, or more, of the younger family members, or sultans, who led the army and ran the day-to-day affairs of state in the Khan's name.

Under the Shaibanids, the empire was divided up into appanages under the government of the neo-eponymous clans descended from Abu'l-Khair. Distribution of these appanages was decided at the quriltai, or general assembly of the Chingizid clans, which was convened either on the death of the Great Khan or when newly-conquered territory needed to be apportioned. These appanages, theoretically all of equal status, were ruled as virtually autonomous states-within-the-state. Once installed in his appanage, a sultan had the right of appointment and dismissal, but no authority beyond his own dominions. Indeed, whenever one sultan attempted to annex parts of an adjacent appanage, civil war almost invariably resulted.

Internally, the sultan maintained the same style of devolved government, sub-dividing it between members of his own clan who, in turn, parcelled out their fiefs to military leaders (amirs) as *iqta*'s or *hukumat*s. These amirid governors were given the title, *Hakim*.[55] The

[54] I have followed McChesney's lucid account of appanage politics (McChesney 1991, 51-60); but see also Raverty v (ii).

[55] For a detailed discussion of the amirid system, see, McChesney 1983.

iqta's, however, were not hereditary—at least not until the appanage system began to break down towards the end of the seventeenth century—and regular redistribution of lands took place under Nazr Muhammad and his successors (McChesney 1983).

Individual tribes (*ulusat*) were accorded different status within the empire. A complex system of diplomatic protocol existed at the court of the Supreme Khan and in the audience halls of the rulers of individual appanages. At the apex of the protocol pyramid were the Khan's most senior officials and amirs, who had the right to use the title, *Bi*. Later, under Nazr Muhammad, the amirs of the Ming and Qataghan tribes were amongst the most senior members of the Balkh appanage's court circle (McChesney 1983, 42). The subsequent rivalry between these two tribes was to be one of the most important factors in Uzbek-Afghan relations in the nineteenth century.

The two most important offices within each appanage were the post of *ataliq* and *diwanbegi*; the former being the adviser to, and supervisor of, the appanage sultan. Appointed by the Great Khan, these ataliqs were the eyes, ears and voice of central authority and acted as restraints on the individual ambitions of appanage holders. The appanage sultans were responsible for appointing their own ataliqs to control and advise the amirs. Of the diwanbegi's duties little is known. They probably supervised the area's finances, but were also actively involved in military campaigns. Underlying the whole politico-military structure of the empire was an unquestioned acceptance of, and abiding loyalty to, the Chingizid tradition, which went hand-in-hand with obedience to the Mongol social and political code, the *yasa* and *yusun* (McChesney 1983, 35).

This highly devolved system of government was in direct contrast to the Persian and, subsequently, the Afghan *padshahi*, or monarchical, style of government, as well as to nineteenth century British and Russian imperial theories of the state, all of which influenced the Durrani view of government. Ironically, the original and indigenous Afghan tribal concept of amirship was very similar to that of the Chingizids, the amir being one amongst a number of tribal leaders who were regarded as equals. However, under the influence of Persian and European imperial, political thought, the Durranis soon laid claim to complete supremacy as the 'Shadow of God'; an oriental version of the Divine Right of Kings. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Uzbeks resisted the imposition of an authoritarian, centralised

system of government which eroded half a millennium of devolved power and amirid rights.

The appanage system, like any other system of government, had its weaknesses and did not prevent inter-appanage or amirid conflict. One of its greatest internal weaknesses was the lack of any proper bureaucratic system to ensure regular and systematic collections of taxes. Even as late as 1840 the British traveller, Arthur Conolly, was appalled that Mizrab Khan, the Mingid ruler of Maimana, kept no accounts and was apparently ignorant of the amount of revenue collected by his *diwanbegi*.[56]

The Shaibanids, 1526-1599

Following the Uzbek conquest of Balkh in 932/1526, Kistan Qara Sultan b. Jani Beg was appointed governor of the appanage.[57] The following year he sent his forces against Herat and Khurasan, determined to wrest the region from the Safawids. In this, they were helped by the unsettled state of affairs in Persia following the death of Shah Isma'il. For seven months Herat was besieged, at the end of which time famine and disease had brought the city to the verge of capitulation. At the eleventh hour, however, a Persian army of forty thousand strong, under the personal command of Shah Tahmasp, comprehensively defeated the Uzbek amir, Zinish Khan (Erskine, 490ff.; McChesney 1991, 61). As the Persians advanced, reinforcements were sent post-haste to the area from across the Amu Darya but on 10 Muharram, 935 (24 September 1528) , near the village of Jam, Persian artillery proved too much for the lightly-armed Uzbeks, and they were completely routed (Babur, 622; Erskine, 490-2; McChesney 1991, 61). Having lifted the siege of Herat, the Persians soon regained much of Khurasan from the Uzbeks.[58]

The loss of Herat was a great loss of face for 'Ubaidullah Khan, and influential sultans and amirs in Badghis and Maimana,

[56] Capt. Arthur Conolly, *Account of a Journey from Bamiyan to Merv*, 1840, ESL:156, encl. 34, no. 4. No. refers to tabulated divisions within the volume in question, encl. to the number of the individual record within the tabulated divisions. A printed copy of this report can be found also at V:27/69/3.

[57] There is a great deal of confusion in many earlier European histories about the Jani-Begid, or Shaibanid, period in Balkh. I have followed McChesney (1991). Raverty despite using contemporary Persian manuscripts such as the *Bahr al-Asrar*, is very unreliable with his dates. He is also writing at the end of the last century, when little was known about the pre-Afghan history of Balkh.

[58] Raverty v (ii), 1846-7.

disillusioned at their leader's lack of military prowess, began to adopt their own, independent, policy towards Persia. In 942/1535, the amir of the iqta' of Gharchistan, probably with the tacit agreement of Kistan Qara Sultan at Balkh, attacked Herat without consulting the Supreme Khan (Howorth, 723; McChesney 1991, 61).

The death of 'Ubaidullah Khan in 947/1540 further weakened Uzbek power, since it precipitated a period of inter-appanage war. The four main Shaibanid appanages became virtually separate states, with individual sultans laying claim to the title of Khan. In *c.* 1547, Pir Muhammad b. Jani Beg of Balkh (d. 975/1566-7), who had succeeded his nephew, Kistan Qara Sultan, in 951/1544,[59] gave sanctuary to Kamran Sultan, the rebellious son of the new Mughal emperor, Homayun b. Babur, and helped him take possession of the Mughal outposts of Dahan-i Ghuri and Baghlan (Howorth, 723-4; McChesney 1991, 67). This action angered Homayun and, in 956/1549, he marched his army across the Hindu Kush and besieged Pir Muhammad's ataliq, at Khwaja Bagh, in Aibak. Following the surrender of this citadel, Homayun marched to Khulm, paying his respects at the shrine of Shah Aulia' at Astana on the way. After a brief stay in the 'Alid shrine at Mazar-i Sharif, rumours of trouble in Kabul and the arrival of strong Uzbek reinforcements from across the Amu Darya, forced Homayun to retreat. As the Mughal army marched back through the valley of Deragaz, they were attacked by the Uzbeks and scattered to the four winds (Howorth, 724-5).

In 958/1551, Pir Muhammad of Balkh attempted to seize Bukhara. This led to the formation of an anti-Jani-Begid confederacy amongst the Shaibanid clans of Transoxiana. The following year, these confederated Uzbek amirs attacked Jani-Begid holdings in Transoxiana and Khwarazm, forcing them to abandon their appanage rights and retire to Balkh (McChesney 1991, 2). Despite this set-back, in 964/1557, a nephew of Pir Muhammad, 'Abdullah b. Iskandar, who governed in Maimana, managed to take Bukhara for the Jani-Begids, appointed his father as Khan and established himself as the paramount military power in the Shaibanid empire (Howorth, 728-9; McChesney 1991, 62-3, 67).

'Abdullah set out to transform the federal structure of the state into a more Persian-style monarchical system based on a father-to-son succession, in opposition to the Chingizid model where the Khan was

[59] As distinct from Pir Muhammad b. Jani Muhammad Sultan b. Yar Muhammad, the first of the Tuqay-Timurid princes who replaced the Jani-Begids in Balkh.

chosen according to his seniority amongst all the sultans. Predictably, this policy provoked a further bout of inter-clan warfare, which 'Abdullah exacerbated by trying to eliminate all Chingizid rivals to his son's succession. Both the powerful Abu'l-Khairid and Jani-Begid clans fiercely opposed such fundamental changes to the Chingizid system (McChesney 1991, 64).[60] One consequence of 'Abdullah's actions was to precipitate hostilities between himself and his uncle, Pir Muhammad, in Balkh and, when Pir Muhammad died in 975/1567 (McChesney 1991, 67),[61] his son, Din Muhammad, carried on the feud. The campaign, though, went badly for Din Muhammad and, in the summer of 981/1573, 'Abdullah took the city, following a ten month siege (Howorth, 731; McChesney 1991, 67). Initially, 'Abdullah divided the newly-acquired Balkh appanage into five amirships but, following the death of his father in the autumn of 990/1582, when he succeeded to the Khanship, his fifteen year old son and heir, 'Abd al-Mu'min, was given the governorship of Balkh, with Jan Kildi Bi as his ataliq (McChesney 1991, 67).

In 996/1587 'Abdullah resumed his attacks on Khurasan. Following a siege which lasted nine months, Herat fell and the city's Persian Governor, 'Ali Quli Khan Shamlu, was put to death. Two years later he siezed control of Mashhad and 'Abd al-Mu'min, standing in the court of Mir 'Ali Shir, watched whilst his soldiers ran wild, massacring the city's inhabitants, violating the holiest parts of the shrine of Imam Reza and putting to the sword all who had sought sanctuary in the complex. Vast amounts of treasure fell into the hands of the Uzbeks and the priceless library attached to the shrine was destroyed or broken up (Howorth, 735-6; McChesney 1991, 74).

When 'Abdullah died in 1006/1589, the Bukharan and Balkh amirs recognised his son, 'Abd al-Mu'min, as Khan, but other amirs refused to accept the hereditary succession. Despite his attempts to unite them by another campaign into Khurasan, 'Abd al-Mu'min was assassinated by his commanders at Uratepa after a reign of only six months

[60] Howarth, 729 says that 'Abdullah visited his uncle, Pir Muhammad, who was in Shibarghan at the time, and agreed to an exchange of territory. Pir Muhammad was ceded Bukhara in return for 'Abdullah being made master of the Balkh appanage. However, this exchange of fiefs was postponed as a result of the rebellion of Pir Muhammad's son, Din Muhammad, who seized Balkh. Pir Muhammad was thus obliged to march back to his capital and put down the rebellion.

[61] Raverty is inconsistent with his dates. At v (ii), 1871-2, he says Pir Muhammad died in 975/1567, but at v (ii), 1880-1 gives the Hijra date as 974. Skrine & Ross, 190, in their genealogical tables, erroneously give the date of Pir Muhammad's death as 968/1561. Howorth, at p. 729, has the date 974 AH but the next page has 975 AH.

(Howorth, 738; McChesney 1991, 65-6). Although his death was also the end of his family's ambitions to establish their own dynasty, 'Abdullah's persecution of the Chingizid sultans had left a huge vacuum, for many senior members of the Shaibanid house had been exterminated. The result, therefore, was confusion and anarchy throughout the Uzbek empire.

The Tuqay-Timurids, 1599-1722

Following the capture of Herat in 996/1588, 'Abdullah had assigned the areas west of the city to Din Muhammad b. Jani Muhammad, who had made an important contribution to the Khurasan campaign. A few years later, in 1001/1592-3, Din Muhammad was shown further marks of favour by being granted control of the frontier territory of Sistan (McChesney 1991, 73-4).

Din Muhammad was a descendant of Tuqay, grandson of Chingiz Khan. His family had taken up their abode in the Astrakhan region on the Caspian, but subsequently Mangqishlaq, the great-grandfather of Din Muhammad. had been forced to flee southwards following the Russian annexation of the region. Mangqishlaq found sanctuary with the Jani-Begids and subsequently took to wife the daughter of a senior member of this clan (McChesney 1991, 72-4).[62] The relationship with the Jani-Begids and his Chingizid pedigree thus made the family of Din Muhammad strong contenders for the Khanship on the death of 'Abd al-Mu'min. Hence, although Pir Muhammad (sometimes referred to by European authorities as Pir Muhammad II), a brother of Iskandar, was appointed as Khan, Din Muhammad called an assembly of his own clan in Sistan which set up Yar Muhammad b. Mangqishlaq, as a rival Khan (Howorth, 739; McChesney 1991, 74-5). Din Muhammad marched to Herat to publicly proclaim this decision and the amirid governor, appointed by 'Abd al-Mu'min, quickly acknowledged the Pretender's authority (Howorth, 739, 744; McChesney 1991, 75).

At this point circumstances beyond Din Muhammad's control intervened in the Tuqay-Timurids' bid for supreme power. News reached Herat that a large Persian army, led by Shah 'Abbas I, was

[62] Jani Muhammad b. Mangqishlaq married Zahra Khanum, a daughter of Iskandar and sister of 'Abdullah (Howorth, 739, 744; Skrine & Ross, 194ff.). Din Muhammad later married, amongst others, the daughter of an official of the shrine of Imam Reza following the Uzbek sack of the city in 1589 (McChesney 1991, 74); see Appendix IV, i.

approaching and the governor persuaded a reluctant Din Muhammad to stay and lead the resistance. In August 1006/1589 Din Muhammad's army was badly defeated and the Sultan himself killed (*CHI* vi, 267; McChesney 1991, 74-5).[63] Din Muhammad's wife and his two young sons, Imam Quli and Nazr Muhammad, escaped from the battle by the skin of their teeth, when a loyal servant, Nadir Muhammad, concealed them in his saddlebags and galloped out of the encampment, despite being wounded in the foot (Howorth, 744).

The mantle of the Tuqay-Timurids fell on Din Muhammad's brother, Baqi Muhammad, who arrived in Transoxiana to find that the Kazakhs, who had recently captured Tashkent and Samarkand, were marching on Bukhara. Baqi Muhammad offered his help and within a short time had dispersed the Kazakh threat (Howorth, 740; McChesney 1991, 76). The following year (1007/1599) Baqi Muhammad, taking advantage of Pir Muhammad's struggle with some recalcitrant amirs, marched to their assistance, entered Bukhara and put the Khan to death. In the ensuing quriltai summoned by Baqi Muhammad, the Chingizid norms of succession were reaffirmed and the innovations of 'Abdullah and 'Abd al-Mu'min overthrown. Yar Muhammad, being the most senior member of the Tuqay-Timurids, was offered the title of Khan, but he declined on the grounds of great age and a wish to spend the remaining days of his life in religious pursuits. Instead, the mantle fell on his eldest son, Jani Muhammad, who became the nominal Head of State (*Sultan-i Suri*) and the first of the Tuqay-Timurid rulers of Bukhara, with rights of coinage and *khutba*. Effective power in the state, however, was in the hands of the dynamic Baqi Muhammad, whose office of the "Real Khanate" (*Sultanat-i Ma'nawi*) was similar to that of heir apparent (Howorth, 741; McChesney 1991, 76-7).

At the time of the quriltai of 1599, Balkh lay outside of the control of Baqi Muhammad, being ruled by 'Abd al-Amin, a nephew of 'Abdullah (Howorth, 745; McChesney 1991, 81). He was quickly overthrown and put to death by Sultan Muhammad Ibrahim, a Shaibanid prince and descendant of Abu'l-Khair,[64] who took Balkh in *c.* 1600 with the help of a Persian army (Howorth, 744-5; McChesney 1991, 81-2). Ibrahim did not last long, dying sometime in 1009/1600,

[63] There is some question as to whether he was killed in the battle, or died later as a result of his wounds (cf. Howorth, 739-40; McChesney 1991, 74-5).

[64] Sources differ about his exact relationship to 'Abd al-Mu'min; see, McChesney 1991, 81 n. 26.

probably as a result of drink. He was succeeded by a certain 'Ubaidullah (Howorth, 745).[65] During his brief reign Ibrahim had alienated influential amirs by appointing an outsider, Khuda Nazar Bi Qunghrat, as his ataliq. One late source also claimed that Ibrahim's pro-Shi'i policies had led to the death of many of the Sunni population, though whether any such sectarian purges took place is highly questionable (McChesney 1991, 81-2). It is more likely that internal rivalries between the Shaibanids and Tuqay-Timurids were the true cause of amirid discontent, for under the Khanship of 'Abdullah and 'Abd al-Mu'min, their power had been severely curtailed. Ibrahim's alliance with the old enemy, Persia, probably did not endear him to the amirs either, as Babur had found out to his cost some years earlier.

One of the main amirid factions in Balkh at this point was led by Baruti Bi Ming, whose son was later to become the first member of this clan to be appointed to the iqta' of Maimana. The Ming tribe were themselves one of the "quadripartite" (*chaharganah*) tribes (*ulus*) of the Tuqay-Timurid line (McChesney 1991, 72) and undoubtedly acted as a fifth column in Balkh for Baqi Muhammad (McChesney 1991, 82). Thus, when Wali Muhammad, another brother of Baqi Muhammad, arrived outside Balkh in 1009/1601, Baruti Bi Ming surrendered the city to him without a fight (Howorth, 745; McChesney 1991, 82).

The conquest of Balkh was an important victory for Baqi Muhammad, for it struck a decisive blow to Safawid power south of the Amu Darya, brought Balkh back under the control of the Khan of Bukhara and prevented the appanage being used as a base by Shaibanid pretenders.

Ibrahim's death had removed one possible rival to the new Khan, but the appanage had provided a sanctuary for two other Shaibanid princes, Jahangir Mirza b. Saiyid Muhammad Sultan, at Shibarghan, and Salim Sultan b. Pir Muhammad II, who had been given the government of Andkhui (Howorth, 745).[66] When news of Wali Muhammad's advance on Balkh reached these two princes, they fled to Persia where they ingratiated themselves with Shah 'Abbas I by returning a famous diamond which had been plundered from the shrine of Imam Reza a few years earlier (Howorth, 745). Wali Muhammad, meanwhile, was confirmed as the appanage-holder of Balkh and became the first of a long line of Tuqay-Timurids to rule the area.

[65] Raverty v (ii), 1887.

[66] Raverty v (ii), 1885-7.

In 1011/1602 Baqi Muhammad marched against the Qarai tribe of Qunduz, with the object of revenging himself for the death of another of his brothers, whom they had killed (Howorth, 745), and massacred the entire garrison.[67] This tribe seems to have had some relationship with the Safawid rulers, for Shah 'Abbas I, accompanied by the two Shaibanid princes, made this attack the *casus belli* for a further invasion of Balkh (Howorth, 745; McChesney 1991, 83).

Initially, the Persian army had significant success and both Andkhui and Shibarghan fell into their hands.[68] The whole region as far as "Biluk Akchi" (Belcheragh? Aqcha?) (Howorth, 745) was laid waste by the Safawids, but lack of water and the outbreak of an epidemic decimated Shah 'Abbas' force. Weakened by thirst and disease, the invaders were quickly dispersed by the Uzbeks with great loss of life. Shah 'Abbas and a few thousand followers fled to Andkhui, which they destroyed, carrying the inhabitants of the town back across the Murghab to Herat. Many Qizilbash troops, as well as the unfortunate citizens of Andkhui, however, perished in the retreat (Howorth, 745).[69]

Sometime during 1014/1606,[70] Baqi Muhammad fell seriously ill and, on the advice of Shaikh 'Alim 'Azizan, he was carried to the Amu Darya and floated on board a ship for several days in the hope that the fresh breezes would cure him. It was all to no avail and the Khan died a short while later (Howorth, 746). Wali Muhammad, who had gone to Qarshi to be with his brother during his final hours, immediately had himself proclaimed Khan (Howorth, 746: McChesney 1991, 94)[71] and appointed his foster-brother, Shah Beg Foladchi, as the temporary governor of Balkh. However, it took a threat of military action before Wali Muhammad was able to persuade his two nephews, Nazr Muhammad and Imam Quli, to recognise his succession (Howorth, 747; McChesney 1991, 94-5).

The following Hijra year (1015), Wali Muhammad sent the fifteen year-old Nazr Muhammad to Balkh as his representative under the close tutelage of an ataliq chosen from amongst Wali Muhammad's own amirs (Howorth, 747; McChesney 1991, 96).

The same year Shah 'Abbas, hoping to take advantage of Baqi Muhammad's death, crossed the Murghab, accompanied by Jahangir

[67] Raverty v (ii), 1890-1.
[68] *Ibid.*
[69] *Ibid.*
[70] See McChesney 1991, 94 n. 68 for the problems of dating Baqi Muhammad's death.
[71] Raverty v (ii), 1891.

Sultan. When news of the Persian advance reached Badghis, Tahir Bi, the amir of Maimana and Chichaktu, Tarkhan Durman of Shibarghan and the heads of the different *hazaras* of "Jolbani" and Gurziwan, dispatched urgent messages to Balkh asking for assistance, but were told that they could expect no help from that quarter.[72] Wali Muhammad, however, sent his own reinforcements to Maimana and, at "Amawza" (Almar?) the Uzbeks attacked and defeated the Shaibanid princes with heavy losses.[73] Jahangir fled to Gharchistan before finally managing to make his way back to Herat. The following year he and his brother returned and marched against Balkh through the mountain regions of Gharchistan. Yet again their Persian army was comprehensively defeated and the Shaibanid princes fled to Gurziwan, where they were captured, taken prisoner and put to death. Thus ended the Shaibanid challenge to the new rulers of Bukhara and Balkh.[74]

To follow up this success, forces from Balkh were sent to raid Persian territory across the Murghab. After attacking Marichaq, the Uzbeks continued on down the river to the very outskirts of Merv, whilst another force went against the fort of Haus-i Khan, Zorabad and the nomadic population of Badghis, until heavy snows and local opposition forced them to retire.[75]

Although the skill and prowess of the amirs of Maimana and Balkh had enabled them to beat back the Shaibanid challenge, internal disputes continued to beset the Tuqay-Timurid Khanate. Wali Muhammad soon established a dubious reputation for "revolting" cruelty (Howorth, 746), having senior advisers of his predecessor, Baqi Muhammad, put to death in a variety of grotesquely novel ways (Howorth, 747). His excess fuelled discontent, which quickly broke into outright rebellion and Nazr Muhammad, whose amirs had already proved their military prowess against the Safawid-Shaibanid challenge, became a rallying point for the rebellion. In 1018/1608 the Walid ataliq of Balkh was assassinated and Nazr Muhammad joined his older brother, Imam Quli, and marched on two fronts against Wali Muhammad. After a brief struggle, the Khan fled to Shah 'Abbas, who received him warmly and gave him eighty thousand troops to reconquer his lost empire (Howorth, 746; McChesney 1991, 96-7).[76]

[72] Raverty v (ii), 1897-8.
[73] Raverty v (ii), 1899.
[74] Raverty v (ii), 1901.
[75] Raverty v (ii), 1902-3.
[76] Raverty v (ii), 1906.

Imam Quli was installed as the new Khan in Bukhara and sent his diwanbegi to assist the amirs of Chichaktu, Gharchistan and Maimana, who had declared for him. Wali Muhammad's son, Rustam Muhammad Sultan, who was in Darra-yi Jauz of Gurziwan at the time of his father's flight, responded by besieging Amir 'Abdullah Bi Qipchaq in Maimana.[77] A short while later, Wali Muhammad himself marched to Marichaq, crossed the Murghab and, avoiding the forces that his son had tied up before Maimana, pushed on across the Amu Darya. In August 1611 (Jumada II, 1020) he briefly recaptured Bukhara, but Imam Quli quickly regrouped his forces and comprehensively defeated Wali Muhammad in a battle before Samarkand. The deposed Khan was captured and, after seeking the guidance of his spiritual adviser, Imam Quli had him beheaded (Howorth, 746-7; McChesney 1991, 96-7).[78] When news of his father's execution reached Rustam Muhammad, he abandoned his investment of Maimana, which had resisted all his efforts to reduce it, and fled, via Darra-yi Jauz, to Safawid-held Herat, where he was later joined by another son of Wali Muhammad, Muhammad Rahim (Howorth, 747).[79]

The execution of Wali Muhammad in 1020/1611 secured the succession for the heirs of Din Muhammad with Nazr Muhammad confirmed as the ruler of Balkh and, for the next three decades, Nazr Muhammad ruled the appanage as heir apparent. His country extended some six hundred miles from east to west and two hundred miles from north to south (McChesney 1991, 97); a province approximately the size of England and Wales. To the west it included the iqta's of Shibarghan, Andkhui, Maimana, Far-yab, Chichaktu, Gurziwan, Darzab, Gharchistan and Juzjan. The southern border stretched from the banks of the Murghab river southwards to north of the Persian-held outpost of Obeh on the upper Hari Rud (McChesney 1991, 97). The boundary then ran eastwards through "the mountains of Ghur" to Kahmard, north of Bamiyan, which straddled the important caravan route between Kabul and Khulm. Kahmard itself became the iqta' of Yalangtush Bi Alchin, the greatest of Nazr Muhammad's amirs who, amongst other things, was to play a crucial part in the defeat of the Walid pretender, Rustam Muhammad Sultan. From his stronghold, Yalangtush controlled Darra-yi Yusuf, Malikan, the tribal regions of the Tulakji, Saiqanji, Ziragi, Gulgi, Hazara-yi Nekudari

[77] Raverty v (ii), 1910-2.
[78] *Ibid.*
[79] Raverty v (ii), 1910.

and the tribal groups as far south as Ghazni, Qandahar, Zamin Dawar, Ghor and Khurasan. In the east, the appanage included Qunduz, Faizabad, Ishkamish and most of the modern province of Badakhshan, excluding the Wakhan corridor. To the north, Kulab and Termez, on the other side of the Amu Darya, were also under Nazr Muhammad's authority (McChesney 1991, 97-8).

On the strategic Murghab-Badghis border, Nazr Muhammad appointed "valiant amirs" who were responsible for repelling Safawid incursions. Amongst these amirs were: Nazar Bi "Kabjah" (Qipchaq?) in Darra-yi Gharchistan, Buzak "a Karayat Turk" at Far-yab; Mirza 'Ali Beg Naiman at Andkhui and Shah Muhammad Bi, a "Kangkurat Mughul" in Shibarghan. The iqta' of Maimana was entrusted to 'Abdullah Bi Qipchaq, who was also responsible for the forts at Chichaktu, Qaisar, Almar, Yabaghu and other border areas along the Murghab. Later, however, the requirements of Nazr Muhammad's sons for their own sub-appanages led to the consolidation of a number of the amirid holdings. In *c.* 1621 Khusrau Sultan, the third son of Nazr Muhammad, was given Maimana as his sub-appanage with Uraz Bi b. Baruti Bi Ming as his ataliq (McChesney 1991, 99, 117-8).

According to Mahmud b. Amir Wali's *Bahr al-Asrar*, Uraz Bi Ming, who rose to be one of the three most important amirs of Nazr Muhammad's era, began his career as the Royal Falcon-Master (*Qushbegi-gari Khassa*), progressing to Hakim of Termez until his appointment as Ataliq of Maimana. Uraz Bi's first period as ataliq lasted some nine years, until 1045/1635, when Nazr Muhammad sent his eldest son and heir, 'Abd al-'Aziz with Ataliq 'Abd al-Rahman Khan Ushun to take charge of the area. Uraz Bi Ming returned to Balkh, but five years later he was sent back and remained in Maimana until his death, having established his tribe's power in the area and laid the foundations of the subsequent Mingid dynasty (McChesney 1991, 101, 117).[80] For, although as a result of the rebellion of his eldest son 'Abd al-'Aziz in 1057/1647, Nazr Muhammad sent his favourite son, Qasim Sultan, to take over his brother's fief at Maimana (Howorth, 752-3), Ming interest in Maimana continued, as many amirs, by this time, were increasingly reluctant to change their iqta', preferring instead to carve out for themselves a hereditary fiefdom.

The appointment of Uraz Bi Ming as Ataliq of Maimana in *c.* 1621, therefore, must be regarded as marking the beginning of the Mingid dynasty of Maimana and we can dismiss as a convenient

[80] Raverty v (ii), 1910, from the *Bahr al-Asrar*.

colonial fiction subsequent claims by Arthur Conolly and British military historians that this family owed its political existence to the patronage and condescension of Ahmad Shah Durrani.[81] In fact Mingid rule in Maimana predates the Durrani monarchy by more than one hundred and twenty years (McChesney 1991, 99, 117). According to one informed oral source, Hakim Haji Bi Ming, whose presence at the court of Ahmad Shah Durrani in 1751 gave rise to subsequent British misunderstandings about the nature of Uzbek-Afghan relations, was the great-great-grandson of a Tuqay-Timurid ataliq.[82]

The unusual political arrangement of the areas between Balkh and the Murghab, known during the nineteenth century as the Chahar Wilayat ('Four Provinces'), is undoubtedly a survival of Nazr Muhammad's division of Balkh into sub-appanages and explains why, during the Afghan period, the hakims of Andkhui, Shibarghan and Sar-i Pul deferred to the Mingid dynasty of Maimana in respect of foreign relations, even though individual members of the Chahar Wilayat might have been in dispute with each other over issues of succession, territory, water-rights, etc. Indeed, we know that Maimana had been the "chief place"[83] of the western marches of Balkh even before Nazr Muhammad chose it as the centre of a princely sub-appanage and it remained so long after the eclipse of the Chingizid system.[84]

Nazr Muhammad's tenure as the Balkh appanage-holder lasted over thirty years[85] but the claim by Howorth (p. 747) that, "on the side of Persia there was peace for many years, the strong arm of Abbas restraining both Uzbeg (*sic*) and Turkomans from making their predatory raids" is only a half truth. For although Persia avoided any direct confrontation, the Safawids encouraged and supported the Walid Pretender, Rustam Muhammad Sultan, and made him governor of their strategic mountain fortress of Obeh which lay just across the border from Nazr Muhammad's territory.

Shortly after his father's assassination, Rustam Muhammad, without obtaining the permission of his patron, Shah 'Abbas I, left Herat and marched into Gharchistan. At the time Nazr Muhammad was

[81] For discussion of Conolly's report and other British official histories during the First Anglo-Afghan War, see chapters 3, 5.

[82] Haji Bi Khan Ming b. Haji Allah Nazar Khan b. 'Abd al-Ahad Khan b. 'Abd al-Wahad Khan b. Ataliq Khan b. Qizil Arslan Khan: Ergeš Uçkun, *personal communication*.

[83] Raverty v (ii), 1949-50, from the *Bahr al-Asrar*.

[84] *Ibid.*

[85] For details about internal organisation and tensions in Balkh during this period, see McChesney 1991, 97-103.

occupied beyond the Amu Darya, having gone to assist his brother, Imam Quli, who was campaigning against the Kazakhs (Howorth, 747-8).[86] Rustam Muhammad managed to occupy the town and bazaar of Balkh, but Nazr's deputy, supported by the prince's mother and brothers, held out in the citadel. Nazr's mother cleverly lulled Rustam Muhammad into a sense of false security by offering to give one of her daughters in marriage to the Pretender and promising to use her influence to secure Rustam Sultan an appropriate appanage.[87] This ploy deceived Rustam Muhammad so completely that he took no defensive precautions in case these promises proved worthless. Nazr Muhammad, meanwhile, secretly dispatched messengers to loyal amirs in the area, ordering them to attack Rustam Khan whilst he was still off his guard. When the trap was sprung, Rustam Muhammad's forces were completely routed and his army decimated, forcing the Walid Pretender to flee for his life to the Safawid outpost of Marichaq.[88]

The following year (1022/1613) Rustam Muhammad returned. This time he marched from Herat to Darra-yi Jauz of Gurziwan; the area he once governed. However, fearful of an attack from Maimana, Rustam tried to retire to the mountain fastness of Gharchistan and Obeh, but an army from Maimana intercepted him near Sar-i Haus in the head-waters of the Ab-i Maimana. Rustam Muhammad managed to beat this attack off and the Maimana amirs returned to the plains, regrouped and marched back into Gharchistan by another route. When news of the return of the Maimana army reached Rustam Muhammad he took up a strong defensive position in the pass of "Bazghurid of Chartak."[89] Despite this strategic advantage, the pass was forced and Rustam Sultan fled to Farah, from whence he made his way back to Herat.[90]

In 1023/1614 Rustam again attacked Gharchistan and occupied several outposts. He then proceeded to march against Muhammad Bi "Khitai," the amir of Asiyar, who sent urgent requests for assistance to Shadman Bi at Maimana. Once more the Maimana tribes were assembled and marched to the relief of Muhammad Bi, via a rarely used and difficult route. Rustam Muhammad, whose intelligence network kept him well informed about the movement of Maimana tribes, set

[86] Raverty v (ii), 1914.

[87] *Ibid.*

[88] Raverty v (ii), 1913.

[89] Raverty v (ii), 1914-5. Probably in the upper Murghab, near Jawand.

[90] *Ibid.*

an ambush in the narrowest and most difficult section of the pass. As Shadman Bi ascended the narrow, steep mountain valley, Rustam Muhammad's men rained arrows and gunfire onto the advancing enemy, killing many, including the amir of Maimana himself. The survivors were forced to seek shelter in the many caves which abound in the Turkistan mountains, only making good their escape after nightfall. Yet, despite this success, Rustam Muhammad failed to push home his advantage and retired to Obeh. Nazr Muhammad, meanwhile, appointed Nazar Bi to replace Shadman Bi.[91]

In 1024/1615 Nazr Muhammad felt strong enough to order the Arlat tribes of Maimana and Badghis to resume the raids against Persian-held Badghis and Khurasan. During the winter of 1026/1616-7 there were a series of raids against western Khurasan. Following the death of Husain Khan, *Beglarbegi* of Khurasan in 1027/1617, his son, Hasan Ishar, was made Amir al-Umara and the government of Herat was bestowed on him, whereupon Yalangtush Bi, the amir of Kahmard, attacked the province as far west as Ghuriyan. However, the Uzbeks made the mistake of leaving their main baggage behind in Maimana and Chichaktu. Rustam Muhammad, who still held the governorship of Obeh, saw his chance and looted the supply camp, forcing the invaders to abandon their raid and return back beyond the Murghab.[92]

Three years later (1030/1620) Rustam Muhammad marched his forces to the Murghab, hoping to attack Balkh. Once more he was defeated and retreated to the "lower" Murghab (Marichaq?) where he was reinforced by Qizilbash troops, probably from Herat. With their help, he succeeded in capturing the strategic fortress of Bala Murghab[93] and raided settlements as far north as Andkhui and Shibarghan. Forces from Balkh were sent to repulse them and, with the help of local Jamshidi tribesmen, Bala Murghab was retaken in a surprise night attack. The Qizilbash garrison was put to the sword and its newly-installed Safawid governor sent for punishment to Nazr Muhammad. Nazr Muhammad's forces next turned their attention to Marichaq, which also fell into their hands. He then raided Persian-held Badghis and Khurasan in retaliation for the attacks on Andkhui and Shibarghan the previous year.[94]

[91] Raverty v (ii), 1918, 1927.
[92] Raverty v (ii), 1927.
[93] Raverty v (ii), 1930. Raverty is not clear whether it was Bala Murghab which was attacked. However, Nazr Muhammad's forces are said to have recaptured the town later the same year.
[94] Raverty v (ii), 1937-8.

The following year, Shah 'Abbas I assembled a large army at Nishapur with the two-fold intention of seizing Qandahar from the Mughal emperor, Jahangir, and supporting Rustam Muhammad's war against Nazr Muhammad. The Persian preparations greatly alarmed the ruler of Balkh, who sent an envoy to Shah 'Abbas with a present of fifty horses (Howorth, 751). Rustam Muhammad, meanwhile, taking advantage of the lull in hostilities occasioned by this diplomatic activity, joined forces with Shah 'Abbas before Qandahar, which fell into Persian hands the same year (1031/1622) (*CHI* vi, 267).[95]

Once freed from his duties at Qandahar, the son of Wali Muhammad returned to his fortress in Gharchistan, attacked Chichaktu and laid siege to Maimana. The surrounding villages and countryside were laid waste and the local population forcibly conscripted into the sultan's army. The arrival of strong reinforcements, under Ataliq 'Abd al-Rahman Ushun, however, forced the Walid Pretender to abandon the siege. Yet again Rustam Muhammad took flight, this time to Chichaktu, before making his way back to his fief at Obeh. 'Abd al-Rahman Ushun, who had ordered hot pursuit of Rustam's shattered army, hearing that the Sultan had fled to the mountains, returned to Balkh leaving Yalangtush Bi to continue the attack.

Orders were issued to all amirs of the region[96] to join forces and, despite severe winter weather, Yalangtush Bi succeeded in capturing Rustam Muhammad's stronghold of Obeh, followed, a short while later, by Chakhcharan. Both districts were thus annexed, for a while at least, to Nazr Muhammad's possessions.[97]

Somehow Rustam Muhammad managed to evade capture and fled to Herat. Shah 'Abbas, concerned about the loss of strategic frontier position, opened negotiations with Nazr Muhammad and agreed to send the prince into virtual exile by appointing him governor of Mazdaran, ending, in the process, a decade of war between Rustam Muhammad and Nazr Muhammad.[98]

For the four years prior to the death of Shah 'Abbas in 1038/1629, Maimana, Chichaktu and the border areas of the Balkh appanage had a chance to recover from the ravages of this civil war and the area, once more, began to prosper. However, when news of Shah 'Abbas'

[95] *Ibid.*
[96] Raverty v (ii), 1931, from the *Bahr al-Asrar*.
[97] Raverty v (ii), 1931-2. This may be the undated campaign referred to in Howorth and Vambery which involved some twenty thousand troops from Balkh with assistance from Imam Quli (Howorth, 751).
[98] Raverty v (ii), 1938, 1947.

demise reached Balkh, Nazr Muhammad, freed from his treaty with the Persian king, sent his commanders against Marichaq, Bala Murghab and other border forts, though without achieving any notable successes. In the same Hijra year Yalangtush Bi marched into the Koh Daman, besieged Mughal-held Kabul and laid waste the surrounding countryside (Inayat Khan, 24). Although the Uzbeks failed to take the city, the new ruler of the Mughal empire, Shah Jahan, later used this raid to justify his campaign against Balkh in 1056/1646 (McChesney 1991, 107-8).[99]

In order to counteract the renewed attacks by the Uzbeks in Herat, the Persian governor of Khurasan allowed Rustam Muhammad to resume the campaign against his cousin, Nazr Muhammad. The ruler of Balkh responded by sending his eldest son 'Abd al-'Aziz to take charge of military operations on the Murghab border. 'Abd al-'Aziz, an able if somewhat impetuous, commander, went onto the offensive, besieged the Persian outpost of Marichaq and sent raiders to pillage Khurasan. Problems in Transoxiana, however, led to 'Abd al-'Aziz's recall and his brother, Khusrau Sultan, temporarily took over. Accusing the Persians of harassing Uzbek merchants, Khusrau marched an army against Panjdeh, but was bought off by the beleaguered Safawid governor, who offered to pay reparations. This settlement, however, did not prevent Khusrau Sultan marching off large numbers of the peasantry and nomads to a new location, presumably within his own borders.[100]

The next year 'Abd al-'Aziz returned from beyond the Amu Darya and was formally given Maimana as his sub-appanage, with 'Abd al-Rahman Ushun as his ataliq. In October[101] of that year, he marched from Shibarghan via Maimana to Chichaktu where levies flocked to the prince's flag from all over Gurziwan. After crossing the Murghab, he set out against Nishapur but, after having encountered stiff resistance from the Safawids, the Uzbek army returned to Maimana. A short while later 'Abd al-Rahman Ushun mounted another lightning raid on Badghis. In the space of a few days, he left a swathe of destruction from the perimeters of Herat city to Yabaghu and Chichaktu. Next, the Ataliq launched a surprise night attack on Obeh, which had been reoccupied by Rustam Muhammad, and completely destroyed the fortress. Once more, the luckless Sultan had to flee to Herat,

[99] Raverty v (ii), 1945-8.
[100] Raverty v (ii), 1949-50.
[101] Raverty v (ii), 1952, "The fifth month" of the Arabic calendar, i.e. Jumada I.

where he finally gave up the unequal struggle against Nazr Muhammad.[102]

Over the next two years, the tribes subject to Nazr Muhammad on the Murghab border raided almost unhindered throughout Badghis and Khurasan. Vast areas of fertile land were laid waste, villages looted and their inhabitants pillaged or enslaved.[103] During the autumn and winter of 1046/1636 'Abd al-'Aziz assembled a force in Darra-yi Jauz of Gurziwan, with the object of attacking the fertile countryside around Herat. Unopposed by the Persian governor, they raided up to the very walls of the city, which had closed its gates, leaving the population of the surrounding villages, who had failed to reach the safety of its defences, to be mercilessly pillaged and slaughtered. Finally, the governor of Khurasan, informed of the situation, collected a force in Mashhad and marched to Herat, forcing the booty-laden 'Uzbeks' back across the Murghab.[104]

In 1051/1641[105] the long reign of Imam Quli Khan came to an end. Having suffered from failing eyesight for several years, the Khan decided to exchange his throne for the pursuit of religious contemplation and pilgrimage (McChesney 1991, 104-5), and summoned his brother to Bukhara. Together they went to the mosque for the Friday prayers and when Imam Quli's name was about to be uttered in the *khutba*, the Khan interrupted the prayer leader (*imam*), and commanded that the name of Nazr Muhammad be inserted instead, thereby signifying his abdication (Howorth, 751).

Imam Quli was one of the greatest Chingizid rulers of Central Asia. Under his leadership, Bukhara had flourished and become the resort of the learned and the pious. He had laboured hard to secure the prosperity of his kingdom and, as a consequence, Bukhara had once more become one of the marvels of Central Asian and Islamic culture. Despite the riches he could command, Imam Quli, unlike his Mughal cousins in India, lived a life of self-denial, choosing to regulate his private life according to the strict principles of the Shari'a law, rather than abandon himself to dissipation, luxurious living and indulgence (Howorth, 749-50).

[102] Raverty v (ii), 1952-3.
[103] *Ibid.*
[104] Raverty v (ii), 1958.
[105] Raverty v (ii), 1961 says 1052/1642, Howorth, 571 gives the date as 1050/1640. For a discussion of dates of Imam Quli's abdication in the Persian sources, see, McChesney 1991, 104 n. 93.

Nazr Muhammad, the new Khan, however, was used to quite a different style of living. His 'moving in' to Bukhara became a major public spectacle, for his vast treasure required a thousand camels alone to transport it. Amongst his possessions he could boast eighty thousand karakul sheep, eight thousand horses, countless brood mares, four hundred chests of orange-coloured satin and much more (Howorth, 751). Nazr Muhammad's surprise accession to the throne, however, was not widely supported by the amirs, who were further alienated by the distribution of new appointments, particularly in removing Yalangtush Bi from Kahmard. Furthermore, he failed to appoint a Tuqay-Timurid sultan to the appanage of Balkh. Instead he sent Nazar Bi Naiman, the father of Khusrau Beg, to govern in his name. 'Abd al-'Aziz, as the Khan's eldest son and the heir apparent, resented this action since he considered Balkh was his by right of succession. Thus, when some time later 'Abd al-'Aziz was ordered by his father to march against rebellious amirs, instead he threw his lot in with the rebel amirs and, in the spring of 1055/1645, took Bukhara and had the *khutba* read in his own name (Howorth, 751; McChesney 1991, 104-7).[106]

Nazr Muhammad fled back to Balkh, where he appointed his grandson, Qasim Sultan, to govern Maimana with Andkhui (Howorth, 752). Meanwhile, the revolt amongst his sons and grandsons spread as it became evident that Nazr Muhammad was in no position to suppress the uprising. In desperation, Nazr Muhammad appealed to the Mughal Emperor, Shah Jahan, for assistance.[107] When the Khan's request reached Delhi, exiled Uzbeks at the Mughal Court encouraged Shah Jahan to believe that an invasion would receive popular support. Since Shah Jahan also had an old score to settle over Yalungtash's invasion of Kabul he sent his son, Murad Bakhsh, across the Hindu Kush, not to help Nazr Muhammad, but to reclaim Badakhshan and Balkh for the Mughals (Inayat Khan, 327-33, 325; McChesney 1991, 107-8).

After an almost bloodless campaign, Balkh fell to the Mughal army on 17 July 1646 (3 Jumada II 1056) (Inayat Khan, 353; McChesney 1991, 74).[108] Nazr Muhammad, realising too late that Shah Jahan had no intention of aiding him in his dispute with his son, had just enough time to gather together some of his vast treasure and

[106] Raverty v (ii), 1961-2.
[107] *Ibid.* Raverty's copy of the *Bahr al-Asrar* ends in the year 1050/1640.
[108] Raverty v (ii), 1961-2.

flee, even as the Mughal prince was pitching his tent in the Bagh-i Murad (Howorth, 752; Inayat Khan, 348-51).

Nazr Muhammad headed westwards to Shibarghan and, with the help of Tardi 'Ali Qataghan, Uraz Bi Ming and troops from Maimana and Chichaktu, he tried to prevent the Mughals making any further advances, but all to no avail. Nazr Muhammad fled further westwards, first to Andkhui, then Maimana eventually making his way to Persian Khurasan. Other members of his entourage, including Sultan Subhan Quli, crossed the Amu Darya and joined forces with 'Abd al-'Aziz Khan in Bukhara (Howorth, 752-3; Inayat Khan, 354-5; McChesney 1991, 107-8).

The Mughal occupation of the Balkh appanage was not a success. They quickly found governing a state, which for generations had been run on lines quite unfamiliar to them, was almost impossible (McChesney 1991, 108). Prince Murad Bakhsh was appointed governor of Balkh (Inayat Khan, 356-7)[109] and he in turn sent governors into the newly-conquered territories from amongst his own Mughal commanders. Raja Pahar Singh, Rustam Khan, Raja Debi Singh, Chandar Man Bondela and Muhammad Khan, along with two thousand matchlockmen and three hundred archers, were stationed in Andkhui. Shibarghan was put in the hands of Jabbar Quli; "Nahr" (the canals?) of Sar-i Pul, Shal and Sangcharak came under the governorship of Khushhal Beg of Kashgar; Aqcha was placed under Shadman Khan, and Nizam Khan was made governor of Mazar-i Sharif.[110]

Within a matter of weeks a disillusioned Murad Bakhsh returned to Kabul without his father's permission (Inayat Khan, 356-7). He was replaced by prince Aurangzeb whose first task was to combat incursions by Uzbeks across the Amu Darya which affected Andkhui, Shibarghan, Termez, Qunduz, Khulm and Mazar-i Sharif (*Astana-yi Imam*) (Inayat Khan, 360ff.). To make matters worse, the Mughals faced severe fiscal problems, for they were unable to collect sufficient revenue from the appanage to sustain their armed presence. The local economy was very soon out of control and the price of grain and other essentials rose steeply (Inayat Khan, 351; McChesney 1991, 108-9).

Nazr Muhammad, meanwhile, reached Persia where he appealed to the new Safawid ruler, Shah 'Abbas II,[111] for assistance. Since Nazr

[109] Raverty v (ii), 1960. Faiz Bakhsh, *Badakhshan*, 43 says the governor appointed in 1052/1642 was Wazir Sadullah Khan.
[110] Faiz Bakhsh, *Badakhshan*, 43.
[111] Raverty v (ii), 1961-2. Shah 'Abbas I died in 1051/1641.

Muhammad's mother was a direct descendant of the Imam Reza, he was treated with some distinction, despite the years of warfare that had been conducted between the two dynasties (Howorth, 752). He received little, however, in the way of practical help and in the end decided to return and rally his forces on the Murghab. After a short stop at Merv, he made his headquarters at Chichaktu where he was advised by loyal amirs from Badghis and Maimana not to go to Bukhara but to remain in the area and rally the discontented iqta' holders in the western marches.

The Khan's first objective was the Mughal garrison at Maimana. For two months Nazr Muhamamd besieged the fortress, during which operation, Khujam Quli, Nazr Muhammad's diwanbegi was killed during an engagement before the walls. The advance of a large Mughal army under Aurangzeb, though, forced Nazr Muhammad to move the bulk of his force to Belcheragh, leaving Kafsh Qalmaq to guard the western entrance to the upper Shirin Tagab and the Maimana-Andkhui road (Inayat Khan, 375-7). The Mughal army, however, was already overstretched. In the east, Taliqan had fallen to the Tuqay-Timurids (Inayat Khan, 379-80) and in the summer of 1057/1647 'Abd al-'Aziz Khan arrived at Qarshi and sent Beg Oghli across the river towards Aqcha. In a running battle near the village of Timurabad, which lasted seven days, the Mughals only just managed to hold their own (Inayat Khan, 385-8).[112] The issue was decided when Subhan Quli arrived to reinforce his brother, and the Mughal prince, realising that his position was completely untenable, opened negotiations with Nazr Muhammad to ensure a peaceful hand-over of power (Inayat Khan, 390-1).

Shah Jahan, reluctantly conceding that neither his army nor his son had the heart to continue the fight, issued a decree (*farman*) authorising the evacuation of Balkh. Maimana was the first fortress to be surrendered to Nazr Muhammad, followed gradually by one citadel after another. Finally, on 13 October 1647 (14 Ramazan 1057), after an occupation which had lasted less than fifteen months, the Mughals abandoned Balkh (Inayat Khan, 396-400). Their troubles, however, were far from over. On the march south to Kabul through the Hindu Kush, Aurangzeb's army, already badly mauled by the fighting in Balkh, was depleted further when the winter snows arrived early. Thousands died from exposure, or as a result of raids made on the Mughal columns by Hazara tribesmen. Travellers who passed that way months later reported finding heaps of bones scattered all over the road (Inayat Khan, 400-3; McChesney 1991, 111).

[112] Raverty v (ii), 1962; Faiz Bakhsh, *Badakhshan*, 43.

Almost as soon as the Mughals had left, the internecine strife between the Tuqay-Timurids broke out again. Within a matter of a few months after Nazr Muhammad having re-entered his capital, a disaffected amir laid siege to Balkh and, although he managed to survive this rebellion and to hold onto the appanage for a further three years, Nazr Muhammad was never able to exert the authority that he had before the abdication of Imam Quli (McChesney 1991, 111-2). Finally, in 1061/1651 his son, Subhan Quli, besieged Balkh and forced Nazr Muhammad to abdicate. Like Imam Quli before him, the man who had dominated Balkh politics for nearly fifty years renounced the world and set his face towards Mecca, only to die en route. His body was carried to Medina and buried beside that of his brother (Howorth, 753; McChesney 1991, 112).[113]

The abdication of Nazr Muhammad, however, did nothing to resolve the conflict between his offspring. In 1065/1655 'Abd al-'Aziz, now *de jure* as well as *de facto* Khan of Bukhara, sent his nephew, Qasim Sultan b. Qutluq Muhammad to seize Balkh from Subhan Quli (Howorth, 753; McChesney 1991, 113). For the forty days of the siege, the fertile area around the town was laid waste before the attackers were forced to seek winter quarters in Qutluq's fief of Hisar. The following spring, after negotiation in Khulm, it was agreed that Subhan Quli would renounce his claims to Hisar, Quybadain and Khulm and hand them over to Qasim Sultan. It was only a matter of two years later, however, before Qasim again attacked Balkh, only to be killed in battle. Following Qasim's death, negotiations were opened with 'Abd al-'Aziz through the mediation of Khwaja 'Abd al-Ghaffar,[114] the *pir*, or spiritual guide, of the Khan, and peace was concluded between the two brothers (Howorth, 753; McChesney 1991, 128).

The war between Nazr Muhammad and his sons, the Mughal invasion and the subsequent fratricidal strife precipitated by Nazr Muhammad's death, exacerbated the tendency of regionalism amongst the amirs of Balkh. The growing power and influence of the Ming tribe in Maimana has already been noted. In the eastern part of the appanage, the Qataghan amirs had also risen to a similar position of

[113] Raverty v (ii), 1962.

[114] By the time of his death Khwaja 'Abd al-Ghaffar, an agnate descendant of the Makhdum-i Azam, had become the leading spiritual figure in Balkh (McChesney 1991, 128-9).

prominence. After the Mughal withdrawal from Balkh in 1057/1647, the iqta' of Qunduz and Badakhshan, had been given into the hands of a certain Mahmud Bi and within a decade this individual had become the most important military leader east of Balkh. In 1068/1658 he took Faizabad and began to enrich himself at the expense of the Badakhshanis by a series of looting raids on the settled farms and villages of the mountain region. These plundering excursions were eventually suppressed after the intervention of the sultans. Even so, during Subhan Quli's thirty year reign, Mahmud Bi laid the foundation of Qataghanid power in Qunduz, which later developed into the amirid state that received so much attention from European travellers in the nineteenth century.

As with the establishment of Mingid power in Maimana, British officials in the early decades of the nineteenth century maintained that Qataghanid authority had no antiquity. Alexander Burnes, whose travel journals and official reports were so instrumental in misrepresenting the history of the region, claimed that, "Moorad Beg is the first of his family or countrymen, who has formed so extensive a principality" (Burnes 1834, ii, 347-8). In fact, the opposite was true. Under Mahmud Bi, an ancestor of Murad Beg (Appendix IV, viii), the power and holdings of Qunduz and the Qataghanids were much greater that in the 1830s.

The rise of the Qataghanid amirs from the middle of the seventeenth century, was the natural counter-balance to Mingid domination of the western marches.[115] Not unnaturally, with the break-up of the appanage system south of the Amu Darya, it was these two tribes, and their respective leaders, who were to vie with each other to fill the power vacuum in Balkh and for the right to use of the emotive titles of 'khan' and 'wali'. In the following century, with this rivalry as bitter as ever, both Mingid and Qataghanid amirs sought to secure Afghan support to further their territorial ambitions in the appanage; a dalliance which was to prove disastrous to both Uzbek tribes (McChesney 1991, 117-8).

In 1092/1681 'Abd al-'Aziz Khan, exhausted by countless wars, and sick with cares and amirid feuds, followed in his father's footsteps and abdicated in order to spend the rest of his days atoning for his sins in Medina. He was eventually laid to rest beside the tombs of

[115] The *waqf* donations to the shrine of Mazar-i Sharif, made sometime in the mid 1660s, indicate that there was also an important Ming presence in the area of Khulm (Khush Robat and Hazrat Sultan) (McChesney 1991, 120-2).

his father and uncle (Howorth, 753-4; McChesney 1991, 151). Apart from his military prowess, he was reputed to have been the fattest man of his generation, historians claiming that a four year old child was able to fit easily into one of his boots (Howorth, 755).

The departure of 'Abd al-'Aziz left Subhan Quli Khan as Khan in Bukhara (Howorth, 753-4; McChesney 1991, 152).[116] Early in 1094/1683 he appointed his eldest son, Iskandar,[117] to the Balkh appanage, though he and his other brothers seem to have been kept under house-arrest in the city and were only occasionally brought out to attend public audiences (Howorth, 755; McChesney 1991, 153). In the winter of the same year[118] Iskandar died of poison, his assassination probably instigated by his younger brother, Abu'l-Mansur Sultan (McChesney 1991, 153). Subhan Quli appears next to have appointed Abu'l-Mansur as *qa'alkhan*, or heir apparent, but quickly revoked this decree in favour of another son, 'Ibadullah, whereupon Mansur had his rival assassinated and rebelled. He managed to hold on to Balkh for four months, before he too was assassinated by a female relative in May 1684 (1095) (Howorth, 755-6; McChesney 1991, 154). The only notable event during his short reign was the holding of an extravagant feast.

A fourth son of Subhan Quli, Siddiq Muhammad Sultan, was the next individual to be appointed to Balkh. This individual is portrayed as a pederast and sadist who kept a harem of slave boys and had murderers torn limb from limb, or ripped apart alive. He also had his brothers' assassins hunted down and executed. Although some authors claimed that his vices were the main reason for the discontent and disturbances which marked his period of governorship, a more likely source was Siddiq's apparent attempt to reassert sultanid authority over the appanage's amirs, who by now dominated the political arena. Such a policy ran counter to the interests and ambitions of the powerful Ming, Qataghan and Turkman amirs and precipitated a revolt by the Mingids, who fortified Shibarghan and declared independence (McChesney 1991, 154).

Siddiq's rule was almost as brief as his predecessor's. Subhan Quli, who was occupied with bringing the Khivan amir, Inush, to heel, ordered Siddiq Sultan to assist him, but when the Sultan's

[116] Faiz Bakhsh, *Badakhshan*, 43-4.

[117] *Ibid.* Faiz Bakhsh says another son of Subhan Quli, Sadiq Muhammad, was Balkh's governor who, he asserts, ruled jointly with his brother, Abu'l-Mansur. For a list of the known sons of Subhan Quli, see, McChesney 1991, 152 n.

[118] Faiz Bakhsh puts his death at 1096/1685; Howorth, 755, says he reigned two years.

sympathisers in Bukhara informed him that his father was hard pressed, he returned to Balkh, hoping that his father's defeat would provide an opportunity for him to seize the whole Khanate. Instead, Subhan Quli appealed to Mahmud Bi. The amir of Qataghan marched an army across the Amu Darya, defeated Inush and subdued the rebel amirs of Khojand for good measure (Howorth, 756). As soon as the Khivan threat had dissipated, Subhan Quli marched against Balkh. Siddiq, informed of his father's approach, had two of his brothers, 'Abd al-Ghani and 'Abd al-Qaiyum, put to death and wrote to the Mughal emperor, Aurangzeb, for help. Nothing, however, came of this, since a short while later Siddiq, lured by his father into the royal camp at Khanabad under promise of safe conduct and a royal pardon, was arrested and put to a slow, excruciating death (Howorth, 756; McChesney 1991, 155-6).

Subhan Quli decided that he could no longer entrust Balkh to his heirs and appointed an Uzbek amir instead, though the names and periods of rule of the amirid governors who ruled Balkh from 1097-1109/1685-1697 are very uncertain (McChesney 1991, 156).[119] What is apparent is that Subhan Quli's attempt to bring Balkh back under central authority did not succeed. By not appointing a sultan to the appanage Subhan Quli merely exacerbated the rivalry between the Mingids and Qataghanids. Though representatives of both tribes seem to have held the post of Ataliq of Balkh at one time or another during this interregnum, by the time that a prince of the royal line was again ruling the appanage the whole region had become a battle-ground as rival amirs from west and east fought for supremacy (Howorth, 756-7; McChesney 1991, 156-7).[120]

The struggle between Ming and Qataghan amirs forced Subhan Quli to try and unite the factions by appointing his sister's son, Saleh Khwaja to govern Balkh. This individual was a descendant of Khwaja Abu Nasr Parsa, a renowned shaikh whose tomb was in Balkh. His family had also held the office of naqib at the shrine of 'Ali b. Abi Talib for more than two centuries (McChesney 1991, 158-9).[121] This attempt to unite the rival amirs, however, did not succeed and the following year, following further disturbances, Subhan Quli bowed to

[119] Cf. Faiz Bakhsh, *Badakhshan*, 44-5; Howorth, 756.

[120] For the problem of chronology, see, McChesney 1991, 157n. Mingid rulers and officials are given as: Ataliq Khadim Ming; Yar Muhammad Ming, diwanbegi; Ataliq 'Adil Bi Ming. Qataghanid pretensions centred on the powerful amir, and confidant of Subhan Quli, Ataliq Mahmud Bi b. Murad Beg.

[121] Faiz Bakhsh, *Badakhshan*, 45.

the inevitable and appointed his grandson, Muhammad Muqim b. Iskandar, as qa'alkhan (Howorth, 158-9).[122]

Muhammad Muqim's appointment, apart from being a triumph for the old order, was a victory for the Mingids since Muqim's ataliq, 'Adil Bi, amir of Shibarghan, was from this *ulus*. Mahmud Bi Qataghan, meanwhile, was forced to quit Balkh and retired to Qunduz (Howorth, 758-60).

Muhammad Muqim's reign in Balkh was a troubled one. Following a major incursion by the Persians from Khurasan, who advanced as far as Maimana, the area was only saved by the indispensable Mahmud Bi, who marched to the rescue. The Qataghanid amir's timely intervention tipped the balance of amirid power in his favour, for the Mingids had proven themselves to be incapable of defending the western border (Howorth, 760). From this point onwards Mahmud Bi's power increased to the detriment of the Mingids and by the time of Subhan Quli Khan's death in 1114/1702, his authority in Balkh was such that it was said he regarded Muhammad Muqim as his own foster son.[123]

The other notable event of Muhammad Muqim's reign was the severe earthquake of 1114/1702 (McChesney 1991, 168),[124] which destroyed many ancient monuments in Balkh and did a great deal of structural damage to the shrine of Mazar-i Sharif; the main dome of the *khanaqa*, attributed to Sultan Husain Baiqara, completely falling in on itself. In 1116/1704-5 Muhammad Muqim ordered repairs to the structure, which seemed to have been accomplished in a very short time (McChesney 1991, 168).

Subhan Quli Khan died in 1114/1702 at the age of eighty, having reigned in Bukhara for over thirty years. He was succeeded by his young son, 'Ubaidullah, who was enthroned in the traditional way in Bukhara (McChesney 1991, 162).[125] 'Ubaidullah's main support came from the powerful Manghit amir, Rahim Bi of Qarshi (Skrine & Ross, 204). This individual had married a daughter of Abu'l-Faiz Khan and could justly claim that his connection with Tuqay-Timurids was as strong as Jani Muhammad Sultan's had been when he succeeded the Jani-Begids (Howorth, 767-7). 'Ubaidullah's almost total dependence

[122] *Ibid.*, who claims Muqim only had the title *Wali-yi Balkh* and that he ruled only on condition that Mahmud Bi became ataliq.

[123] Faiz Bakhsh, *Badakhshan*, 47-8.

[124] Raverty v (ii), 1968-9; 'Ghulam Rabbani' (Faiz Bakhsh), *Journey from Cabul to Peshawar*, 1865-66, ESL:260, fols. 849-67.

[125] Skrine & Ross, 199 say that Muqim succeeded.

on his Manghit sponsors meant that the Khan's role was increasingly reduced to a token, legitimising presence, all major decisions being left in the hands of Rahim Bi and his appointees. The day after 'Ubaidullah's accession, Muhammad Muqim, supported by Mahmud Bi Qataghan, held his own investiture ceremony in Balkh and thus, for the first time in the history of the Tuqay-Timurid state, Bukhara and Balkh became centres of rival Khanates.

Initially, things did not go well for the new ruler of Bukhara. In 1115/1703 'Ubaidullah attacked Khanabad, but his army was comprehensively routed by the Qataghanid amir. Later in the same year, Rahim Bi Manghit marched in person against the rebellious governor of Hisar, who promptly allied himself with Muhammad Muqim and Mahmud Bi and together they soundly defeated the Bukharans (McChesney 1991, 164).[126]

In 1119/1707, however, Muhammad Muqim was killed, possibly at the instigation of Mahmud Bi, and the amirs who had supported the Anti-Khan recognised 'Ubaidullah as the legitimate successor of the Tuqay-Timurid dynasty. Probably another reason for this move was anxiety amongst some amirs about Mahmud Bi's pretensions in respect of the Balkh appanage. Following the death of Muhammad Muqim, he had refused to acknowledge 'Ubaidullah's succession and took the unprecedented step of assuming the title of *Khan* (McChesney 1991, 164). Later that year, Mahmud Bi was driven out of Balkh, his supporters purged and 'Adil Beg, the Mingid amir of Shibarghan, re-appointed as ataliq.[127] 'Ubaidullah's authority over Balkh, however, was very limited, for the Mingid and Qataghanid amirs were a law unto themselves and central authority was so weak as to preclude any attempt at military action to bring them to heel. Increasingly, Bukhara's overlordship was seen by the amirs as an imposition and, within two years of the reconquest of Balkh, Mahmud Bi was again challenging for power (McChesney 1991, 164-5).

In March 1711 (1123) 'Ubaidullah, who was trying to organise a second expedition to Balkh to revenge himself for insults offered to

[126] Faiz Bakhsh, *Badakhshan*, 47-8. Both Howorth and Faiz Bakhsh's accounts of Muhammad Muqim's reign are very sketchy and their dates inaccurate. McChesney (1991) has used contemporary manuscripts probably unavailable to these other authorities.

[127] McChesney mentions another Mingid, Khushhal Bi Diwanbegi, son of Muhammad Yar Ataliq Ming, an amir who was influential in Balkh during the Khanship of 'Ubaidullah. Other members of the same family held important positions in Balkh during this century. Yar Muhammad's brother, Adina Bahadur, held the rank of diwanbegi in the 1680s. Adina's son, Muhammad Shukur Bi Ming, endowed a third of Khush Robat near Khulm to the shrine of 'Ali b. Abi Talib (McChesney 1991, 120, 172).

one of his appointees, was assassinated and his sixteen year old brother, Abu'l-Faiz was placed on the throne by Rahim Bi Manghit (Howorth, 767; McChesney 1991, 165).

In Balkh, the desire for a Chingizid head of state remained a strong emotional and cultural need, even though his power had become merely nominal. Following the enthronement of Abu'l-Faiz, 'Adil Bi Ming, Ataliq of Balkh, negotiated safe passage with the Safawids to visit Herat where the descendants of Rustam Muhammad Sultan b. Wali Muhammad were living in exile. The meeting in Herat resulted in a Walid prince, 'Ibadullah Sultan, accepting the invitation to move to Balkh to act as titular head of the appanage. However, since his appointment had been promoted by 'Adil Bi, the return of the Walids to Balkh ensured that the Ming tribe had its hand firmly on the reins of power. This appointment, made without reference to the wishes of the ruler in Bukhara, was one more sign of the growing divorce between the territories north and south of the Amu Darya (McChesney 1991, 167, 194).[128]

'Ibadullah reigned for less than two years and was briefly succeeded, in 1713, by his eldest son, Jahangir. After only a few days in office, Jahangir's brother, Sultan Sanjar, put him to death and assumed control. He ruled for five years before he, too, was assassinated, this time by one of his officials. During his reign, Mahmud Bi Qataghan died during a severe earthquake in Badakhshan (McChesney 1991, 167). Sanjar died in 1130/1718 and was succeeded by another distant relative of Wali Muhammad, Muhammad Sultan, who was brought from Herat. Muhammad's appointment precipitated a revolt by the Qataghan tribe and other amirs, who were discontented with Ming domination of the appanage. Following their defeat, a number of the Qataghan tribes made their home in the Aibak area (McChesney 1991, 167).

Muhammad Sultan's attempts to curb amirid power led, predictably, to his overthrow in 1132/1720, by the Qipchaq amirs, who placed 'Arab Muhammad Sultan on the throne. Little is known about this individual, though it is likely he was also a Chingizid. He survived until *c.* 1732 when his place was taken by Chingiz Muhammad. He, in turn, was succeeded in *c.* 1150/1737-8 by 'Abu'l-Hasan. These last Tuqay-Timurid rulers of Balkh are all referred to by the title, *Bahadur*

[128] Howorth, 762 says Andkhui and Maimana remained part of the Bukharan state under Saiyid Abu'l-Hasan b. Saleh Khwaja. For a discussion of the dates of these Walid and later Chingizid rulers of Balkh, see McChesney 1991, 192-5.

Khan, implying they were Chingizids, possibly from the line of Wali Muhammad (McChesney 1991, 166-8).

The break-up of the Chingizid appanages and the rise of the amirs weakened the ancient empire and undermined the inherent strengths of this devolved system of government. Individual amirs and tribal groupings carved out for themselves hereditary fiefdoms and brooked no interference from the centre. By the end of the first decade of the seventeenth century the Khan in Bukhara ruled only with the consent of the Manghit amir, Rahim Bi, and had no power of independent action. In Balkh, the same applied to the Walids, who merely provided a legal facade for Mingid domination. The fragmentation of Uzbek power, both north and south of the Amu Darya, made the Tuqay-Timurid realms ripe for invasion and conquest. It was not long in coming.

In the second decade of the eighteenth century, Herat was governed, on behalf of the Safawids, by Asadullah Sadozai, an Abdali Afghan. In 1130/1717 he broke away from the decaying Persian empire and struck coins in the name of his father, 'Abdullah Khan, the titular head of the tribe (Dupree 1978, 324). The Abdalis quickly subdued Ghuriyan and Badghis, extended their power up to the left bank of the Murghab and installed their own governors. Encouraged by these successes and the good pasturage that Badghis afforded, Abdali tribesmen began to migrate to the area and establish settlements.[129] By 1140/1727 Marichaq, the strategic fort which had been so often fought over by Uzbek and Persian, was under Allah Yar Khan Abdali, who was later to rule Herat in his own right.[130]

The conquest of Badghis brought Afghans into direct contact with the Uzbek tribes of Qaisar and Maimana for the first time. Initially, the arrival of the Sunni Abdalis was regarded as a positive move by the Mingid amir of Maimana and in 1130/1718 Uzbek and Abdali combined in a joint attack on Persian Khurasan which caused much destruction in the province. The Uzbeks, numbering some twelve thousand men under Safi Quli, were finally put to flight by an army of thirty thousand men, though later the Abdalis, with the help of their Uzbek allies, succeeded in defeating the Persians and retaining their hold on Herat (Howorth, 762).

In 1131/1719, the Abdali ruler of Herat was heavily defeated by Mahmud, son of Mir Wais, the Ghilzai governor of Qandahar at the

[129] Raverty v (ii), 1980-1.
[130] Raverty v (ii), 1998.

inaptly named village of Dilaram. This defeat sparked off a bitter fratricidal struggle in Herat which weakened Abdali power. Mahmud, honoured by the Safawids for defeating their Afghan rivals, took advantage of the crumbling power of Sultan Husain Safawi, invaded Persia and briefly held Kerman, until he was forced to return and deal with a revolt in Qandahar (Dupree 1978, 324). Some two years later the Ghilzais returned and in 1134/1722 laid siege to the Safawid capital of Isfahan, forcing the Shah, Sultan Mahmud, to abdicate and publicly proclaim Mahmud as his legal successor (*CHI* vi, 323-4; Dupree 1978, 325ff.).[131]

The overthrow of the Safawids by the Ghilzais was an important landmark in the shifting balance of power in the region. The decline of the Safawid monarchy in Persia was paralleled by the decay of Chingizid authority in Bukhara and Balkh. This power vacuum provided the opportunity for the two most powerful Afghan tribes, the Abdalis in Herat and Ghilzais of Qandahar, Farah and southern Persia, to replace the Safawids and Mughals as the main power south of the Hindu Kush, and to mount a challenge to Chingizid control of Balkh. It was, therefore, but a matter of time before Uzbek and Afghan were to be locked in a bitter war for supremacy though, for a while at least, this clash of wills was postponed while both Uzbek and Afghan fought side-by-side, carving out a fleeting empire for an obscure Turkman from northern Khurasan who, in his early life, had spent four years as a slave of the Uzbeks.

[131] Raverty v (ii), 1987.

CHAPTER THREE

NADIR SHAH AFSHAR, HAJI BI MING AND AHMAD SHAH DURRANI, 1722-1772

> Nothing can exhibit a more striking contrast to the government of the Afghauns than that of the Uzbeks. In Bokhaura and Ferghauna at least, every thing is in the hands of the sovereign; there is no vestige of popular government, and scarcely any trace of aristocracy ... no separate jurisdictions exist even in the wandering hordes. There are no assemblies of the tribe, or its elders, as amongst the Afghauns, either for the conduct of its affairs or for the settlement of disputes (Elphinstone ii, 186).

Nadir Shah's Occupation of Balkh, 1731-1747

The overthrow of Safawid power and the Afghan conquest of Isfahan, resulted in Persia becoming a battleground between rival armies and factions, who vied for control of the dismembered Safawid Empire (Browne iv, 133). After some eight years of civil war Tahmasp Isma'il, the heir to the Safawid throne, with the backing of his powerful and ruthless Turkman amir, Nadir Shah Afshar, finally gained the upper hand. Mashhad fell to Nadir in 1726[1] and three years later, following the defeat of Allah Yar Khan near Islam Qal'a and before Herat, the Abdalis were also subdued. The following year Isfahan was recaptured from the Ghilzais but, though Tahmasp Isma'il was proclaimed Shah, the real authority lay with his Afshar general. A matter of two years later, Nadir forced Tahmasp II to abdicate and his infant heir was placed on the throne instead. The following Nauroz (21 March 1736), Nadir finally abandoned all pretence and assumed the purple in his own right, thus ending the Safawid dynasty (Browne iv, 134; Dupree 1978, 328-9).

The revolt of Zu'l-Faqar Khan in Herat in 1731, and the overthrow of Allah Yar Khan, brought Nadir Shah once more to Khurasan (Dupree 1978, 329-30; Singh, 13). Allah Yar Khan managed to escape from Herat and fled to Marichaq, where he mustered a body of troops from amongst the Abdali colonists and indigenous Aimaq tribes and sent them to assist Nadir, who had laid siege to Herat.[2]

[1] From henceforth dates will be AD unless otherwise stated.

Whilst the siege was in progress, Nadir sent a column of troops to attack and subdue Maimana and Chichaktu. They seem to have reached as far north as Andkhui; at least its ruler acknowledged Nadir's authority, for his "rebellion" is given as one of the reasons for Reza Quli's subsequent invasion of Turkistan in 1737 (Dupree 1978, 330; Lockhart, 53, 163-4; Singh, 397).[3] Unfortunately, we know very little about this expedition and nothing is said about how Abu'l-Hasan Khan of Balkh reacted to this incursion into his territory, for Lockhart, in his biography of Nadir Shah, like most colonial historians of Afghanistan, takes very little interest in events beyond the Hindu Kush (see McChesney 1991, 199).

Zu'l-Faqar Khan of Herat finally surrendered in August 1731[4] and Allah Yar Khan Abdali was reinstated. Allah Yar Khan, however, soon broke out into rebellion and Nadir was forced to return to Herat and deal with its turbulent Afghan ruler. During this second campaign, Nadir Shah attacked and subdued the stronghold of Obeh, where the Afghans had secured some of their stores. An attempt by Afghan troops from Herat to prevent this was beaten off. From Obeh, Nadir marched once more into Badghis, this time seizing the Abdali stronghold of Marichaq where Allah Yar Khan had sent his family for safety. All Afghan attempts to recapture this fortress were to no avail.[5] On 28 Feb. 1732[6] Allah Yar Khan surrendered and was allowed to leave for Multan. Nadir Shah stripped the Abdalis of their power and installed a Persian governor instead (Champagne, 24; Dupree 1978, 330). Some six thousand Afghan families were exiled to Mashhad and Nishapur, though, following the fall of Qandahar, they were allowed to return (Dupree 1978, 330; Singh, 13).[7]

In 1736 Nadir's eldest son, Reza Quli Khan, was made governor of Khurasan and the following year, possibly using the excuse of disturbances in the Maimana-Andkhui area, Nadir ordered his son to march into Badghis. According to Lockhart, the object of Nadir's wrath was the Turkman amir, 'Ali Mardan,[8] "governor" of Andkhui,

[3] Raverty v (ii), 2009-10; but see McChesney 1991, 199.

[4] According to Raverty, v (ii), 2026, the date of surrender was 17 Safar 1144 which he converts to 9 August 1731, but if the Hijra date is correct, the proper AD date is 22 August. Dupree 1978, 330 says Herat surrendered in July.

[5] Raverty v (ii), 2025ff.

[6] 1 Ramazan 1144; Raverty v (ii), 2030.

[7] Raverty v (ii), 2032.

[8] Lockhart calls him 'Ali Mardan Khan Afshar, but the use of 'Khan' is quite unwarranted since this title was only used by the Chingizid ruler, whilst amongst the Pushtuns, Khan had a much less specific meaning. From the Nadirid occupation onwards amirs of the Qataghan,

who had "rebelled" (McChesney 1991, 199 n. 3; Howorth, 762-3; Lockhart, 163-4; Vambery 1873, 340).[9] Making his base at Marichaq, Reza Quli quickly subdued Chichaktu and then marched against Andkhui, presumably via Maimana. Since 'Ali Mardan showed no signs of submitting, Reza Quli set out to secure the defection of the Qara and Salor tribes by bribing them on an enormous scale. Despite the defection of these Turkmans, 'Ali Mardan held out for six weeks before finally surrendering. The unfortunate amir was sent as a prisoner to Herat, where he was subsequently executed (Howorth, 762-3; Lockhart, 163; Vambery 1873, 340). Sulaiman Khan, possibly a relative of the executed governor, was appointed in his place.

The next citadel to fall was Shibarghan, followed by Aqcha, and in July 1737,[10] Reza Quli marched against Balkh (Howorth, 763). Abu'l-Hasan Khan, faced with overwhelmingly superior forces, wanted to submit immediately, but Saiyid 'Khan', the Ming ataliq, persuaded him to resist (Lockhart, 163; McChesney 1991, 198). Saiyid Ming barred the Persian advance with a series of deep trenches behind which the Uzbeks arrayed their forces, but the superiority of the invaders' artillery, some of which was of European manufacture, soon broke the back of the resistance and they were defeated with heavy loss of life (Howorth, 763; Vambery 1873, 340). The unfortunate Abu'l-Hasan was captured and sent to Qandahar with other notables from the area, whilst the ataliq made good his escape (Lockhart, 166; McChesney 1991, 198-9).

The conquest of Balkh so pleased Nadir Shah that he showered extravagant gifts on his son, including three hundred dresses of honour, "high-bred" horses adorned with gold, bejewelled saddles and bridles, and twelve thousand gold pieces (Vambery, 340).[11] Encouraged by his successes and his father's adulation, Reza Quli decided to carry the battle across the Amu Darya and attack Abu'l-Faiz in Bukhara. Qarshi easily fell into his hands and, with Bukhara at his mercy, it seemed only a matter of time before the Chingizids went the way of the Safawids. Abu'l-Faiz Khan was saved, however, by the

Ming and other tribes are frequently referred to indiscriminately as Khan. Lockhart also used the term Afshar very loosely; cf. below, when referring to the Salor and Qara who are quite separate Turkman tribes. However, by claiming that the "governor" of Andkhui was an "Afshar," he implies that Nadir Shah had a tribal link with this individual and hence some claim over Andkhui when, in fact, no such relationship existed.

[9] Raverty v (ii), 2035.

[10] For the problem of dating the Nadirid conquest of Balkh, see McChesney 1991, 198 n.1.

[11] Vambery calls them ducats.

intervention of Ilbars, the now-independent amir of Khiva, who joined with his Bukharan rival in order to oppose the invaders, whose presence was a threat to them both. In a battle at Qarshi, Reza Quli was defeated and Nadir Shah, concerned that his son's defeat would precipitate an invasion of Balkh and force him to abandon the siege of Qandahar, recalled his son and informed Abu'l-Faiz that Reza Quli had acted without orders (Howorth, 763).

Though the threat of a Bukharan invasion was thus removed, Nadir Shah did not let matters rest there and he set out to secure the loyalty of Rahim Bi and other Manghit amirs in Bukhara by the secret distribution of large bribes. He also worked hard to break up the fragile coalition between Bukhara and Ilbars by exploiting their long-standing differences. So successful was this policy of divide and rule, that the two rulers were soon at each others' throats once more (Skrine & Ross, 200).

The re-emergence of these divisions in Transoxiana left Nadir Shah free to complete the conquest of Qandahar, which fell in 1738. The following year, he marched his army into India; a campaign which culminated in the sack of Delhi. A few months after the fall of the Mughal capital, Nadir Shah returned northwards, laden with booty. Meanwhile, news of the fall of Delhi had reached Bukhara through the mercantile grapevine and the Bukharan ruler, deeply worried about the Persian despot's intentions, sent an ambassador to meet Nadir. Abu'l-Faiz Khan's envoy met the triumphant ruler at his camp in Peshawar, where he handed over a letter from the Khan which was so abject and maudlin that it left Nadir Shah in no doubt that, were the conqueror of Delhi to march across the Amu Darya, Bukhara would be completely at his mercy:

> I am the last off-shoot of an ancient line. I am not powerful enough to withstand a monarch so redoubtable as thou and so I keep myself apart, offering prayers for thy welfare. If, however, thou shouldst deign to honour me by a visit, I will show thee the regard due to a guest (Howorth, 763; Skrine & Ross, 201).[12]

The invitation to "visit" Bukhara was quickly acted on by Nadir, since there were other pressing reasons to move into Turkistan. During his absence in India, there had been further trouble in Herat, as well as depredations in Khurasan by Uzbek tribesmen subject to Ilbars (Dilworth, 70, 101; Howorth, 763) which Reza Quli had been unable

[12] Quoting from 'Abd al-Karim Bukhari; see also Raverty v (ii), 2036.

to suppress. As a consequence of these attacks, a number of Persians had been taken prisoner and sold into slavery. Nadir sent ambassadors to Ilbars to request the release of these individuals and the resolution of these grievances. Ilbars, however, put all but one of Nadir's envoys to death and the sole survivor of this mission was sent back, minus his nose and ears, to convey a message of contempt and defiance (Dilworth, 70; Howorth, 913).

Such deliberate insults could not go unavenged. Nadir ordered his army to march to Herat and sent instructions to Reza Quli to join forces with him in Badghis, where they would mount a joint attack on Ilbars and visit Bukhara in order to determine the extent to which Abu'l-Faiz Khan was willing to submit to him. Father and son met at Qara Tepa, near Marichaq (Lockhart, 186ff.).[13] Reza Quli had brought with him ten thousand men,[14] whilst Nadir had brought along all the loot from his Indian campaign, including three hundred battle elephants (Skrine & Ross, 201).

Before entering Turkistan, an entertainment of unparalleled extravagance and magnificence was held at Qara Tepa, probably on the flat top of this ancient citadel mound. All the plunder from Delhi was displayed during the course of the banquet, which was held in an enormous tent adorned with gold poles and fringes of stringed pearls manufactured in India for the specific purpose of celebrating the triumph (Skrine & Ross, 201; C. E. Yate 1888, 102, from the *Tarikh-i Nadiri*). But the centre piece of wonder was the Peacock Throne, designed and crafted by a European jeweller, and seized from the *Divan-i Khas* of the Mughal king of Delhi (Skrine and Ross, 201 n.). The celebration was not, however, a totally joyous occasion since it marked the beginning of Nadir's suspicion that his son, Reza Quli, was plotting his assassination in order to seize power himself. Accusing his son, ironically, of excessive harshness in his government, Nadir later dismissed him as governor of Khurasan and finally had him put to death (Lockhart, 186).[15]

Having celebrated his recent conquests in lavish style, Nadir Shah marched his forces through Marichaq, Chichaktu, Maimana, Andkhui and on to Balkh (Lockhart, 186).[16] From Balkh he moved

[13] Raverty v (ii), 2036-7. Qara Tepa is located in the Kushka valley. In 1886 it was a large mound fifty foot high by a hundred yards square at its top, surrounded at the base by a moat. It presently lies within the Republic of Turkmenistan (C. E. Yate 1888, 102-3, n.).

[14] *Ibid.*

[15] Raverty v (ii), 2039.

[16] *Ibid.*

north-westwards along the south bank of the Oxus to Qarqi,[17] where he was met by Ataliq Rahim Bi Manghit with presents and supplies for his vast army (Skrine & Ross, 201-2). Together they marched to Charjui where Nadir's men threw a bridge across the river and, leaving half his army to guard his priceless treasures, Nadir pushed on to Qaraqul, a fortress one day's march from Bukhara itself. On 12 September 1740 (Howorth, 764) Abu'l-Faiz Khan, along with his chief courtiers, came out to greet Nadir with presents of horses and other suitable gifts. The heir of one of the most exalted dynasties of Central Asia abjectly abased himself at the feet of the conqueror of Delhi and was honoured by being raised to a seat in Nadir Shah's presence and given gifts suitable to his rank (Howorth, 764; Skrine & Ross, 201-2).

In the formal negotiations which followed, a treaty was drawn up which recognised the Amu Darya as the border between Nadir and Abu'l-Faiz Khan's domains. Exactly how far down the course of the Oxus this border was drawn is not stated, but presumably Charjui was ceded to Nadir, as was Bukharan territory south of the Amu Darya to the point where Abu'l-Faiz's territory ended and that of Ilbars commenced (Lockhart, 186).[18] To seal the treaty, Nadir agreed to marry Abu'l-Faiz's daughter and her sister was bestowed on Nadir's nephew (Howorth, 764; Skrine & Ross, 202). Rahim Bi, the Manghit kingmaker, was well-rewarded for his support of Nadir, being elevated to the rank of Khan and given command of six thousand Turkistan levies (Howorth, 764; Skrine & Ross, 202).

Having settled matters with Bukhara, Nadir Shah turned his attention to the troublesome principality of Khiva, whose ruler had dealt so harshly and contemptuously with his envoys. Khiva was invested and, after three days of relentless cannonade, Ilbars was forced to throw himself on the mercy of a ruler who was as ruthless as himself. The relatives of Nadir's slaughtered ambassadors demanded that the Khivan be put to death and Ilbars, along with twenty-one of his principal officers, was executed (Howorth, 913). Nadir then returned to Charjui, where he demonstrated his contempt of Abu'l-Faiz by returning the daughter whom he had married only a few weeks earlier. Having thus settled matters to his satisfaction, Nadir withdrew to Khurasan, though Rahim Bi stayed with him at the head of the Uzbek and Turkman force (Howorth, 764-5). Sometime later, when Abu'l-Faiz Khan faced a serious challenge from rebels in the Ferghana oasis, he

[17] Howorth, 765 says Qarshi, but this is not on the way to Charjui.

[18] R. Watson, *The Boundaries of Persia*, 15 Dec. 1864, SLEP:167, no. 1 of 1865.

applied to Nadir for assistance, and twelve thousand men under Rahim Bi were dispatched and forced the rebels back from before Bukhara (Howorth, 764).

Nadir's Occupation of Balkh and Its Repercussions

The ten year occupation of the Balkh appanage by Nadir's Persianised administration was an important watershed in the history of Lesser Turkistan. The overthrow of Abu'l-Hasan Khan in 1737 by Reza Quli, brought to an end half a millennium of Chingizid domination of Balkh and created a power vacuum which the Afghans eventually filled when Nadir Shah's fragile empire collapsed.

As with the Mughal invasion in the previous century, the Persian forces of occupation did not find it easy to control affairs in the province. They brought with them a political world view which revolved around a highly centralised, absolutist system, which was diametrically opposed to the federal appanage system of the Chingizid Khanate. Not unexpectedly, this produced considerable resentment, especially when the Iranians began to impose their own administrators. Governors and fiscal agents were assigned to each town and implemented requisitions ordered by the central authority. When these impositions were resisted by the amirs, military force was used.

The Persians mercilessly exploited the province. The male population was either conscripted into the army, or sent to work as forced labourers in Khurasan. Grain and other supplies were expropriated to feed the conquerer's troops in complete disregard of the economic needs of the indigenous population of the appanage (McChesney 1991, 207). In 1742 alone, during the operations against Khiva, a levy of four thousand *kharwar*s of grain was made on Balkh (McChesney 1991, 200-1). When Nadir Shah's governor, Niyaz Khan, was unable to meet this target, despite having at his disposal all the means of state coercion, he lost his job. In Balkh, the price of grain rose by between five and seven hundred percent, to levels which the area had not experienced for nearly a century. Most of the seed grain for the following year's harvest was also seized (McChesney 1991, 201-2).

The tyranny of the Nadirid occupation, and the powerlessness of the local amirs to organise any effective resistance, led to the channelling of local resentment into a millennialist movement led by a charismatic leader from the region of Obeh called Rasul; though whether

this was his actual name, or a title given to him in virtue of the widely-held belief that he was a prophet, is unclear.

Rasul had moved from Obeh to Ghazni, where he had created a considerable stir by his ability as a cabalist necromancer and a large number of disciples gathered around him. In the summer of 1741, following the advice of one of his followers, he travelled north and arrived before Andkhui at the head of possibly as many as fifty thousand disciples (McChesney 1991, 205-6). The reason for his choosing Andkhui is unclear, but it must have had something to do with the importance of the place in the religious life of the province. Andkhui was the burial place of Hazrat Ishan Baba Wali, or Baba Sangu, the shaikh whose advice Timur Lang had sought prior to his invasion of Khurasan. It was also a saiyid from this town whom Sultan Husain Baiqara had appointed as the first naqib of the most important shrine in the Balkh appanage, that of 'Ali b. Abi Talib at Mazar-i Sharif. Outside Andkhui, on the Shibarghan road, was another important 'Alid *qadamga*, Shah-i Mardan. This region, therefore, was an ideal place for Rasul to commence operations amongst the dispirited and oppressed population of the province, providing, as it did, an emotive religious and historical backdrop to his millennialist and egalitarian message (McChesney 1991, 206ff.).

The arrival of Rasul at the head of a vast crowd of palm-carrying devotees posed a considerable dilemma for the Persian governor of the town and the shaikh was forbidden admittance. News, however, soon spread that remarkable miracles had been performed by Rasul, who had turned palm fronds into bread. In a matter of days, his camp was besieged by vast crowds of desperate and dejected people. It was not long before he was being referred to as Hazrat Ishan; a direct allusion to his great forebear, Baba Sangu. The possibility of such a movement becoming a rallying point for nationalistic sentiment was not lost on the Persian occupiers and the governor of Andkhui went in person to Rasul's camp hoping to expose him as a charlatan. However, when he saw for himself the wonders (*karamat*) which the Ishan performed before his own eyes, the governor himself became a disciple and bestowed on him many gifts (McChesney 1991, 206).

News of the miraculous powers of Rasul spread to Balkh and he was invited by some of the religious personages to move to the capital where he continued to attract a multitude of impoverished and marginalised people who had suffered much as a result of the oppressive policies of the Persian occupiers. Outside Balkh, he was greeted by a

crowd of between fifty and sixty thousand, acclaiming him as the "Apostle of the Age" (*Rasul-i Muddati*) and the "True Imam" (*Imam Bi-Haq*).

In order to reinforce the growing Mahdi-ism of his message, Hazrat Ishan decided to take up his abode at the shrine of Mazar-i Sharif. In doing so, he sent a veiled message to the Persian occupiers that he was the true representative of the Imam's teaching, and not the Shi'i invaders. The guardian (*mutawalli*) of the shrine, Khwaja Ni'mat Ansari, made a room available for the Hazrat and soon multitudes of sick and maimed were flocking to the shaikh. His miracles continued to amaze the populace, particularly when he raised to life two decapitated bodies before the very eyes of the Nadirid governor of Balkh, Niyaz Khan, and Khwaja Ni'mat Ansari (McChesney 1991, 207-8).

His message and wonders made a particular impression on the Qipchaq tribe which occupied the Balkh plains and the north-facing mountain slopes of the Hindu Kush. Following the defeat of the Ming ataliq, Saiyid Khan, in 1737, the Qipchaqs had been the main opponents of the Persian occupiers. 'Ismatullah Beg, the amir who acted as a mediator between his tribe and Niyaz Khan, acknowledged, on behalf of his tribe, the Ishan's powers and placed his whole *ulus* under Rasul's spiritual authority and leadership. From this point onwards, the followers of the Hazrat became increasingly militarised. Muhammad Kazim,[19] who gives the most detailed account of this movement, blames the shift to armed uprising on the Qipchaq chief, but militant resistance to oppression is implicit in Islamic eschatology of the Mahdi, as is the belief that the appearance of this justice-restoring individual is but a precursor to the return of the miracle-working prophet, 'Isa b. Maryam, who will slay the anti-Christ, *al-Dajjal*.[20] It is not difficult, therefore, to understand why Hazrat Ishan's preaching, accompanied as it was by extraordinary miracles, was seen as implicit criticism of the Shi'i invaders, who had overthrown the ancient order and brought with them tyranny and hardship on an unprecedented scale. How much Rasul himself encouraged such political aspirations is not clear, but he seems to have made no attempt to discourage the militarisation of his disciples (McChesney 1991, 207-9).

[19] *Nama-yi 'Alam-ara-yi Nadiri*, I have paraphrased McChesney's account of this uprising, McChesney 1991, 203-13.

[20] See MacDonald's article, "Al-Mahdi," *SEI*, 310-3.

The Qipchaqs final broke out in revolt in the autumn of 1741 and was initial successful. A Persian force from Balkh was defeated and the capital besieged. Niyaz Khan next tried to break out from Balkh by attacking the Qipchaq's western flank but he was forced back by an army of some sixty thousand rebels. However, during this battle, 'Ismatullah Beg was seriously wounded and his followers, confident in the Hazrat's powers to cure the incurable, carried the injured Qipchaq amir to Mazar-i Sharif (McChesney 1991, 209).

Unfortunately for Rasul, his powers deserted him just when they were most needed and the chief died. The failure to restore to health the man who had risked his life for the Ishan's cause, destroyed public confidence in his claims and the whole Qipchaq tribe abandoned Rasul to his fate. By the middle of December 1741 the Ishan found himself alone in the shrine of Mazar-i Sharif. The *mutawalli* of the shrine, who anyway had been placed in a difficult position by the shaikh's presence, realised that the rebellion was over and ingratiated himself with his Persian overlords by ensuring that the populist leader was arrested and executed by Niyaz Khan (McChesney 1991, 209-10).

In the reprisals that followed, the Qipchaq tribe was decimated. Special troops were sent by Nadir Shah to stamp out all vestiges of resistance and thousands were slain or enslaved. Six thousand five hundred tribesmen, chosen by lot, were beheaded and their skulls made into a pyramid. The Ishan's closest disciple, who had announced him in the villages as "Lord of the Age and Time," was buried alive in this grisly tomb. It was reported that his screams continued for many days until death finally released him from his agony (McChesney 1991, 210).

The repression served to further fragment a society which was already beginning to lose any central authority. Furthermore, Nadir's persecution and decimation of the Qipchaq's ulus strengthened the power of the Ming and Qataghan amirs for up to this point in time, the Qipchaqs had been one of the main power-brokers in the region. Thus the decade of Nadirid government in the appanage exacerbated the tendency to regionalism. This was accentuated by the demands Nadir Shah made on the wilayat for troops to replenish his army, which drained the province of Persian forces. In order to keep a sort of peace, Nadir's governor was obliged to rely increasingly on local Uzbek tribes to police their own people. Thus when, in 1745/6 Kulab and Badakhshan revolted against high taxation, the uprising was

suppressed by an army made up entirely of Uzbeks recruited from the appanage. The reliance on local levies strengthened the hands of local Uzbek amirs, particularly Hazara "Khan" Qataghani, a direct descendant of Mahmud Bi,[21] the amir of Qunduz who, despite having given sanctuary to Ataliq Saiyid Ming following his defeat by Reza Quli Khan in 1737, had eventually made his peace with the invaders. From *c.* 1746, following the Badakhshan campaign, he began to adopt a more independent stance, realising that the Persian governor was not in a position to enforce his will over his territory.

Balkh and the Kingdom of the Afghans, 1747-1751

Following the assassination of Nadir Shah in June 1747 by his Persian commanders, who decided to "breakfast off him ere he should sup off them" (Browne iv, 137), the empire he had carved out for himself broke into three parts. In Persia, Nadir's nephew, 'Ali Quli, succeeded his father, but he was quickly killed by his brother, Ibrahim, who in turn was assassinated in 1749 by supporters of Nadir's grandson, Shah Rukh. Shah Rukh too was deposed and blinded but, contrary to the traditional practice which disqualifies the blind from kingship, he was later reinstated and reigned in Mashhad until 1796 (Browne iv, 138). Meanwhile, in Qandahar, the Afghans asserted their independence by the election of Ahmad Shah of the Abdali tribe, a younger brother of Zu'l-Faqar Khan the former ruler of Herat, as their commander, or Amir. Following a dream, Ahmad Shah caused the name of the Abdali tribe to be changed to Durrani (*dur* = pearl) and henceforth he was known as Ahmad Shah Durrani (Dupree 1978, 332-3).

Balkh was evacuated by the remaining Nadirid contingents without too much difficulty (McChesney 1991, 214-5), but their departure left a huge power vacuum. The old Chingizid order had been swept aside during the decade of occupation and control of Balkh was henceforth to be disputed between the Ming and Qataghan tribes, until Balkh was invaded by Sardar Muhammad Akram Khan in 1849. No attempt was made to re-establish a Chingizid as the nominal head of the Balkh Khanate, partly because there were few legitimate claimants and partly because events in Bukhara made it obvious that there was no hope of reviving the Tuqay-Timurid dynasty.

[21] For his genealogy and discussion of the conflicting claims in the sources, see McChesney 1991, 214 n.

When news of Nadir's death reached Ataliq Rahim Bi Manghit at his camp in Charjui, he kept the news a close secret and hurried to Bukhara. With the dust of the journey still on his coat, he went to the royal palace and demanded an interview with Abu'l-Faiz Khan. Having gained access to the Khan's chamber, he ordered the unfortunate ruler to be seized and imprisoned in the Mir 'Arab *madrasa*. Rahim Bi's action produced a quick response from the rump of Nadir's army, which had been sent to suppress an uprising in Ferghana. When they heard of Nadir's death and the confinement of Abu'l-Faiz, they abandoned their operations in the east and besieged Rahim Bi in Bukhara. Nothing daunted, Rahim Bi cleverly exploited the ethnic and tribal divisions within their ranks and succeeded in persuading the Ghilzai contingent to change sides. Weakened by this defection, the Persians abandoned the siege, negotiated safe passage back across the Amu Darya and returned to their own country. Immediately the Ghilzai defection had been achieved, Rahim Bi had the wretched Abu'l-Faiz Khan put to death (Howorth, 765). 'Abd al-Mu'min, who had the dubious distinction of being Rahim Bi's son-in-law, was then set up as a figure-head to give a token respectability to Rahim Bi's putsch.

There could have been little doubt in anyone's mind that the Manghit amir was now the true ruler of Bukhara and it was but a matter of time before he, or his heirs, made away with the Tuqay-Timurid line altogether (Howorth, 765). A few years later, in 1751, Rahim Bi had 'Abd al-Mu'min assassinated, after he had shown himself to be rather too independently-minded, and placed 'Ubaidullah, a son(?) of Abu'l-Faiz in his place. However, before eighteen months of his reign had been completed, he too had been deposed.

Rahim Bi's domination of the Chingizid Khan in Bukhara was a further impetus for individual amirs in Balkh to operate independently. The abandonment of the province by the Persians was seen by the Ming and Qataghan amirs of Maimana and Qunduz as an opportunity to lay hold of the 'Ancient Supremacy' and claim for themselves the titles of *Khan* and *Wali-yi Balkh*.[22] Haji Bi Ming, amir of Maimana,[23] was the first to take advantage of the break up of Nadir's empire. He

[22] Translated by nineteenth century commentators as 'Governor of Balkh', but wali is better translated in the context of the Chingizid domination of Balkh as 'Regent'.

[23] After Bukhari (McChesney 1991, 214-5). Muhammad Kazim mentions another Mingid, Musa Khwaja Uzbek, in connection with the take-over at Balkh. However, since Haji Bi, or Haji Khan, as the sources call him (though this title was formally given to him later), is mentioned in other contemporary histories, such as the *Tarikh-i Ahmad Shahi* (see below), it is more likely that it was he who took control after 1747.

seized control of Balkh, but a few weeks later his great rival, Hazara Bi of Qataghan, ousted him (McChesney 1991, 215). Realising that their military might was equally balanced and that he needed allies to defeat the Qataghanids, Haji Bi made the fatal mistake of approaching the newly-elected Amir of the Afghan tribes, Ahmad Shah Durrani.

British Perceptions of Balkh in the Post-Nadirid Period

The political situation of the province of Balkh, following the death of Nadir Shah, has attracted little comment from historians, mainly because the focus of European attention from 1747 onwards had been concentrated, more or less exclusively, on the rise of Afghan power in Qandahar and, later, Kabul. Even today, historical works on Afghanistan still reflect this bias (e.g. Dupree 1978). The reason for this is not difficult to pin-point. In the nineteenth century, the rivalry between Britain and Russia, known inappropriately by the Kiplingesque sobriquet, 'The Great Game', resulted in British sponsorship of 'Afghanistan'—or perhaps, more accurately, the Amirs of that country—as a buffer between the Tsarist empire and British India.

This often uncomfortable alliance resulted in British military and political officials relying heavily on Afghan sources for historical information on the early Durrani period. There is strong evidence (see below and chapter 6) that British ignorance of Central Asian history and the traditional alignments beyond the Hindu Kush, was manipulated by both Sadozai and Barakzai Amirs in order to extend their power up to the Amu Darya or even Bukhara. The remoteness of Turkistan from India, Uzbek, Aimaq and Turkman involvement in the slave trade,[24] and the executions of Conolly and Stoddard in Bukhara in 1842,[25] were further factors which restricted European contact with Turkistan and Bukhara and contributed to British prejudice against the Uzbeks and "The Man-Stealing Turcomans" (Marvin 1881).

Underlying all of the British frontier policy was a European obsession with classical history, and Alexander the Great in particular.

[24] Sadozai support of the slave trade during the First Anglo-Afghan War (cf. Yar Muhammad Khan's sale of Qizilbash, Hazaras and his political opponents into slavery) was generally played down by the British, for obvious political reasons, as was the forcible enslavement of Uzbeks, Hazaras and Kafirs by 'Abd al-Rahman Khan from 1889 onwards—well after the Uzbek-Turkman slave trade had been suppressed by the Russian conquest of the Central Asian Khanates.

[25] For a discussion of how these executions continued to dominate Anglo-Bukharan relations well after the deaths of Nasrullah Khan and Dost Muhammad Khan, see chapters 5 & 6.

Successive generations of British political and military officers, viceroys and civil servants were educated in a system which was steeped in the Greek and Latin works which Alexander's conquests spawned. When, at the turn of the nineteenth century, the East India Company's attention was drawn to the Central Asian region, it was to these sources that officials turned for information about the human and military geography of the regions beyond the Khyber and the Amu Darya.[26] The journals of explorers and military strategists, such as Edward Stirling, Alexander Burnes, Arthur Conolly and many others, are shot through with references to Herodotus, Plutarch, Quintus Curtius Rufus, etc. Explorers and travellers made copious notes about the locations of the geographical places mentioned by classical geographers, while others, like Burnes, made collections of Bactrian coins, or sought to identify races such as the Kafirs or Pushtuns as the descendants of Greek settlers. Implicit in all of these enquiries, was the assumption that Central Asian history began with Alexander and that little had changed, in strategic or political terms, since 326 BC.

Since oriental and archaeological studies of the area were in their infancy it was possible for 'authorities' on the area to leap over more than two millennia of invasion, migration and religious revolutions to sustain the myth that since Alexander drew his border on the Oxus,[27] Britain too, should regard the same river as the 'natural' boundary of 'Our Indian Possessions'.

Furthermore, the population of Transoxiana which, in the nineteenth century, was dominated by the Manghit Uzbek dynasty of Bukhara and other semi-independent Turkman and Uzbek amirs, was viewed very much in the manner of Plutarch's mythological view of barbarian Sogdiana in *De Alexandri Magni Fortuna aut Virtute*. The region's "wild and savage way of living" was personified for both British and Russian officials in the slave trade; a traffic which had to be "overcome" by the modern heirs of Alexander. If the slave traders could not be 'civilized' then they had to be beaten for "wickedness was the way of the barbarians" (quoted Holt, 25). This Plutarchian myth can be detected in the journals of early European explorers of Central Asia in the 1820s and 30s and was reinforced and consolidated as a consequence of the unavenged executions of Conolly and

[26] See, for example, Fraser-Tytler's comment (p. 142) on Lord Lytton's ardent espousal of the 'Forward Policy' in 1878-89 which led to the Second Anglo-Afghan War.

[27] In fact Alexander did not stop at the Oxus, but conquered the satrapy of Sogdiana as far north as the Sir Darya (Jaxartes) river.

Stoddard at the hands of Nasrullah of Bukhara in 1842. Since Britain was unable itself to destroy the power of the rump Chingizid state either side of the Amu Darya, the alternative was to encourage its break up and demise by sponsoring the expansion of the Durrani state in the south and through tacit connivance with the southward expansion of the other European imperial power in the region, Russia.

Not that this classical world view is peculiar to the nineteenth century colonial mind. It also pervades the work of Tarn (Tarn 1948 & 1980) and the writing of British officials of this century, such as Fraser-Tytler, who was himself an active participant in British Central Asian policy. Fraser-Tytler's historical survey of Afghanistan begins with a reference to the *Meteorologica* of Aristotle and Alexander's conquest (Fraser-Tytler, 3-4). Even more extraordinarily, he subsequently constructs an elaborate defence of British Central Asian policy during the last century based entirely on the precedent of the Græco-Bactrian kingdom, and pointedly ignores half a millennium of Chingizid domination of the Amu and Sir Darya plains:[28]

> No ruler of India can afford to allow a powerful and potentially hostile state to occupy or outflank the great frontier barrier of India - the mountains of the Hindu Kush. This is the simple (*sic*) fact which has come down to us through history, it is a fact which ... still remains, even today, in spite of all modern inventions and devices, as true as when, over two thousand years ago, the Greeks crossed the Hindu Kush to found the first European Empire of India (Fraser-Tytler, 142).

Despite the illogicality, even ridiculousness, of such an argument, it has been the basis of an unchallenged truism that has underlain more than a hundred and fifty years of British involvement in Afghanistan and Central Asia. In European terms, it is as if the present Italian government were to lay claim to England and Wales on the basis that the Roman empire's northern border had been drawn at Hadrian's Wall and were to add insult to injury by subsidising the French to enforce their presumed rights.

Even today, western scholarship maintains its dalliance with the romance of Alexander, preferring classical geographical terms, such as 'Oxus', 'Jaxartes' and 'Paropamisus', which are meaningless to the local population unless, of course, they have received a western education.[29] British, French and, to an extent, Russian archæological

[28] See also Fraser-Tytler, Part III, "The Lessons of History," 275ff.

[29] For contemporary examples, see Dupree 1978 (though he prefers Amu Darya to Oxus), Yapp 1980 *et al.*

exploration of Afghanistan in this century has perpetuated this obsession, concentrating on sites which are presumed to have Alexandrine, and hence, European, associations.

The cumulative effect of these prejudices was to lead, eventually, to the northern border of Afghanistan being drawn on the Amu Darya. As a corollary, it became highly inconvenient to dig too deeply into the pre-Nadirid history of the Balkh appanage, since one only had to scratch the surface to discover uncomfortable facts which ran counter to both British and Russian beliefs about the 'natural', 'scientific' frontiers of India and Central Asia.

Another factor which distorted British perceptions of the frontier issue was the inaccuracy of intelligence on which Central Asian policy was based. In the first half of the nineteenth century, British officials relied almost exclusively on the reports of British officers and military travellers, which were regarded as authoritative by policy-makers and historians. More often than not, however, these reports were poorly researched and were the result of the author's selective and subjective interpretation.[30] Many of the sources were oral and originated with individuals who had a vested interest in interpreting or distorting facts to their own advantage. Policy-makers not only lived thousands of miles from the events in question and were thus unable to gauge the effect of their policies on the indigenous population, they were also many years removed from the foundation of the Durrani Amirship, the invasions of Nadir Shah, and the last days of the Chingizid Khanate.

By the time Britain began to take an interest in affairs beyond the Indus and officers were able to conduct surveys in the area, nearly a hundred years had passed since the election of Ahmad Shah Durrani, the death of Nadir Shah and the break-up of the appanage system. Yet British officials constantly sought to legitimise their decisions about frontiers on the basis of what occurred in the middle of the seventeenth century.

From its inception, therefore, British Central Asian and Afghanistan policy was built on a foundation of sand, being constructed on a heady cocktail of Alexandrian romanticism and unreliable, partial and prejudiced sources. It is no wonder that British colonial strategy in Central Asia bears little relation to historic precedent, or that regions which had ancient cultural and political

[30] E.g. the debate about the exact location of Khwaja Saleh on the Amu Darya, which rumbled on throughout the century.

affinities with each other were divided by arbitrary borders into states which were never united by consensus but merely sustained by military might and European sponsorship. It is hardly unexpected therefore, in an age which has witnessed the collapse of both the British and Russian empires, that so much ethnic conflict has broken out in territories formerly controlled by these powers. Afghanistan is no exception and the present conflict is an inevitable outcome of policies pursued by Britain, Russia and the Afghan Amirs, over the last two centuries.

Haji Bi Ming's Embassy to Ahmad Shah Durrani, 1751

Arthur Conolly's brief account of Haji Bi and the Mingid dynasty of Balkh and Maimana,[31] written in 1840, is a good example of this concoction of historical inaccuracy, classical romanticism and partisan manipulation. For over a hundred and fifty years, this laconic report has been the basis for nearly all histories of Balkh and Maimana, from the days of Ahmad Shah Durrani to the flight of Amir Dost Muhammad Khan in 1839.[32] Even today, scholars still treat Conolly's memorandum as if it were authoritative.[33]

Conolly's source for his history of the Mingid dynasty was a certain Saiyid 'Abbas, a Persian scribe (*mirza*) who accompanied his mission on the recommendation of Alexander Burnes. Saiyid 'Abbas, according to Conolly's own account, claimed to have lived some ten years in Maimana, where he had practised medicine and enjoyed "the favour and intimacy" of Mizrab Khan, Wali of Maimana at that period.[34] According to the Mirza, or rather Conolly's interpretation of his material, the rise of the Mingid dynasty came about in the following way:

[31] Conolly, *Bamiyan to Merve*, 1840.

[32] Cf. Afghan Boundary Commission, *Gazetteer* (1895) ii, 217-8; J. Talboys Wheeler (1869) and many others. Future references in text to *Gazetteer*, with appropriate edition date and volume number, refer to the Afghan Boundary Commission's Gazetteer, vol. ii, *Afghan Turkistan* (editions in 1895, 1907 and 1919) and vol. iii, *Herat* (1910). Other, earlier, Gazetteers, e.g. MacGregor (1871), are referred to by author's name. A complete set of the ABC Gazetteer's are located in the IOLR at L/MIL/17/4/1-4 with route maps and indexes. See also *Curzon Collection*, MSS Eur., F112.

[33] The Afghan Boundary Commission's Gazetteers were recently republished by Adamec (1979 for the volume on Afghan Turkistan) with very little critical appraisal of their historical material. Unfortunately, this has led to the perpetuation of certain historical perceptions which have little basis in fact, cf. McChesney 1991, 220 and n.

[34] Conolly, *Bamiyan to Merve*, 1840.

> Hajee Khan, the founder of the ruling family belonging to the Oosbeg tribe of Mingeah, was a soldier of fortune in Nadir Shah's army together with Ahmed Khan Abdowlee. When the latter, after the murder of the Persian monarch [Nadir Shah], had made himself King of the Afghans, Hajee Khan repaired to his Court and Ahmed Shah, who was bent upon retaining (*sic*) all that Nadir Shah had conquered, appointed his old comrade Walee of Meiminna and Bulkh on condition of his furnishing certain military aid at call. Meiminna at that time was not a place of importance enough to have a money currency, its substitute was the Kerbus, or common cotton cloth of the native handlooms, as at this day among the Huzerahs, and Hajee Khan's seat was at Bulkh, one of his relatives remaining as his deputy at the latter place. Ahmad Shah moreover to help his former associate in arms to maintain a good appearance on the frontier gave him territorial grants upon territory in the province of Heraut to the amount of twelve or fourteen ploughs, a grant which was enjoyed by his descendants up to the last Walee fourteen years ago when it was resumed by Shah Kamran.[35]

Such is the substance of Conolly's terse history of Haji 'Khan'. Though McChesney (1991, 220) speculates that Saiyid 'Abbas might have been familiar with Reza Quli Khan's *Mulhaqat-i Rawzat al-Safa-yi Nadiri*, the number of inaccuracies this report contains would suggest that much of the mirza's information was based on hearsay.

We have seen how, immediately after the evacuation of the province by the remnant of Nadir's forces in 1747, Haji Bi Ming of Maimana had seized Balkh and established himself as wali to the detriment of his Qataghanid rival, Hazara Bi, only to be ousted by the amir of Qunduz a few weeks later. Thus, even before Ahmad Shah was elected as Amir of the Afghans, or the Durrani leader conferred on Haji Bi the title of *Wali-yi Balkh*, the Ming amir had ruled both Balkh and Maimana in the immediate post-Nadirid era. Indeed, he was chief of arguably the most powerful Uzbek tribe south of the Amu Darya.

Fortunately, we no longer have to rely on Conolly as our sole source for the history of Haji Bi Ming, for the *Tarikh-i Ahmad Shahi* of Mahmud b. Ibrahim al-Husaini deals in some detail with events in Balkh during Ahmad Shah's reign. At the time of his visit to Qandahar, Haji Bi Ming is called Hakim of Maimana; a position we know he had held since at least 1747, and probably much earlier (Mahmud, 126b). The *Tarikh* gives the date of the meeting between the Uzbek and Afghan amirs as, "the year that Ahmad Shah had his victories in the West," that is 1163/1750-1, which is when the Afghans re-took

[35] *Ibid.*

Herat and not immediately after Ahmad Shah's election, as implied by Conolly (Mahmud, 126b; McChesney 1991, 220; Singh, 83).[36]

Haji Bi Ming, along with a number of other elders (*aqsaqalan*), probably from the Chahar Wilayat and territories west of Balkh, came to Qandahar and complained about the exactions of Rahim Bi Khan, the Manghit Ataliq of Bukhara, who had overthrown Abu'l-Faiz Khan in 1747 (Mahmud, 126b). Though the *Tarikh-i Ahmad Shahi* does not say so in as many words, we can deduce that the arrival of these Turkistani[37] amirs was more than likely a direct result of the Afghan seizure of Herat, for its fall had brought Afghan troops to within striking distance of the Murghab river—the traditional border between Maimana and Herat, the Uzbek and Persian Empires.

Conolly, if we can trust him on this point, claims that Haji Bi and Ahmad Shah had fought together under Nadir Shah, and no doubt the hakim saw an opportunity of exploiting an old friendship by obtaining Afghan assistance to throw his Qataghan rival out of Balkh and of re-establishing his own supremacy. The alleged extortions of Rahim Bi's tax collectors provided the excuse that Ahmad Shah required to justify his intervention beyond the Hindu Kush for, as Conolly points out, the Durrani Amir saw himself as the rightful heir to the Nadirid empire; a belief which he was to pass on to his successors. The interference of the Bukharans across the Amu Darya could be construed as a breach of the treaty between Nadir Shah and Abu'l-Faiz Khan and, even though such agreements were only valid until the death of one or other of the contracting parties, a *casus belli* was needed to justify the Afghan intervention. The presence of Bukharan officials suggests that Rahim Bi Manghit was trying to re-assert a measure of Bukharan authority over the Balkh appanage, and Maimana in particular.

The main purpose, therefore, of the meeting between Ahmad Shah Durrani and Haji Bi Ming, was to arrange for a Mingid-Durrani alliance against the Qataghanid amir of Balkh and to force Rahim Bi Manghit's army back across the Amu Darya. 'Ataullah Khan Turkman, who had already commanded a combined Afghan-Uzbek force in Isfahan under Ibrahim Khan, was appointed as supreme commander (*sipah salar*) of Turkistan, with Mukhless Khan Durrani in charge of the Qizilbash troops. They were sent north, though neither

[36] Raverty vi, 2969.

[37] Turkistan was the name by which the province of Balkh was known to southerners (cf. preface; McChesney 1991, 220). It is still used in local parlance by the Aimaqs and Tadjiks living in the Tir Band-i Turkistan and the upper Murghab to distinguish their mountain area from the northern plains.

the route of their march, nor the details of their campaign are recorded by Mahmud's history (Mahmud, 100b, 128a-b, 167a). He does mention, however, that prior to his return to Turkistan, Haji Bi Ming was appointed Chief Collector of Taxes (*Sahib-i Ikhtiyar*) in Turkistan and allowed to assume the emotive title (*laqab*) of *Khan* and *Wali-yi Balkh*.[38]

Haji Bi Ming as 'Khan' and 'Wali-yi Balkh wa Maimana'

Mahmud al-Husaini makes it plain that he was well aware of the significance of these titles for the Chingizid (McChesney 1991, 220) and it is hard to believe that Ahmad Shah Durrani, who had fought alongside Uzbeks under Nadir Shah, failed to understand the implications of such concessions. The Nadirid occupation of Balkh and the subsequent assassination of Abu'l-Faiz Khan by Rahim Bi Manghit had left not only Balkh, but Bukhara, without any Chingizid as titular head of the Uzbek state. Haji Bi Khan seems to have had pretensions to fill this void—indeed, it is possible that, like Rahim Bi, he had some family link with the Chingizid line, possibly through marriage. What these titles thus indicate is the importance that Ahmad Shah attached to his alliance with Haji Bi and the high price that the Afghan Amir was prepared to pay pay to secure it. Once the amir of Qataghan had been subdued, Haji Bi was to become the new Chingizid ruler of the Balkh appanage. At the same time his status as Hakim of Maimana was enhanced by the more exalted style of address, *Wali*, a title which deliberately harked back to the age of the Tuqay-Timurids.

It seems, however, that Haji Khan Ming did not reside in Balkh during his period as *Wali-yi Balkh*. Mahmud, in contradiction to Conolly's account, indicates that Haji Khan Ming's actual place of residence was Maimana and, during the period of the judicial commissioner which Ahmad Shah established in *c.* 1755/6 to investigate alleged oppression by Haji Khan, the Wali of Balkh was living in Maimana and rarely visited Balkh unless pressurised by the commissioner to do so (Mahmud, 356b, 357a, 517a).

This arrangement seems, at first, to be somewhat curious and we must look at the function of this office in the following century to understand the exact nature of Haji Khan's position.

[38] From henceforth Mahmud refers to Haji Bi as "Haji Khan Ming, *Wali-yi Balkh wa Maimana*."

The concept of an Uzbek as *Wali-yi Balkh* persisted under the Durrani monarchy until at least the onset of the First Anglo-Afghan War in 1838. Despite the increased dominance of Afghan power and the presence of a Kabul-appointed governor of Balkh, the Amir also appointed an Uzbek counterpart who had the right to this title. In the late 1830s the individual who held this post was reckoned to be the "Paramount Lord" of the Uzbeks (Harlan 1939, 28-9). He always held this office concurrently whilst actual holding the hakimship of another district of Turkistan.

The case of Ahmad Beg, the eldest son of Mir Qilij Beg, Hakim of Khulm, is a good example of this dualism. In 1811 he was appointed by the Afghan ruler of Kabul, Shah Mahmud, as governor of Aibak, but at the same time was made *Wali-yi Balkh.* Some years later, it was conferred on Mir Qilij's second son, Baba Beg, after he had poisoned his elder brother (Moorcroft ii, 399). Through his tenure as *Wali-yi Balkh* Ahmad Beg remained in Aibak and never lived in Balkh. Yet he was responsible for the collection of the annual tribute (cash and kind) which the amirs of Turkistan paid as *nazarana* to Kabul.

At the time of Ahmad Beg's appointment, Sardar Najibullah Khan Surkhani was the Afghan governor of Balkh, exercising a token authority over the city of that name, on behalf of the Amir. Expenses incurred in virtue of this office, however, were disbursed to him by his Uzbek counterpart. This, of course, gave Ahmad Beg and his successors considerable power, since they controlled the purse-strings of the Afghan Resident.

The Uzbek *Wali-yi Balkh* also acted as the agent and spokesman for all the Uzbek tribes in their dealings with the Afghan power and *vice versa* (Ferrier 1858, 101; Izzat Ullah, 81, 85).[39] This link between the title of *Wali-yi Balkh* and the collection of state tribute goes some way to explain the kinds of duties Ahmad Shah expected of Haji Khan Ming when making him his Sahib-i Ikhtiyar in Turkistan.

Although the Uzbek wali was non-resident in the appanage capital, we can see that this office was far from being honorary. That it was a much coveted appointment is evident, inasmuch as both Mingid and Qataghanid dynasties fought bitterly for the privilege of having this title conferred on them by the Amir of Kabul. It clearly retained a strong historical association for the Uzbeks in the same way that, in Britain, the title 'Prince of Wales' is held by the heir apparent to the throne. This position confers no political or judicial power over

[39] See also Chapter 4 for the position of Afghan governors of Balkh.

Wales, neither does it involve residence in the Welsh capital, yet there are few in Britain who do not know that the holder of this title is second only in rank to the reigning monarch.

We have seen how, although Conolly's history of Haji Bi Ming has some similarities to that of Mahmud al-Husaini, the relationship between the Afghan Amir and Haji Bi is interpreted in a completely different way from the actual situation that obtained in 1751. Conolly portrays Haji Khan as a "soldier of fortune" (i.e. a mercenary) who supplicates the Afghan ruler, as his superior, to grant him some appointment in Turkistan on the grounds of an old army acquaintance. Haji Bi was not, however, some stateless adventurer begging favours, but a governor of Balkh and Maimana long before his appearance in Qandahar and prior to Ahmad Shah Durrani's elevation to the Amirship of the Afghan tribes.[40] His tribe, and doubtless members of his own immediate family, had held senior posts in the Chingizid administration of the Balkh appanage since the days of Ataliq Uraz Bi Ming and Nazr Muhammad Khan and were among the major power brokers for over a century prior to the foundation of the Durrani dynasty.

Conolly's account is also anachronistic. In 1747 'Turkistan' lay outside of Ahmad Shah's dominions and the Amir had no power to appoint anyone to govern Balkh. Nor was the appanage under his power in 1751, when Haji Bi and the other elders came to Qandahar. Conolly therefore is highly misleading when he states that at the time of Haji Bi's visit, Ahmad Shah Durrani was "bent upon retaining all that Nadir Shah had conquered," for it is impossible to retain what one never possessed. Indeed, up to that point, no Afghan or Abdali had ever ruled Balkh, Maimana or, indeed, any part of what the Afghans referred to as Turkistan. What Ahmad Shah (and his successors) sought, was the assertion of Afghan power in the appanage of Balkh, in emulation of Nadir Shah Afshar's earlier conquests.

By 1751, Maimana was a place of some importance and Conolly was wrong to devalue its economic and political significance by implying that it had no proper monetary system. Maimana straddled

[40] Thus one of the central problems implicit in Conolly's biography of Haji 'Khan' is clarified by the contemporary source. If Haji Khan Ming was merely a "soldier of fortune," why did Ahmad Shah entrust an apparently powerless and positionless Uzbek mercenary with the dual governorship of the strategic and prestigious provinces of Balkh and Maimana? Conolly's claim that the appointment was made merely on the basis of an old army friendship and "on condition of his [i.e. Haji Bi Ming's] furnishing certain military aid at call," is ludicrous. Indeed, the very fact that Haji Bi Khan Ming was given these positions should have indicated to Conolly that this individual was a person of considerable political standing amongst his own people prior to his appointment by Ahmad Shah Durrani.

an important trade route between Khurasan and Bukhara and its population had become increasingly sedentary over the previous hundred years as trade had prospered. This is one reason why, under Nazr Muhammad, Maimana became the centre of a princely sub-appanage government and was regarded as the chief place west of Balkh. Since Shaibanid times, the tribes around Maimana had played a major *rôle* in defending the borders against Safawid encroachment. We know that on the eve of the Nadirid invasion, the cis Oxus territory was prosperous and trade was on the increase. A new bazaar complex had been built in Qunduz, which included shops, storage facilities and workshops for some thirty different trades. By the early 1700s there was a more or less unified currency system operating throughout the province and Bukhara, based on the Subhan Quli tanga (McChesney 1991, 200-1). Although the Nadirid occupation destroyed trade and the local agricultural economy, by the time of Timur Shah Durrani the revenues of Balkh, including Maimana, were paid in both cash and kind.[41] Indeed, it is inconceivable that caravan traders were not able to use both Bukharan and Persian currencies in Maimana at the time of Nadir Shah's conquest. The presence of many Jews and Hindus in the town and the rest of the province in the early 1820s is an indication of the need for currency transactions; the non-Muslims being used as brokers and bankers because of the Islamic proscription of usury. In fact, Conolly contradicts himself on this point. Later in his report, he informs us that Ahmad Shah established a government mehman khana, or guest-cum-post house, in the area. A tax of one *tuman*[42] per village (or 360 ploughs, or *jarib*s, of land) and an estate (*jagir*) of twelve or fourteen ploughs in Herat were set aside to cover the costs of establishing a postal and communications systems between Qandahar, Herat and Balkh. Conolly, therefore, admits that Bukharan currency was in circulation at the time of the meeting between Haji Bi and Ahmad Shah.

[41] *Report of Ghulam Sarwar, Native Agent of the Hon. East India Company, on Special Mission to the Country of Shah Zemaun, 1793-1795*, 7 June 1797, IOLR, P:Bengal Secret Consultations, 41, n. pag. (henceforth, Ghulam Sarwar, 1797). Hall, 4 has the wrong location for this report in her footnote.

[42] For monetary units, linear measurements, etc., see Appendix II.

'Turkistan' and Ahmad Shah Durrani, 1751-1772

Having established the exact nature of the relationship between Haji Bi Ming and Ahmad Shah Durrani, the Balkh campaign, which was the most important outcome of the meeting between the two amirs, takes on quite a different perspective. Ahmad Shah, in effect, agreed to assist the Mingids in re-establishing their control over Balkh in return for a nominal Afghan presence in the appanage capital. Attempts by British officers in the nineteenth century to claim that the Afghans annexed or incorporated the area into their kingdom are, therefore, quite untrue (McChesney 1991, 221).

The army sent into 'Turkistan' consisted not only of Afghans, but also Qizilbash troops, with support from Uzbeks probably drawn from Maimana and the Chahar Wilayat. The primary objective of this 'invasion' was not the Afghan annexation of Balkh, as Dost Muhammad Khan was later to attempt, but to defeat the Qataghanid amir, throw him out of Balkh and establish Haji Bi Ming as the pro-Durrani wali, which would leave Ahmad Shah free to pursue his campaigns against India without fear of an attack from the north. By the "fifth regal year", or the summer of 1752/1165, these aims had been more or less achieved. Hazara Khan Qataghan had been ousted from Balkh (Mahmud, 147b; Singh, 99; Vambery 1873, 356) and Haji Bi Khan Ming had assumed control of Balkh with Sardar 'Ataullah Khan Turkman in overall command of military affairs in the region. Problems, however, soon arose between the Afghans and the Qizilbash, after the latter tried to involve Ilbars, the Khan of Khiva and Urganj, in the affairs of the province. Eventually, the Afghans forced the Qizilbash regiments to quit the province, though in the process they undermined their own hold over the area (Katib i, 16; Mahmud, 167a).

The weakness of the Durrani alliance encouraged the Qataghan tribe under Mizrab Bi b. Hazara Bi, who had succeeded his father in 1753, to rebel (Mahmud, 292b). In response, Ahmad Shah was obliged to send a further five thousand men, under Khanjan Khan Sardar, from Hindustan in order "to facilitate the dispersing and concluding of this matter of momentous purification" (Mahmud, 301a). An (unnamed) son of Haji Khan Ming was also sent towards Balkh to attack the western borders of Qataghan and, with the help of other nobles of Turkistan,[43] they forced Mizrab Bi, "to bow the

[43] جمعی دیگر از ترکستان

shoulder to the Lord of the World, the Centre of Adornment" (Mahmud, 301a). This success was followed up by the subjugation of Badakhshan, after which Haji Khan Ming, along with other victorious Afghan and Uzbek leaders, went to Qandahar, where Ahmad Shah generously rewarded them (Mahmud, 301a).[44]

A few years later, in 1755/6, Haji Bi Khan Ming visited the Durrani Amir again, this time at Kabul, and petitioned to be appointed as *sardar* of Turkistan in place of 'Ataullah Khan Turkman, promising that he would increase the amount of revenue and keep the province quiet. This request was granted and thus the alliance between Mingid and Durrani was further strengthened to the detriment of the Qataghanids (Mahmud, 354a-b). However, Haji Khan abused his new position and resorted to extortion and brutality. The *Tarikh-i Ahmad Shahi*, admittedly hardly an impartial authority, accuses him of being, "innately and wantonly evil and tyrannical"[45] and consequently alienating "both small and great" (Mahmud, 354a). Thus, when eventually, a delegation of notables from the appanage complained to Ahmad Shah about Haji Khan's rapacity, cruelty and oppression the Amir appointed an Afghan, Saiyid 'Ataullah Khan, as Judicial Superintendent (*Darugha-yi 'Adalat*)[46] to investigate these allegations (Mahmud, 354b).

When Haji Khan heard that reports of his oppressions had reached the ears of the Amir, he moderated his exactions and did his utmost to frustrate Saiyid 'Ataullah's investigations. So successful was he in this, that the judicial investigator was forced to demand a further mandate for his enquiries from Ahmad Shah, who reconfirmed his appointment. To demonstrate his displeasure with Haji Bi Ming, the Amir stripped him of his post of sardar and sent Nawab Khan 'Alikozai in his place (Mahmud, 354b, 355a). This decision had a salutary effect on Haji Khan, who realised that the Amir no longer regarded him as indispensable and was prepared to take a more interventionist stance in Balkh which coul only be to the detriment of the indigenous amirs. Haji Khan therefore made a pretence of having reformed his ways, at least for a while, but in fact the appointment of the Sardar aroused considerable suspicion amongst the amirs that the Afghans were trying to take over the province (Mahmud, 355a).

[44] Faiz Bakhsh, *Badakhshan*, 49.

[45] بجر و ستم مفطور و معتاد

[46] McChesney 1991, 221, translates this title as 'Military Ombudsman'.

To counteract the rising inflluence of the Afghans, Haji Khan Ming began to plot with Izbasar, the Hakim of Shibarghan,[47] who was discontented with the appointment of an Afghan as sardar, and together they broke out in rebellion. The security situation deteriorated rapidly and Allah Nazr Khan, whom the *Tarikh* calls Ataliq of Turkistan, had to ask Ahmad Shah to send reinforcements. When they arrived, Allah Nazr Khan and Nawab Khan marched against Izbasar. The attack, however, did not go well and they were forced to return empty-handed to Balkh after Wali Muhammad Khan Jawansher was fatally wounded during the siege of Shibarghan (Mahmud, 355b-356b). On his return, Nawab Khan 'Alikozai quarrelled with 'Ataullah Khan and Ataliq Allah Nazr Khan over their various areas of responsibility. The result was that the army split up into different factions as each leader took umbrage and they returned with their followers to their respective power bases (Mahmud, 356b). Nawab Khan then asked Haji Khan and the elders and rulers of Turkistan to come to Balkh to discuss their grievances. Haji Khan appears to have attended this meeting, which he used as a forum to voice his own complaints about Sardar Nawab Khan, whom he evidently distrusted. However, 'Ataullah Khan and Allah Nazr Khan brought about a temporary reconciliation between the two and Haji Khan received a Royal Pardon for "past faults and misdemeanours" (Mahmud, 357a).

Izbasar and other Uzbek leaders of Turkistan, however, continued to oppose Nawab Khan's appointment and sought the assistance of Bukhara. In 1761, Shah Murad, a relative of Rahim Bi, sent Musa Khwaja with an army of six thousand men across the Amu Darya and laid siege to the strategic fortress of Aqcha, the western gateway to Balkh. When this news reached Nawab Khan, 'Ataullah Khan Turkman and Daniyal Khwaja were sent at the head of a small force to hold Aqcha, whilst urgent messages were sent to Ahmad Shah requesting reinforcements. Meanwhile, Izbasar marched his own army to Aqcha and deceived 'Ataullah Khan into believing that he had come to mediate in the dispute. Completely fooled, 'Ataullah Khan Turkman accompanied Izbasar to Shibarghan, leaving Musa Khwaja free to occupy Aqcha and reclaim it for Bukhara (Mahmud, 514b).

[47] Shibarghan at this period seems to have been an important centre of culture, especially for the illumination of manuscripts. In Febuary 1988 I was shown a finely illustrated copy of the *Diwan* of 'Ali Sher Nawa'i in the possession of a mullah from Andkhui in Khurasan camp, Pakistan. It was signed by Saiyid Khan-i Aznab b. Qazi Naman and dated Shibarghan, 1167 (AD 1753-4).

Perhaps realising that he had been duped, 'Ataullah Khan quickly abandoned his mission and returned to Balkh, forcing the population en route to abandon their villages and come into the city. Musa Khwaja, however, informed of his movements, ambushed him somewhere near the village of Dilbarjin, and it was only the timely intervention of Daniyal Khan, who was dispatched post-haste with five hundred men, that saved the day. Musa Khwaja and the Bukharans fled, leaving behind some three hundred of their number dead, with many more wounded or taken prisoner. 'Ataullah Khan celebrated his victory over the Bukharans by building a pyramid out of the decapitated heads of his enemies (Mahmud, 515a).

Despite this defeat, Aqcha remained in Bukharan hands and Nawab Khan assembled an army of five thousand men to reduce the city. On the approach of Nawab Khan's force, Khwaja Musa marched out to meet the Afghans in the open field, but was again defeated and fled to Izbasar at Shibarghan (Mahmud, 515b-516a). Khwaja Musa's son continued to hold out in the citadel of Aqcha, where he was besieged for forty days, during which time Sardar Nawab Khan was unable to make the slightest impression on the walls with his artillery (Mahmud, 515b). Khwaja Musa, meanwhile, with the help of Izbasar, assembled a force of eight thousand men and set out to lift the siege of Aqcha but was defeated yet again, this time by a combined force of 'Ataullah Khan and Haji Khan of Maimana who, despite having refused to co-operate any further with the judicial investigation, had decided that it was in his interests to support Ahmad Shah's representative (Mahmud, 515b, 516a).

The failure of Izbasar and Khwaja Musa to relieve Aqcha resulted in a military stalemate. Sardar Nawab Khan was unable to take the citadel, but Izbasar and Khwaja Musa were incapable of defeating the Afghans in the open field. As a result, 'Ataullah Khan Turkman asked Haji Khan Ming, in his capacity as *Wali-yi Balkh*, to choose an envoy to negotiate terms with the Bukharans. Haji Khan appointed a certain Mullah Gul Muhammad for this task, but the besieged soldiers would not agree to come out of their stronghold until 'Abd al-Hakim (whose title, *Shaikh 'Alisalam*, indicates that he was an important religious personage) and Allah Nazr Khan, Ataliq of Balkh, were present to guarantee their safe passage. When these dignitaries arrived, the Bukharans surrendered, although Khwaja Musa's son, along with his wives, was captured and does not seem to have been included in the

amnesty. Their surrender concluded this attempt by Bukhara to reimpose its authority in Balkh (Mahmud, 516b).

Having secured Aqcha, 'Ataullah Khan Turkman ordered Nawab Khan and Haji Khan Ming to advance on Shibarghan and subdue the rebellious Izbasar, promising Haji Khan the governorship of the area if he was successful (Mahmud, 516b). Izbasar, hearing of this, wrote to Nawab Khan and tried to make peace. 'Ataullah Khan Turkman was at that time in Shibarghan, possibly trying to bring Izbasar to heel without the necessity of further military action. Whatever the reason for his visit, it proved fatal for the Sipah Salar. We have seen how Nawab Khan and 'Ataullah Khan Turkman had already quarrelled over their respective areas of authority and a bitter hatred appears to have sprung up between them which had been suppressed during operations against the Bukharans. Now, however, Nawab Khan seized his opportunity to settle old scores. When Izbasar's letter arrived, the Sardar informed the amir of Shibarghan that if he was serious about being reconciled he should have 'Ataullah Khan Turkman put to death. Izbasar agreed, and the Sipah Salar was conveniently assassinated. Nawab Khan, having achieved both the pacification of Shibarghan and the death of his arch rival, returned to Balkh, leaving Shibarghan in the hands of Izbasar, and Haji Khan Ming of Maimana cold-shouldered (Mahmud, 516b, 517a).

Meanwhile Saiyid 'Ataullah Khan, Ahmad Shah's judicial commissioner, continued his futile attempts to bring Haji Khan Ming to account. Once more he ordered the Wali of Maimana to come to Balkh, but Haji Khan informed him that, instead of appearing in person, he was sending one of his tribal leaders[48] in his stead. A short while later, Haji Khan's son, Nazr Sultan, reached Balkh but, as his reply had not been to the Darugha-yi 'Adalat's liking, he was badly treated. Eventually, however, a face-saving agreement was reached and Nazr Sultan was allowed to return to Maimana with the usual gifts and presents. Following his visit, Saiyid 'Ataullah Khan's enquiries into Haji Khan's affairs seem to have ended and the matter is not referred to again by the *Tarikh* (Mahmud, 517a).

In 1768, Rahim Bi Manghit of Bukhara died. During his final years, Rahim Bi had suffered from depression and the affairs of state had been left to his wazir, a Persian slave called Daulat Bi. Following the decease of the Manghit amir, this individual seized control of Bukhara, assumed the title of *Ataliq* and placed Daniyal Khan, a

[48] خد خدا

relative of Abu'l-Faiz, on the throne.[49] Some two years later, however, Daniyal Khan died and Daniyal Bi's son, Ma'sum or Shah Murad, took over (Skrine & Ross, 205).

In the same year that Rahim Bi Manghit passed away, there was further trouble in "Balkh and Badakhshan," which had been stirred up by the Qataghan amirs, and Ahmad Shah was forced to send his wazir, Shah Wali Khan, with an army of six thousand men, to deal with the disturbances (Katib i, 27; McChesney 1991, 225; Singh, 319). When Shah Murad heard about this, he marched to the assistance of the rebels which caused Shah Wali considerable concern. He wrote to the Durrani Amir, who gathered another force and marched into Turkistan by way of Maimana, Andkhui and Shibarghan to deal with this threat. Shah Murad again crossed the Amu Darya and marched on Balkh, whose population had also rebelled (Katib i, 27). This show of force deterred the Bukharan ruler from his attempt to invade and negotiations were opened which resulted in the two parties agreeing that the Amu Darya should "separate the jurisdictions of their two powers" (McChesney 1991, 225).

The Afghan-Bukharan treaty of 1768 is important for, in the following century, the British used it as a justification for promoting an Afghan state which included Balkh. Ahmad Shah, however, never entertained the idea of direct rule or annexation. Even after the agreement of 1768, Lesser Turkistan was seen as a foreign country, and was regarded as such well into the second half of the next century. It was a region, however, in which the Durrani rulers had a strategic interest, since it abutted their territory. It was a source of additional revenue for the Afghans and they maintained a nominal influence in the region through local leaders such as Haji Bi Ming or, later, the Qataghanids of Khulm, who collected the annual tribute. Thus the treaty of 1768 was an acknowledgement by Bukhara that Balkh lay within the Afghan sphere of influence and the newly-established Manghit dynasty agreed to abstain from armed intervention in the region. As such it merely confirmed the *status quo*; a reassertion of the treaty worked out in 1751 between Haji Bi Ming and Ahmad Shah. It is impossible to equate it, as British officials did later, with the settlement made between Nadir Shah and Abu'l-Faiz Khan, which was forced on Bukhara by the Persian ruler following his annexation of Balkh (McChesney 1991, 226-7).

[49] Sources disagree about his relationship to former rulers of Bukhara; for a discussion of the various claims see Howorth, 67.

The most significant aspect of the treaty of 1768, namely the surrender by Shah Murad of the *khirqa*, or mantle, of the Prophet to Ahmad Shah Durrani, was completely missed by European historians in the last century. In order to avoid a confrontation with the Afghans, the Manghit ruler agreed to hand over this most sacred of relics after the Afghan Amir requested it as part of the terms of peace.[50] The khirqa was a powerful religious symbol, visible evidence of the mystic power of inspiration and *baraka* that was the centre of a cult as popular as that of the 'Alid shrine at Mazar-i Sharif. As in mediæval Europe, the possession of relics directly associated with, or which had been in the possession of, the founders of Christianity, was a means of legitimising sovereignty, so the transfer of the khirqa from Bukhara to Ahmad Shah, provided the nascent Durrani state with the credibility it lacked. The khirqa had been in the possession of the dominant Hanafi power in Central Asia for over five centuries, and its surrender signified a dramatic shift in regional balance of power in favour of the Afghans. The glory, as it were, had departed, and with it, by implication, went the divine sanction which had maintained the Chingizids in power (Katib i, 27-9).

It is no wonder that Ahmad Shah made the most of this acquisition. The relic's progress to Qandahar was accompanied by an extraordinary show of religious devotion, donations and pageantry and the establishment of a qadamga at every stage to act as a reminder to all and sundry of its passing. When it finally arrived in Qandahar, at that period still the Afghan capital, Ahmad Shah commissioned a building which was to house both the khirqa and his own body after he died. However, it seems that the mantle was never actually placed in the mausoleum, for the *'ulama* of the city opposed the use of such an important relic as a political tool (Katib i, 28; McChesney 1991, 222-4). This did not prevent Ahmad Shah's successor actively seeking to convert what was a symbolic transference of authority, into direct sovereignty over the appanage of Balkh.

[50] For the story of the cloak and how it came to be in the possession of Bukhara, see McChesney 1991, 222-7; Katib i, 27-9.

CHAPTER FOUR

FROM JAN MUHAMMAD KHAN TO 'ALI YAR KHAN, 1772-1829

> There has been an infiltration of Turkish tribes into Afghanistan from a very early date (Fraser-Tytler, 55).

Shah Murad, Timur Shah and Balkh, 1772-1793

According to Conolly, Haji Bi Ming died shortly before Ahmad Shah, probably around 1772, and was succeeded by his son, Jan Muhammad Khan.[1] The fate of Nazr Sultan, who acted as his father's representative during Ahmad Shah's judicial investigation of Haji Bi's affairs, is not given in the *Tarikh-i Ahmad Shahi*. As it was traditional for rulers to send their heirs to perform such tasks, it is not unreasonable to suggest that Nazr Sultan was the eldest son of Haji Bi, who would have been expected to succeed to the governorship of Balkh and Maimana. Conolly, however, makes no mention of this individual, although we know from a contemporary source that Jan Khan was ruling Maimana in 1793.[2] It would seem, therefore, that Nazr Sultan died, or was killed, before his father passed away, leaving his younger brother, Jan Khan, to succeed to the waliship of Balkh, though he continued to reside in Maimana.

In October of the same year,[3] Ahmad Shah Durrani, despite many pilgrimages to tombs of famous saints, finally succumbed to a virulent disease, possibly some form of cancer, which had gradually eaten away his nose, throat, chest and, finally, his brain (Katib i, 29-30).[4] He was succeeded by his son, Timur Shah, who reigned for twenty years (Dupree 1978, 340; Hall, 3). In 1775, following opposition from some Qandahari tribes, Timur transferred the capital of the Afghan kingdom to Kabul (Dupree 1978, chart 12; Hall, 3). At the same time, revolts and disturbances arose in Balkh, possibly as a result of

[1] Conolly, *Bamiyan to Merve*, 1840; Ergeš Uçkun, *personal communication*.
[2] Ghulam Sarwar, 1797.
[3] Raverty vi, 2083, has September 1771/1185, but see Katib i, 29.
[4] His nose had been completely eaten away by disease and had been replaced by a diamond stud.

attempts by the new Amir to bring the region more under his own authority, for Conolly records that the new Afghan Amir stripped Jan Khan Ming of the title of *Wali-yi Balkh* and appointed an Afghan as governor of the province.[5]

Timur's interventionist policy precipitated a number of disturbances which were exploited by Shah Murad Bi Manghit of Bukhara who, in 1784, had put out the eyes of 'Abd al-Ghazi, and usurped his power, though he made sure that the Khan was kept alive to provide a semblance of legitimacy to this *putsch*.[6] Assuming the title of *Amir al-Mu'minin*,[7] or 'Commander of the Faithful' (Akiner, 271; Skrine & Ross, 205-6), the new Manghit Khan ambitiously set out to reconquer territory which had once been part of the Chingizid state. A year after seizing power, he marched against Merv with six thousand men.[8] During the course of this campaign, Shah Murad destroyed the ancient *band*, or irrigation dam, which had been built by Sultan Sanjar and which was the prime source of water for the agriculture of this ancient oasis. Merv was forced to capitulate and thirty thousand people were forcibly deported to Bukhara (Howorth, 769-71; Katib i, 41). To replace them, Shah Murad ordered the region to be colonised by the people of Shahr-i Sabz and Bukhara (Katib i, 41).

Shah Murad next turned his attention to Balkh and Aqcha,[9] which he claimed, rightly, had long been subject to the rulers of Bukhara, and demanded that Timur Shah's newly-appointed Afghan governor be recalled.[10] When the Amir failed to comply with this ultimatum, Shah Murad marched his army to the Amu Darya and, sometime during the summer of 1788, crossed the river into the area of Balkh or Aqcha, ignoring the warnings sent to him by Timur Shah, who was campaigning in Multan at the time (Elphinstone ii, 304-5; Howorth, 771; Katib i, 41).[11] Although the Durrani Amir was unable to attend to this threat in person, some forty thousand soldiers, under 'Abd al-Latif Khan and other sardars, were sent to Balkh. Despite the size of this army, however, the Afghans were "not able to cope successfully"

[5] Conolly, *Bamiyan to Merve*, 1840.
[6] Ghulam Sarwar, 1797.
[7] This title was previously used by the Caliphs and was also assumed by the Durranis.
[8] Elphinstone ii, 305-6 says the invasion of Merv took place in the spring of 1789 and claims Shah Murad had an army of 100,000 men.
[9] Ghulam Sarwar, 1797.
[10] *Ibid.*
[11] Faiz Bakhsh, *Badakhshan*, 50.

with Shah Murad, though whether there was any battle between them is not stated (Lall i, 145).[12]

Timur returned to Kabul in August and prepared to set out in person for Balkh. However, after marching only a few miles ("seven coss") from his capital, news reached him that fighting had broken out between factions in Shah Murad's army, during which one of the Manghit ruler's sons had been killed. So serious had this dispute been, that Shah Murad had been forced to abandon his campaign and retire to Qunduz, "a place of his own jurisdiction."[13] There were even reports that Shah Murad himself had been killed.[14] Timur, relieved not to have to negotiate the passes of the Hindu Kush during the winter snows, returned to Kabul, where he laid plans to attack the Bukharans the following spring (Elphinstone ii, 305-6).

During the winter, Shah Murad seems to have been occupied intriguing with Uzbek amirs in Aqcha and Balkh (*Gazetteer* (1895) ii, 35; Howorth, 771). In order to lull Timur Shah into a sense of false security, he wrote to the Afghan ruler, in an obsequious manner, assuring his rival that his conquests were purely altruistic and for the good of Islam. Since the Bukharan ruler made no mention of relinquishing any territory in Balkh, nor promised to desist from any further acts of aggression, Timur dismissed the platitudes as mere hypocrisy. Elphinstone, summarising the contents of Timur's riposte, records that Shah Murad was informed that:

> Ahmed Shauh had always been on friendly terms with the state of Bokhaura: that Timoor had maintained the same relations; that Shah Moraud had for some time been encroaching on the Dooraunee empire, and had always averted a war by speedy explanations and humble professions; taking care, however, always to secure the point he had in view; that he had at last seized Mour [i.e. Merv], and had driven away the Sheeah inhabitants, and had given as a reason his wish to convert them to the true Mahommedan faith; it urges, that no state can have a right to interfere with the subjects of another on account of their religion; and then points out the inconsistency of Shauh Moraud's zeal on this occasion, with his detaining Timour Shauh by his encroachments from clearing India of Hindoos, Jews, Christians, and other unbelievers; and with his wars against the people of Sher Subz and Khojend and the Toorkomauns, who were undoubtedly Soonees... These nations have appealed to [Timur], and he has been determined, by Shah Moraud's conduct towards himself, to take up their quarrel: he then announces his intention of moving immediately to Toorkistaun, and requires Shah Moraud to come to him in person to settle their differences (Elphinstone ii, 305).

[12] *Intelligence from Kabul* (henceforth, *IK*), 14 Sept. 1788, *Calendar of Persian Correspondence*, VIII, 1788-9, no. 798, p. 331.

[13] *Ibid.* The text has "Kundur/Cundeesh" but Qunduz is certainly meant here, see Elphinstone ii, 305-6. Faiz Bakhsh, *Badakhshan*, 50 says that the invasion of Balkh had been precipitated by the rebellion of Kabad Khan, Timur's governor in Qunduz.

[14] *Ibid.*

In order to ensure that the people of his realm were aware of the cause of his hostilities with Bukhara, Timur Shah ordered copies of this letter to be made and had them widely distributed throughout the major cities of his kingdom.[15]

The following spring, Shah Murad's army arrived at Kilift, on the right bank of the Amu Darya (Elphinstone ii, 305-6; Vambery 1873, 356-7), where he wrote another letter to Timur demanding that the Afghans evacuate Balkh and Aqcha.[16] Timur refused, and marched to Balkh at the head of some one hundred to one hundred and fifty thousand men (Howorth, 771). Despite the size of this army, Timur Shah's force was beset with internal divisions (Ferrier 1858, 100-2)[17] and the Amir travelled slowly and by short marches northwards, in the hope that a peaceful settlement of the dispute could be found (Elphinstone ii, 305-6; Katib i, 41).[18] Meanwhile Balkh, Aqcha and the Chahar Wilayat all declared for Shah Murad (Elphinstone ii, 196; Ferrier 1858, 100-2; Talboys Wheeler, vii-viii). The Afghan governor of Balkh was expelled and the Bukharan ruler was invited by the local *amirs* to appoint a governor of his own choosing. In response, Shah Murad sent a small detachment of troops, under the command of his brother, 'Omar Khushbegi, to secure Aqcha, whilst Allah Berdi Tauz of Qurghan Tepa raided throughout the province and cut off the provisions and fodder of the advancing Afghan army (Elphinstone ii, 156-7, 305).

Rather than risk an all-out confrontation with Shah Murad, Timur took advantage of Bukhara's preoccupation with Aqcha and Balkh to march on Qunduz, which he attacked and forced to pay tribute (Elphinstone ii, 196).[19] Having succeeded in wresting this important region from Bukhara, Timur advanced on Aqcha, via Balkh. Exactly what happened next is uncertain. Rahmat Bi Uzbek, the Bukharan military commander in Aqcha, seems to have abandoned his position and retreated, or fled, beyond the Amu Darya where he rejoined the

[15] According to Elphinstone, a large number of these letters were still in people's possession in Kabul as late as 1809.

[16] Ghulam Sarwar, 1797.

[17] *Memorandum on the Northern Boundaries of Afghanistan*, 1869, ESL:263, fols. 71-7.

[18] Lal i, 145 says the army commander was Sardar Safraz Khan.

[19] Faiz Bakhsh, *Badakhshan*, 50; *Timur to Viceroy*, 8 Nov. 1790, 23 April 1791, CPC, IX, 1790-1, no. 1156, p. 249; no. 1633, p. 330.

main Bukharan army (Vambery 1873, 358). Meanwhile, the Afghans marched almost unopposed into Aqcha (Elphinstone ii, 306). This was in September 1789 (Katib i, 41). According to the *Saraj al-Tawarikh*, Shah Murad then sent thirty thousand cavalry across the Amu Darya at night, in an attempt to encircle the Afghans. But Timur Shah, informed of the Bukharan plan, placed his army across the route of the advancing cavalry and, after a bloody encounter in which some six thousand Uzbeks were killed, the Amir won the day.[20]

Following the Afghan victory, both sides showed considerable anxiety to settle the dispute without resorting to further conflict. Timur Shah's commanders were still arguing amongst themselves and the rebellion of the chief of the Upper Momunds required his urgent attention (Elphinstone ii, 306-7). Shah Murad, chronically short of cash to pay his troops, realised that once the Afghan army withdrew he would still be able to dominate affairs in Balkh and it was in his interests to come to some agreement with the Afghans (Lall i, 146).[21] The Manghit ruler therefore sent the principal religious leader of Bukhara to Timur's camp and "gave him the credit of a victory" (Elphinstone ii, 306; Katib i, 41).[22] Bukhara, however, gained Afghan recognition of its recent conquests beyond the Amu Darya in exchange for re-confirming the Amu Darya as the border between their two realms (Ferrier 1858, 101-2; Katib i, 41; Vambery 1873, 358.).[23] Shah Murad also conceded the right of the Amir to appoint an Afghan as governor of Balkh and Aqcha, along with a small bodyguard of Afghan soldiers, known as the *Kohna Nokar* (literally, 'Old Retainers'), who were the remnants of the Afghan garrison, or their descendents, that had been in Balkh since the days of Ahmad Shah Durrani.[24] The treaty, in accordance with tradition, was made

[20] Izzat Ullah, 78 reported that in Kilift there was a stone fort which had been built by Shah Murad to commemorate those, "who fell in battle against Timoor Shah, King of Cabul," which indicates some fighting may have taken place in, or around, the banks of the Amu Darya.

[21] Ghulam Sarwar, 1797.

[22] Pottinger, *Memoir on the Country between Herat and Cabool, the Paropamisian Mountains and the Amoo*, 3 Dec. 1839, ESL:145, encl. 7 [black], no. 20.

[23] Ghulam Sarwar, 1797.

[24] The Kohna Nokar's responsibilities were limited to the protection of the Afghan Resident (wali), and, by implication, the defence of the citadel (*arg*) of Balkh which, by the early 1800s was the normal residence of the Amir's representative (Izzat Ullah, 61, 81, 85). Any other trouble was dealt with by the Uzbek wali and the amirs, not the Afghans. According to Ghulam Sarwar's report, under Zaman Shah the Kohna Nokar of Balkh numbered 2,900 cavalry with 11 guns, with a further 1,000 cavalry and 4 guns at Aqcha, the latter place being regarded as a frontier post and "a very strong place." Earlier, under the waliship of Hukumat Khan Durrani, Ghulam Sarwar reports that the Afghan resident lived in Aqcha along with the bulk of his Afghan troops. Only a small force of 250 cavalry, under Rahmatullah Khan, were stationed in Balkh. The importance of the defence of Aqcha was necessitated by the Bukharan threat across the Amu Darya. Elphinstone ii, 198, claims that not less than 5,000 Kohna Nokar had been recruited for the purpose of forming a bodyguard for the Afghan governor, but this may be a total figure rather than indicating how many troops were stationed in the north at any one time.

By the turn of the nineteenth century, service in Balkh was so unpopular that the Amir of Kabul offered a bounty of five tumans to anyone who enlisted for duty north of the Hindu Kush. Even so, many who took up this generous offer quickly returned to Kabul. Consequently, recruits were usually drawn from "the lowest orders" and by *c.* 1809 their number had dwindled to less than 1,000, though some later reports put the figure somewhat higher (Harlan 1939, 31). They had been given land and houses in the town in lieu of pay. According to Harlan, *loc. cit.*, the Kohna Nokar were not allowed to bear arms and were ineligible for any positions within the Uzbek administration. Elphinstone, *loc. cit.*, states that by 1808 they were housed exclusively in the *arg* of Balkh, though Harlan, writing in 1838, reported that they were more dispersed, with the bulk of them resident in the area of Mazar-i Sharif and Balkh. Some of these old soldiers had intermarried with local Uzbeks, and consequently were much more sympathetic to the local culture and customs, cf. *Memorandum on the Northern Boundaries of Affghanistan*, 1869.

binding on the two rulers until the death of one or other of the contracting parties (Katib i, 41; Vambery 1873, 358), though in the following century British officers claimed that this agreement was made "in perpetuity."[25]

By the time matters had been settled between Timur Shah and Shah Murad, winter had set in and heavy snows had fallen in the passes of the Hindu Kush, through which the Afghan army's route lay. Even though Timur left his artillery train behind in Balkh in order to accomplish the march south more quickly, many of his troops died from exposure as they battled their way back through the deep snow to the Afghan capital (Elphinstone ii, 306; Katib i, 41). Finally, in October 1790,[26] the Afghan Amir re-entered his capital, but his army was decimated and the bulk of his artillery was as good as lost. This did not prevent Timur, on his return, writing to the Governor-General of India informing him that he had subdued "some refractory chiefs of Turkistan" as well as taking Qunduz. In reply he received a brief note of congratulation.[27]

For the rest of Timur's reign, the province of Balkh remained divided. In the west, Maimana and the Chahar Wilayat aligned themselves with the Manghit rulers in Bukhara, whilst in the east Mir Qilij Beg of Khulm ruled in all but name from Balkh to Badakhshan and offset the power of the Ming and Manghit dynasties through an alliance with the Afghan Amirs in Kabul (Ferrier 1858, 101-2;

[25] See, *Lord to Macnaughten*, 6 Nov. 1839, ESL:145, encl.. 6 no. 8; *Todd to Macnaughten*, 26 Feb. 1840, ESL:149, encl. 49.

[26] 27 Muhurram (7 October); *Timur to Viceroy*, 8 Nov. 1790, 23 April 1791.

[27] *Ibid. Letter to Timur*, 27 May 1791, CPC, IX, 1790-91, no. 1241, p. 265. A certain Ghulam Muhammad al-Husain was in Kabul at the time as the Company's Ambassador at the Court of the Amir, CPC, VIII, no. 321, pp. 123ff., for this correspondence.

McChesney 1991, 231-2). A descendant of Mahmud Bi Qataghan, the eighteenth century amir of Qunduz (Elphinstone ii, 196-7),[28] Mir Qilij 'Ali Beg had cast in his lot with Amir Timur Shah at the time of Shah Murad's invasion of Balkh and had made the most of this alliance by helping himself to the important region of Hazrat Imam, knowing that the Afghans were in no position to argue. Following Timur's treaty with Bukhara, Khulm's power and authority over Qataghan, Balkh and the western marches of Turkistan increased even further, for Qilij Beg persuaded the Amir to transfer most of the powers of the Wali of Balkh, once the prerogative of the Mingids of Maimana, to himself and his heirs. From this point onwards, until the Afghans took Khulm in 1849, the Amirs of Kabul conferred the title of Wali-yi Balkh on one, or other, of the descendants of Mir Qilij 'Ali Beg. Even Qunduz was subordinated to the power of the ruler of Khulm and was governed by Qilij Beg's brother, Kokdad Mirza, father of the famous Murad Beg (Elphinstone ii, 197). There is no contemporary evidence for later European claims, based on disingenuous information provided by Kamran Shah of Herat and his wazir, Yar Muhammad Khan, that at this time Maimana and the Chahar Wilayat had been detached from the province of Balkh and placed under Herat. Nor is there any contemporary evidence to support Kamran's claim that the heir to the Maimana Khanate was obliged to reside in the Sadozai capital.[29]

Khulm's domination of Qataghan and the eastern marches of the appanage of Balkh, inevitably meant that the authority of the Afghan governor of Balkh was so eroded that he could barely claim to rule the town of Balkh itself. By the end of Timur's reign this office was

[28] Izzat Ullah, 80 writing in 1813, describes Mir Qilij 'Ali Beg as about sixty years old, with a slightly greying beard, small eyes and spacious forehead. His dress was according to the Uzbek style, with a small turban and the traditional embroidered cap. His government was strict but not severe, thieves being pilloried rather than put to death, at least for first offences. He had acquired a reputation for justice and piety. He had four wives, thirteen sons and twelve daughters. Elphinstone ii, 199-200 gives the following description of him:

> Killich Ali Beg is about sixty years old; he is a handsome man with a red and white complexion. He has a few grey hairs on his chin for a beard, small eyes, broad forehead, and Uzbek attire. On his head he wears a cap, and over it two turbans twisted up together. He wears an Uzbek shirt and a gown, over which is a girdle, wound round his loins, with a long knife stuck in it; and over the whole he generally has a robe of cotton or other cloth of some sober colour... He does not always wear boots ... but only when he rides; he carries a short stick in his hand, and takes a great deal of snuff. Killich Ali is honest, just, well disposed, kind to his subjects, judicious and discriminating in his treatment of his servants, economical in his expenses, vigilant and well informed in the affairs of his government. He gives bread and broth to a hundred poor persons daily.

[29] Pottinger, *Memoir*, 1839; Ghulam Sarwar, 1797.

said to have been the least sought appointment in the gift of the Afghan Amir. No-one was prepared to govern "these turbulent cities" (Ferrier 1858, 101). The ruler of Khulm, who collected and controlled the revenues of Balkh and the disbursement of the Afghan Resident's expenses, provided the unlucky individual who had been nominated to this remote outpost barely enough to keep body and soul together. As a consequence, the reluctance of any self-respecting Afghan to take up this appointment became legendary and caused much amusement amongst the local population. The peripatetic entertainers (still a common sight in northern Afghanistan) even taught their monkeys to throw dust over themselves when asked whether they wanted to be governor of Balkh (Ferrier 1858, 102). Arguably, Timur's insistence on maintaining a token Afghan presence in an area which was independent of Kabul in all but name, was more detrimental to Afghan interests than if Balkh had been abandoned altogether, for it demonstrated to all and sundry how weak and ineffective the ruler of Kabul had become.

Zaman Shah, Shah Murad and Balkh, 1793

Matters became worse following the unexpected death of the Amir in 1793. In late April of 1793,[30] Timur Shah left Peshawar for Kabul and sometime during the ride, his horse startled, causing the crown on his head to fall to the ground; an omen which Timur took to mean that his overthrow was imminent. A few days later he was suddenly seized by a pain in the kidney, which was followed by acute dejection, fever and severe headache.[31] He managed to reach Chaharbagh, between Jalalabad and Kabul, where his son, Zaman Shah, hearing of his father's illness, was waiting anxiously. After celebrating the 'Id al-Fitr festival, father and son rode to Kabul, where the Amir's condition worsened. In mid-May, Timur Shah, realising he was dying, summoned his counsellors, nominated Zaman as his successor, and made his heir vow that his older brothers, Homayun and Mahmud, would keep their

[30] 10 Muharram 1207/21 April 1793, *IK*, 21 April-12 June 1793, CPC, X (1792-93), no. 1569, pp. 320-1, though another report says he left on 1 Shawwal/12 May 1793, but this allowed him only 8 days to march to Kabul according to the same report, *News respecting Zaman Shah, son of Timur Shah enclosed in a letter from Ghulam Sarwar*, 23 Aug. 1793, CPC, X, no. 1738, p. 360.

[31] *IK*, 21 April-12 June 1793; *IK*, rcvd. 31 July 1793, CPC, X, no. 1537, pp. 1792-3. For a discussion of the possible long-term illness that Amir Timur Shah, and subsequent Afghan rulers, suffered from, see Lee 1991a.

fiefs of Qandahar and Herat when he succeeded to the Amirship.[32] Timur Shah finally expired in the early hours of the morning a few days later.[33] Immediately the news was broken to the Court, serious disturbances broke out in Kabul as the sardars plundered the bazaars, killing some one hundred people in the process.[34] It was several days before order was restored and Zaman Shah installed as the new ruler.[35]

Inevitably, Zaman's older brothers disputed the succession and a civil war ensued which lasted for over twenty years (Elphinstone ii, 307-8; Fraser-Tytler, 67-8). Timur's eldest son, Homayun, who was governor of Qandahar, refused to accept his younger brother's right to Kabul, enlisted the support of another brother, Mahmud, who controlled Herat and, helped by "powerful Turkish chiefs," declared war on his younger brother (Dupree 1978, 365-6; Elphinstone ii, 307-8).[36] Zaman responded quickly, sending thirty thousand troops towards Qandahar under Sher Muhammad, son of Shah Wali Khan[37] and managed to defeat Homayun by bribing many of the opposing sardars into changing sides.[38] Homayun fled to Baluchistan, whilst Zaman Shah's forces took possession of Qandahar. Mahmud, meanwhile, afraid that Herat would also be attacked, "meekly submitted"[39] and was confirmed in his governorship of that city in accordance with Timur Shah's wishes. After an abortive attempt by Homayun to recover Qandahar, he too tendered his allegiance and received a Royal Pardon.[40] Shah 'Abbas, another of Timur's sons who ruled in Peshawar, was not so fortunate. He was lured to Kabul and imprisoned.[41]

A few weeks after Timur's death, Shah Murad of Bukhara, freed from his treaty obligations to the Afghans, sent a small force across

[32] *IK*, 21 April-12 June, 31 July 1793. *IK*, rcvd. 27 Aug. 1793, CPC, X, no. 1598, p. 327. It is not true, as some authorities claim, that Timur died intestate and that this was the cause of the civil war which followed. Contemporary sources show that he had specifically nominated Zaman Shah as his heir as soon as he realised that he was dying.

[33] At midnight on 20 May, according to *IK*, 31 July 1793, but *IK*, 21 April-12 June 1793, says he died at 3.00 a.m. on 10 Shawwal/21 May, whilst *News respecting Zaman Shah*, 31 Aug. 1793, gives the date of decease as 9 Shawwal/20 May.

[34] *IK*, 31 July 1793.

[35] *Ibid. IK*, 21 April-12 June 1793, says it was on 15 Shawwal 1207/26 May 1793.

[36] *IK*, 21 April-12 June, 31 July, 1793.

[37] *Letter from Ghulam Sarwar (News Respecting Zamaun Shah)*, 23 Aug. 1793, CPC, X, no. 1738, pp. 361-2.

[38] *Ibid.*

[39] *IK*, 23 Aug. 1793.

[40] *Letter from Ghulam Sarwar*, 31 Aug. 1793; *Letter from Ghulam Muhammad Khan*, 20 Dec. 1793, CPC, X, nos. 1739, 1966, pp. 361, 400.

[41] *IK*, 27 Aug. 1793.

the Amu Darya towards Balkh (Elphinstone ii, 309).[42] Muhammad Khan Siya Mansur Khan, the Afghan governor of Balkh (Elphinstone ii, 309),[43] marched out to meet the Bukharans with four thousand men, but was ambushed, defeated and taken prisoner.[44] Balkh was then besieged (Elphinstone ii, 309; Vambery 1873, 358),[45] but the garrison refused to submit and held out for four months in the *arg*. Frustrated by this unexpected resistance, Shah Murad threatened to put Mansur Khan to death if they did not surrender and, when the garrison remained unmoved, the unfortunate governor was executed before their eyes. Despite such tactics, Balkh continued to hold out, anticipating that a relief force would be sent from Kabul (Elphinstone ii, 309).[46]

When Zaman Shah heard of the Bukharan attack, he returned in haste to his capital (Vambery 1873, 358-9) and gave every sign that he was planning to march in person against the Bukharans. Shah Murad, however, hearing of the Afghan Amir's preparations, offered to negotiate with the Afghan government on the basis of previous treaties between the two countries. Zaman Shah, beset by civil war and other rebellions, was more than happy to settle the affairs of Balkh so amicably and agreed to meet with Bukharan ambassadors in Kabul (Elphinstone ii, 309-10; Talboys Wheeler, vii-viii). Once more Bukhara agreed to regard the regions south of the Amu Darya as within the Afghan sphere of interest, in return for a reaffirmation that native peoples would be allowed to run their own affairs (MacGregor, 142; Vambery 1873, 358-9). As soon as the agreement was concluded, Shah Murad lifted the siege of Balkh and retired across the river. The Amir handed control of the province of Balkh over to Hukumat Khan Durrani, though he, and the bulk of the troops were stationed, at least initially, at Aqcha, with a much smaller force, under Rahmatullah Khan, in Balkh. As soon as affairs north of the Hindu Kush were settled, the Amir marched his army back to Kabul to resume his wars in the south.[47]

Despite Zaman Shah's prompt actions during the first few months of his reign, he had secured only a temporary peace for his troubled realm. This was mainly due to his own lack of administrative skill.

[42] *IK*, 21 April-12 June 1793 says that there were only 1,500 Bukharans.

[43] *Ibid*

[44] *Ibid.* The report implies that it was Shah Murad who was defeated.

[45] *Ibid.*

[46] Cf. Ghulam Sarwar, 1797.

[47] *Ibid.*

Rather than consolidating his hold over the territory he already possessed, Zaman Shah, like his father and grandfather before him, was obsessed with the invasion of India. Taking little account of the potential threat from Herat, he marched southwards and took possession of Peshawar, hoping to muster sufficient forces to attack across the Indus (Elphinstone ii, 309; Dupree 1978, 365; Ingram, 36, 60, 126, 179).

The Report of Ghulam Sarwar, 1793-1795

Reports of Afghan preparations to invade India caused alarm to the East India Company, who feared that war with Zaman Shah was imminent. In order to ascertain the exact state of affairs beyond the Indus, a native agent, Ghulam Sarwar,[48] was sent to Peshawar and Kabul to obtain first-hand intelligence about the little-known Afghan kingdom. During his journeys, which lasted from March 1793 to February 1795, Ghulam Sarwar accumulated a great deal of valuable information and, by the judicious use of Company rupees, compiled a considerable amount of intelligence about the Afghan government's financial and military affairs, including copies of maps in the Amir's archives (Hall, 4).[49] Ghulam Sarwar's report is the first systematic analysis of the Kingdom of Kabul commissioned by the British and predates the work of the Elphinstone Mission by over a decade.

The expenses of the twin city-states of Balkh and Aqcha had long exceeded the revenues and a large sum was sent annually from the central treasury to meet the deficit. The revenues of Balkh consisted of tribute of 1,700 horses and 22,000 sheep, in addition to which a further 400,000 rupees was raised in taxation. The expenses of the government's representative in the city were; 150,000 rupees for "Tioldars;" Rs. 320,000 for the pay and upkeep of the garrison and defence, and Rs. 45,000 which was set aside for charitable donations, presumably the upkeep and maintenance of important shrines such as Mazar-i Sharif and Khwaja Parsa of Balkh. The shortfall of Rs. 115,000 was sent, in cash, to Balkh, by the Kabul treasury. Aqcha's

[48] According to Prasad, 39 another native spy, Ghulam Ahmad, was at the Court of Zaman Shah in 1797 and reported occasionally to the East India Company. There was also an agent stationed in Sind, "to obtain correct information of the motions and condition of Zeman Shah," Ingram, 212.

[49] Ghulam Sarwar's report consists of several hundred pages. The maps, copied from those commissioned by the Durrani Amirs, are not filed with the India Office's copy. I have been unable to trace their whereabouts.

revenues came to Rs. 180,000 whilst the expenses of the state exceeded this figure by Rs. 70,000 which was also made up by central government. Balkh with Aqcha, however, did send 4,700 horses and 22,000 sheep annually to the Afghan capital. Thus the maintenance of a token presence north of the Hindu Kush cost the Afghan treasury just under two lakh rupees a year, whilst nearly five hundred thousand rupees were allocated to defence and the upkeep of the Balkh garrison and the support of Hukumat Khan Durrani, the Afghan governor.

Khulm and its associated satellite territories, like the other states of the province of Balkh, made no contribution in cash to the Kabul government, but sent an annual *nazarana* of 1,200 horses and 15,000 sheep.[50] According to Sarwar, "a deduction has long been made for cash, for charity, and other expenses," but no further details of the income or expenses of this state are included in his report. Qunduz's annual tribute of livestock amounted to 1,000 horse and 10,000 "vulaitee" (*wilayati*, or native?) sheep with "a deduction from government for his expenses" of 210,000 rupees—equivalent to the total sum realised by the state from land rents.[51] When reporting on the countries west of Balkh, Sarwar makes no mention of Shibarghan or Andkhui's accounts, but he does gives some details of Maimana's revenues under Jan Khan Ming, whom he refers to as "king" and his family as "royal."[52] An annual *nazarana* of eleven thousand sheep and twelve hundred horses was sent to the Amir by the wali, whose expenses are given as one lakh rupees, the equivalent to the sum realised from land taxes. State expenditure included thirty-five thousand rupees for Jan Khan Ming's establishment, ten thousand rupees which was set aside for "charitable assignments," presumably *waqf* payments for the upkeep of shrines, mosques and associated lands, and sixty-five thousand rupees for *jagir* holders, which was offset by a grant from the central Afghan treasury.[53] No mention is made of income from transit duties, or the trade in karakul skins, horses, iron,

[50] Earlier, Sarwar gives the figure of 11,000 sheep and states that this tribute had been given jointly by Khulm and "Indkho," though why Khulm should be linked with Andkhui is not explained in the report, unless "Indkho" is another place near Khulm, such as Ishkamish. No mention is made of the revenues of Andkhui and nothing is said at all about Shibarghan.

[51] In a statistical section towards the end of his report, Sarwar has separate entries for "Khoollum and Inakho," "Districts under Meer Ally Khan" and "Districts under Nufseer Khaun." It is unclear which regions these latter two individuals governed, but they appear in the section dealing with Balkh and Lesser Turkistan.

[52] An earlier reference in Sarwar's report refers to the Wali of Maimana as Jahan Khan, but this is probably a translation or clerical error.

[53] Ghulam Sarwar, 1797.

salt, or agricultural and industrial items, which we know from early nineteenth century European sources, were the mainstay of Maimana's trade. However, Sarwar was concerned solely with the revenues and incomes derived from, or apportioned to, these regions by the Afghan government. Internal trade and revenue was the prerogative of the wali and hence did not come within his terms of reference. More than likely, the Afghans had no information about the internal finances of these states anyway. Sarwar lists Andkhui, Khulm and Qunduz as distinct provinces.

The Question of the Maimana Succession, 1790-1831

Arthur Conolly and the sources which follow him, state that Jan Muhammad Khan Ming of Maimana predeceased Timur Shah in *c.* 1790,[54] but we know from Ghulam Sarwar's report that this was not the case and the Mingid ruler was still alive in 1793. Other contemporary reports also force us to rethink the chronology of the Mingid dynasty down to 1830. Though Conolly is vague about events in Maimana following the death of Jan Khan, he does give estimates of the number of years each wali reigned, as well as some brief biographical material.

According to his account, Jan Khan was succeeded by an unnamed son who was quickly deposed and blinded by a younger brother, Muhammad Rahim Khan,[55] who reigned in Maimana for "some years." Rahim Khan in turn was killed by another of his younger brothers, Ahmad Quli Khan,[56] who ruled "ten or twelve years." He too was assassinated and succeeded by a son of Rahim Khan, 'Ali Yar Khan, who was "only a lad" at the time he came to the throne.[57] 'Ali Yar reigned "sixteen years" before he succumbed to cholera. Writing in

[54] Conolly, *Bamiyan to Merve*, 1840. Cf. Talboys Wheeler 1869; MacGregor 1871; *Gazetteer* (1895) ii; Peacocke 1888.

[55] *Ibid.* Ergeš Uçkun, *personal communication.*

[56] *Ibid.* This was his full title and names according to Ergeš Uçkun. Amir Khan & Taimus 1888, 240-1 say Ahmad was Rahim's son, but this is quite untrue.

[57] Conolly, *Bamiyan to Merve*, 1840, refers to him as Allah Yar Khan, as does Ergeš Uçkun, probably on the basis of European sources. Pottinger, *Memoir*, 1839 uses this name in the copy of his original report, which is in the Political and Secret Department files, but the printed report in the *Memorandum* series (PSDL:G/10) has "Ali Yai (*sic*) Khan." Stirling 1991, 284 the only European to have visited Maimana during his reign, calls the Mingid ruler "Ally Yar." In Moorcroft's unpublished journal, *Bukhara and the Return from Bukhara*, July-Aug. 1825, MSS Eur. D.245, fol. 276, Moorcroft records that he requested letters of introduction to the ruler of Maimana whom he refers to as "Alu Yar Khan." Given that both Stirling and Moorcroft call him 'Ali Yar Khan, I have preferred these contemporary reports.

November 1840, Conolly states that 'Ali Yar Khan's death took place "fourteen years ago," i.e. in 1826.[58] He was succeeded by 'Abd al-Mu'min Khan, a son of Ahmad Quli Khan. He survived for a matter of only "five or six months," when he was poisoned and his older half-brother, Mizrab Khan, seized power and reigned until his death in 1845.

On the basis of Conolly's estimated lengths of reigns, and the fact that the death of 'Ali Yar Khan Ming was presumed to have occurred in 1826, or fourteen years before Conolly was in Maimana, official publications and gazetteers produced by the British Indian administration in the last century gave the following approximated dates for the reigns of the walis of Maimana up to, and including, Mizrab Khan.

Ming rulers of Maimana	*Conolly*	*'Official' Dates*
Haji Bi Khan	not given	1747-1772
Jan Khan	not given	1772-1790
Rahim Khan	"some years"	1790-1798
Ahmad Khan	"10 or 12 years"	1798-1810
'Ali Yar Khan	"6 years"	1810-1826
'Abd al-Mu'min Khan	"5-6 months"	1826
Mizrab Khan	"14 years ago"	1826-1845

Ghulam Sarwar's report, as we have seen, shows that Jan Khan was still alive in 1794/5; that is well after the death of Timur Shah Durrani. The date of 1826 for the death of 'Ali Yar Khan must also be discounted. Edward Stirling, a Scottish civil servant of the East India Company, was in Maimana in late 1828 and recorded in his journal that 'Ali Yar Khan was still alive (Stirling 1991, 284-6). 'Ali Yar's death can, however, be reasonably accurately placed. Alexander Burnes,[59] writing in early 1838, states that Mizrab Khan succeeded his brother "about six years ago," whilst the Persian mirza, who provided Conolly with his history of Maimana, claimed to have lived in Maimana "in the favour and intimacy of Mizrab Khan" for ten years,[60] which implies that Mizrab Khan had been reigning for at least a decade. It is reasonable to assume that Conolly's mirza, interviewed in October 1840 (1256), would have based his estimate of ten years on the Hijra calendar. Thus both sources give good reason for us to

[58] *Ibid.*

[59] Lt. Alexander Burnes, "Herat with a Sketch of the State of Affairs in the Surrounding Countries," Feb. 1838, in *Political, Geographical and Commercial Reports and Papers*, etc. Calcutta, 1838, MEIR:90 (for the uncensored report see ESL:130, fols. 122-31). The published report has been erroneously dated 1837.

[60] Conolly, *Bamiyan to Merve*, 1840.

believe that the latter half of 1831/1247 is a more accurate date for the commencement of Mizrab Khan's reign.[61] Although Talboys Wheeler (pp. vii-viii) rather curiously claims that the period between 1820 and 1830 in Maimana was one of "domestic tragedies," without, apparently, any authority, he gives the date of 1830 for the accession of Mizrab Khan.

Furthermore, Stirling provides sufficient genealogical evidence about the Mingid dynasty for us to be able to say that 1798 is too early a date for the death of Rahim Khan, for 'Ali Yar Khan was "not more than twenty-four or twenty-five years of age" in 1828 (Stirling 1991, 284). Since 'Ali Yar Khan was the son of Rahim Khan, the assassination of Rahim Khan could not have taken place any earlier than 1804.[62] We must also place the end of Ahmad Quli Khan's reign later than 1810 (MacGregor, 143). Conolly mentions a son of Ahmad Quli Khan, Subhan Quli Khan, who fled to Sar-i Pul in *c.* 1831, following the death of 'Ali Yar Khan, and became the focus of a local war between the two states. Though Conolly does not give his exact age, he does call him a "lad," implying that he was, at the most, a teenager at the time of his flight.[63] If Ahmad Quli died in 1810, his son would have been an adult of at least twenty years old by the time he left for Sar-i Pul. His father was therefore more likely to have died some years later.

If we combine the information provided by Ghulam Sarwar, Burnes and Stirling, we conclude that 1804 is a much more likely date for the assassination of Rahim Khan, whilst the start of Mizrab Khan's reign was probably 1831. These conclusions tie in well with the dates supplied by one authoritative oral source.[64] It is, however, still possible to reconcile these conclusions with Conolly's figures for the lengths of individual reigns, provided we take his lower figure of ten years for the reign of Ahmad Quli Khan.

[61] Neither Elphinstone nor Izzat Ullah give the names of any of the rulers of the Chahar Wilayat. The India Office L/P&S/5 series for the years 1828-30 has very little material on Maimana and nothing on the death of 'Ali Yar Khan.

[62] Conolly, *Bamiyan to Merve*, 1840; Pottinger, *Memoir*, 1839.

[63] *Id.*

[64] Ergeš Uçkun, *personal communication.*

Mingid Rulers of Maimana, 1747-1845[65]	*Revised Dates*
Haji Bi Khan	*c.* 1731-1772
Jan Muhammad Khan	1772-1795(?)
Eldest son of Jan Khan (unnamed)	*c.* 1795
Muhammad Rahim Khan, second son of Jan Khan	*c.* 1795-1804
[*Birth of Mizrab Khan to Ahmad Quli Khan*[66]	*c.* 1798]
[*Birth of 'Ali Yar Khan, eldest son of Rahim Khan*	*c.* 1804]
Ataliq Ahmad Quli Khan, younger brother of Rahim Khan	1804-1814
[*Birth of Subhan Quli Khan to Ahmad Quli Khan*	*c.* 1813/4]
'Ali Yar Khan, oldest son of Muhammad Rahim Khan	1814-1830
Persian Regent for infant child of 'Ali Yar Khan	1830
'Abd al-Mu'min Khan, son of Ataliq Ahmad Quli Khan	1830-1831
Mizrab Khan, half-brother of 'Abd al-Mu'min Khan	1831-1845

This revised chronology is consistent with Conolly's claim that 'Ali Yar Khan was "only a lad" when he took control of affairs in Maimana. In 1814 he would have been ten or eleven years of age. Subhan Quli would have been about fifteen or sixteen, when, as a "lad," he was taken to Sar-i Pul.

We conclude, therefore, that Jan Muhammad Khan Ming of Maimana died, in unknown circumstance, in *c.* 1795 and his death plunged the province into fratricidal strife which was the mirror image of the civil war being fought out on a wider arena between various Afghan princes. Jan Khan's eldest son and heir was soon deposed and blinded by his younger brother, Rahim Khan, who managed to hold on to power for several years.[67]

Herat and the Break-Up of the Afghan Kingdom, 1797-1809

In 1797, Shah Mahmud of Herat rebelled again, aided by a grant of ten thousand rupees from the British native agent in Persia, Mehdi 'Ali, who hoped thereby to keep Zaman Shah so busy with internal affairs that he would be unable to mount any invasion of India (Prasad, 42-3; Yapp 1980, 25-7). Mahmud assembled a formidable army of twenty thousand men (Elphinstone ii, 316), which included many amirs of the Aimaq, Hazara, Turkman and Uzbek tribes drawn from Khurasan, Ghor, and Maimana (Champagne, 49-50; Elphinstone ii, 310-11; Prasad 42-3, 380).[68] Zaman Shah, hearing of the rebellion, was forced to return from operations beyond the Indus and march to

[65] Including full titles and names as provided by Ergeš Uçkun

[66] "About forty," Burnes, *Herat*, 1838.

[67] Conolly, *Bamiyan to Merve*, 1840.

[68] Raverty v (ii), 2095-7.

Qandahar, where he assembled an army of some fifteen thousand men and set out for Herat. Despite his "injudicious arrangements" (Elphinstone ii, 316), which brought him to the brink of disaster, Zaman Shah managed to defeat his rival in an encounter on the Helmand, helped by the defection of one of Mahmud's Aimaq allies, Qilij Khan Timuri,[69] who declared for Zaman Shah and seized the citadel of Herat after Mahmud had left for Sistan. The Durrani governor, whom Mahmud had left behind, also changed sides.

As disaffection spread throughout Mahmud's army, the Afghan prince fled with his son, Kamran, back to Herat but was refused admission and was forced to seek refuge in Persian territory (Elphinstone ii, 317; Dupree 1978, Chart 21). Meanwhile, many of the sardars in his army, along with some of the Aimaq chiefs, fell into the hands of Zaman Shah,[70] who followed up his success by occupying Farah and Herat.[71] Zaman Shah, however, pardoned the Aimaq chiefs of Badghis and Maimana and allowed them to return to their own country (Champagne, 51; Elphinstone ii, 310; Prasad, 42-3).[72]

Despite his success at Herat, Zaman Shah still showed no interest in consolidating his realms, preferring to pursue the chimera of Indian conquest. With his mind clouded by the dreams of past glories, he returned to Peshawar where he began to assemble yet another army to march across the Indus (Elphinstone ii, 310-11). At the end of 1798, however, news reached him that Fath 'Ali Shah of Persia had attacked Khurasan and the Amir was forced to return in such haste to Peshawar

[69] *Ibid.* Raverty says Zaman took Qilij prisoner. According to the Afghan Boundary Commissioners, the Timuri tribe was of Arab descent and named after Amir Timur Gurgan, or Timur Lang, who gave a number of captive Arab families to Mir Saiyid Qasim, known as Mir Saiyid Kalal, who lived near Bukhara. He was a descendant of 'Ali b. Abi Talib. Later, Timur gave one of his daughters in marriage to Saiyid Kalal's son, Mir Shams al-Din Muhammad, who moved to Herat after his father's death. Shams al-Din's tomb is said to be at Khwaja Tak, outside the city walls. This individual was granted lands in Zamin Dawar and elsewhere. The descendants of Shams al-Din Muhammad became powerful chiefs and by the time of Timur Shah Durrani they were located around Gulran of Badghis under the leadership of Haji Khan, whose son is the Qilij Khan mentioned in the text. Following the defeat of Zaman Khan by Shah Mahmud, the Timuri tribe felt unable to stay in the country and migrated to Khaf. A small number of the clan, who seemed to have already become separated from the main tribe by this time, remained in Sabzawar. In 1885 the Khaf Timuris numbered 2,500 families, or about 10,000 individuals, under Darwish 'Ali Khan, a descendant of Qilij Khan (Maitland 1891, 271-6; Schurmann, 53-5). During the nineteenth century, intelligence reports often confuse the Taimanis with the Timuris (or Taimuris), but since the Timuri tribe were so small and mostly living in Persian territory, it is almost always the Taimani Aimaq that is being referred to.

[70] Raverty v (ii), 2095-7.

[71] *Ibid.* Raverty claims Zaman appointed Firoz al-Din as his *na'ib.* Dupree 1978, chart 21, after Elphinstone ii, 318, says the governor was Prince Qaisar, son of Zaman.

[72] *Ibid.*

that he lost his guns whilst crossing the Indus (Elphinstone ii, 317). When he finally reached Herat, Zaman Shah announced he would spend the rest of the year in the city, putting the affairs of the province in order and making proper arrangements for his western defences, since the presence of Mahmud with the Persian army posed a serious threat to security (Elphinstone ii, 317-8). However, when reports reached Herat that Fath 'Ali Shah had withdrawn from Khurasan, Zaman Shah quit the city to winter in Qandahar.

The Amir had under-estimated the resourcefulness and determination of his rival, who remained behind in Khurasan and persuaded the chiefs of Qa'in and Birjand to aid him in an attempt to recapture Herat. Together they marched with ten thousand men across the border, defeated Prince Qaisar and laid siege to the city. These early successes, however, quickly evaporated. Mahmud's confidence in his Persian supporters was cleverly undermined by supporters of Zaman Shah, who had infiltrated the enemy camp. Fearing that a plot was afoot to assassinate him, Shah Mahmud fled during the night, abandoning his army to its fate (Elphinstone ii, 318) and made his way, via Maimana, to the court of Shah Murad of Bukhara.

At first the refugee Afghan prince was well received, but an ambassador from Zaman Shah, who had been dispatched to Bukhara post-haste, publicly remonstrated with Shah Murad about the legitimacy of giving asylum to a rebel and, as a further inducement, offered a huge bribe to the Manghit Khan to betray Mahmud. Shah Murad was unwilling to break the code of honour and sanctuary, but had no wish to incur the wrath of Zaman Shah. To overcome this dilemma, he persuaded Shah Mahmud to embark on a pilgrimage to Mecca, thus allowing the refugee to leave Bukhara under the protection of a sacred truce. Once on the road Mahmud, with more earthly matters on his mind, abandoned the pretence of pilgrimage and fled once more to Persia (Elphinstone ii, 319). A few months later, in December 1799 (Howorth, 774),[73] Shah Murad of Bukhara was dead and his son, Saiyid Haidar Tura, succeeded him.

In the spring of 1800, Fath 'Ali Shah returned once more to Khurasan accompanied by Shah Mahmud, who had received further promises of support from the Persian monarch in his bid to regain Herat (Elphinstone ii, 320). Once more Zaman Shah was forced to march to the defence of Herat, but returned in some haste to Kabul when, in early autumn, Fath 'Ali Shah quit Khurasan after signally failing to

[73] 14 Rajab 1214/12 Dec. 1799, Skrine & Ross, 207.

fulfil his promises to the unfortunate Afghan prince, whom he left high and dry in Khurasan (Elphinstone ii, 320-1). Just when Mahmud's fortunes seemed to have reached their lowest ebb, Fath Khan Barakzai, the eldest son of Payinda Khan, "animated with the spirit of revenge and hatred to Shauh Zemaun" (Elphinstone ii, 321), arrived in Khurasan. He persuaded Mahmud to abandon his reliance on Persia and to seize the initiative himself by marching on Qandahar. At the head of a mere fifty horsemen, Shah Mahmud left for Sistan, where he was welcomed with open arms by its chief, Bahram Khan, who gave his daughter in marriage to Mahmud's eldest son, Kamran Mirza. The success was quickly followed by the capture of Qandahar, after a brief siege.

It was only when news of the fall of the former Durrani capital reached Zaman Shah that the Afghan Amir set out to deal with the threat posed by Mahmud, but even then he failed to take his rival seriously and left the bulk of his force behind him in Peshawar under his brother, Shuja' al-Mulk. As a consequence of this lack of foresight, Zaman Shah was defeated, captured and blinded. Shah Mahmud marched on Kabul, which fell without much trouble, and had himself proclaimed the new Amir; his brother, Firoz, being appointed to govern Herat. Mahmud, however, only held onto power until 1803, when he in turn was overthrown by Zaman's brother, Shuja' al-Mulk, who showed unusual clemency by not putting out the eyes of his rival when it was within his rights to exact revenge for the blinding of his brother (Elphinstone ii, 323-7).

Following Shah Shuja''s conquest of Kabul, Herat remained in the hands of Shah Mahmud's family under Prince Firoz al-Din, a full brother of the deposed Amir. Kamran Mirza b. Shah Mahmud also took refuge in the city. In 1806, Kamran tried to seize Qandahar from Shah Shuja''s governor, Qaisar, but he was forced to return when news reached him that a Persian army was marching against Herat in revenge for raids made by Firoz on eastern Khurasan (Elphinstone ii, 347). Firoz rallied some fifty thousand men, mainly from the Aimaq tribes of Badghis who "were raised to great enthusiasm" (Elphinstone ii, 347), by the influence of Hazrat Allah Berdi, *Sufi al-Islam* (1725-1806), an Uzbek shaikh who originally came from the vicinity of Maimana. He had seen service with the Manghits of Bukhara and had distinguished himself to such an extent that he had quickly been promoted to high rank. Whilst campaigning near Merv, though, he had a vision of Khwaja Khizr which caused him to abandon a military career for the life of contemplation. His subsequent preaching was so popular that the Hazrat excited the jealousy of the ruler of Bukhara. He fled across the Amu Darya and took up residence some thirty miles east of Herat, at Karukh.

On the approach of the Persian force the shaikh, now in his early eighties, declared holy war (*jihad*) against the Qizilbash and marched into battle at the head of his followers, mounted on an elephant (N. H. Dupree 1977, 334). In a battle on 19 June 1807 (22 Rabi' II, 1222) Firoz was badly defeated, after failing to secure the crossing over the Hari Rud and being outflanked by the enemy. In a desperate attempt to break out the Afghan forces charged the massed ranks of the Persian army but were cut to pieces. Firoz's Aimaq allies fled in panic, many of them drowning in the rush to ford the river. Hazrat Sufi al-Islam was surrounded and, despite putting up a valiant struggle, he was finally killed by an arrow through the heart and his bodyguard massacred to the last man (N. H. Dupree 1977, 334). The Persians took revenge on the Hazrat by cutting his body into pieces and burning it to ashes (Elphinstone ii, 348; Katib i, 75). What little was left of the shaikh's mortal remains was collected by devotees and interred at Karukh where his grave rapidly became a major local centre of pilgrimage (N. H. Dupree 1977, 334).

Firoz al-Din managed to escape the massacre by the skin of his teeth. He fled to Herat and prepared the city for a prolonged siege. Fortunately those troops who survived the battle quickly regrouped and were reinforced from the south under Malik Qasim. Unwilling to risk a protracted war with the Afghans and hearing of his father's death, Muhammad Mirza, the Qajar prince who had led the Persian army, offered stiff terms, which Firoz wisely accepted. Having agreed a treaty, the Persian army returned to Khurasan, leaving the Afghans to fight amongst themselves (Elphinstone ii, 348; Katib i, 75).

Balkh; Internal Developments, 1804-1814

The history of Maimana, Balkh and Qataghan in the first decade of the nineteenth century is quite uncertain and only scattered, often contradictory, references appear in European sources. We have seen how, *c.* 1804, Muhammad Rahim Khan Ming was assassinated by his younger brother, Ahmad Quli Khan.[74] Though the murdered wali's

[74] Conolly, *Bamiyan to Merve*, 1840 states that Muhammad Rahim Khan was "killed by his subjects," but this is merely a euphemism for a *coup d'état*.

new-born child, 'Ali Yar Khan, was spared the same fate as his father and lived to reign another day, the overthrow of Rahim Khan was the latest incident in a bloody feud between Jan Khan's sons, which left a sanguinary and bitter legacy to their descendants. Ahmad Quli Khan was closely related to Zu'l-Faqar Sher Khan his governor of Sar-i Pul, which at the time of Ahmad Quli's accession was a sub-district of Maimana,[75] having married a sister of Zu'l-Faqar.[76] The new ruler of Maimana had also married a Persian slave woman whom he regarded as more than a mere concubine, since the son he had by her, Mizrab Khan, was eventually to rule Maimana. Zu'l-Faqar Sher Khan's family had also inter-married with Persian-speaking (*farsiwan*) women from Kabul for several generations. Zu'l-Faqar Sher's own mother was a *farsiwan* and he himself was married to a woman from Kabul. According to Ferrier, Zu'l-Faqar's facial appearance was more Persian than Uzbek (Ferrier 1857, 225).

It is more difficult to be precise about who ruled the other two states of the Chahar Wilayat during the reign of Ahmad Quli Khan of Maimana. In 1988, the author was shown a manuscript of Persian poetry written in Shibarghan in 1800/1215 or 1804/1219 which was dedicated to Erich Khan b. Daulat Khan. Stirling informs us that Erich Khan was the father of Manwar Khan, the ruler of Shibarghan at the time of Stirling's visit in 1828 (Stirling 1991, 287). It is more or less impossible, in the present state of knowledge, to state accurately who ruled Andkhui at the turn of the nineteenth century, though it is more than likely to have been Rahmatullah Khan Afshar whose father, Sulaiman Khan, according to Stirling "was appointed governor of the district by Nadir Shah" (Stirling 1991, 286).

Ahmad Quli Khan appears to have consolidated Maimana's ancient ties with Bukhara by a formal confirmation of Bukharan sovereignty over the Chahar Wilayat, for Conolly informs us that Ahmad Khan was given the prestigious title of ataliq by Haidar Khan Manghit,[77] a reward, no doubt, for his loyalty. The Elphinstone Mission confirms that Andkhui, and by implication the whole western part of Lesser Turkistan, was a part of the "Kingdom of Bukhara," used Bukharan currency and was "independent," that is, not part of the Afghan

[75] See Strachey, *Memoir on the Revenue and Trade of Cabul*, 1811, H. Misc. 659 (ii); Lt. F. Irvine, *Memoir on the Climate, Soil, Products and Husbandry of Afghanistan and the Neighbouring Country*, 1809, H. Misc. 659 (iv). Ahmad Quli may well have appointed Zu'l-Faqar Sher Khan as Hakim of Sar-i Pul in 1804.

[76] Conolly, *Bamiyan to Merve*, 1840.

[77] *Ibid.*

kingdom of Shah Shuja'.[78] As a result of the civil war between Timur Shah's sons, the Durranis lost what nominal influence they had over Maimana and the Chahar Wilayat by the early 1800s. A token presence, however, in the form of an Afghan governor at Balkh, still remained.

In Qataghan the real power lay with Qilij 'Ali Beg of Khulm who continued the alliance with the Afghans which had begun during the reign of Timur Shah (Elphinstone ii, 197). Maimana's cultivation of its links with Bukhara had, as we have seen, resulted in the Mingid rulers being stripped of the title of *Wali-yi Balkh* by Timur Shah. Sometime later Zaman Shah, in order to offset the Bukharan influence in the west, conferred this title on the eldest son of Mir Qilij, Ahmad Beg, and even gave him the right to call himself ataliq, possibly in direct response to Ahmad Khan Ming's elevation to the same status by Haidar Khan Manghit of Bukhara (Elphinstone ii, 188, 197). This appointment consolidated the alliance between Khulm and Kabul and marked a complete turn-about of Afghan policy towards the Balkh appanage since the days of Ahmad Shah Durrani. The supremacy of the Ming tribe of Maimana was overturned and their old rivals, the Qataghanids, had assumed the mantle of the paramount tribe, at least in the eyes of the Afghan Amir in Kabul.

This realignment was an inevitable result of Timur Shah's decision to move his capital from Qandahar to Kabul in 1775/6. The Badghis corridor and Maimana were no longer the most direct route from the Afghan capital to Balkh. This now ran via Bamiyan, Aibak and Khulm. Thus, though the Afghans could allow Maimana to go its own way, in order to protect the northern flanks of the Afghan dominions from Bukharan invasion it was essential to maintain close, friendly relations with Mir Qilij Beg and Khulm. The only alternative to such a policy was to extend Afghan sovereignty beyond the Hindu Kush by direct annexation of the plains of Aibak and Khulm which were the gateway to Kabul.

According to Faiz Bakhsh,[79] in the civil war which followed Haidar Khan Manghit's accession in Bukhara (1799/1800), Qunduz and Balkh were seized by a certain Qata Khan. His two sons, "Tor" (Tora?) Khan and Khudayar Khan, expelled Qara Khan b. 'Aliwardi Khan. These rebels were themselves soon ousted by Haidar Khan

[78] Strachey, *Memoir*; Irvine, *Memoir*; Lt. I. Macartney, *Memoir of a Map of Caboul and the Adjacent Country*, 1818, H. Misc. 659 (iii).

[79] Faiz Bakhsh, *Badakhshan*, 51.

Manghit, who presumably sent an army across the Amu Darya to restore the authority of Qara Khan.[80] A laconic reference to an Afghan "victory over the Uzbeks in Bulkh (*sic*)" in 1802 (Elphinstone ii, 331),[81] may indicate that Qilij Beg of Khulm, with the help of the ousted Durrani governor, had managed to re-establish control over Balkh in the name of Shah Shuja'. Whether this battle for Qunduz had anything to do with the struggle between Haidar Khan Manghit and his three paternal uncles, 'Omar Bi, Fazl Bi and Mahmud Bi, which marked the early months of his reign, we do not know (Howorth, 780-2). However, in 1805-6/1220 envoys from Haidar Khan and Qilij Khan came to the court of the then Afghan ruler of Kabul, Shah Shuja' al-Mulk, which resulted in the Amir marrying the virgin daughter of the Bukharan ruler (Katib i, 69). By *c.* 1808 the ruler of Qunduz is named as "Khaul Daud" Khan of Qataghan. This name is actually a mutilation of the ancient Chingizid title, Qa'alkhan, and the district was probably under the authority of Kokan Beg, father of the famous Murad Beg (Elphinstone ii, 200; Howorth, 855; Appendix, IV, viii).

In 1809, Shah 'Abbas, a nephew of Shah Shuja', managed to escape from imprisonment in Kabul and made his way to Balkh, where he was welcomed by the Afghan governor. Shah Shuja', too occupied in dealing with an uprising in the south, requested his faithful ally, Qilij 'Ali Beg of Khulm, to deal with this rebellion. More than willing to comply with this royal plea, Qilij marched his force to Balkh and expelled both Shah 'Abbas and the Afghan governor. Though Shah Shuja' sent a replacement, probably Sardar Najibullah Khan Surkhani (Izzat Ullah, 61, 81, 85), who was still in Balkh in 1812/3, Qilij Khan became, to all intents and purposes, the *de facto*, if not *de jure*, ruler of Balkh, Qataghan and Khulm (Elphinstone ii, 197).

The following year, Ataliq Ahmad Quli Khan Ming of Maimana, after a reign of some ten years, fell victim to the poisoner's art.[82] Ahmad Quli's two sons, Mizrab Khan and 'Abd al-Mu'min Khan, fled for their lives to seek sanctuary at Mazar-i Sharif,[83] whilst the young son of Muhammad Rahim Khan, 'Ali Yar Khan, a child of about ten, was placed on the throne. Though the sources do not say so, it would be reasonable to suppose that 'Ali Yar Khan personally had had little to do with the death of his uncle and that he was merely

[80] *Ibid.*
[81] Dupree 1978, chart 21 expands this by claiming, "North Afghanistan *(sic)* holds out for Zaman Shah."
[82] Burnes, *Herat*, 1838.
[83] Conolly, *Bamiyan to Merve*, 1840.

a pawn in the long-standing family feud. A notable feature of the reign of 'Ali Yar Khan is the powerful influence that freed Persian slaves had in his administration. His '*arzbegi* was a certain 'Abd al-Din ("Abadin") from Qa'in, who had been captured as a very young child on one of the many raids made into Persian Khurasan and brought to Maimana in a saddle bag. Following this individual's rise to power, he introduced two of his brothers into positions of influence in 'Ali Yar Khan's government. The diwanbegi at the time of the wali's death was a Persian and was even appointed Regent for 'Ali Yar's infant heir.[84] The Household Guard, which 'Ali Yar Khan's father, Muhammad Rahim Khan, had apparently formed from slaves, may also have been predominantly raised from captives of Khurasan origin.[85]

Shortly after the murder of Ahmad Quli Khan, Zu'l-Faqar Sher Khan, sub-governor of Sar-i Pul, took advantage of the weakness of his overlords to declare independence. After some fighting, he succeeded in carving out for himself a country which stretched north and east of the Shirin Tagab from Qurchi and the Mirza Wulang pass to the borders of Shibarghan (*Gazetteer* (1895) ii, 285; MacGregor, 645; Stirling 1991, 296). This added another dimension to the rivalry between Ahmadi and Rahimid clans in Maimana, for Zu'l-Faqar Sher Khan was related by marriage to both branches of the ruling house of Maimana; 'Ali Yar Khan eventually married one of the amir of Sar-i Pul's daughters.[86]

Having broken away from Maimana, Zu'l-Faqar Sher took the offensive against Manwar Khan of Shibarghan and, sometime in the mid 1820s, seized the important district of Qaflatun, or Chahar Burj, the region from where the rivers that irrigate Shibarghan rise, and diverted the streams for his own use, causing much hardship to the population in the plains to the north in the process (Ferrier 1857, 202; Stirling 1991, 294).

In the same year that Ahmad Quli was assassinated (1814), the tragic figure of the blinded ex-Amir of Kabul, Zaman Shah passed through Khulm on a pilgrimage to the shrine of 'Ali at Mazar-i Sharif. After being sumptuously entertained by the ageing Qilij 'Ali Beg of Khulm[87] and performed the *ziyarat* rites at the tomb of Shah-i

[84] *Ibid.*
[85] *Ibid.*
[86] *Ibid.*
[87] He was between sixty and seventy years old, Izzat Ullah, 80; Elphinstone ii, 191.

Mardan, he continued his pilgrimage northwards to Bukhara, where he was well received, given the young daughter of Amir Haidar in marriage and promised Manghit support for the conquest of Balkh (Howorth, 855). However, there was no serious intent on Haidar's part to help Zaman take possession of a province which the Bukharans still claimed sovereignty over and it was not long before Zaman Shah found that his stay in Bukhara had turned to imprisonment. Eventually he managed to make his escape and fled to Persia via Maimana,[88] from whence he departed to perform the pilgrimage to Mecca (Howorth, 855).

Sadozai Herat, 1814-1829

In 1814 Persia renewed its threats against Herat and Firoz requested his brother, Mahmud, who had succeeded in overthrowing Shah Shuja', to send Fath 'Ali Khan to his aid. When Fath Khan arrived in Herat, however, he had Firoz arrested and sent to Kabul to explain his "equivocal dealings with Persia" (Hall, 7). Firoz's property was looted and a half-brother of Fath 'Ali Khan, Dost Muhammad Khan, who later became one of the greatest of all Afghan Amirs, violated his rival's harem and was forced to flee for his life to Kashmir (Dupree 1978, chart 21; Hall, 6-7). In a further twist of fortune, Shah Mahmud himself was overthrown in 1818 and retired to Herat. His *wazir*, Fath Khan, however, was not so fortunate and was blinded. This action, not unexpectedly, precipitated a further round of hostilities and blood-letting between the Sadozai and Barakzai clans (Elphinstone ii, 350-1; Fraser-Tytler, 68; Hall, 6-7).[89] Shah Mahmud's expulsion from Kabul marked the end of the Sadozai dynasty's control of Kabul, with the exception of the brief reign of Shah Shuja' al-Mulk who was reinstated, under British patronage, in 1839. A rump Sadozai kingdom, however, continued to exist in Herat until the city finally fell to Dost Muhammad Khan in 1862.

Despite establishing himself in Herat, Shah Mahmud failed to escape from the internecine strife which had beset the Afghan ruling family. In 1824, the Sadozai ruler was overthrown by his own son, Kamran Mirza and, fearing for his life, he sought sanctuary at Khwaja

[88] Raverty vi, 2137. Zaman's visit may explain Mizrab Khan's cryptic comment to Conolly: "when members of that house [the Sadozai] fell into misfortune they found hospitality here," Conolly, *Bamiyan to Merve*, 1840

[89] Raverty vi, 2135.

Ansari's tomb in Guzargah, from whence he upbraided his heir for his "wicked" conduct. Kamran, however, was completely indifferent to such paternal rebukes and, after six months' residence at the shrine, Shah Mahmud fled across the Murghab to request help from 'Ali Yar Khan of Maimana (Conolly 1834, ii, 414-5).[90] Aided by the leader of the Jamshidi Aimaqs, Darwish 'Ali Khan, Maimana sent three thousand men across the Murghab to attack Herat. Kamran, meanwhile, allied himself with Persia, and six thousand men with four guns, under Arghan Mirza, were dispatched to deal with the threat from Badghis (Forrest, 8).

When the Persians reached Herat, they combined with two thousand of Kamran's own troops led by his son, Jahangir Mirza, and marched to the Murghab (Conolly 1834, ii, 414-5; Forrest, 8). Details of the ensuing battle are sketchy, but it appears that spies betrayed Kamran's line of advance to Shah Mahmud and his allies, who prepared an ambush. "In the grey of the morning" (Conolly 1834, ii, 414-5) the Aimaqs and Uzbeks surprised the advancing Persians and completely defeated them. Following this resounding victory, Shah Mahmud marched to Herat but, due to his "want of resolution," the Sadozai ruler decided to entrench himself outside of the citadel rather than storming the walls. The result was that all the benefit of the Badghis victory quickly dissipated (Conolly 1834, ii, 414-5) and the siege was a miserable failure. Shah Mahmud fled back across the Murghab, where he was given sanctuary by the Sunni Hazaras of Qal'a-yi Nau (Conolly 1834, ii, 414-5).[91]

Kamran refused to allow his father any peace and marched at the head of his army into Ghor, sweeping aside an Aimaq army which had been sent against him. All supply routes to the Aimaq mountain strongholds were cut and within a short space of time the Sunni Hazaras were starved into handing over Shah Mahmud, who was taken back to Herat by his son, but stripped of all power. Broken by a life of almost perpetual fighting and civil war, Shah Mahmud passed away the following year (1827) (Champagne, 99-100; Conolly 1843, ii, 414-5; Forrest, 8).[92]

[90] Raverty vi, 2149-50. One contemporary French traveller said he went to Farah, *Itinerary from Yezd to Herat and from Herat to Kabul via Kandahar*, in, Forrest, 8.

[91] Raverty vi, 2125.

[92] Raverty vi, 2125, 2149-50. Raverty claims that Kamran deliberately destroyed his father's health.

The Re-assertion of Bukharan Sovereignty, 1817-1829

Qilij 'Ali Beg, amir of Khulm, died in 1817 at a ripe old age (Dupree 1978, chart 21; Izzat Ullah, 80; Howorth, 855)[93] and with his demise the power of Khulm went into a steep decline. For several years prior to Qilij 'Ali's death, his nephew, Murad Beg, amir of Qunduz (Izzat Ullah, 89), had been intriguing with Qilij's second-born son, Baba Beg.[94] In 1812, Baba Beg had poisoned his older brother during a feast and became both heir to his father's throne and the prestigious title of *Wali-yi Balkh* (Burnes 1834 i, 202-3; Harlan 1939, 32ff.; Howorth, 855; Izzat Ullah, 81; Moorcroft ii, 399-400). When Qilij Beg eventually passed away, however, Baba Beg discovered that his erstwhile protector and sponsor had grown so powerful that he was obliged to subordinate himself to the amir of Qunduz in order to hold on to power in Khulm.

Mir Baba Beg's enforced alliance with Qunduz was not to the liking of the Afghans and when Dost Muhammad Khan became Amir of Kabul in 1826, he stripped Baba Beg of his title, *Wali-yi Balkh* (Howorth, 855; Izzat Ullah, 80-1; Moorcroft, ii, 399ff.). Instead the Afghan Amir conferred it on Baba Beg's younger brother, 'Ali Mardan Beg, known generally by his title *Mir Wali*, who ruled independently from Aibak. Murad Beg, meanwhile, signified his new-found authority over Qataghan by striking coins in his own name along with the words "Mother of Cities," the Arabic name for Balkh, signifying, thereby, that he claimed to be the lawful ruler of the Chingizid

[93] Later sources give the date of his death as 1824 or 1826, cf. Burnes 1834 i,. 347; Talboys Wheeler, vii-viii, 35.

[94] Moorcroft ii, 399ff., seems to imply there were only two sons of Qilij 'Ali, Baba Beg and Muhammad Ahmad Beg. Subsequent authorities reflect this confusion, e.g. Howorth, 855. However, Izzat Ullah, 81 records the names of the three eldest sons of the ruler of Khulm as: firstly, Ahmad Beg, aged 20, governor of Aibak and *Wali-yi Balkh*, who was poisoned in 1812; secondly, Baba Beg ruler in "Yunayee, Ureek," aged 16; thirdly, 'Ali Mardan Beg, aged 14, governor of Darra-yi Yusuf. By the time of Moorcroft's visit in 1825, "Mohammed Ahmed Beg, the second son of the late Mir Kalich Ali, who had assumed the title of Wali or 'Protector of Balkh'" was governing Aibak (Moorcroft ii, 399-400), but later Moorcroft records that, "the third son, our new acquaintance [i.e. Ahmad Beg], had endeavoured to assert his independence and occupied Aibek" (Moorcroft ii, 400). Moorcroft also refers to Baba Beg, then ruler of Khulm, as the "second son" of Mir Qilij (Moorcroft ii, 400, 413). The confusion in Moorcroft's account can be explained when we realise that Muhammad "Ahmad" Beg was the second surviving son of Qilij Beg, but his third born son. Baba Beg was the second oldest but, as the eldest surviving offspring of Qilij Beg, he had succeeded at Khulm on the death of his father (Alder, 331; Burnes 1834, i, 202-3; Harlan 1939, 27-8, 33-6). The person Moorcroft refers to as Muhammad Ahmad Beg is the same individual as Muhammad Amin Beg Khan, Mir Wali of Khulm. See also, Harlan 1939, 34-6 for details of the disagreements which ensued following the death of Qilij Beg. Harlan's account differs in some points from that of Moorcroft.

appanage in opposition to the Afghan-sponsored wali (Burnes 1834, ii, 228-9).

The death of Qilij 'Ali Khan and the divisions which had appeared amongst the amirid rulers of Qataghan, encouraged Haidar Khan of Bukhara to fill the vacuum. In 1817 he marched across the Amu Darya and overthrew the last vestiges of Afghan authority in Balkh without, apparently, any opposition. Ishan Saiyid Parsa Khwaja Naqib,[95] the pir of the Gauhari shaikhs of Qasan near Qarshi, a descendant of Timur Lang, through his daughter[96] and hence a Chingizid in his own right, was appointed as the governor of Balkh. As a direct challenge to both the Afghan-backed Mir Wali and the independent amir Murad Beg in Qunduz, Haidar Khan allowed Ishan Naqib to assume the title of *Wali-yi Balkh* (Harlan 1939, 29; Moorcroft ii, 490). Ishan Naqib's eldest son, Saiyid Muhammad Uraq, usually referred to as Ishan Uraq,[97] was put in charge of the important fortress of Aqcha. Maimana, under 'Ali Yar Khan, along with the rest of the Chahar Wilayat, submitted to Bukhara, though the Wali retained his family's long-standing alliance with the Sadozais by sending an annual *nazarana* of horses and other gifts to Shah Mahmud at Herat (Conolly 1834, ii, *Appendix* I, 261-3; Fraser, *Appendix* B, 121; Harlan 1939, 27), a relationship which British political officers and Yar Muhammad of Herat were later to completely misrepresent for their own political ends (Conolly 1834, ii, 261-3; Fraser, *Appendix* B, 46, 121).[98]

Ishan Uraq, his brother, Ishan Sudur[99] and other relatives of Ishan Khwaja Naqib were destined to play a major part in the wars of

[95] These names are all religious titles and the governor's personal name(s) are not known. According to the family's own genealogy, Ishan Khwaja Naqib was a descendant of Saiyid Mir Haidar Qutb al-Din of Medina whom Timur Lang brought to Bukhara in 1348-9/750, along with a number of other saiyids. The family were given land at Qasan, near Qarshi (Nasaf). The shrine of Ishan Khwaja Naqib is in the village of Fuladi, a short distance outside Qasan. Despite the name, he does not appear to have come from the same *shaikhly* line as Abu Nasr Parsa, whose shrine is at Balkh. Saiyid Mohai al-Din Gauhari, *interview*, Mazar-i Sharif, April 1993. For the genealogy of Ishan Parsa Khwaja Naqib Gauhari, see Appendix IV, vii and Plate VIII.

[96] Saiyid Mohai al-Din Gauhari, *interview*, April 1993. Saiyid Mir Haidar Qutb al-Din was given Timur's daughter, Gauhar, in marriage. From this union ten sons resulted, of whom only Saiyid 'Abdullah outlived his father, and was consequently recognised as a *pir* of their sub-Order of Naqshbandi Sufism.

[97] European sources say Ishan Sudur was the eldest son, but according to the Gauhari family, who are well-versed in their family history, Ishan Uraq was the oldest. This is consistent with the *Siraj al-Tawarikh*. Today the family refer to Ishan Uraq as, *Hakim-i Mustaqel*, Saiyid Mohai al-Din Gauhari, *interview*, April 1993.

[98] Burnes, *Herat*, 1838; Pottinger, *Memoir*, 1839; Conolly, *Bamiyan to Merve*, 1840. The issue of misinformation about the Chahar Wilayat's affiliations is discussed in Chapter 5.

[99] *CD*, 29 April-5 May 1864, P:IFPC/204/73, no. 40 of June, fols. 102-3.

independence which took place during the last half of the century though, regrettably, little is known about them apart from occasional, and often cryptic, references in native agents' reports, political diaries and the journals of European travellers. Each different province of Bukhara had a naqib. These were men of exalted political and spiritual importance. Apart from being the guardians of important shrines and the heads, or pirs, of various sub-Orders of Naqshbandi Sufism (Khanikov, 251ff.), the naqibs were entrusted with considerable political power under the Manghit dynasty of Bukhara. Sir John Malcolm, in his *History of Persia* (Malcolm ii, 256-60), records that the Ishan Naqib of the northern border town of Jizakh rose to the exalted rank of chief advisor to Daniyal Bi and no-one could obtain an audience with the Bukharan ruler without first having to address himself to this individual. This individual was related, on the distaff side, to the ruling house, his mother being the daughter of Daniyal Bi Khan. He was extremely wealthy. His personal cup was made of "pure gold ornamented with silver" whilst his guests drank from vessels of silver inlaid with gold (Malcolm ii, 254). In 1825, when Ishan Khwaja Naqib of Qasan was governing Balkh, another Ishan Khwaja "Nukieb," the governor (i.e. hakim) of Karmina ("Karameena"), which lies between Bukhara and Samarkand, was executed "on suspicion of his entertaining ambitious projects."[100] This would suggest that the Manghit dynasty placed considerable trust in these individuals for, as well as their being deferred to in spiritual matters, they were put in charge of strategic provinces within the Bukharan realms. The pedigree of Ishan Naqib of Balkh was equally exalted and by appointing a descendant of Timur Lang to govern the capital of the former appanage, Haidar Khan was clearly trying to reaffirm the Chingizid link between Balkh and Bukhara.

We know from Moorcroft's journals that Ishan Naqib of Balkh was born around 1785 and that by 1825 his face had been badly disfigured by the loss of his nose from an unknown disease, possibly leprosy or venereal disease (Moorcroft ii, 493). He also informs us that the Ishan's maternal uncle was Saiyid Shuja' al-Din, the *mutawalli* of the shrine of Mazar-i Sharif. This links him, on his mother's side, with the Ansari shaikhs who had held the guardianship of the ziyarat since the days of Sultan Husain Baiqara (Moorcroft ii, 490). Later, in the 1860s, Ishan Uraq and his nephew were to marry daughters of Muzaffar Khan Manghit, the then ruler of Bukhara.

[100] Moorcroft, *Bukhara and the Return from Bukhara*, 49.

As a result of the deaths of Moorcroft and his fellow-Europeans in Balkh during 1825, which British sources believed was the result of the avarice and treachery of Ishan Naqib and the *mutawalli* of Mazar, the generation of European travellers and adventurers who followed these pioneer explorers wrote highly uncomplimentary accounts of the rulers of Balkh, Mazar-i Sharif and Qunduz. Yet Moorcroft himself praises Shuja' al-Din of Mazar, in particular, for the warmth of his welcome, after he finally extracted himself from the clutches of Murad Beg of Qunduz. The *mutawalli*, Moorcroft records, showed, "the greatest kindness, promising us every assistance in his power, and giving us unsolicited letters of recommendation to the governor of Balkh and to the Hakim Bè, or chief minister,[101] of Bokhara" (Moorcroft ii, 490). Shuja' al-Din Mazari is described as being about forty-five years of age, of middle stature with a plain, unaffected manner. He was more Tadjik in appearance than Uzbek (Moorcroft ii, 490).

Josiah Harlan (Harlan 1939, 32ff.), the mercenary adventurer employed by Dost Muhammad Khan in 1838/9 in the campaign against Murad Beg and Balkh, is typical of the generation which followed Moorcroft. On the basis of hearsay, he alleged that Shuja' al-Din slowly and secretly poisoned the whole of Moorcroft's party (Harlan 1939, 32-3) and paints a highly uncomplimentary picture of the *mutawalli*, though he conceded that the guardian of the 'Alid shrine was a poet of some reputation and a patron of the arts.

> He is a man of grave address and dignified deportment, but his character is full of duplicity and political tergiversation. He is addicted to literary pursuits and is said to be a good poet. He covets the reputation of a mediator and is frequently referred to for the settlement of feuds in which occupation much of his time is passed... His best friends would be relentlessly sacrificed to the prospect of immediate benefit. He has been known to foment disputes, quarrels and intrigues among his neighbours for the purpose of extending his power. He is an unprincipled politician and unworthy of confidence... He is ... a bad man of mysterious motives and of hidden resolves, of cruel, cold and heartless principles but not reckless of a fair name (Harlan 1939, 32-3).

Since Shuja' al-Din had opposed Dost Muhammad's invasion of Qataghan and Balkh, and Harlan was in the Amir's pay, it is hardly surprising to find that the 'General' had few good words to say about his opponent.

[101] That is, the *khushbegi*.

Ishan Saiyid Khwaja Naqib ruled Balkh in the name of the Manghits of Bukhara for over twenty years [1817-1838].[102] Since during the same period the Afghans continued to squabble amongst themselves, the Bukharan governor had little to fear from Kabul. The main opposition came from Murad Beg of Qunduz, who resented Bukharan intervention and continued to claim the right to govern the region. During the 1820s and 1830s the ruler of Qataghan raided outlying districts of Balkh, carrying away the population, and caused much devastation to the delicate network of the Hazhda Nahr irrigation system (Harlan 1939, 28; Moorcroft ii, 444). Sometime during the winter of 1824/5 under the leadership of Ishan Naqib, 'Ali Yar Khan, the rulers of the Chahar Wilayat, Shuja' al-Din of Mazar and the Mir Wali joined together in an attempt to bring Murad Beg to heel (Gregorian, 57-8; Moorcroft ii, 444, 452-3). Despite mustering an army that numbered some eight thousand men, Murad Beg brought into the field an army nearly twice this size and successfully fought off all attempts by Ishan Naqib and his allies to subdue him. Murad Beg was undoubtedly helped by the death, at the end of 1826, of Haidar Khan of Bukhara, for this event precipitated the usual power struggle between rival claimants, which took some eighteen months to resolve. Had Haidar Khan been able to support Ishan Naqib against Qunduz, the reunification of the Balkh appanage might well have been accomplished and the history of Afghanistan and Central Asia would have taken quite a different course.

The Travels of Moorcroft and Stirling, 1825-1829

In 1825, the first of a number of British explorers reached Turkistan. William Moorcroft, accompanied by Trebeck, Guthrie and a large retinue of Indian servants, crossed the Hindu Kush in a vain attempt to find suitable cavalry horses for the East India Company's stud (Alder 1985; Moorcroft 1979).[103] However, despite his

[102] Later, European writers claimed that Murad Beg of Qunduz seized Balkh in, or around, 1826 only to be forced out again by Bukhara. These reports are based on later sources, such as Burnes, and are confused with the Bukharan incursion of 1838/9. There is no contemporary evidence to suggest such an event took place in *c.* 1826; Dupree 1978, 369; *Gazetteer* (1895) ii, 335; MacGregor, 194; Talboys Wheeler, pp. vii-viii, 34).

[103] Though extracts from Moorcroft's journals were published after his death, they were far from being a comprehensive account of his travels and the record of his last journey, from Bukhara to Balkh and Andkhui, remains unpublished, along with a vast amount of Moorcroft's letters and other reports. The majority of these papers are in the India Office Library's *Moorcroft Collection*, MSS. Eur. D.253-4; C.68-9 or in individual Proceedings series. See Alder's superb biography for individual references and papers.

disappointment and tragic death, his reports, journals and unpublished papers still remain an important source for the history of the area. Without them, very little would be known about the state of affairs in Khulm, Qunduz, Balkh and Bukhara during an important and formative period of Uzbek-Afghan relations.

In 1825, Moorcroft's party passed through Aibak, Khulm and Qunduz and were badly treated by Murad Beg, who accused them of spying, hoping thereby to extort as much money and property from them as he could. Moorcroft only finally broke free from his clutches after making a daring, secret journey to Taliqan to appeal to Murad Beg's spiritual guide, Pirzada Qasim Khwaja Jan, who ordered his disciple to grant the foreigners safe passage out of his territory (Moorcroft ii, 456ff.). From Qunduz, Moorcroft left for Bukhara, travelling via Mazar-i Sharif and Balkh, where Ishan Khwaja Naqib and his uncle denounced Murad Beg's treatment of the travellers as "bringing shame upon all Turkistan" (Moorcroft ii, 490).

On his return from Bukhara, Moorcroft was faced with the dilemma of which route to take back to India. He had no desire to risk trying to reach Kabul and India through territory controlled by Murad Beg and so he began to make enquiries about the western route, via Andkhui, Sar-i Pul, Maimana and Herat (Alder, 356-7).[104] As he passed through Qarshi *en route* to the Amu Darya, he persuaded the local governor to write letters of recommendation to 'Ali Yar Khan of Maimana in order to facilitate his return through the Chahar Wilayat.[105] After crossing the river, however, Moorcroft went first to Aqcha and then to Balkh, presumably remembering the friendliness of the reception his party had received from Ishan Naqib earlier in the year. Once again, Moorcroft records how the Wali of Balkh made him welcome and he decided to leave the majority of his party in Balkh whilst he reconnoitred the route through the Chahar Wilayat (Alder, 356-7). The rest of the sad story is shrouded in mystery. Moorcroft reached Andkhui safely and was planning to travel to Maimana when he fell victim to a fever and died in the town on 27 August 1825. Following his death, Yulduz Khan, the ruler of Andkhui, is alleged to have impounded his baggage until a suitable ransom was paid for its release by other members of the party who had accompanied him to Andkhui (Alder, 361).

[104] Moorcroft, *Bukhara and the Return from Bukhara*, 276.

[105] *Ibid.*

The death of Moorcroft signalled the break-up of his party. The survivors of the Andkhui expedition returned to Balkh with the decomposing body and buried it in an unknown grave in the western part of the city (Alder, 361).[106] A few weeks later Guthrie succumbed to Balkh's unhealthy climate and, despite warnings from Ishan Naqib about the unreliability of Shuja' al-Din's promises of help, Trebeck moved the survivors to Mazar, hoping to escape the fever. Despite this precaution, he too died from a combination of fever and exhaustion. Askar 'Ali, one of the surviving Indian servants whose uncorroborated account of these events has been accorded a far greater credibility by Europeans than it deserves, later claimed that, following Trebeck's death the *mutawalli* of Mazar-i Sharif briefly abdicated in favour of his brother in order to absolve himself from his oath to protect the survivors. His family thereupon proceeded to help themselves to the party's baggage and other property (Alder, 362; Harlan 1939, 33; Stirling 1991, *Appendix* A). After a period of imprisonment, some of the Indian servants managed to escape and made their way towards Maimana and the Murghab but were captured by the Hazaras, who sold them as slaves to the Uzbeks of Almar. Askar 'Ali, having finally discovered their whereabouts, claims to have ransomed them and together they made their way back to India (Alder, 362-3; Stirling 1991, *Appendix* A).

Some three years after these events, the Scotsman, Edward Stirling (Stirling 1991), travelled from Mashhad to Kabul through the Chahar Wilayat. Unfortunately, despite the growing interest in Central Asian exploration during the late 1820s, Stirling never published his journal and only part of his manuscript has survived (Stirling 1991, xxii-xxvi). In many ways Stirling's journey was more remarkable than Moorcroft's, for he was accompanied by a single Indian servant and funded his travels from his own pocket. Disguised as an Indian *hakim*, or physician, Stirling left Mashhad in the autumn of 1828 and travelled to Kabul *via* Sarrakhs, Bala Murghab, Almar, Maimana, Sar-i Pul, Mazar-i Sharif, Khulm and Bamiyan. His journey through the Hindu Kush was accomplished during the winter of 1828/9 and the caravan he was travelling with had to force its way through heavy

[106] Alexander Burnes claimed to have identified Moorcroft's grave, but he made no attempt to mark the site for posterity and his description of its location is so vague as to be useless. Alder (*personal communication*) tried to locate Moorcroft's grave in the 1970s, but failed, mainly, I suspect, because the town plan of Balkh has changed completely since 1825. The city and bazaar were completely rebuilt, along with most of the other northern towns such as Maimana, in the 1930s (Byron, 249).

blizzards and drifting snow. When he finally reached India, in the spring of 1829, Stirling had become the first European of his generation to return alive from Turkistan. In the process he had pioneered the route from Bala Murghab to Balkh via Maimana, the Shirin Tagab and Sar-i Pul and his report on Maimana and the surrounding principalities is an important complement to Moorcroft's journals, since none of Moorcroft's party ever reached this town. Regrettably, the authorities in Calcutta, completely indifferent to Stirling's remarkable journey, rejected a claim for reimbursement of expenses and dismissed him from his post because he had overrun his leave of absence by some three weeks (Stirling 1991, ix-xxii & *Appendix* E). Given such apathy, and Stirling's subsequent blindness, it is remarkable that so much of his journal has survived.

Stirling confirms that under 'Ali Yar Khan Ming, Maimana and the Chahar Wilayat were regarded as a dependency of Bukhara, remarking that, "at present Ally Yar Khan is said to be on good terms with Buhadur Khan, the Ameer of Bokhara. He sometimes sends embassies and keeps up his connection with the Ameer" (Stirling 1991, 286). The boundaries of Maimana extended northwards beyond the low chul hills to beyond the confines of Butkhak, Khairabad and Daulatabad. In the south, Maimana extended as far as "the lofty hills of the Paropamisian." Eastwards, the state controlled the majority of the Shirin Tagab valley and Gurziwan, as far as Qurchi, whilst the Aimaq tribes of the Jamshidis and the Sunni Hazaras,[107] situated between Maimana and the Murghab, though having internal autonomy under their own chiefs, were dependent on 'Ali Yar Khan (Stirling 1991, 284-5).

Sher Muhammad Khan, chief of the Sunni Hazaras, who was to subsequently play such an important part in the defence of Herat during 1838, ruled his tribe from Angurak. A blood feud, however, existed between Sher Muhammad and his relative, Bairam Khan,

[107] The Sunni, or Qal'a-yi Nau, Hazaras are one of the Chahar Aimaq groups of Badghis and Ghor and are quite distinct from the Shi'i Hazaras of the Hazarajat. Sher Muhammad Khan's genealogy is given as: son of Sikandar Khan b. Agha Sultan (who is reported to have been the founder of Qal'a-yi Nau) b. Kafilan Sultan. According to the Boundary Commission's Intelligence Party, who made a particular study of the Chahar Aimaq tribes, the Sunni Hazaras were a colony of Shi'i Hazaras from the Hazarajat located in the area by Nadir Shah Afshar. Their first chief was Mir Kush Sultan b. Kafilan Sultan. They were originally located on the Murghab, probably at Angurak, but later moved their capital to Qal'a-yi Nau. This must have happened between 1828 and 1838. Sher Muhammad Khan held the title of *Nizam al-Daula* which had been bestowed on him by Shah Kamran. For genealogies and history of the Sunni Hazaras, see Maitland 1891, 87-106; Appendix V, ii.

probably arising from Sher Muhammad Khan's usurping of the chieftainship of the tribe following his assassination of his paternal cousin, Bunyad Khan, earlier in the decade (Maitland 1891, 87, 92-4; Appendix V, iii). Bairam Khan had migrated to "Jam" (Turbat-i Shaikh Jam), taking with him a number of families who had remained loyal to him, and submitted to Fath 'Ali Shah of Persia. Stirling was not impressed by Angurak, its "unprincipled chief," or its population, and claimed that it was "inhabited by the most profligate set of men" (Stirling 1991, 262-3).

Jamshidi[108] territory included Marichaq ("Marchagah"), which had recently been acquired by the Aimaqs from Persia. Qurmach was under Muhamad Zaman Beg Jamshidi, whom Stirling says was a cousin[109] of Darwish 'Ali Khan b. Yalangtush Khan, the overall chief of the tribe whose headquarters was at Bala Murghab (Stirling 1991, 250-55, 258-9). According to Stirling, the Jamshidis had only been in the area since the days of Yalangtush Khan Jamshidi, having moved from "near the ancient town of Bagis" after a dispute with the Murghab Turkmans (Stirling 1991, 260-1; Maitland 1891, 60-66). The Sunni Hazaras, the Jamshidis and Maimana acted together in forming raiding parties against Khurasan, which brought back much booty and many slaves.

Contrary to later nineteenth century European claims, slave-trading and raiding were far from being the sole, or even main, occupations of these tribes. The Aimaqs, Sunni Hazaras, Turkmans and Uzbeks kept vast flocks of sheep, cattle and horses, which were grazed on the "prolific, verdant and fattening" pastures of Badghis. Grain and fruit were also extensively grown throughout the region (Stirling 1991, 261), but probably the main cash crop was pistachio nuts which, even in 1886, were still a significant part of the local economy (Maitland 1891, 91).

Stirling found Maimana to be a large and prosperous town with a population of ten to fifteen thousand souls, mainly Uzbeks, Hazaras and captive Persians. More than half of this population still lived in tents that had been enclosed by low walls. Maimana had a number of shops and a weekly bazaar (Stirling 1991, 285-6). Its importance as a

[108] The Jamshidis are another of the Chahar Aimaq tribes of Badghis, who claim a descent from the famous, howbeit mythological, figure of Jamshid. For the history and genealogies of the Jamshidi Aimaq, see Maitland 1891, 57-83; Schurmann, 49-72; Appendix V, i.

[109] The Afghan Boundary Commission's history of the Jamshidis, however, says that he was a nephew of Darwish 'Ali Khan. Muhammad Zaman Khan was later put to death by Khan Agha in *c.* 1842; Maitland 1891, 57-8, 62.

pivot of Central Asian trade is shown by the fact that caravans from Herat, Mashhad, Sarrakhs, Balkh, Andkhui, Bukhara, Merv and Urganj all passed through the town. Amongst other things being traded along these routes were iron from Bukhara and salt[110] from Bukhara and Shibarghan (Stirling 1991, 292). Another important revenue-earner for the state was its bloodstock, and traders as far west as Mashhad came to buy horses. Stirling makes it clear that the breeding of these animals was far from being a haphazard matter. A deliberate attempt to improve the bloodstock of Almar had led to "the importation of one or two famous stallions" some years earlier (Stirling 1991, 286). Wheat and barley were the main grain crops in the region, but a considerable amount of fruit, including watermelons, walnuts and olives, was grown. Grapes were less plentiful and raisins had to be imported, though Stirling noted some vineyards on the south-facing slopes of the Ab-i Maimana (Stirling 1991, 286).

State revenues came from taxation on land which consisted of a tariff of one bag in forty on agricultural produce from the "old Usbak proprietors." Newer land holders, "from proprietors of a different tribe who have lately acquired proprietary rights," were taxed at between one fifth and one quarter, in kind. Stirling, unfortunately, says little about this "tribe" who had recently been settled on the land, but this does suggest that the movement towards a more sedentary lifestyle was continuing apace as the revenue from trade and agriculture increased. Sheep, goats and cattle were all taxed at one fortieth of the annual stock, though with smaller flocks 'Ali Yar Khan just took a number of the best animals (Stirling 1991, 285).

One of the wealthiest persons in Maimana, outside of the ruling family, was the barber, who was no mere hairdresser but the local surgeon who performed bleedings (the panacea for all forms of sicknesses) and circumcisions. Several Hindus and Jews were living in Maimana and had become very wealthy money-lenders, acting as brokers for local traders and caravans (Stirling 1991, 285). Maimana, like all the Uzbek states of the Chahar Wilayat, was an *entrepôt* for Persian and Shi'i Hazara slaves, a trade which appalled Stirling. Irregular cavalry from Maimana frequently joined raiding parties attacking Khurasan. One result of this "Afracean business" (Stirling

[110] Salt was a major commodity in Asia, a fact recognised by the British in India, who maintained a strict monopoly over it. In Central Asia, apart from its obvious domestic uses in bread and other foods, salt was a vital part of the diet of the vast flocks of sheep which roamed the plains and *chul* of Turkistan and Badghis.

1991, 234) was that a large number of Persian captives lived in the town.

Maimana's army consisted of a five hundred strong corps of hereditary household guard, called *ghulam*s (i.e. slaves). These janissaries, or their fathers, had also served under Rahim Khan Ming. They were "all equipped and mounted by himself ['Ali Yar Khan] ... attached to him by time, favours and expectations, and by a regard to their families who are all within his grasp" (Stirling 1991, 285). The *arg*, or citadel, built of brick and mud, struck Stirling as "particularly lofty" (see Plates I, II, IV). Today, this *arg* has been demolished, and the local cinema and a tea-house are the only buildings to be seen on the citadel mound. Stirling stayed inside the walls of the fort, being allocated rooms in the *mehman khana*, or state guest house (Stirling 1991, 273).

Though Stirling never visited Andkhui or Shibarghan, he did record some details about these states in his journals. Andkhui's ruler was 'Abd al-'Aziz Khan b. Yulduz Khan b. Rahmatullah Khan b. Sulaiman Khan, an Afshar Turk, though Stirling wrongly claims this tribe was of Arab extraction. He estimated the population of Andkhui at between eight and ten thousand families, with an army of four to five thousand irregular cavalry. Small pomegranates and horses were the most notable products of the area, though it also boasted some good arable land and pasturage. A caravan, consisting solely of Andkhui pomegranates, arrived in Mashhad whilst Stirling was in that city. A feud existed between Maimana and Andkhui, though Stirling gives us no reason for this local rivalry (Stirling 1991, 285-7).

Shibarghan was ruled by Manwar Khan b. Erich Khan. The standing army of this state was a mere two thousand cavalry, but the people of the area had a reputation for being brave and warlike. Shibarghan, too, was on bad terms with Andkhui. The area's agriculture depended heavily on the irrigation supplied by rivers running from the north-facing foothills of the Tir Band-i Turkistan. This, as we have seen, made the state vulnerable to attacks from a hostile Sar-i Pul which, at the time of Stirling's visit, had cut off the water (Stirling 1991, 287).

Stirling's travels marked something of a watershed in British exploration of Central Asia. Though Moorcroft and his party had a political dimension to their travels, their journey to Bukhara was primarily commercial in nature (Alder, 64, 209ff.). Stirling too, though asked by the military *attaché* at the British Embassy in Tehran

to report to Calcutta on potential invasion routes to India, was primarily a civil servant fulfilling a personal dream during his leave of absence and was not employed by the East India Company's political or military establishment on an intelligence-gathering mission.[111] When he returned, government officials took the position that Stirling was a private traveller who undertook his journey "solely under the impulse of [his] own inclination" (Stirling 1991, 341).[112] The apathy which greeted his return from Central Asia extended up to the Governor-General's Council itself and Stirling, like Moorcroft before him, was denied any say in the formation, or rather the transformation, of the Company's Central Asian policy, which occurred in the early 1830s. By the time Stirling finally published his observations on possible invasion routes to India, in 1835, the travels of Alexander Burnes and others had transformed British perceptions of the strategic importance of Afghanistan for the defence of India.

Stirling's travels marked the end of private exploration and he and Moorcroft were succeeded by a younger, more radical breed of Central Asian explorers: political and military officers who were employed by the East India Company with the specific brief of acquiring intelligence about a little-known area. Their reports and recommendations formed the basis of a new, more interventionist, strategy towards the rulers of the Afghan city states. Ironically, many of this rising generation of politico-military travellers were themselves to die violently at the hands of the very peoples whose destiny they sought to control.

[111] Malleson, 158, one of the few later historians of the nineteenth century to give credit to Stirling for his pioneering travels, calls him "Captain" Stirling and confuses Stirling's account of Maimana with that of Izzat Ullah.

[112] *Edward Stirling to Chief Secr. to Govt., Fort William*, 2 July 1830; *Swinton to Stirling*, 23 July 1830, P:126/17, nos. 95, 96 of 23 July 1830.

CHAPTER FIVE

'ABD AL-MU'MIN KHAN AND MIZRAB KHAN, 1829-1845

If you go to Bukhara, you're mad,
You're worthy of chains and the prison house
(Rumi, *Mathnawi*)[1]

The Struggle for the Succession, 1829-1831

'Ali Yar Khan's life was terminated suddenly around 1829,[2] when he fell victim to cholera[3] which was raging throughout the region that year, causing thousands of deaths (*Gazetteer* (1907) ii, 43). The untimely death of the wali in his mid-twenties created a crisis of succession, for 'Ali Yar Khan's only child was a boy two or three years of age.[4] As the heir to the throne was a minor, 'Ali Yar Khan's diwanbegi, a Persian slave, was appointed Regent. This individual was a native of "Kaum" (Qa'in?; Qum?) in Persia who had been taken captive as a small child, but had risen to prominence under the patronage of the dead wali and his family. It may well be that he was one of the brothers of 'Abd al-Din, 'Ali Yar Khan's '*arzbegi*, whom Stirling informs us had been promoted to high office. The appointment of a Persian and a Shi'i as Regent in this Sunni principality, was a highly unpopular action and he did not last long. A few months later the diwanbegi's "insolent airs,"[5] led to his murder, at the hands of unknown assassins, on his way home from the bazaar.[6]

'Ali Yar Khan's infant heir was untouched by this murder, but there is sufficient evidence to believe that the Regent's assassination was the work of a rival faction who supported the claims of the exiled

[1] گر بخارا میروی دیوانۀ لایق زنجیر و زندان خانۀ
According to Katib i, 15 this was the augury which Dost Muhammad Khan took before fleeing to Nasrullah Khan of Bukhara in 1840.

[2] Burnes, *Herat*, 1838; Conolly, *Bamiyan to Merve*, 1840; cf. Pottinger, *Memoir*, 1838. See Chapter 4 for the problem of dating.

[3] Pottinger, *Memoir*, 1839; there were unsubstantiated rumours that the wali had been poisoned, Burnes, *Herat*, 1838.

[4] Conolly, *Bamiyan to Merve*, 1840.

[5] *Ibid.*

[6] *Ibid.*

sons of Ahmad Quli Khan, who were 'Ali Yar Khan's main rivals to the throne of Maimana. We have seen how, following the poisoning of Ataliq Ahmad Quli in 1814, his two sons fled for their lives and, for the duration of 'Ali Yar Khan's reign, Mizrab Khan and 'Abd al-Mu'min Khan had been forced to live as impoverished exiles in Mazar-i Sharif. When news of the untimely death of 'Ali Yar Khan reached Mazar, the two brothers moved to Shibarghan, "to be ready for any good fortune that might turn up."[7] For the Hakim of Shibarghan, Rustam Khan, who had recently succeeded his father, Manwar Khan,[8] was married to one of Mizrab Khan's daughters and had espoused the Ahmadi cause.[9]

The movement of the two exiles, coming as it did on the heels of 'Ali Yar Khan's death, but before the assassination of the Persian Regent, suggests strongly that Mizrab Khan and his brother had prior warning of a plot to overthrow their rivals. This hypothesis is strengthened by the fact that, instead of appointing another Regent to uphold the rights and succession of 'Ali Yar's child, Mizrab Khan and 'Abd al-Mu'min Khan were "invited," presumably by the Regent's assassins, to take control of Maimana's affairs.[10] Furthermore, when Mizrab Khan and 'Abd al-Mu'min returned to Maimana, no provision was made for the infant heir of 'Ali Yar Khan to become wali once he attained his majority. Subsequent events were to demonstrate all too clearly that the murder of the Regent marked a significant change in the balance of power in the Khanate, for it was not long before Mizrab Khan ensured that the Rahimids could never again challenge his family's right to rule.

Shortly after the diwanbegi's assassination, Mizrab Khan and his brother returned to Maimana where they were acclaimed as the new rulers. Once installed in the citadel, however, relations between the two half-brothers quickly deteriorated. Mizrab Khan, though the eldest son of Ahmad Khan, was only half Uzbek, the son of a Persian slave girl. He was passed over in favour of his half-brother who,

[7] *Ibid.*

[8] The two half-brothers probably left Mazar-i Sharif in 1829. According to Stirling, Manwar Khan was still ruling Shibarghan in 1828. Following the death of 'Ali Yar Khan, Mizrab Khan and his half-brother had gone to Shibarghan before being recalled to Maimana. Given the close relationship between Mizrab Khan and Rustam Khan, this would suggest that Rustam Khan was already in power by the time the two sons of Ahmad Khan were guests in Shibarghan. Rustam Khan may have been the son of Manwar, but this is not stated categorically in either Conolly's or Pottinger's reports.

[9] Conolly, *Bamiyan to Merve*, 1840.

[10] *Ibid.*

being of "pure" (*sic*) Uzbek stock, was made wali and Mizrab Khan was forced, for the time being at least, to accept the inferior position of *na'ib* or deputy.[11]

'Abd al-Mu'min, however, reigned for only five or six months and his end was as violent as that of his predecessor's. Sometime in the middle of 1831 he was seized with, "a pain in the glands of his throat, and shortly died,"[12] leaving Mizrab Khan free to assume control of Maimana's affairs. The new wali's position, though, was far from secure. Mizrab Khan had already experienced the strength of local prejudice regarding his birth. The infant heir of 'Ali Yar Khan, along with several powerful relatives of Muhammad Rahim Khan, was still living in the *arg*. The manner of 'Abd al-Mu'min's death, furthermore, gave rise to widespread rumours that Mizrab Khan had done away with his half-brother. As accusations of foul play grew stronger, the new wali cunningly set out to divert suspicion away from himself whilst, at the same time, providing the necessary excuse to exterminate the only people who posed a threat to his succession.

A negro slave woman in the service of 'Ali Yar Khan's mother was put to the torture and, after being badly beaten and burnt, the unfortunate woman confessed to having administered poison to 'Abd al-Mu'min Khan in his tea, under orders from her mistress, "a woman of spirit and intrigue."[13] News of the slave's confession was relayed to the grief-stricken mother of 'Abd al-Mu'min Khan, who had returned to Maimana with her son.

What happened next became a matter of much dispute in the following years. According to sources close to Mizrab Khan, this woman, overcome with grief and rage, ordered Mizrab Khan's personal bodyguard to destroy 'Ali Yar's child, the baby's grandmother and other influential members of the Rahimid clan. In the ensuing blood bath all the senior members of Rahim Khan's family perished,[14] though exactly how many persons died at the hands of these janissaries is not known. Conolly, who gives the most detail of these events, states that, though the infant son of 'Ali Yar Khan was killed, his wife survived and was forced to marry Mizrab Khan. Eldred Pottinger's account of the same events contains details which appear to contradict Conolly. He claims that "on his [i.e. Mizrab Khan's]

[11] *Ibid.*
[12] *Ibid.*
[13] *Ibid.*
[14] *Ibid.*

accession, his first act was the murder of his predecessor's women and children; one child escaped to his grandfather, Zoolpikar (*sic*) Khan, of Sir-i-pool."[15] In other words, Pottinger would have us believe that, though some members of Rahim Khan's family were killed, one of the most important members of this clan, a son of 'Ali Yar Khan, survived. We know from Conolly that there was only one child of the former ruler alive in 1831, rather than the several implied by Pottinger, and though it is possible that this child could have survived the slaughter, it seems highly unlikely.

Pottinger's confusion of the boy who escaped to Sar-i Pul with the young child of 'Ali Yar Khan is understandable in the light of the complex relationships that existed between the amir of Sar-i Pul and two branches of the Mingid dynasty of Maimana. The problem is clarified by Conolly when, later in his account of Maimana, he lists the causes of the war between Mizrab Khan and Sar-i Pul that followed Mizrab Khan's accession. He gives three reasons for this conflict:

> First, the mother of the murdered infant was Zulficar Shere's *daughter;* next the Seripol chief's *sister* had been one of the *wives* of Mizzab (*sic*) Khan's father to whom she had borne a son named Soobhar (*sic*) Kouli Khan, now alive at Seripool. This boy was at Meiminna at the time of the last murders, when some of his servants, fearing that he also would be made away with, fled with him to Seripool.... A third, and for an Oosbeg more bitter, cause of quarrel, was this. On Allahyar (*sic*) Khan's death, Abdool Mohmid Khan took possession of all his wives, except one, who had been sent a little before to the house of her father the chief of Andkooee. Zulficar Shere bore the appropriation of his daughter by Abdool Mohmid Khan, as he was of pure Oosbeg race, but when, on the poisoning of the latter the half born brother took reversionary possession of the same lady, the old father's ire broke beyond bounds and he exerted ... his utmost hostility against Mizzab Khan.... [my emphasis].[16]

Conolly's report reveals that the fugitive Mingid heir who found refuge at Sar-i Pul was not the infant *son* of 'Ali Yar Khan at all, but rather a *half-brother* of Mizrab Khan. Pottinger's confusion is understandable, given the amount of inter-marriage there had been between relatives of Zu'l-Faqar Sher Khan and the Mingids of Maimana. The mother of 'Ali Yar Khan's only child was a daughter of Zu'l-Faqar Khan,[17] whilst the refugee prince who had fled to Sar-i Pul was the son of Zu'l-Faqar Khan's sister. To confuse matters even further, a

[15] Pottinger, *Memoir*, 1839.
[16] Conolly, *Bamiyan to Merve*, 1840.
[17] Burnes, *Herat*, 1838.

second sister of the ruler of Sar-i Pul had been married to Rahim Khan and was the mother of 'Ali Yar Khan (Appendix III, ii). Pottinger, knowing that Zu'l-Faqar Sher Khan had set up the "boy,"[18] Subhan Quli Khan, as pretender to the Maimana throne, not unnaturally assumed that he was the son of 'Ali Yar Khan when, in fact, he was Mizrab Khan's half-brother.

It is not surprising to see why Zu'l-Faqar Sher espoused the cause of Subhan Quli Khan, since Mizrab Khan was implicated in the murder of possibly two of the beglarbegi's sisters. To add insult to injury Mizrab Khan had appropriated to his harem the surviving wives and concubines of 'Ali Yar Khan and 'Abd al-Mu'min Khan, including 'Ali Yar Khan's chief wife, the daughter of Zu'l-Faqar Sher Khan.

Apart from the assassination of 'Ali Yar's infant heir and the grandmother and wife of Rahim Khan, a female relative of the Mir Wali of Khulm, who had married into the Rahimid line, also perished.[19] Mizrab's refusal to return these women to their fathers, all of whom were important dignitaries from the surrounding states, gave him some insurance against possible retaliation by these rulers though, in the case of the ruler of Sar-i Pul, it merely exacerbated the blood feud.

Later, Mizrab Khan tried to distance himself from any guilt in these murders, and told Conolly that his personal bodyguard[20] was "used without his knowledge and God, to whom he must render account of all, alone knows the truth."[21] However, Mizrab Khan had the strongest motive for doing away with both 'Abd al-Mu'min Khan and the family and heirs of Rahim Khan, nor is it likely that Mizrab's janissaries would have acted without their master's approval. We must, therefore, assume that Mizrab Khan instigated the poisoning of his half-brother and condoned, even if he did not order, the extermination of the Rahimid line.

A protracted war between Maimana and Sar-i Pul was the immediate outcomes of Mizrab Khan's seizure of power; a war which was to last until the death of Zu'l-Faqar Khan in 1840. Shortly after Mizrab's accession, an army from Sar-i Pul, possibly assisted by discontented

[18] Conolly, *Bamiyan to Merve*, 1840.

[19] Pottinger, *Memoir*, 1839.

[20] We do not know whether these janissaries were the same as 'Ali Yar Khan's personal guard which he had inherited from his father, Rahim Khan, or if Mizrab Khan had raised his own force, either in Maimana or during his period of exile in Mazar-i Sharif.

[21] Conolly, *Bamiyan to Merve*, 1840. This avowal indicates much greater doubt about the truth of what happened than Conolly's English translation suggests.

landowners in the eastern parts of Maimana, forced the new ruler of Maimana out of Gurziwan and the upper Shirin Tagab valley, marching to within six miles ("two fursukhs") of Mizrab's capital,[22] before the wali managed to push the attackers back east of Belcheragh possibly aided by the severe famine and typhus epidemic of 1833.[23] Mizrab Khan, however, was unable to regain control of the upper reaches of the Shirin Tagab, Gurziwan and Qurchi, which remained under Sar-i Pul until after Mizrab's death. The population of eastern Maimana also continued to cause trouble for Mizrab Khan throughout his reign.[24]

The invasion by the Beglarbegi of Sar-i Pul[25] was compounded by other external problems. Mizrab Khan had antagonised the ruler of Andkhui, 'Abd al-'Aziz Khan,[26] one of whose daughters had been married to 'Ali Yar Khan. This woman had escaped the sanguinary events of 1831 only by the accident of having been on a visit to her father in Andkhui. When news of the Maimana murders reached Andkhui, her father refused her permission to return. 'Abd al-'Aziz had never been on very good terms with the rulers of Maimana, despite the intermarriage between their families, and Mizrab Khan's bloody accession to the throne, followed as it was by a curt demand that 'Abd al-'Aziz return his daughter to Maimana, merely made matters worse. Like Zu'l-Faqar Sher Khan, 'Abd al-'Aziz continued to be hostile to Maimana right up to the time of his death, from unknown causes, in *c.* 1835 (Talboys Wheeler, 16),[27] when the new ruler of Andkhui, Shah Wali Khan, reversed the policy of his predecessor

[22] *Ibid.* Pottinger, *Memoir*, 1839. The Sar-i Pul army reached as far as "Kureh Shakhu" according to Conolly, but this place cannot be located. It may be Chashma-yi Safed, Qara Shaikhi or Darra-yi Shakh of Gurziwan, though this latter place is much more than two farsangs from Maimana.

[23] The typhus killed 8,000 persons in Herat city alone, and as many as 25,000 others in the surrounding districts died as a result of disease and starvation during 1833, *PWD*, 22 April-19 May 1833, SLEP:95, fol. 408.

[24] Burnes, *Herat*, 1838; Conolly, *Bamiyan to Merve*, 1840; Pottinger, *Memoir*, 1839.

[25] According to Pottinger, *Memoir*, 1839, Zu'l-Faqar Sher also annexed territory in Balkhab and subjugated Mullah Mu'min the Hazara amir of Zaranj ("Zarung").

[26] Conolly, *Bamiyan to Merve*, 1840.

[27] 'Abd al-'Aziz Khan was ruling when Stirling visited Maimana at the end of 1828 and since Conolly in 1840 implies that the hostility which arose between the (unnamed) ruler of Andkhui and Mizrab Khan was over the issue of a daughter of the then ruler of Andkhui, who was married to 'Ali Yar Khan, we deduce that 'Abd al-'Aziz was still alive in 1831 and was the individual in question whose daughter was the subject of the dispute. We know that by 1838 the ruler of Andkhui was Shah Wali Khan. In the absence of any more definitive date for the death of 'Abd al-'Aziz, I have given it as *c.* 1835; cf. Burnes, *Herat*, 1838; Pottinger, *Memoir*, 1839; *Royal Firman read in Public Mosque in Tehran*, Oct. 1838, in, *Political Dept. Papers, 1834-1839*, PSDL:A7, no. 39, fol. 90.

and re-established friendly relations with Maimana.[28] Mizrab Khan's coup also angered the ruler of Herat, Kamran Shah, who confiscated the hereditary *jagir* which had been given to Haji Bi Ming by Ahmad Shah Durrani, the income from which had supported the costs of frontier defences in Badghis and a government *mehman khana* in Maimana.[29]

Maimana's Administration and Ecoonomy Under Mizrab Khan

Internal challenges to Mizrab Khan's authority came from the traditional Uzbek landowners who, under the Chingizid system still operating in the amirid territories, held their land against the provision of military support to the wali (see below). Many of the *mingbashis*, *yuzbashis* and *onbashis* owed allegiance to 'Ali Yar Khan's family, for some of them had been given "proprietary rights" under this ruler.[30] In order to neutralise these powerful individuals, Mizrab Khan forced them, or their heirs, to live in the city of Maimana and forbad them to build any fortifications or observation towers in their villages. In some cases, the lands of those considered too influential were confiscated and distributed amongst Mizrab Khan's personal bodyguard, presumably as a reward for their part in the revolution, as well as to secure his interests in the outlying areas.[31] It may be that the four provincial governors of Maimana mentioned by Pottinger were also senior commanders of this band of ghulams.[32] The number of Mizrab Khan's household guard was increased to three thousand, of whom a thousand were resident in the *arg* at any one time to provide a quick response to any uprising within the city.[33] The reorganisation of the political and military structure of the Khanate ensured that any unrest was nipped in the bud and must have been one of the main reasons why Mizrab Khan managed to keep control of the reins of power

[28] Conolly, *Bamiyan to Merve*, 1840; Burnes, *Herat*, 1838; Pottinger, *Memoir*, 1839. In the printed version of Pottinger's report [PSDL:G10] the ruler of "Andkoee" is mistakenly referred to as Afghan.

[29] Conolly, *Bamiyan to Merve*, 1840.

[30] *Ibid.* Pottinger, *Memoir*, 1839.

[31] Pottinger, *Memoir*, 1839.

[32] *Ibid.*

[33] *Ibid.* Conolly, *Bamiyan to Merve*, 1839 says there were only 1,000 *ghulams* and I have assumed that this figure refers only to those soldiers actually resident at any one time in the *arg*. Pottinger implies that some of the personal guard were stationed outside the capital in order to better hold down the countryside and support Mizrab Khan's commanders, who were also drawn from their ranks.

despite considerable internal and external opposition. Pottinger's cynical and uncomplimentary assessment of Mizrab Khan as "dull, inactive, cowardly and time-serving"[34] can, therefore, be dismissed as baseless prejudice. Rather, what we know of Mizrab Khan indicates that, though he was ruthless, he showed considerable military, political and administrative acumen.

Mizrab Khan's abilities showed themselves in other ways. He encouraged trade with the surrounding states and during his reign there was a marked upturn in the region's prosperity which gave a further fillip to a drift towards a sedentary lifestyle (Merk, 265; C. E. Yate 1888, 337). The trend towards the urbanisation of the settlement of Maimana was thus accelerated, with a considerable increase in the number of shops and permanent houses located within the city walls. Another sign of Maimana's prosperity was the commissioning, by Mizrab Khan, of a large and imposing burnt brick madrasa and mosque in the eastern part of the city, which was completed in 1251/1835-6[35] and today still bears his name (Plate VI).

In keeping with the custom current amongst Uzbek rulers on both sides of the Amu Darya, Mizrab Khan did not keep "regular accounts"[36] and both Pottinger and Conolly found it difficult to assess the amount of revenue Maimana realised from its various commercial, agricultural and personal taxes and duties. In accordance with the Chingizid pattern, Mizrab Khan employed a diwanbegi, who provided the wali with an income equivalent to eighty thousand Kabuli rupees (ten thousand Bukharan tilas) per annum for his expenses.[37] In return, the diwanbegi was allowed to raise as much revenue as he could from the various taxable activities of the population of Maimana which, in 1840, amounted to one and a half lakh rupees.[38] Both Pottinger and

[34] *Ibid.* Conolly, *Bamiyan to Merve*, 1840, gives a far more complimentary picture of Mizrab Khan.

[35] According to the *abjad*, or numerical value, of the Persian word *ghamyar* (1000 + 40 + 10 + 1 + 200 = 1251/1835-6, 'Abd al-Ra'uf Nafir, *personal communication*, 1988.

[36] Conolly, *Bamiyan to Merve*, 1840.

[37] Pottinger, *Memoir*, 1839 says "about half a lac," or 50,000 rupees. Lord, in 1838, gives the following exchange rates in Qunduz with their English equivalents:

1 *tila* = 4½ - 5 Indian rupees (9/-)
5 *tangas* = 1 Indian silver rupee (2/-)
8-9 *pice* = 1 silver *janga* (4¾d.)
1 pice = 2 farthings
1 Kabuli rupee = 26 *pul*

The Kabuli rupee was one eighth alloy and exchanged with the Indian rupee at a rate of 15:9, Dr. P. B. Lord, *Report on the Bazaar of Koondooz*, etc., 1838, ESL:130, fols. 494-514.

[38] Pottinger, *Memoir*, 1839.

Conolly believed this income could be manifoldly increased "if anything like system were introduced."[39]

The burden of taxation was mainly placed on "resident strangers and people of the town"[40] but a land tax was also demanded from certain landlords. Pottinger gives the following breakdown of Maimana's revenue and taxation which he acquired during his visit in 1839:[41]

Land:	"A tithe", which in Stirling's day (1828) was either $\frac{1}{40}$ or ¼ depending on the individual's status.
Livestock:	2% on sale of cattle and sheep; $\frac{3}{22}$ of a tila on sales of horses and camels.[42]
Gardens:	(i.e. *bagh,* orchards/vineyards), 1 tila, or 7 Kabuli rupees, each.
Houses:	½ tila [3½ rupees] per unit.
Shops:	6 tilas [42 rupees] per unit.
Merchandise:	2%
Transit dues:	$\frac{3}{11}$ tila per camel load of iron (from Bukhara); $\frac{5}{22}$ tila on other goods.
Minerals:	A government monopoly operated on the mining of sulphur, alum and saltpetre ("nitre"), the raw materials for the manufacture of gunpowder.
Personal:	Turban tax; cloak tax; religious capitation tax, or *jiziya,* on non- Muslims (Hindus and Jews).

The high taxation on shops in Maimana is some indication of how profitable the caravan trade had become to Maimana. Mizrab Khan also taxed the nomadic Arab community of Maimana, taking three tilas per annum in lieu of land rent, in return for which they had the right to graze their cattle and sheep within his territory.[43]

About one quarter of Maimana's agricultural land was irrigated (*abi*), the rest being dry land (*lalmi*). The yields from *abi* and *lalmi* lands were considerable; some 22,600 *kharwar*s, or nearly six thousand tonnes of grain.[44] More than three hundred and sixty

[39] *Ibid.* Conolly, *Bamiyan to Merve*, 1840.

[40] Pottinger, *Memoir*, 1839.

[41] *Ibid.*

[42] Conolly met the diwanbegi's tax collectors in Hashtomin in late autumn 1840, where they were collecting a tax of one sheep in forty for the wali. This was presumably the annual collection of livestock due to Mizrab Khan, rather than a tax on individual sales.

[43] Conolly, *Bamiyan to Merve*, 1840.

[44] *Ibid.* A *kharwar* is a variable weight (Appendix II, i). Though the modern Kabuli kharwar is equivalent to 80 *ser* or 1,248 lbs (566 kg) (Glassman, *Appendix* XII), in the last century it was somewhat lighter, around 560 lbs (254 kg). 22,600 kharwars thus equals 5,740,400 kg. The yield from *abi* land was 5,400 kharwars (1,371,600 kg); from *lalmi*, 17,200 kharwars (4,368,800 kg). Lord, reporting in 1838 on the bazaar of Qunduz (Lord, *Report on the Bazaar of Koondooz*, 1838) gives the following values for weights in use at this period:

1 *mann* = 8 *ser* Kabul (115 lbs 3oz.)
1 *ser* = 4 "chawk" (*chaharak?*) (14 lbs 6 oz.)
1 "chawk" = 4 *pau* (3 lbs 9 oz.)
1 *pau* = 2 *khurd* (14 oz.)
1 *khurd* = 10 *toli* (7 oz.)

villages, each with one or more ploughs, lay within the boundaries of Maimana; each plough's crops being estimated at some fifteen kharwars, or nearly four tonnes.[45] This figure reflects the great fertility of the *chul* of the Maimana area and the abundance of perennial water that flows off the Turkistan mountains.

Additional revenue accrued to Maimana through the sale and barter of slaves, but neither Conolly nor Pottinger, who were both appalled at this trade in human flesh, could bring themselves to quantify the amount of revenue this form of commerce brought to Maimana or the other states of Lesser Turkistan. Conolly, however, informs us that slaves were a standard unit of barter. Towards the latter part of Mizrab Khan's reign, Herat had glutted this market, since Wazir Yar Muhammad Khan had been selling large numbers of captive Hazaras and Herati Shi'is to the rulers of the Chahar Wilayat. Slaves were valued according to their ethnic origin. In 1840, Hazaras fetched only moderate prices, whilst young men and women from "Kaum" (Qa'en?), Birjand, or of Qizilbash origin, fetched the best prices.[46]

Estimates for the population of Maimana during Mizrab Khan's reign vary considerably. Burnes, who never visited the Chahar Wilayat, reported that the town of Maimana consisted of "about five hundred houses, but the strength of the chief consists in his 'ils', or moving population."[47] Stirling, writing ten years earlier than Burnes, estimated the population of the whole area at between ten and fifteen thousand "souls" (Stirling 1991, 286), whilst Ferrier, who was in Maimana just after Mizrab Khan's death, claims that the Khanate's population was fifteen to eighteen thousand families (Ferrier 1857, 197). It may be that Stirling's figure is actually the number of households, rather than individuals. Between 1837 and 1840 Maimana became a haven for tens of thousands of refugees from Herat and Balkh (Harlan 1939, 27-9).

[45] *Ibid.* On his earlier travels through Persia and Afghanistan, Conolly wrote the following in respect of Herat's land usage which has relevance to Maimana at this period. "The produce is calculated from the number of ploughs that are rated against the villages of each district, for every plough is averaged to turn up land for three kharwars of seed. The soil of Heraut returns at a medium calculation, tenfold, and at this rate produce is estimated" (Conolly 1834, ii, 6).

[46] Conolly, *Bamiyan to Merve*, 1840.

[47] Burnes, *Herat*, 1838.

Population, Army & Revenues of the Chahar Wilayat, 1828-1845

MAIMANA

source	*ghulams*	*cavalry*	*foot*	*others*	*total*	*population*	*revenue*[48]
Stirling[49]	500	2-4,000	8,000	12,500	na	10-15,000*	na
Burnes	na	na	na	na	6,000	500*#	na
Pottinger	na	3,000	10,000	25,000	na	38-50,000	na
Conolly	na	1,000	10,000[50]	4,000	na	15-150,000	na
Ferrier	1,000[51]	1,500	8-10,000	12,500	na	15-18,000*	£20,000

ANDKHUI[52]

source	*standing army*	*total force*	*population*
Stirling	na	4-5,000	8-12,000
Burnes	500 horse	na	na
Pottinger	400, no reserves	na	over 100,000
Ferrier	2,400[53]	7,200	15,000

SAR-I PUL

source	*standing army*	*total force*	*population*
Stirling	na	na	10,000 #
Burnes	1,000 horse	na	na
Pottinger	3,000 militia	50,000	na
Ferrier	4,000[54]	12,000	70,000[55]

SHIBARGHAN

source	*standing army*	*total force*	*population*
Stirling	na	2,000 horse	na
Burnes	5-600 horse	na	na
Pottinger	600 militia	na	over 55,000
Ferrier	2,500[56]	6,000	12,000#

* = families or households
+ = minimum figure
# = population of capital alone
na = not available in source

The organisation of the armies of the Chahar Wilayat was on similar lines to that of other Uzbek and Turkman states. In 1838/9 'General' Harlan gives the following account of the way in which these rulers organised and raised their militias:

[48] Revenue estimates are in Kabuli rupees, unless otherwise indicated.
[49] Sources are listed from earliest to latest and cover the period 1828 to 1845.
[50] The printed version of Conolly's report at V:27/69/3 gives the figure of only 1,000 but in the original copy in ESL:156, the figure is 10,000, "a tenth of whom are slaves."
[51] Listed as "foot" but this probably refers to the *ghulams* stationed in and around the *arg*.
[52] Conolly gives no figures for the rest of the Chahar Wilayat and his name has been omitted from the columns.
[53] 1,800 horse, 600 foot.
[54] 2,000 cavalry, 2000 infantry.
[55] 18,000 persons in the town and not more than four times this figure in the whole Khanate.
[56] 2,000 horse, 500 foot.

> Every man who is a landholder is liable to be called upon for the performance of military duty. This service is the tenure by which he is enfiefed of his lands.... When a foray is intended, the chief causes proclamation to be made on a public market day, in some conspicuous part of the town, to the effect that at a specified period their attendance is expected at the capital for service. The time of service is certified, which seldom exceeds fifteen days. The people are punctual in meeting at the appointed time; they proceed upon the expedition martialled under their respective village leaders and on the day their time of service expires everyone scampers off and returns to his native village without the ceremony of leave-taking or dismissal. It sometimes happens, when unlooked for obstacles retard their operations, that the chief is obliged to leave unfinished an important enterprise and hurry away with his dispersing forces to the shelter of his stronghold.... Grants of lands [are] made to prominent individuals in Jaghire, or upon plan of Knight's Tenure, in return for which the recipient binds himself to serve his superior at all times when called upon, and engages to attend upon his chief with a specified number of followers, well mounted and accoutred for actual service. He is supposed to be always able to obey a summons on a sudden notification (Harlan 1939, 60-1).

The Family of Mizrab Khan Ming

Mizrab Khan was in his early thirties when he began to reign in Maimana[57] probably in the second half of 1831. Sometime before he took control of affairs in Maimana, Mizrab Khan had given his daughter in marriage to Rustam Khan of Shibarghan. Mizrab's accession as Wali of Maimana thus increased the prestige and influence of Rustam Khan in the region, for although later in the century Shibarghan was to become the most important principality of the Chahar Wilayat next to Maimana, at this period it was probably the smallest and least important of the 'Four Provinces' (Ferrier 1857, 202).[58] Throughout his reign, Mir Rustam Khan, "proud of the accession to power by this connection" (Ferrier 1857, 202) proved to be Maimana's staunchest ally. The hakim's personal bravery, and the peace, justice and prosperity which he brought to his country, made him both a popular ruler and a "formidable opponent" (Ferrier 1857, 202). When Maimana and Shibarghan acted together, as they frequently did, few amirs between the Amu Darya and the Hindu Kush could risk challenging their combined power.[59] It was this alliance which prevented Zu'l-Faqar Sher Khan of Sar-i Pul from making any headway against Mizrab Khan,

[57] Burnes, *Herat*, 1838, who says Mizrab Khan was "about forty" in 1838.
[58] See also, Pottinger, *Memoir*, 1839.
[59] *Ibid.* Burnes, *Herat*, 1838; Conolly, *Bamiyan to Merve*, 1840.

since he was constantly threatened at his rear by the armies of Shibarghan. Rustam Khan also maintained a bitter feud with Andkhui's rulers, which seems to have continued well after 'Abd al-'Aziz Khan had passed away. In this he was doubtless encouraged by his father-in-law.

Despite the assassination of his half-brother, Mizrab Khan retained the loyalty and services of at least two of his (full?) brothers, 'Abd al-Muhammad and a younger brother, 'Abd'l-Nazr.[60] Mizrab Khan's eldest son, and the future ruler of Maimana, was Hukumat Khan,[61] who was already "grown up" in 1838.[62] His second son, Sher Muhammad, was a half-brother to Hukumat Khan (Ferrier 1857, 197ff.).[63] His other sons are given variously as Shadman Khan (Campbell, 265)[64] and another half-brother of Hukumat Khan, Husain Khan (Merk, 263).[65] A full sister of Husain Khan was subsequently married to Khan Agha, who later became chief of the Jamshidis (Maitland 1891, 63).

British India and 'Afghanistan' Policy, 1830-1838

Information about domestic events in Balkh and Maimana during the early years of Mizrab Khan's reign is very scant. The first few years of the 1830s, however, were important for the Chahar Wilayat inasmuch as they marked the beginning of an important shift in Britain's Central Asian policy, which was to be the foundation of 'The Great Game'; the competition between Britain and Russia for political control of Central Asia. Britain, in particular, was destined to become embroiled in the affairs of the territory increasingly referred to as 'Afghanistan', an intervention that eventually led to the partition of tribal and cultural groups such as the Pushtuns, Baluchis, Tadjiks, Uzbeks and Turkmans, by arbitrary boundaries which had more to do with Britain's obsession with the defence of India against Russian invasion than the historical alignments of the indigenous peoples.[66]

[60] 'Abd al-Muhammad Khan acted as Conolly's *mehmandar* during his visit in 1840; 'Abd'l-Nazr(?) Khan was sent to Herat to make arrangements for Mizrab's token submission to Kamran in the summer of the same year, Conolly, *Bamiyan to Merve*, 1840; *Todd to Macnaughten*, 4 Sept. 1840, ESL:153, encl. 124, no. 47.

[61] Conolly, *Bamiyan to Merve*, 1840.

[62] Pottinger, *Memoir*, 1839.

[63] *Ibid.*

[64] Campbell's travels, however, are mostly fiction, and no reliance can be placed on this claim.

[65] Vambery 1863, 249 says he was the son of Hukumat Khan.

[66] See Yapp 1962, 521, 523 who rightly observes that Dost Muhammad Khan had little, if any, concept of 'Afghanistan' in the modern, national sense, during the First Anglo-Afghan War. Instead he appealed to different religious, tribal and ethnic feelings in order to muster opposition against the British invaders in both Balkh and the Afghan-dominated south.

The First Anglo-Afghan War (1839-1842) is probably the most written-about period of Afghanistan's history (e.g. Dupree 1978; Fraser-Tytler 1967; Norris 1967; Yapp 1980, *et al.*) and it is not the intention of this work to go over ground already covered by other scholars. Rather, it is an attempt to examine how and why, in the course of this short, but bloody, campaign, Britain came to regard the Balkh appanage as an integral part of Afghan dominions and developed an almost irrational prejudice against the indigenous rulers of Turkistan, the Manghit dynasty of Bukhara, and Uzbeks and Turkmans in general, prejudices which were to condition all future policy in the region. This is an aspect of British policy which western scholars have, by and large, ignored, and accounts of The First Anglo-Afghan War have concentrated, almost exclusively, on developments in the south.[67]

As a consequence of the occupation of what is now southern Afghanistan and the presence of military observers in Herat, British officers had unprecedented opportunities to survey parts of Afghanistan and Balkh which, by 1838, still remained largely unexplored. Numerous confidential reports were submitted to the Government in India and were subsequently published in highly censored versions. These formed a corpus of information about Afghanistan and the countries north of the Hindu Kush, which became the bedrock of all future British histories of the region. Most, if not all, of these officers unashamedly believed that the Amu Darya was the 'natural' line of defence for India. Many of them advocated annexation of the province and the garrisoning of Balkh with British troops. Their official reports must thus be treated with considerable care, since this, and other, colonial imperatives are reflected in them. Indeed, in their eagerness to support their particular outlook on Central Asia, many officers resorted to the used of arbitrary, dubious, and even, on occasions, fictitious historical precedent, conveniently provided by individuals such as Yar Muhammad Khan of Herat or the Mir Wali of Khulm, who had their own axes to grind north of the Hindu Kush. By adeptly exploiting these officers' prejudices these individuals hoped that they would be able to increase their power and territory in the region with the connivance and support of the foreigner.

[67] See Yapp 1962, who is the exception.

British officials generally took as their starting point for their claim that the Afghan frontier included the appanage of Balkh, either Nadir Shah's conquest of Balkh or his treaty with Abu'l-Faiz Khan. This in itself is quite extraordinary since Nadir Shah was a Persian invader and in no way connected to the Durrani Amirate which rose out of the ashes of his empire. On other occasions, the argument advanced is that at the time of Ahmad Shah Durrani's accession to the 'throne' in 1747, Balkh and Lesser Turkistan were as much a part of the Afghan realm as Qandahar. As we have already seen (Chapter 3), these claims do not stand up to close scrutiny, which explains why, on occasions, British political officers were wont to move the goal posts to suit their own convenience. There was never any close enquiry made about the situation prior to Nadir Shah's invasion of Balkh, nor any attempt to investigate the exact relationship that existed between Ahmad Shah Durrani and Haji Bi Ming, or the other amirid rulers of the appanage.

Such enquiry, of course, was not necessary, since the further one dug into the history of the region, the more awkward and embarrassing questions about the legality of British policy and the Durrani claims to sovereignty over Balkh became. All that was required was a sufficient number of pseudo-historical precedents to justify publicly a policy which was never intended to be based on scholarly research, but which was motivated by and large by imperial self-interest.

The arbitrariness, even cynicism, which marked British frontier policy in Afghanistan reveals itself starkly when one examines the British attitude towards the Afghan claims to Peshawar and the North-West Frontier Provinces, territory which every knowledgable British official knew had been very much a part of Ahmad Shah Durrani's dominions in a way that Balkh never was. Yet despite the Afghan government's strong claim to sovereignty over the territories between the Khyber and the Indus, Britain refused to countenance any suggestion that Peshawar be handed back to the Amirs and later, after the defeat of the Sikhs, Peshawar and the whole of the Punjab was arbitrarily annexed to British India without the slightest reference to the rights of the ruler of Kabul. Indeed, at the time of the First Anglo-Afghan War, Britain took the opportunity to help itself to Kalat, a region whose rulers had long been clients of the Afghan Amirs (Yapp 1980, 264-6).

Until the early 1830s, Britain had, by and large, remained "indifferent" (Yapp 1980, 201) to the Afghans and the struggle between Barakzai and Sadozai sardars which had resulted, by 1830, in Kabul,

Qandahar and Herat being governed by separate rulers. Occasionally, as during the reign of Timur Shah [1772-1793], concern had been expressed by the British authorities in India about possible invasions of the Punjab by the Afghans and a few years later, in the first decade of the nineteenth century, there was some fear that Napoleon would try to emulate Alexander the Great and march an army through Persia to the Indus. This latter threat had resulted in the first official British mission to the Afghan Court of Shah Shuja' al-Mulk, led by Mountstuart Elphinstone. The only long-term benefit this visit produced, however, was the first systematic account of Afghan history and culture to be published by a European (Elphinstone 1972).

In 1831 Arthur Conolly travelled overland through Persia and Afghanistan to India. In association with Charles Trevelyan, Conolly wrote an official report for the East India Company on his travels,[68] in which he challenged the prevailing assumptions of what Yapp terms the "Malcolm School" (Yapp 1980, 208),[69] which saw Persia as the sole bulwark against any possible invasion of India from Britain's latest foe, Tsarist Russia. 'Afghanistan', rather than Persia, Conolly argued, was the most strategic country of Central Asia and only a strong, united Afghan kingdom, allied, of course, to Britain, could protect India's North-West Frontier (Yapp 1980, 208ff.).[70] Though the then Governor-General of Bengal, Lord Bentinck, rejected any direct British involvement in Afghanistan, implicit in Conolly's recommendations, he did endorse a proposal that further information about Turkistan and Afghanistan should be obtained. Alexander Burnes, who had already distinguished himself by his exploration of the Indus in 1831, was chosen and sent to Kabul, from whence he crossed the Hindu Kush to Balkh and Bukhara.

Far from being a pioneer exploration of Central Asia, Alexander Burnes' journey to Bukhara during 1832 covered little new ground geographically, the real pioneers being Moorcroft, Stirling and Masson, in the previous decade. Burnes, for example, never visted Maimana, Andkhui or Sar-i Pul whilst Moorcroft had already pioneered the route to Bukhara some years earlier, though at the time of Burnes' travels, he had yet to receive any public recognition for many years of tireless travel and exploration in Central Asia. Burnes, on the

[68] Lt. Arthur Conolly & C. E. Trevelyan, *Papers on the Trade of Afghanistan and the Country between the Indus and the Caspian*, 1831, MEIR:59.

[69] Named after Sir John Malcolm (1769-1833), British Ambassador to Persia [1799-1801, 1807-1810] and Governor of Bombay [1827-1830].

[70] *Ibid.*

contrary, became an instant celebrity. Fêted and honoured as 'Bukhara Burnes' by London society and awarded the Royal Geographical Society's gold medal, he was able to make his opinions on the Central Asian question known at the very highest levels of government, both in England and Calcutta, where they received a great deal more attention, and were regarded with much greater respect, than they deserved.[71]

In a series of secret reports submitted to the Government,[72] Burnes expanded on the radical views of Arthur Conolly, arguing that Khiva, Herat and the Oxus were the strategic pivots for the defence of India and had to be protected, at all costs, from Russian domination. To accomplish this, Burnes advocated an alliance with Dost Muhammad Khan of Kabul, rather than the Shah of Persia—whose relations with Britain were already in terminal decline. Afghanistan, he argued, should become the new, and sole, Central Asian buffer between Russia and India. Burnes thus advocated a much deeper involvement in Afghanistan's affairs than Britain, to that point, had ever contemplated. British indifference to Afghan politics should be replaced by a policy of indirect and, if necessary, direct interference, in order to maintain its strategic interests. Provided that Dost Muhammad Khan[73] was prepared to support these aims, all would be well for him, but

[71] At least one dissenting voice was raised amongst all the Burnes hysteria. Major D'Arcy Todd (1808-1845), a Royal Engineer who later served in Herat during the first Anglo-Afghan War, was attached to the British Embassy in Persia and was asked to critique Burnes' military intelligence on Afghanistan. Having read the material, Todd wrote a scathing indictment of Burnes' report. The information, argued Todd, lacked any proper technical precision. It contained sweeping generalisations about the passability, width and all-weather status of routes for a modern European army encumbered with artillery and the report's conclusions were muddled, unjustified and unjustifiable. He even accused Burnes of plagiarizing older, out-of-date reports (Moorcroft? Stirling?), without due acknowledgment and presenting his 'findings' to Government as if they were the results of his own research and route surveys. As well as Burnes' incompetence as a surveyor, Todd maintained he was naïve to the point of being ridiculous when he claimed that a British army would have little difficulty in subduing Afghanistan. "It does not appear to me," Todd wrote, "that the country ... would submit without a struggle to the power of strangers, infidels and invaders." A member of the Secret Committee, having read Todd's Observations, wrote in pencil on the back of the memorandum (fol. 465): "These observations [i.e. by Todd] give rise to a very painful suspicion that Lt. Burnes has been much over-rated as an accurate narrator," Todd, *Observations on the Military Memoir of Cpt. Burnes on Afghanistan*, 2 July 1837, SLEP:102, fols. 420-63. Charles Masson, the explorer and British news writer in Kabul, was another who took a profound dislike to Burnes (see Dupree 1978, 383; Yapp 1980, 191).

[72] Burnes, *Report on the Countries between India and Russia*, 1838, 4 vols, MEIR:78-82, also see vol. 91.

[73] Burnes believed that Britain should abandon the Sadozai line, represented by the exiled Shah Shuja' al- Mulk, and recognise Dost Muhammad Khan, who was from the rival, Barakzai, clan.

were he to prove unco-operative, or if Russian influence were to spread to the Amu Darya or Afghanistan, some form of direct intervention would, by implication, be required to protect British interests. This more aggressive and interventionist approach was to lead, in the short-term, to the disaster of the first Anglo-Afghan War and, ironically, to Burnes' own untimely death (Yapp 1980, 125, 208-9; Dupree 1978, 370; Fraser-Tytler, Chapters V-VI).

Burnes recommended that a British Commercial Agency should be established in Kabul to stimulate trade between India and Turkistan and "check intrigues and satisfy both Afghans and Uzbeks that the vaunts of Russia are unmeaning and empty" (quoted from, Yapp 1980, 211). In 1837 Burnes returned to Kabul, not this time as a private traveller, but in an official capacity to discuss a commercial treaty. The negotiations, however, quickly became dominated by political, rather than commercial, matters, precipitated in part, by the Persian siege of Herat and the submission of Maimana to 'Ali Yar Khan, Asaf al-Daula, the governor of Khurasan (Yapp 1980, 216ff.; Dupree 1987, 368).[74]

Balkh and the Persian Siege of Herat, 1837-1838

Maimana and the Chahar Wilayat were drawn into the 'Great Game' not by events in Kabul, but as a result of the long-standing struggle between the Persians and Afghans for control of Herat. Herat, as we have seen, had been the strategic fortress on the eastern frontier of the Safawid empire, and its first line of defence against any Uzbek invasion of Khurasan. The governorship of Herat had eventually passed into the hands of the Abdalis, who initially ruled the region as subjects of Persia, but in the early part of the eighteenth century, had declared their independence. Despite the overthrow of the Safawid empire, the Qajar dynasty, which finally succeeded to the purple after the death of Nadir Shah, did not abandon Persia's claim to sovereignty over Herat and by 1838 several unsuccessful attempts had been made by the Qajars to recapture the region from the Afghans. In 1833 'Abbas Mirza sent his son, Muhammad Mirza, to attack the city, but the death of the Shah, in October of the same year, obliged the

[74] Though he was sent to negotiate a commercial treaty, Burnes interpreted his brief as being essentially political. Consequently his discussions with the Amir of Kabul had little to do with trade. Unfortunately, Burnes was not the ideal man for such a delicate task and his political judgment was frequently clouded by his own arrogance, ambition and political immaturity.

Persian prince to lift the siege. However, Muhammad Mirza vowed that, once he had secured the throne of Persia, he would return and avenge himself on the city that had the timerity to resist his army (Champagne, 116).

In July 1837 the Persian monarch, defying British protests, returned at the head of a large army to fulfil his sanguinary promise.[75] Apart from a desire to avenge his wounded honour, Muhammad Shah saw the conquest of Herat as the first step in fulfilling an ambitious plan to extend Persia's influence up to the Amu Darya[76] and to deal out retribution to the slave-trading amirs of Badghis, Turkistan and Khwarazm, who had turned much of the Persian province of Khurasan into wasteland. Sir John MacNeill, the British ambassador at Tehran, even claimed that the Persians planned to combine with the Russians and march on Khiva.[77]

Kamran Shah, the Sadozai ruler of Herat and Yar Muhammad Khan, his wazir, had little hope of holding on to Herat by their own efforts. Both were deeply unpopular and the population, terrorised by the inhumanity of their overlords and dispirited by the economic decline that had impoverished the city (Gregorian, 53),[78] were hardly likely to put up much of a fight. The internal repressions in Herat and the threat of invasion, had precipitated the flight of some ten thousand Aimaq families across the Murghab into Maimana territory, though they were treated no better there, for Mizrab Khan, apparently, sold many of them into slavery.[79] Nor were Herat's crumbling fortifications in any state to withstand a serious assault and they were inadequately defended, the Herat army consisting of a few thousand badly-equipped soldiers. Furthermore, not only had Herat to deal with the Persians, but the independent Barakzai sardars of Qandahar had a long-standing feud with Kamran Shah over Sistan and were secretly encouraging the Persian attack for their own ends.[80] So hopeless was the situation that, even before a shot had been fired, or the Persian army reached Herat, Kamran Shah was planning to "bolt."[81] His flight

[75] For the political background to the siege of Herat, see Yapp 1980, chap. 4; Champagne 1981.

[76] *Leech to Burnes*, 5 Feb. 1838, ESL:130, fols. 139-41.

[77] *McNeill to Palmerston*, 30 Oct. 1837, SLEP:104, fols. 59, 62.

[78] See, Todd, *Report on Results of Observations and Enquiries upon the State of Herat*, 2 Oct. 1839, ESL:144, encl. 11 (Secret & Confidential), fols. 420-65 (fol. 4 of report).

[79] *Todd to Macnaughten*, 26 Feb. 1840.

[80] *Kohun Dil Khan, Chief of Candahar, to Asef ul-Dawleh, Governor of Khorasan*, n.d. 1837, SLEP:103, fols. 63-5.

[81] *McNeill to Palmerston*, 7 Dec. 1837, SLEP:104, fols. 316-7.

was only prevented when the Sunni Hazara amir, Sher Muhammad Khan of Qal'a-yi Nau, vowed to fight to the death for Kamran and promised the Sadozai leader sanctuary amongst his tribe in the event of the city falling into Persian hands.[82]

Sher Muhammad Khan Hazara was the most loyal and important source of support available to Kamran Shah. For many years he had underpinned the Sadozai governorship of Herat and prevented Wazir Yar Muhammad Khan overthrowing Kamran and assuming the purple himself. As a reward for his services, he had been given the title of *Nizam al-Daula* by Kamran (Maitland 1891, 94-5).[83] Prior to the Persian invasion in 1833, Sher Muhammad Khan had organised a confederacy of Aimaq, Uzbek and Turkman tribes which, united under the banner of Sunni Islam, bound themselves to the defence of Herat against the Shi'is.[84] Not only so, but Sher Muhammad had been instrumental in persuading Mizrab Khan of Maimana to overcome his suspicion of Yar Muhammad and join the *jihad*. To confirm this agreement, the wali had sent a gift of horses to Herat and received a robe of honour (*khalat*) in return, unaware that this customary exchange of presents would be used a few years later to support Herat's claim for sovereignty over the Chahar Wilayat.[85] Faced with a renewed Persian assault on Herat, Sher Muhammad Khan, aided by the son of Shah Kamran, Prince Nadir Mirza, once more exerted his considerable diplomatic abilities and revived the tribal confederacy under his leadership and that of Mizrab Khan of Maimana and 'Abd al-Rahman Turkman (Katib i, 132). Before Muhammad Shah had marched his army to Herat, some ten to twelve thousand horsemen, drawn from the Sunni Hazaras, the tribes of the Chahar Aimaq and the Chahar Wilayat, had assembled around Qal'a-yi Nau and were threatening to attack the Persian flanks as they marched east (Katib i, 132).

In order to counteract this threat, Muhammad Shah ordered twelve thousand of his best soldiers with nine guns to march from Turbat-i Shaikh Jam to Qara Tepa[86] under the leadership of Yar Muhammad Khan, Asaf al-Daula, governor of Khurasan (Katib i, 132).[87] In

[82] *Ibid.*

[83] Burnes, *Herat*, 1838.

[84] *Ibid.*; *PWD*, 29 July-29 Sept. 1833, SLEP:95, fol. 769.

[85] Burnes, *Herat*, 1838; Conolly, *Bamiyan to Merve*, 1840; Pottinger, *Memoir*, 1839; Maj. R. L. Taylor, *Memorandum on Meimeneh*, 1 Feb. 1858, ESL:253, fols. 865-71.

[86] They marched via Karez, Kuhsan and Qush Rabat.

[87] I have followed Katib's, *Siraj al-Tawarikh*, which gives a detailed account of the Persian

November, Sher Muhammad Khan went in person to Herat to strengthen Kamran's resolve and renew his pledge to fight to the death even though, by this time, the Asaf al-Daula was already marching on Sher Muhammad's capital of Qal'a-yi Nau. By the middle of that month, the governor of Khurasan had seized Qara Tepa and the inhabitants of the area fled, leaving Muhammad Zaman Jamshidi at Kushk with just six thousand men to oppose the Persian advance (Katib i, 132-3). After some desperate fighting, the Jamshidis were scattered, losing two to three hundred men killed and as many again taken prisoner. After a halt of three days, the Asaf al-Daula's force marched into Qal'a-yi Nau. Cash and property to the value of half a million tumans, presumably the contents of Sher Muhammad's treasury, also fell into his hands; a welcome acquisition for an army perpetually short of money (Katib i, 133).[88]

Following the Jamshidis defeat, Sher Muhammad Hazara decided not to risk defending his capital, thus tying up the bulk of his forces in the citadel. Instead, he ordered his men to move "far out of reach of Asif ul-Dauleh in the Dasht-i-Tahaboy,"[89] the high limestone tableland of the Nakhjaristan plateau which was bisected by hundreds of precipitous, serpentine river valleys and made up part of the Murghab watershed around Chaman-i Bed, Sur Ghul and Darra-yi Bum. By this time the confederate army at Marichaq had swollen to fifteen thousand men, composed of elements from the Aimaq, Uzbek and Turkman rulers of Badghis, Ghor, Murghab, Panjdeh, Maimana, the Chahar Wilayat, Khiva, Bukhara and Urganj, with Mizrab Khan of Maimana as Commander-in-Chief. Whilst the Asaf al-Daula pondered his next move, the Sunni confederates decided to split their forces, half being sent against the main siege army at Herat whilst the rest tried to tie the Persian invaders down in the mountains, thus

campaign in Badghis and Maimana. For British sources, see: *Stoddard to McNeill*, 29 Oct., 10 Dec. 1837; *McNeill to Palmerston*, 27 Nov. 1837, SLEP:104, fols. 231ff., 316-317, 428. *Pottinger to Macnaughten*, 25 May 1838, ESL:141, encl. 33, no. 3, says there were less than 10,000 Persians sent to Badghis; Lord estimates their numbers as thirteen thousand, with eight guns, but claimed these figures were exaggerated, *Lord to Burnes*, 27 Dec. 1837, ESL:134, encl. 4 [red], no. 34. *Leech to Burnes*, 5 Feb. 1838, gives the figure of 20,000 men with 11 guns.

[88] *Stoddard to McNeill*, 10 Dec. 1837; *Journal of Mirza Agha*, 21 Nov. 1837, SLEP:105, fol. 193. British reports of the Persian operations in Badghis and the Murghab are confused and Katib does not give any date for the fall of Qal'a-yi Nau. However, Stoddard implies that Qal'a-yi Nau fell before 10 December. Mirza Agha's report probably relates to the battle with the Jamshidis which led to the fall of the Sunni Hazara capital.

[89] *McNeill to Palmerston*, 7 Dec. 1837.

preventing them from returning to assist the main army that was laying siege to Herat.[90]

Despite having captured Qal'a-yi Nau, the Persian army was faced with a very difficult dilemma, since the Sunni confederation remained undefeated and out of reach in the inaccessible tableland of the upper Murghab river. The severe winter cold and frost, which come much earlier to the mountains than they do in the Herat plains, had already arrived,[91] making it impossible for the Asaf al-Daula to winter in Qal'a-yi Nau; especially when such a large enemy concentration, familiar with the mountain terrain, was poised to swoop down on him at the first opportunity. The Persian commander therefore decided to try and disperse the enemy forces and push on, across the mountains, to Bala Murghab in order to prevent the Sunni Hazaras and their allies carrying out their threat to march to the relief of Herat. Thus, after a rest of ten days at Qal'a-yi Nau, he gave the order to march, hoping to seize Bala Murghab before the worst of the winter weather cut his army off from its extended supply lines (Katib i, 133).

The Asaf al-Daula's route passed through some of the most difficult terrain in Afghanistan. Hundreds of deep, narrow gorges twist and turn through the limestone plateau. The paths over the mountains and through the valleys are mere sheep tracks, hardly wide enough to allow a single person to pass in safety, let alone an army laden with heavy artillery, munitions, pack animals and other encumbrances. The passes are precipitous in the extreme and the rock underfoot slippery, even in fine weather. In fact, it was ideal terrain for ambush and the hit-and-run tactics so beloved by the hill tribes of the area. A few miles short of the settlement of "Pada Kaj," Muhammad Zaman Jamshidi, Sher Muhammad Khan Hazara and Shah Pasand Khan Firozkohi[92] swooped down on the floundering Persians. A ferocious,

[90] British sources for the Asaf al-Daula's march from Qal'a-yi Nau to Qaisar are: Conolly, *Bamiyan to Merve*, 1840; *Meer Afzal to Dost Mohamed*, 23 Dec. 1837; *Leech to Burnes*, 27 Dec. 1837, 5 Feb. 1838; *Todd to Macnaughten*, 26 Feb. 1840; *McNeill to Palmerston*, 30 Dec. 1837, SLEP:104, fol. 413; *Stoddard to McNeill*, 7 Jan. 1838, SLEP:105, fols. 258-9; *Afzal Khan to Dost Mohamed*, rcvd. Kabul, 23 Dec. 1837; *Mihr Dil to Ameer of Caboul*, rcvd. 15 Jan. 1838, in *Military Papers 1841-43*, 96, 117.

[91] Stirling found the head-waters of the Shirin Tagab frozen solid when he crossed the Mirza Wulang pass at the end of November and by late December he encountered blizzards and deep, drifting snow as he crossed the Hindu Kush (Stirling 1991, 293-4, 313-5).

[92] The Firozkohi are another of the Chahar Aimaq tribes of Badghis and Ghor who occupy the areas around Qadis, Chakhcharan and the northern watershed of the upper Murghab, namely the south-facing slopes of the Tir Band-i Turkistan around the district known severally as Laulash, Filawar and Bandar. According to their own oral histories, recorded by the Afghan Boundary Commission's Surveyors, they took their name from a mountain of this name near

four hour battle ensued, which ended only when the Aimaqs withdrew. Two hundred and fifty Aimaq tribesmen lay dead in the field, but they had succeeded in inflicting even heavier casualties upon the Asaf al-Daula's men before they broke off the engagement and allowed the Persians to occupy "Pada Kaj" (Katib i, 133).

From this *manzil*, the Asaf al-Daula sent forward two regiments of regular infantry under his nephew, Iskandar Khan, as a vanguard. Not surprisingly, they took the wrong turning and became lost in the tangle of narrow ravines. As Iskandar Khan's column entered the narrow gorge, an Aimaq force blocked the valley behind them whilst the Firozkohis cut off the Persian line of advance and their access to water. Having trapped the enemy in the defiles, the Aimaqs opened fire into their flanks, killing a number of Persians and causing havoc amongst the rest. Many of their horses were shot dead and Iskandar Khan himself was wounded by a bullet. Despite his injury, Iskandar Khan ordered a redoubt to be formed from the corpses of horses and men as a protection against the merciless fire being poured down on them from the surrounding mountain sides, for since all escape routes were blocked, the Persian force had no choice but to try and defend their position as best they could until relief reached them from the main army (Katib i, 133).

Fortunately for Iskandar Khan, the Asaf al-Daula, having arrived at the pre-arranged camping ground and seeing no sign of the other column, began to be concerned. Suddenly, the sound of musket fire reached him and he realised that Iskandar Khan had lost his way and been ambushed by the Sunni Confederates. Even so, as it was nearly dark, the Asaf al-Daula did not bother to go to the rescue, instead he passed an anxious night and early the next morning sent a relief force of cavalry and infantry to find and succour Iskandar Khan. They reached him in the nick of time, for Iskandar Khan had almost given up hope of rescue. However, just when the reinforcements appeared to have gained the upper hand, a further three thousand Aimaq cavalry arrived and the Sunni Hazaras, Firozkohis and Jamshidis turned back

Samnan in Persia and were driven eastwards by Timur Lang. Shah Pasand Khan of Robat was the amir of the Darazi clan. His genealogy is given as; son of Husain 'Ali Khan b. Saiyid Nazar Khan b. Rahim Sultan, who was the first chief of the Firozkohis. According to Pottinger, Shah Pasand was at odds with Maudud Quli Khan, *amir* of the Firozkohi Aimaqs of Qadis and Lash, whose father, Bahram Khan, had been slain by Shah Pasand. As a result of this feud, Maudud Quli defected to the Persians. The *Siraj al-Tawarikh*, however, flatly contradicts Pottinger's report and claims that the Aimaq leaders acted in concert against the Asaf al-Daula. Cf. Pottinger, *Memoir*, 1839; Burnes, *Herat*, 1838. For a detailed history and genealogical charts, see Maitland 1891, ii, 107-161; Appendix V, iii.

and attacked the Persian army with renewed vigour. At the height of this battle, Rahimdad Sultan, an amir of the Sunni(?) Hazaras was mortally wounded and the Aimaq broke off the engagement, allowing the Persians to limp back to the main camp (Katib i, 133).

Following this sanguinary battle, the Asaf al-Daula continued his push to the Murghab, this time using a local guide, Haji Beg, who had pretended to defect to the Persians. In reality, he was acting on orders from Sher Muhammad Hazara, and having deliberately led the Persian army into a ravine where a Turkman force lay in ambush, Haji Beg promptly disappeared. Trapped in the narrow gorge, the Persians were easy pickings for the Turkman marksmen. Hundreds of the Asaf al-Daula's men died in the hail of bullets and for the whole night the Persians, reduced to taking cover behind their horses and pack animals, were picked off one by one by the Turkman snipers.

The following morning, with hundreds of his men lying dead and wounded on the floor of the ravine, the Asaf al-Daula, realising that to stay put was suicidal, ordered his men to fight their way out towards Bala Murghab. Iskandar Khan, still suffering from the wounds he had received in the earlier battle, was ordered to lead an advance party to "Khwaja Kandu" (Khwaja Kenti), south of Chichaktu and, somehow or other, he succeeded in reaching this settlement. Then, as they tried to enter the village, they were attacked once more, this time by Uzbek forces, and several of his men were captured. When the Asaf al-Daula heard of this, he sent two hundred more soldiers to help his son, but they too were soon surrounded by a force of Hazaras and their line of retreat cut off. Once more, the members of the Persian relief force were obliged to use their horses as shields until the main force arrived and the enemy retreated (Katib i, 133-4).[93]

The forced march through the Tir Band-i Turkistan had cost the Persians dear. Several thousand of the original force of twelve thousand men had perished and the Asaf al-Daula had yet to confront the main Sunni army, which had moved up the Murghab towards Chichaktu to bar any further advance. The Persian general wrote a frantic letter to the Shah, still encamped before Herat, pleading for reinforcements to be sent post-haste, and three thousand additional troops, supported by a huge artillery train of thirty-two guns, was sent to his aid (Katib i, 134).[94] A high rate of casualties was not the only problem

[93] See also, *Stoddard to McNeill*, 10 Dec. 1837, 7 Jan. 1838; *Meer Afzal to Dost Mohamed*, 23 Dec. 1837; *Lord to Burnes*, 27 Dec. 1837; *Leech to Burnes*, 5 Feb. 1838.

[94] *Leech to Burnes*, 5 Feb. 1838. *Mihr Dil Khan to Ameer*, 15 Jan. 1838 reported that the Asaf

besetting Asaf's men; they were chronically short of supplies. Once installed in the comparative safety of Khwaja Kenti, the Persians raided the surrounding countryside and managed to bring in five thousand sheep along with the twenty shepherds who were tending them. However, the majority of the Jamshidi and Firozkohi tribes, numbering some thirty seven thousand households (*ui*), had already decamped with all their cattle and portable property down river from Bala Murghab and were beyond the reach of the Asaf al-Daula. Sher Muhammad Hazara, Muhammad Zaman Jamshidi and Shah Pasand Khan Firozkohi, meanwhile, went to Maimana, where they made arrangements with Mizrab Khan, Khalifa 'Abd al-Rahman Turkman and Shahzada Nadir Mirza to strengthen defences in four separate locations across the Persian line of advance on Chahar Shanbeh (Katib i, 134).

Even when the reinforcements from Herat arrived, the Asaf al-Daula's army was still greatly outnumbered,[95] though there was some small encouragement when news reached him that another Persian force had managed to prevent an army of six thousand Taimani Aimaqs in Obeh from attacking him in his rear.[96] Across the Asaf al-Daula's line of advance lay a force of some twenty thousand Uzbeks, Aimaqs and Turkmans. Once more the Persian governor ordered his men to prepare for battle and, leaving a large force behind to guard his baggage, they marched out against Mizrab Khan. On, or around 20 December 1837, the Asaf al-Daula finally came face-to-face with the main confederate army in the relatively open country between Khwaja Kenti and Chahar Shanbeh.[97] Four times the Sunni Confederate cavalry charged the massed ranks of the Qizilbash but each time they failed to break the lines, mainly due to the devastating effect of the large Persian artillery train, which may have numbered as many as forty guns.[98] The fire-power from the Qajar guns finally

al-Daula had asked the Shah for permission to retire to Mashhad because of their "sad condition."

[95] *Stoddard to McNeill*, 7 Jan. 1838; Conolly, *Bamiyan to Merve*, 1840; *Leech to Burnes*, 5 Feb. 1838; *Royal Firman*, Tehran 1838; *Persian Firman issued to Governor of Kirmanshah*, 1838, in, *Political Dept. Papers Relative to the War between Persia and Afghanistan*, PSDL:A7, vol. i, part ii, no. 38, 90.

[96] *Afzal Khan to Ameer*, 23 Dec. 1838; *Mihr Dil to Ameer*, 15 Jan. 1838; *Bikload Khan to Kohun Dil*, 25 Dec. 1838, in, *Military Papers, 1841-43*, 117.

[97] *Pottinger to Macnaughten*, 25 May 1838, says the battle took place at Marichaq but Katib is much more precise as to the location of this, the main battle of the campaign.

[98] Katib says the Asaf al-Daula only took seven guns into the attack, but he admits that he was not sure exactly whether, or to what extent, the Persian army had been reinforced. I have preferred the account given by Stoddard, who was in the Persian camp before Herat.

forced the Sunni army to take up static, defensive positions and the Asaf al-Daula, finally fighting the sort of battle he understood, ordered a frontal assault on the enemy's trenches and "totally defeated" them with "great slaughter."[99] Mizrab Khan, "ran without once stopping until he shut himself up in his fort"[100] whilst the Asaf al-Daula's army looted their enemy's baggage train and executed the seven hundred prisoners who had fallen into their hands during the course of the battle. Three days later, the Persian army entered Chahar Shanbeh in triumph, from whence they marched, unopposed, to Qaisar via Chichaktu and Alti Khwaja (Katib i, 134).[101]

Mizrab Khan, meanwhile, was sending frantic messages to Murad Beg and other rulers of Balkh informing them of the advance of the Persian army on Maimana and begging for aid.[102] However, Murad Beg, hardly a friend of the Mingids at the best of times, had made too many enemies in Balkh and the Chahar Wilayat to march to Mizrab Khan's aid, even if he had wanted to do so. He informed Dr. Lord, who had been sent to Qunduz by Alexander Burnes, that, "even if I wished how ... could I go there [i.e. to Maimana]? Bulkh is closed, Sirepul is closed, Akcha is closed, what road shall I go?"[103] Lord watched the Persian advance with considerable apprehension, for Britain had opposed the Qajar expedition against Herat and now it seemed as if the whole of Lesser Turkistan was at the mercy of Persia. At the end of December, he informed Burnes:

> If the Persians take Meimina, which there seems no reasonable doubt, there is nothing earthly to prevent their taking Bulkh and then all this country is at their mercy. There is neither hill nor fort to protect it. Murad Beg is totally powerless out of his own territory.[104]

Even after the Asaf al-Daula had actually retired from Qaisar, Lord continued to report to Burnes the imminent arrival of the Persian army and claimed that Mizrab Khan of Maimana, as a condition of his

[99] *Lord to Burnes*, 27 Dec. 1837; Katib i, 134, does not give the number of Sunni dead.

[100] *Ibid.*

[101] *Ibid. McNeill to Palmerston*, 23 Feb. 1838, SLEP:105, fol. 174; *Stoddard to McNeill*, 7 Jan. 1838.

[102] Prince Nadir Mirza, son of Kamran, fled to Bukhara and appealed to Nasrullah Khan for help but was told, "precipitantly to leave the city," *Burnes to Macnaughten*, 20 Feb. 1838. Lord said that only a "kalun sirdar" (important commander) had been sent to Bukhara, *Lord to Burnes*, 27 Dec. 1837.

[103] *Lord to Burnes*, 27 Dec. 1837.

[104] *Ibid.* See also *McNeill to Palmerston*, 23 Feb. 1838.

submission, had been forced to cede the Qizilbash free passage through the Chahar Wilayat for their march on Balkh.[105]

As the Persian army moved ever nearer Maimana, Mizrab Khan, unable to rally any significant support, had to choose between submitting and trying to withstand a winter siege for which he was completely unprepared. Though the citadel of Maimana had a reputation for strength and his people were reckoned some of the bravest and most determined fighters in the area, the walls of the city and the *arg* were not built to withstand the kind of artillery barrage which the Asaf al-Daula would be able to bring to bear on them. Maimana was overlooked by high loess hills and the Persian guns, sited on these elevations, would be able to fire over the walls directly into the city. Mizrab Khan therefore decided to sue for peace and sent his son, Hukumat Khan, along with ambassadors from the Aimaq and Chahar Wilayat, to Qaisar and offered to submit to Persian authority.

The Asaf al-Daula, "glad to be quit of one thorn in his flank,"[106] appointed Ja'far Quli Khan, a Kurd, as his ambassador, and sent him to Maimana to discuss terms, for the Persian general was as eager as Mizrab Khan to avoid further, costly confrontation. Winter had arrived and the Asaf al-Daula's men were not equipped for the biting cold of Badghis. Aimaq and Turkman irregulars had also regrouped and were raiding his over-extended supply lines. More importantly, the Asaf al-Daula had exceeded his orders by marching to Qaisar and his many enemies in the Persian camp at Herat had used this, and his recent embarrassments in the Turkistan mountains, to intrigue against him.[107]

The Persian ambassador was met at Almar by Sher Muhammad Khan Hazara and Muhammad Zaman Jamshidi with an escort of a thousand men and was conducted with appropriate pomp and ceremony to Maimana. When they reached the city, "all the people of the city and the environs came out to meet him" and for sixteen days Mizrab Khan entertained the Persian ambassador and negotiated terms of submission (Katib i, 134). Mizrab Khan agreed to hand over his son, Hukumat Khan, as security for the good behaviour of Maimana and the Chahar Wilayat. Sher Muhammad Khan Hazara and Zaman Khan Jamshidi provided similar hostages from amongst their

[105] *Lord to Burnes*, 30 Jan. 1838, ESL:130, fols. 148-55.
[106] Conolly, *Bamiyan to Merve*, 1840.
[107] *Stoddard to McNeill*, 7 Jan. 1838; *Pottinger to Macnaughten*, 25 May 1839; *Pottinger to Leech*, 12, 13 March 1838, in Forrest, 99-100.

immediate family, who were sent to Herat in order to proffer their submission to the Shah in person (Katib i, 134).[108] Hukumat Khan, however, was not kept in the Persian camp, and he appears to have been sent back to his father accompanied by Mirza Wali, a Persian ambassador, who remained in Maimana to ensure Mizrab Khan observed the terms of the treaty.[109] Mizrab Khan also undertook to remain neutral throughout the remainder of the Persian campaign, "and engaged that if the Persians took Herat he would transfer his allegiance to the Persian monarch as ruler of that city."[110] In addition, he was forced to "bring in every sort of supply for the [Persian] army,"[111] an important condition since the Asaf al-Daula's men were in great straits. 'Abdullah Khan Qipchaq, brother[112] of Shah Pasand Khan, was furthermore obliged to remove twelve thousand households of Qipchaq, Maududi and Firozkohi tribesmen from Qaisar back into their mountain homes. A short while after this treaty was agreed, Mizrab Khan sent his nephew to the Qajar camp at Herat bearing a letter in which he besought the Shah not to force Maimana to admit a garrison; a request which was favourably received (Katib i, 134-5).

For the remainder of the Persian siege of Herat, Mizrab Khan remained faithful to his agreement even though, by doing so, he incurred the anger of Yar Muhammad Khan of Herat and the Khan Hazrat of Khiva who, in the spring of 1838, tried to organise a second Sunni confederacy against the Persians. Maimana's refusal to budge from its undertakings was probably one of the main reasons why Khiva's plan failed. In retaliation the Khan Hazrat threatened to "lay waste the province of Maimana if [Mizrab Khan] persisted in refusing to act against the infidel"[113] and took Panjdeh from the Turkman, claiming it was compensation for Khivan support of the Sunni Confederates the previous winter.[114]

As soon as Mizrab Khan had concluded his peace with the Asaf al-Daula, the Persian army in Badghis returned across the Murghab to seek out suitable winter quarters. It was now January and the fierce winter weather was upon them. Opposition by the tribes of Badghis

[108] Conolly, *Bamiyan to Merve*, 1840; Pottinger, *Memoir*, 1838; *Burnes to Macnaughten*, 20 Feb. 1838; Taylor, *Meimeneh*, 1858.
[109] *Royal Firman*, Tehran 1838; *Royal Firman*, Kirmanshah 1838; Pottinger, *Memoir*, 1838.
[110] Conolly, *Bamiyan to Merve*, 1840.
[111] Taylor, *Meimeneh*, 1858.
[112] So source, but he may well have been his brother-in-law, given that he came from a different tribe.
[113] Conolly, *Bamiyan to Merve*, 1840.
[114] *Todd to Macnaughten*, 26 Feb. 1838.

was also on the increase and the Asaf al-Daula requested further reinforcements so that he could fight his way back across the mountains, something which he was unable to do, "without regular infantry, guns, ammunition and horse being sent, along with clothes for wintering at Qala-i Nau,"[115] grossly exaggerating the numbers of tribesmen opposing him at the same time.[116] Muhammad Shah, however, was in no mood to assist his governor. Angered by his general's disobedience, the Shah wrote on the bottom of this petition: "Who ordered him to go towards Meimuna? He went of himself and he may get back as he can."[117] Somehow or other the Asaf al-Daula managed to recross the Murghab, but he was unable to reach Qal'a-yi Nau and was forced to winter in the high plateau-land north of Jawand, around Chaman-i Bed.[118] The unauthorised march on Maimana thus effectively cut off the Asaf al-Daula from the main Persian force in Herat for the remainder of the winter. For over three months several thousand of the best Persian troops, along with much of the artillery train which was needed for the siege of Herat, were holed up in the inaccessible tableland of the Tir Band-i Turkistan. Throughout this unpleasant winter sojourn, they were subjected to continual harassment from local tribesmen, who amused themselves "by cutting off the grass cutters and other wanderers about the neighbourhood of the [Persian] camp."[119] Their position was not helped by the stream of contradictory orders emanating from Court officials in the camp before Herat. As a result, it was not until 12 March 1838 that the Asaf al-Daula was sent a clear order from the Shah himself to return to Herat.[120] His army finally rejoined the main Persian force at Herat at the end of March or beginning of April, a few weeks before the first attempt to take the city by storm.[121]

[115] *Stoddard to McNeill*, 7 Jan. 1838.

[116] *Ibid.* "The eels (sic) he has been torturing will writhe round and destroy him.... These eels are 200,000 horse, 40,000 Hazaras, 70,000 Maimanees, 90,000 Teke Turkomans."

[117] *Ibid.*

[118] There is also a Chaman-i Bed on the Kushka river, north of Herat, but earlier reports state that the Asaf al-Daula was trying to reach Qal'a-yi Nau and the district in the upper Murghab would seem the more likely. Doubtless the snows on the mountains had much to do with why the Persian force failed to reach Qal'a-yi Nau. *Pottinger to Burnes*, 12, 13 March 1838 says that Chaman-i Bed was 18 farsangs (50 to 60 miles) from Herat, but this is a considerable underestimation for either place.

[119] *Pottinger to Burnes*, 12, 13 March 1838.

[120] *Ibid.* After much complaining about these contradictory instructions, an investigation was instituted. The *Wazir* was held responsible for the confusion and was put to death by Muhammad Shah

[121] *Ibid.* The *Siraj al-Tawarikh* offers no explanation for the gap between the signing of the treaty with the Aimaq tribes and the Chahar Wilayat and the return of the Asaf al-Daula. Katib gives the date of the governor's return as early Zu'l-Hijja 1254 (May 1839), but by that time the Persian siege had been raised and he presumably meant 1253. Even so, May is too late and I have preferred Pottinger's eye-witness report.

The contribution of the Aimaq, Uzbek and Turkman alliance to the defeat of the Persian siege of Herat has been almost completely ignored by Western historians.[122] Instead, when discussing the reasons for the Persian failure, most authorities point to the incompetence of the Persian military, the heavy diplomatic pressure brought to bear on Muhammad Shah by the British, who in August 1838 broke diplomatic relations with Persia and threatened to declare war on the Shah (Yapp 1980, 278, 286), and the bravery of the Irishman, Lt. Eldred Pottinger, later dubbed 'The Hero of Herat', who had travelled incognito to the city a few months prior to the siege and managed to rally the dispirited defenders (MacGregor, 376; Dupree 1978, 372; Yapp 1980, 148).[123] Yet this Sunni confederacy was the main reason for the unexpected survival of Herat during the winter of 1837/8 and Burnes certainly did not exaggerate when he wrote that "without the aid of Sher Mahomed Khan, Herat could have no hope against Persia."[124] Yar Muhammad too, when he tried to inspire, or perhaps shame, the Barakzai sardars of Qandahar into coming to his aid, urged them to "imitate the Shah of Bokara and Khorasan, the people of Toorkistan and the Toorkman who are coming to gain the honour of martyrdom.... Come quickly and save the honour of the nation."[125]

The confederate resistance to the Asaf al-Daula was undoubtedly a major factor in the failure of the Persian attack on Herat. Even before commencing the investment of the city, Muhammad Shah Qajar had been obliged to send one third of his force, consisting of twelve thousand of his best troops with eight guns, to oppose a combined force of

[122] As far as I can ascertain Fraser-Tytler's laconic reference to this campaign is the most comprehensive account given by a recent historian.

> In February 1838 the British envoy ... reported from Tehran that the city was holding out well, but that the Persians had penetrated north-eastwards as far as Maimana and had so cut off any hope of assistance reaching the Afghans from that quarter (Fraser-Tytler, 99).

In contrast, Katib, realising the importance of this campaign to the overall failure of the Persian attack on Herat, goes into great detail.

[123] For Pottinger's life (1811-1843) see Diver (1912); Pottinger (1983); Kaye 1904, ii, 204-92. Pottinger's private journal of his time in Herat and his subsequent travels through Badghis and the Chahar Wilayat do not appear to have survived, though Kaye (1904) appears to have had access to some private papers when he wrote his life of Pottinger. Pottinger died in Hong Kong, soon after the end of the First Anglo-Afghan War.

[124] Burnes, *Herat*, 1838.

[125] *Mohamed Khan to Candahar Chiefs*, n.d. (Dec.?) 1837, in *Military Papers on Afghanistan, 1841-43*, 118.

some twelve to fifteen thousand tribesmen. Arrayed against the Asaf al-Daula was no rag-tag army, but a formidable coalition of the most feared and mobile cavalry in Central Asia. The subjugation of the Sunni confederates took several months of hard campaigning, from the end of October 1837 to about the middle of January 1838, and was only achieved at the cost of a large number of casualties. So hard-fought was the campaign, Muhammad Shah was obliged to send several thousand more men into Badghis, along with much of the artillery which had been brought to batter down the walls of Herat.[126] Despite the Asaf al-Daula's victory at Khwaja Kenti, the Persian General was prevented from returning to Herat by the onset of winter. In all, he was over five months in Badghis and the Turkistan mountains. Thus, what started as a large-scale foray against the Aimaq, quickly developed into a major, and extremely bloody, campaign which seriously depleted Persian strength. It is no wonder, therefore, that during the absence of the Asaf al-Daula the Persian siege of Herat made little progress and it was only after he had rejoined the main army that Muhammad Shah felt strong enough to order the first serious assault on the city walls.

The Failure of the Burnes Mission, 1838

Whilst the Asaf al-Daula was licking his wounds in Chaman-i Bed, Lord's report of Persian successes in Badghis was having an important influence on the continued negotiations between Burnes and Dost Muhammad Khan in Kabul. Britain had consistently discouraged Muhammad Shah from attacking Herat, believing that Russia planned to dominate Central Asia through an alliance with the Persians, a belief that was reinforced by the presence of Russian soldiers and advisers in the Shah's army.

In late November, or early December, 1837 this conviction was further strengthened when a young Russian officer, Captain Vitkevich, arrived in Kabul with orders to promote an Afghan-Persian alliance (Yapp 1980, 234-6). Although Vitkevich's visit was in response to an earlier appeal in 1835/6 by Dost Muhammad Khan for Russian help against the Sikhs and Shah Shuja' al-Mulk, the presence

[126] According to British intelligence reports, over two-thirds of the Persian artillery was eventually committed to the defeat of the tribal confederacy. The whole force at Muhammad Shah's disposal was 36,000 men with 66 guns. The Asaf al-Daula's column initially consisted of 12,000 men with 8 guns, to which were added at least a further 3,000 troops and 32 guns.

of a Russian ambassador in Kabul and the prospect of a treaty between Persia and Afghanistan, under Russian protection, made the securing of the Amir's friendship even more urgent as far as Burnes was concerned. He also realised that Vitkevich's arrival served to strengthen Dost Muhammad's negotiating position, for if the Amir was not satisfied with the terms offered to him by Britain, he could always turn to the Russians.

Burnes had been allowed very little room for manoeuvre by Calcutta and he was hard pressed to demonstrate that an alliance with Britain would bring sufficient rewards for the Afghans and meet the Amir's demand for *'izat wa ikram*, 'honour and respect' (Yapp 1980, 236ff.). Lord's worrying report which claimed that Balkh was at the mercy of the Asaf al-Daula, reached Kabul at the end of February 1838 and Burnes concluded, not unnaturally, that the fall of Herat was merely "a matter of time."[127] Assuming that the Asaf al-Daula was probably already marching against Balkh, thus posing a serious threat to Kabul, Burnes, in a last ditch attempt to secure Dost Muhammad Khan's signature on a treaty, took matters into his own hands. Without seeking official approval for his action, he pledged British support for the Amir's claim to Peshawar and promised East India Company assistance for the Barakzai sardars at Qandahar, if Herat fell to Muhammad Shah, or Persian forces threatened to attack the former Afghan capital. Burnes, however, did not inform Dost Muhammad Khan that these offers were done without his superiors' approval or knowledge, for he remained naïvely optimistic that he could convince Calcutta that these policies were the best course to follow in the circumstances.

Far from being commended, however, Burnes was sternly rebuked for his *ex officio* offer and, in an embarrassing interview with Dost Muhammad Khan, he was obliged to confess that he had acted independently. Reporting the outcome of this meeting, Burnes sought to justify his actions to Calcutta on the basis of the reports he had received from Herat and Balkh during the early months of 1838:

> Affairs to the west were getting every day more complicated, the Persians having not only held their position before Herat, but overrun Maimuna and the adjacent States, being now actually without any people between them and Cabool itself, excepting the Huzarees, who are all of the Shiah persuasion, and linked by religion and alliance to the Kuzzilbash faction in the city ... The

[127] *Burnes to Macnaughten*, 20 Feb. 1838, in, *Military Papers, 1841-43*, 152-3.

> consternation at the present time regarding Herat is such that they [i.e. the people of Kabul] believe themselves the next victims of Persia if that city falls.[128]

At the time, Burnes did not know that the Asaf al-Daula had been forced back across the Murghab by the cold, or that the Persian operations in Badghis did not have the appproval of Muhammad Shah. Had he been aware of this at the beginning of January 1838, Burnes would have realised that there was no imminent Persian threat to Balkh and he may well have been less inclined to take such a desperate course of action. As it was, the Afghan winter had not only thwarted the Asaf al-Daula. Lord's letters from Qunduz, informing Burnes of the Persian withdrawal, took several weeks to reach Kabul across the snow-bound passes of the Hindu Kush and by the time they arrived it was too late for the British to try again.

Having had his hands tied by Calcutta, Burnes was, in effect, trying to persuade the Afghan Amir to arrange an agreement which, whilst being highly beneficial to Britain, offered Dost Muhammad Khan absolutely nothing in return, either in terms of territorial concessions, internal security or financial incentives. As a consequence, at the end of April 1838 Burnes left Kabul empty-handed. In the wake of this diplomatic charade, Dost Muhammad Khan brought the Russian ambassador, Vitkevich, out of cold storage and gave him an official welcome, though later Burnes' counterpart too was to be disowned by his superiors.

Meanwhile, in India, British officials, convinced that Dost Muhammad Khan was unreliable and believing that he would allow Russia to dominate Central Asia, began to plan for his overthrow and the reinstatement of the exiled Sadozai ruler, Shah Shuja' al-Mulk (Yapp 1980, 238).[129] In the end, however, it was the 'invasion' of Balkh from another quarter which provided a salutary reminder that there was another power in Central Asia which had historic claims to the territory south of the the Amu Darya.

[128] *Burnes to Macnaughten*, 23 Feb. 1838, in, *Military Papers, 1841-43*, 155-7.

[129] Yapp 1980, 244 says the plan to overthrow Dost Muhammad Khan had already been mooted by the Governor-General in December 1837, i.e. whilst Burnes was still in Kabul.

Balkh: Bukharan and Afghan Intervention, 1838-1840

Nasrullah Khan of Bukhara, although he had refused to assist Kamran Shah against the Persians, had every reason to be concerned about the state of affairs south of the Amu Darya, for Mizrab Khan's recent treaty with the Asaf al-Daula significantly changed the balance of power in the region and posed a threat to the slave trade from which Bukhara profited considerably. Not only so, but a Chingizid, Ishan Khwaja Naqib, still ruled Balkh in the name of the Manghits, though he was in no position to defend the province against the Persians.

Over the last decade Ishan Naqib had been more and more hard-pressed by Murad Beg of Qunduz, who had raided the settlements scattered along the eastern canals of the Hazhda Nahr, seized Balkh outposts and sold or enslaved thousands of Ishan Naqib's subjects. Many more, particularly the Tadjiks in the south of Qataghan, had been transported by Murad Beg to the unhealthy reed jungles of the Amu Darya, where they died in their hundreds (Burnes 1834, i, 346; Harlan 1939, 28-9). So desperate had the situation become that Ishan Khwaja Naqib, either too timid or weak to risk facing his powerful neighbour in the open field, contemplated flight (Burnes 1834, i, 346), something that many thousands of ordinary citizens of the region had already done, seeking refuge within the borders of Maimana (Harlan 1939, 28-9).

Finally, sometime in 1837, Murad Beg seized control of one of the eastern canals, probably the Nahr-i Shahi, which as well as being one of the most important of the Hazhda Nahr system was the main source of revenue for the shrine at Mazar-i Sharif, and began to fortify the villages (Harlan 1939, 29).[130] Murad Beg's aggression, the ineffectual and costly rule of Ishan Khwaja Naqib[131] and the threat posed to Balkh by the Asaf al-Daula, forced Nasrullah Khan to take military action to defend Bukharan interests. In November 1837 a Bukharan army of four thousand men crossed the Amu Darya (Harlan 1939, 29)[132] and marched to Balkh, where Ishan Naqib was deposed

[130] *Burnes to Macnaughten*, 6 Dec. 1837, in, *Military Papers, 1841-43*, 76-7.

[131] The Amir of Bukhara paid the governor 2,000 tilas of revenue from the town for his personal expenses and the defence of the area (Burnes 1834, ii, 370).

[132] So, *Burnes to Macnaughten*, 6 Dec. 1837, but the actual date the Bukharan army reached Balkh cannot be firmly fixed. It was certainly a winter campaign, since in February 1838 Burnes reported that Nasrullah "had just dislodged" Murad Beg from Balkh, Burnes, *Herat*, 1838. However, Pottinger, *Memoir*, 1839 records that "the King of Bokhara crossed the Amoo this spring," i.e. a year later, a date which is followed by the Afghan Boundary Commission (*Gazetteer* (1907) ii, 43-4). Burnes and Harlan are contemporary and I have followed Burnes in

and sent as a prisoner to Bukhara.[133] In his place a certain 'Abd al-Jabbar Bi was appointed.[134] Ishan Naqib's son, Ishan Saiyid Uraq, who had been governing Aqcha for his father, fled to the Mir Wali of Khulm who, since his father's death, had gained a measure of autonomy from Murad Beg. The Mir Wali received the fugitive Ishan warmly and, helped by Shuja' al-Din of Mazar-i Sharif, they plotted the overthrow of Nasrullah Khan's governor and the containment of Murad Beg (*Gazetteer* (1907) ii, 44; Peacocke, 324; Talboys Wheeler, 36).

Having settled the affairs of Balkh and Aqcha, the Bukharan army, swelled by another five thousand locally-recruited soldiers, marched against Murad Beg to force him to destroy his forts on the Hazhda Nahr (Harlan 1939, 29).[135] Murad Beg, however, offered no resistance, demolished his fortress and abandoned control over the canal network. However, in order to ensure that Bukhara would gain no benefit from the irrigation system, Murad Beg destroyed those canals which lay within his power prior to abandoning the region (Harlan 1939, 29).[136]

Having pushed back Murad Beg, Nasrullah Khan did not bother to pursue the war any further. Instead, in the spring of 1838, he turned his attention to the Chahar Wilayat. The arrival of a Bukharan army at Balkh and the overthrow of the governor of that city, must have placed these amirs in quite a dilemma. Having recently been forced to submit to the Asaf al-Daula and with his army camped threateningly in Qal'a-yi Nau, the risk of a Persian spring offensive against Balkh was still a strong possibility. Mizrab Khan, however, decided that, despite the presence of a Qajar ambassador in Maimana, he would send his son to pay his respects to the Manghit Khan at Balkh.[137]

dating this incident in the winter of 1837/8; cf. Conolly, *Bamiyan to Merve*, 1840 where the arrival of Nasrullah Khan is placed shortly after Maimana's defeat by the Persians.

[133] Nothing further is heard about Ishan Khwaja Naqib, though given that his sons fled to Khulm, it may well be that Nasrullah had him executed. According to Saiyid Mohai al-Din Gauhari, *interview*, 1993, who visited Qarshi in 1992, Ishan Khwaja Naqib is buried in the family graveyard near Qasan.

Nasrullah's *khushbegi* had opposed Bukharan action across the Amu Darya and was demoted to the governorship of Qarshi, *Burnes to Macnaughten*, 6 Dec. 1837.

[134] Pottinger, *Memoir*, 1839. Lord calls him "Pir Nazar Bi." The disparity between 'Nazar' (Nazr?) and "Jabbar" may be the result of a copyist's error. 'Pir' is a synonym for 'ishan', *Lord to Macnaughten*, 11 June 1840, ESL:151, encl. 85, no. 41.

[135] Burnes, *Herat*, 1838.

[136] *Ibid.*

[137] Pottinger, *Memoir*, 1839. Maimana's "tribute" (actually, *nazarana*) to the Bukharan ruler was a present of nine slaves.

Nasrullah, however, was dissatisfied with Maimana's profession of loyalty and a section of the Bukharan army was ordered to march towards Shibarghan.

Apart from Maimana's treaty with Persia, one of the main causes of Bukharan displeasure lay with Mizrab Khan's closest ally, Rustam Khan of Shibarghan. He had recently plundered a group of nomadic Ersari Turkmans who had fled Panjdeh the previous year to escape the exactions of Sher Muhammad Khan Hazara.[138] Hoping to find more amenable surroundings in the Chahar Wilayat, these Turkman tribesmen had tried to migrate to the borders of the Amu Darya, passing through Shibarghan *en route*.

Rustam Khan, hearing of the unauthorised movement of the tribe through his territory, sent troops to force them to settle within his borders. The Turkmans, however, refused to comply with this demand, whereupon Rustam Khan "choupawed them,"[139] seizing a large number of sheep and cattle in the process. The Turkmans sent a frantic appeal to Nasrullah Khan for protection, thereby providing the Manghit ruler with the excuse he needed to mount a show of force in the Chahar Wilayat. Dunmast Bi was given command of a section of the Bukharan army and sent to Shibarghan.

Rustam Khan, in response, promptly appealed for help from his father-in-law at Maimana. Mizrab Khan, obliged to Rustam Khan for his support in the long-running dispute with Sar-i Pul, sent a detachment of his best levies to Shibarghan's aid, thus forcing the Bukharan general to open negotiations. In order to save face, Dunmast Bi was allowed to seize an equivalent amount of cattle and sheep from Shibarghan as retribution for Rustam's pillaging of the Turkmans. Rustam Khan, in return, was allowed to settle the Turkmans in his territory and they were given grazing rights around Yangi 'Aruq, on the present Shibarghan-Aqcha road.

Having thus settled the affairs of Balkh, Qunduz and the Chahar Wilayat to his satisfaction, Nasrullah Khan struck camp and returned back across the Amu Darya. Not to be outdone by Murad Beg, Nasrullah, too, ordered sections of the town of Balkh destroyed and then forcibly removed several thousand of its people beyond the Amu Darya (*Gazetteer* (1907) ii, 43-4).[140] Balkh, which had fallen into

[138] Conolly, *Bamiyan to Merve*, 1840. The details of the Bukharan attack on Shibarghan are somewhat confused. Unfortunately, Conolly is our only source.

[139] *Ibid.*

[140] 100,000 people according to this source, but this belief is based partly on Burnes, *Herat*, 1838 and his earlier journals (Burnes 1834) which indicate that enforced migration from Balkh

decline since the establishment of the 'Alid shrine at Mazar-i Sharif in the seventeenth century, was thus dealt a further body-blow to its economic and agricultural importance.[141]

The troubles of the unfortunate Turkmans of Panjdeh, however, continued. Disappointed by the Bukharan 'help', they had been obliged to settle in Shibarghan on terms highly favourable to Rustam Khan. Following the death of Zu'l-Faqar Sher Khan in 1839, their herds were attacked by marauding bands from Sar-i Pul and they left for Maimana where Mizrab Khan relieved them of "many fine horses" after accusing them of causing disturbances.[142] Eventually the Turkmans returned to their old grazing grounds, preferring the devil they knew to the one they did not. The oppression of the Sunni Hazaras and other Aimaq chiefs, however, was as bad as it had ever been and it was only after they had appealed to the Khan Hazrat of Khiva for protection that these Turkman tribesmen finally found some freedom from the exactions of their landlords.[143]

The Persian threat to Balkh faded during the spring of 1838 as the siege of Herat ground ineffectually on until, in September of that same year, Muhammad Shah finally abandoned the attempt to regain control of the area. In Turkistan, during the same period, Murad Beg turned away from his attacks on Balkh and began to raid the border

had been going on for several years. The claim that the Bukharan army evicted 100,000 people from Balkh to Bukhara is highly unlikely, but such a high figure may refer to the numbers of people who had either fled, been captured or removed by Murad Beg's prolonged campaign as well as by Nasrullah's actions in 1838.

It is interesting to note how the forcible removal, or acquisition, of population was a frequent occurrence during invasions of one state by another, which suggests that the populations of villages and regions were considered to be as much a part of the booty of an expedition as cattle, sheep and other portable property. The reasons for this are complex, but since all the states on both sides of the Amu Darya were engaged in the slave trade, the capture of several thousand individuals during a campaign would realise a considerable revenue for the conqueror, both in terms of sale of these individuals in the slave market, and in ransom money. Frequent epidemics, a series of bloody wars, high child mortality and low life-expectancy, combined with inefficient management of the resources (natural as well as human) available to these states, meant that areas which had been prosperous and well-populated two centuries before, were now barren or lying fallow. The influx of new families, whether by forcible removal or by encouraging migration and refugees, would thus mean additional revenues for the state, accrued by direct taxation and, indirectly, through their economic activities. Extra families also meant more men available to serve in the army, etc. For the chronic economic condition of Afghanistan at this period, see Gregorian, chapter 3.

[141] Mazar-i Sharif seems to have been unaffected by the Bukharan devastations, probably because of its sanctity. However, it may well have suffered economically as a result of Murad Beg's depopulation of the Hazhda Nahr system.

[142] *Ibid.*

[143] *Ibid.* Conolly says that following Maimana's peace treaty with the Asaf al-Daula, the Khan Hazrat of Khiva actually occupied Panjdeh for a while.

areas north of Bamiyan. This brought him into direct confrontation with Dost Muhammad Khan of Kabul (Harlan 1939, 36). In the winter of 1838, the Afghan Amir sent his son, Muhammad Akram Khan, with an army of over three and a half thousand men, northwards from Bamiyan to attack and punish the Qataghanid ruler for his insolence. In this, Dost Muhammad was aided significantly by the Mir Wali of Khulm, who had broken free from Qunduz and re-established the long-standing alliance with the rulers of Kabul (Harlan 1939, 92-5, 101). In a short campaign, Murad Beg was soundly defeated and the two strategic fortresses of Saighan and Kahmard were incorporated into Dost Muhammad Khan's realms. The Afghan Amir thus secured a foothold north of Bamiyan, a position from which he could control the north-south trade route (Harlan 1939, 36; Yapp 1962).

Meanwhile, Murad Beg's defeat precipitated a series of internal challenges to his authority with the consequence that the power of Qunduz went into a swift and terminal decline. Into the power vacuum stepped the Mir Wali of Khulm, who reasserted his family's dominance of the western marches of the appanage (Harlan 1939, 39; Yapp 1962).

Although in this, his first campaign against an amir beyond the Hindu Kush, Dost Muhammad had succeeded in establishing friendly relations with the ruler who controlled the northern gateway to Kabul, to the south his position as Amir of Kabul was threatened by the advance of a joint British-Sikh force into Afghanistan. Despite the Persian abandonment of the siege of Herat in September 1838, which removed one of the main reasons for the British invasion of Afghanistan (Kaye (1874) i, 384-5), Calcutta's decision to march on Kabul was not rescinded. In October 1838, the Simla Declaration "bluntly spelled out [Britain's] intentions; the invasion of Afghan territory and the restoration of the Sadozai exiled King, Shuja ul-Mulk" (Dupree 1978, 367). By the end of April 1839 the 'Army of the Indus', as the invading force was called, had occupied Qandahar and by August Kabul itself had fallen. Dost Muhammad Khan, deserted by his followers, fled to his ally, Mir Wali and, from the sanctuary of Khulm, sent messages to the rulers of the surrounding amirs calling for a *jihad* against the infidel (Yapp 1962).

Dr Lord's Forward Policy in Turkistan, 1839-1840

Almost as soon as the British had established their headquarters in Kabul, one of the most pressing tasks facing them was to monitor the activities of Dost Muhammad in Turkistan. It soon became apparent that very little was known about the geography or politics of the amirid states beyond the Hindu Kush. British intelligence-gathering operations had, to this point, been mainly concentrated on the Afghan-controlled city-states of Herat, Qandahar and Kabul. What little information there was about the Uzbek states of Balkh and Turkistan was either outdated, inaccurate or misleading (Yapp 1980, 352). Nor could they rely on Shah Shuja' al-Mulk, for he had been in exile in India for decades and was more out of touch with political developments in Afghanistan than the British or Sikhs. Indeed, when Shah Shuja' had been Amir, Balkh had been a foreign country which attracted little interest south of the Hindu Kush.

This paucity of information about the Uzbek principalities, contributed further to the growing British misconceptions about the appanage. Initially, British officials were forced to rely heavily on the very limited knowledge of Alexander Burnes and Dr Lord, who were the only two European member of the Army of the Indus who had ever travelled in the region. This ignorance of the country beyond the Hindu Kush was quite astonishing, considering the situation. Sir William Macnaughten, the British Envoy at the Court of Shah Shuja', actually believed that Balkh was part of the Kingdom of Kabul and does not seem to have realised that at the time the region was ruled by a man appointed by Bukhara (Yapp 1980, 354). When he was informed of the true situation, Macnaughten merely dismissed the whole matter saying that "the conduct of the King of Bukhara," who by this time was holding the British officer, Colonel Stoddard, in one of his prisons, did not "merit any consideration."[144]

Calcutta, more concerned at this *lacuna* in its intelligence operation than the political officers in Kabul, urged Macnaughten to acquire "the fullest and most accurate information of the political condition of the countries lying near the Oxus," in order to assess "the practicability of maintaining the power of Shah Shooja and the influence of the British nation in that quarter of Asia."[145] However, before

[144] *Macnaughten to Maddock*, 30 Oct. 1839; *Nazir Khan Ollah at Bokhara to Macnaughten*, 24 Sept. (15 Rajab) 1839, ESL:144, encl. 11 (Secret & Confidential), no. 2.
[145] *Maddock to Macnaughten*, 2 Sept. 1839, ESL:144, encl. 37 [red], no. 7.

this request reached Kabul, Macnaughten had appointed Dr. Lord, who had already spent time in Qunduz, as a Political Assistant and sent him to Khulm[146] with orders to, "get friends of Shah Shooja ... at Koodooz and Khoolum and eject Dost Mahomed, using even public money for that purpose."[147] The reason for this move was the fear that Dost Muhammad would make his base in the unknown and inaccessible Chahar Wilayat, from where he could threaten both Herat and Kabul with impunity, possibly with Persian support.[148] Lord's brief was to try and prevent any such hypothetical alliance.

Lord, like many of the young political and military officers who must bear much of the blame for the fiasco of the first Anglo-Afghan War, had much more ambitious plans. Almost as soon as he had left for the north, he wrote to Macnaughten recommending the annexation of the whole of the region between the Hindu Kush and the Amu Darya to the realm of Shah Shuja'. Although this suggestion was rejected out of hand, Lord continued to advocate this aggressive policy of annexation using every means at his disposal. One of the most effective ways he promoted his views was by filing alarmist reports about the situation in Balkh which, at best, were based on bazaar gossip and, at the worst, probably fabrication. When Lord reported that Dost Muhammad Khan and the Mir Wali had entered into an anti-British alliance with their old enemy, Murad Beg of Qunduz, Macnaughten promised to send a brigade of Company troops beyond the Hindu Kush the following spring. Later, the British Envoy was told that the amirs who ruled the country between Bamiyan and Balkh were willing to submit to Shah Shuja'. On another occasion Lord claimed that Dost Muhammad and the Mir Wali planned to attack Kahmard, a fort to the north of Bamiyan. Dost Muhammad Khan was planning to go to Persia to enlist Qajar support, whilst, on another occasion, the Amir was said to have been invited to Bukhara by Nasrullah Khan, who had promised him one of his daughters in marriage, "with the province of Balk as a dowry" and an army of twelve thousand men for the conquest of Bamiyan (Stocqueler 72; Yapp 1980, 353-4).

Lord even found an excuse not to go to Khulm and to make his base at Bamiyan (Yapp 1980, 353). From this strategic outpost, and

[146] Dr P. B. Lord (1808-1840) was a medical doctor. For a more detailed discussion of Lord's aggressive frontier policy towards Khulm, see Yapp 1962 & 1980, 351-61.
[147] *Macnaughten to Lord*, 20 Aug. 1839, ESL:144, encl. 37 [red], no. 36.
[148] *Ibid.*

despite the onset of the Afghan winter, Lord lost no time in spreading the fear of a British invasion throughout Qataghan. The strategic district of Saighan, which lay on the north-south trade routes to the Amu Darya, was in turmoil. After its return to Afghan control, following Dost Muhammad Khan's campaign against Murad Beg, the area had become "torn by internal dissensions" due to a bitter internal dispute over the matter of the succession (Stocqueler, 66). One of the pretenders, Qilij Beg, sought the help of the Mir Wali of Khulm, who sent several hundred Uzbek troops, under his son, Ghulam Beg, and laid siege to Sar-i Sang fort. Muhammad 'Ali Beg, Qilij Beg's main rival, applied to Dr. Lord to support his claim. Using the excuse that, "a confidential follower of the ex-Ameer was in the camp of the besiegers and ... in the event of the capture of the place, this man was to have been nominated Governor in the name of Dost Mahomed Khan" (Stocqueler, 66), Lord sent Qilij Beg an ultimatum to lift the siege. When this expired without reply, he sent a force to relieve Muhammad 'Ali Beg which surprised the besiegers and forced Ghulam Beg to retreat (Yapp 1980, 354; Stocqueler, 68ff.). Having succeeded in repelling the attack by the Mir Wali and his allies, Lord promptly had the Afghan flag raised and claimed Saighan for Shah Shuja' (Yapp 1980, 354-5).

Next Lord turned his attention to the Chahar Wilayat. In November 1839 he used some of the public money at his disposal to send a "trusty man" to Sar-i Pul, Maimana, Shibarghan and Andkhui, "for the purpose of ascertaining how they are affected towards the Shah." This agent carried "secret credentials empowering him to induce these chiefs to intercept Dost Mohummud's flight towards Meshed should he attempt going in that direction."[149] By this time Lord's activities on this most sensitive of frontiers, was beginning to cause alarm both in Kabul and Calcutta. Macnaughten's reply to Lord's latest initiative sought to control the impetuosity of his political officer who was acting almost independently:

> I am ... doubtful as to the propriety of your mission to the chiefs of Sireepool, Shibbergaun, Andkoee and Meimuna. Those chiefs now owe allegiance to Bokhara and by sounding them as to how they are affected towards the Shah they may be induced to suppose that it is His Majesty's desire to extend his influence over those countries.... The circulation of such rumours, especially if it reached the Shah of Bokhara, might be extremely prejudicial to the interests of

[149] *Lord to Macnaughten*, 27 Nov. 1839, ESL:145, encl. 6 [black], no. 12. No report of this agent survives in the India Office Records.

> Shah Shooja.... I trust that you will observe the greatest caution in your communications with the chiefs in your neighbourhood so as to avoid compromising His Majesty's government....[150]

Macnaughten's fears about Bukharan intervention had little effect on Lord. In March 1840 he submitted detailed plans to the British Envoy for an invasion of Balkh in the following year. The force was to consist of "three regiments of the line, one of cavalry, the Gurkha corps, Horse Artillery, mortar battery, and 3,000 good Afghan cavalry."[151] Pressure was maintained on the amirs of Balkh province to bring them under Shah Shuja''s authority and, apparently in complete disregard of his superior's warning to tread carefully, Lord began to chip away at the fringes of Khulm's territory, moving the Afghan border imperceptibly northwards. Exploiting Macnaughten's ignorance of the geography of the area, Lord informed the British Envoy that the Kahmard valley, some thirty miles beyond Saighan, was the 'natural' defensive border of Afghan domains. Trusting his agent's opinion, Macnaughten consented to the area's annexation and, without further ado Bajgah, a village located at a particularly narrow part of the Kahmard valley, was occupied (Yapp 1980, 355). This new acquisition put Lord in a strong position to bully the Mir Wali. Letters, which contained both threats and promises, were sent to the amir. To make the point even more strongly, a group of surveyors was sent towards Aibak to report on the state of the road (Burslem 1846; Yapp 1980, 356ff.).

The Mir Wali, unaware that Lord had no official sanction for his Balkh policy, sought to exploit the British presence to his own advantage, realising that by claiming to act in the interests of Shah Shuja' and, by implication, his foreign sponsors, he could expand his influence into the Chahar Wilayat, where the native rulers were almost completely ignorant of the true state of affairs to the south. In the spring of 1840 the aged Zu'l-Faqar Sher Khan of Sar-i Pul finally passed away. Before his death, this indomitable ruler had divided his territory between his two sons. The eldest,[152] Mahmud Khan, [*c.*1840-1851],[153] was given charge of Sar-i Pul proper with twelve

[150] *Macnaughten to Lord*, 30 Dec. 1839, ESL:145, encl. 6 [black], no. 3.

[151] *Lord to Macnaughten*, 25 March 1840, ESL:150, encl. 64, no. 2.

[152] Harlan 1939, 29 says they were Zu'l-Faqar's brothers, but this is very unlikely given the age of Zu'l-Faqar Sher when he died and the age of the eldest, Mahmud.

[153] Pottinger says both the eldest and youngest sons of Zu'l-Faqar Sher Khan were called Muhammad. Lord in his letters to Macnaughten calls the ruler of Sar-i Pul, Muhammad, *Lord to Macnaughten*, 5 June 1840, ESL:150, encl. 85, no. 5. Neither Lord nor Pottinger actually met

hundred men at his command. Mahmud's half-brother, Qilij Khan, assisted by his younger full brother, Muhammad, ruled over the frontier district of Qurchi in the upper Shirin Tagab valley, where he had some seven hundred troops.[154] Even before their father died, there had been trouble between Mahmud and Qilij (Harlan 1939, 29). Once their father had passed on, open warfare broke out as the two brothers disputed the succession. Qilij Khan in Qurchi, supported by Muhammad Khan, joined forces with their father's old enemies, Mizrab Khan of Maimana and Rustam Khan of Shibarghan. Supported by troops from Maimana, Qilij Khan marched across the Mirza Wulang pass, whilst Rustam Khan sent an army southwards in a joint attack on Mahmud, who was holed up in the capital. The two columns converged at the fort of "Sagharah" (Sayad?) some six miles or so southwest of Sar-i Pul.[155] Even though he had a reputation for bravery and daring (Ferrier 1857, 225), Mahmud Khan was no match for the forces ranged against him and retreated into the citadel, appealing to the Mir Wali of Khulm, to come to his rescue (Ferrier 1857, 225).[156]

The Mir Wali seized his opportunity and marched to the relief of his beleaguered son-in-law, but first made sure that he was not going to be attacked by the Bukharan governor in Balkh by forcing 'Abd al-Jabbar Bi out of the Hazhda Nahr and installing the eldest son of Ishan Naqib, Ishan Saiyid Uraq. He, in turn, appointed his younger brother, Ishan Sudur, to the sub-governorship of Aqcha, which guarded the main road to Bukhara and the Amu Darya (*Gazetteer* (1907) ii, 43; Peacocke, 324; Talboys Wheeler, 36; Yapp 1962,

the eldest son of Zu'l-Faqar Sher Khan, though Lord corresponded with him and clerks frequently mistook the word 'Muhammad' for 'Mahmud'. Ferrier 1857, 203 who was in Sar-i Pul in 1845, had several audiences with the ruler of Sar-i Pul, whom he calls Mahmud. That Ferrier's Mahmud is the same individual who ruled Sar-i Pul when Pottinger and Lord were in Lesser Turkistan is reasonably certain, since his relationship as the son-in-law of the Mir Wali of Khulm is referred to by both sources. Following the Afghan invasion of Balkh in 1849, the ruler of Sar-i Pul is sometimes referred to as 'Mahmud' and on other occasions as 'Muhammad' in the English versions of agent's reports filed in the India Office Records. This makes it very difficult to decide whether, from 1849 onwards, the youngest son of Zu'l-Faqar Sher had succeeded his older brother, or whether Mahmud was still alive. However, the evidence suggests that Mahmud lived until *c.* 1860, when his brother, Qilij, succeeded him, though by this time they were both fugitives from the Afghans, living in Maimana. Qilij ruled from *c.* 1851-1861 and only then did the third son, Muhammad, succeed to his father's title. It would be unusual for Muhammad to have succeeded immediately after Mahmud's presumed death. Mahmud was born *c.* 1805; Ferrier 1857, 225 "about forty;" Pottinger, *Memoir*, 1839 "about 35."

[154] Pottinger, *Memoir*, 1839. Ferrier 1857, 225, mentions a fourth brother, Husain Khan, who governed Shibarghan for a brief period in 1846.

[155] *Lord to Macnaughten*, 5 June 1840; *Walee of Khooloom to Lord*, 26 May 1840, ESL:151, encl. 85, no. 5.

[156] *Walee of Khooloom to Lord*, 28 May, 5 June 1840.

513).[157] In the middle of May 1840 the Mir Wali arrived at Behsud,[158] a few miles north of Sar-i Pul, where he discovered, to his alarm, that the enemy forces were far greater than he had anticipated. In an attempt to extract himself from the situation without loss of dignity, the Mir Wali sent ambassadors to Mizrab Khan's camp demanding, in the name of Shah Shuja', that the siege of Sar-i Pul be lifted. In another letter, he informed Lord of his actions and appealed to the British agent and Nawab Akram Khan, who was still in Khulm, to come to his aid.[159]

When the Mir Wali's letter reached Mizrab Khan the Mingid ruler was concerned, for he had no wish to give any further excuse for the British to interfere in his affairs. Maimana was already under pressure from Major Todd, the British agent in Herat (see below). Lord's agents had already been active in the Chahar Wilayat and it was clear that the foreigners were endeavouring to force the region to accept the authority of Shah Shuja'. Believing that the Mir Wali was acting on behalf of the British-backed Amir of Kabul, Mizrab Khan and Rustam Khan lifted the siege and sent ambassadors to the Mir Wali's camp to settle the dispute, which was done, "without receiving anything for themselves." As part of the agreed terms, both Maimana and Shibarghan acknowledged Shah Shuja''s suzerainty and marched their armies back to their own countries.[160]

The Mir Wali was elated with his success. In a campaign lasting a matter of weeks, Khulm had again become one of the most important power brokers in Lesser Turkistan. Balkh was ruled by a governor who was indebted to him for his position, whilst he had succeeded in overawing Shibarghan and Maimana by a brazen bluff and ingratiated himself, in the process, with the new ruler of Sar-i Pul. All he had to do was to find suitable justification for his aggression so that he could divert any British criticism of his actions.

[157] The exact date of the Mir Wali's action at Balkh is hard to place as the sources give conflicting evidence. Yapp 1962, 513 places it in the following year, that is after the attack on Sar-i Pul, citing Macnaughten's repudiation of the Mir Wali's action as his source, a letter which was written in May 1841. However, this letter was a reaction subsequent to an event that had already taken place some while earlier and I have placed the Mir Wali's ousting of the Bukharan governor in 1840 rather than 1841.

[158] Not to be confused with the Hazara settlement located in Wardak province.

[159] *Lord to Macnaughten*, 25 May, 5 June 1840. According to Lord, Akram Khan had 2,000 Afghan troops in Khulm, *Lord to Macnaughten*, 22 June 1840, ESL:151, encl. 88, no. 3.

[160] *Walee of Khooloom to Lord*, 28 May 1840; *Macnaughten to Lord*, 8 June 1840, ESL:151, encl. 85, no. 5.

In a triumphant letter to Lord, he informed the British Agent that, in the name of Shah Shuja' and the British, he had "caused all the country from Maimana to the river Murghab, Shiberghan as far as the limits of Badalphshan (*sic*) to acknowledge the authority of the great government."[161] The Mir Wali, however, had seriously misunderstood the situation and the character of the British. Lord's policy towards Qataghan led the ruler of Khulm to conclude that the English were planning to incorporate the whole of the Balkh appanage into a greater Afghanistan and he thought that they could be fooled into believing that he was doing their dirty work whilst, in reality, he was merely extending his own power under a flag of convenience. After all, this is exactly what had happened when his father had been an ally of the Amirs of Kabul. Unfortunately for the Mir Wali, Macnaughten saw through the deception and far from congratulating him, the Envoy was extremely angry. Lord was informed that Khulm's intervention in the affairs of the Chahar Wilayat was not acceptable and could not be condoned. Indeed, it was extremely counter-productive to British policy in Afghanistan:

> The whole tenor of the ... chief's conduct towards us has been such as to warrant our adopting towards him that course which is most consistent with our own convenience. He has exercised a forcible interference in the affairs of Sar-i Pul which principality is, nominally at least, subject to Bokhara, and it may suit his present purpose to tender his allegiance to His Majesty, Shah Shoojah ool Moolk with a view to avert the danger by which he may be threatened in consequence of such interference.... He himself is acting the part of an enemy towards us in allowing the family of Dost Mahomed Khan an asylum in Kholoom and authorising them to collect the transit duties of that place which by his own admission belong to His Majesty.[162]

Macnaughten's refusal to endorse Khulm's aggression must have meant a considerable loss of face for the Mir Wali, who appears to have believed that his action in Balkh and Sar-i Pul would have ingratiated him with the British and staved off any military intervention from Bamiyan. When his ploy back-fired, the Mir Wali's position became completely untenable. He was forced to abandon his support for Mahmud Khan and relinquish his influence over Balkh, though Ishan Uraq and his brother continued to govern the area. However, in order to stay in power, Uraq had to agree to strike coins and read the *khutba*

[161] *Walee of Khooloom to Lord*, 28 May 1840.
[162] *Macnaughten to Lord*, 8 June 1840; cf. *Macnaughten to Lord*, 22 June 1840; Yapp 1980, 510.

in the name of Nasrullah Khan of Bukhara (Talboys Wheeler, 36; Yapp 1962, 510).[163]

In June, a few weeks after his *tour de force* through the Chahar Wilayat, in a bid to prevent an anticipated invasion, envoys from the Mir Wali and Qunduz arrived in Kabul offering to submit formally to Shah Shuja'. Macnaughten, though angry at his agent's proceedings in Bamiyan, astutely played on Khulm's fears and deliberately avoided any suggestion that Lord's 'Forward Policy' was not sanctioned by his superior officers (Yapp 1962, 510ff.; Yapp 1980, 356).[164] Futhermore, Macnaughten sought to exploit the rivalry which existed between Khulm and Qunduz by trying to persuade the envoy from Qunduz to agree to Murad Beg's overthrow of the Mir Wali, though nothing came of this scheme (Yapp 1980, 509). Eventually, the Mir Wali's ambassador, believing that his country was about to be forcibly annexed to Afghan territory, had little option but to agree to pay Shah Shuja' an annual tribute and to allow an Afghan garrison to reside in Khulm (Yapp 1962, 510). Lord's "confidence trick" (Yapp 1980, 336) thus succeeded, at least temporarily, in bringing about the submission of two important Uzbek amirs and for a while Macnaughten and his officials convinced themselves that the pacification of 'Afghanistan' was almost achieved. But they were living in a fool's paradise. Even as the envoys were signing the terms of submission, Khulm was secretly intriguing with Ishan Shuja' al-Din of Mazar-i Sharif and the rulers of Qunduz and Sar-i Pul to declare a *jihad* against the British (Yapp 1980, 510).[165]

Dost Muhuammad Khan in Bukhara and Balkh, 1840

Meanwhile, Dost Muhammad Khan, uncertain of Khulm's intentions and in defiance of a highly unfavourable augury (n. 1 above), fled to Bukhara with a large entourage. Dost Muhammad, like the son of Shah Kamran earlier, was not well received and given no state allowance. Soon the Afghan refugees were in such financial straights that

[163] The contemporary accounts do not mention the name of the ruler of Balkh after the Mir Wali relinquished his rights there. Talboys Wheeler says Balkh was returned to the Governor of Aqcha, i.e. Ishan Uraq (cf. *Gazetteer* (1907) ii, 43-4; Peacocke, 324). In 1845, Ferrier 1857, 202 records that Ishan Uraq was governor of Aqcha and Ishan Sudur, Wali of Balkh, though it was certainly the other way around.
[164] Ironically, in May 1840, Lord Auckland actually sanctioned a limited advance to the Amu Darya under certain strict conditions, but the dispatch authorising this arrived too late to be of any use (Yapp 1980, 357).
[165] *Lord to Macnaughten*, 22 June 1840.

they were forced to sell their weapons and armour. Although the sardar was eventually granted permission to leave, Dost Muhammad discovered, just in time, that Nasrullah Khan had given orders that the boat which was to take him across the Amu Darya should conveniently sink as soon as they had left the shore. When the Bukharan Khan realised that Dost Muhammad was aware of the assassination attempt, the armed guard who had accompanied the Afghan ruler forced him to return to Bukhara. A short while later, a number of senior members of the Amir's party tried to escape, but were caught and all the refugees were imprisoned, though subsequently Nasrullah Khan released a number of Dost Muhammad's party so they could arrange for the Amir's family to be sent to Kabul (Katib i, 151-3).

As matters went from bad to worse, members of Dost Muhammad's family advised him not to worry about their fate but to seek his own safety in flight. The Amir secretly purchased a horse and, disguised as a dervish, made good his escape to Shahr-i Sabz. In response, Nasrullah Khan promptly threw Sardar Akbar Khan, the heir apparent to the Kabul throne, into the *Siya Chah*, or Black Well. A large party of cavalry was sent out in pursuit of Dost Muhammad Khan, but it was too late. The *Amir-i Kabir* was given sanctuary by a Kabuli family in Shahr-i Sabz but, when the governor of Shahr-i Sabz, who was at odds with Bukhara, heard that such a distinguished personage was in the city, he put the government guest house at Dost Muhammad's disposal. Aided by a guard of seven hundred cavalry provided by the governor, Dost Muhammad Khan recrossed the Amu Darya without further trouble and made his way to Qunduz. However, the Amir was never to forget the treatment he had received at the hands of the Manghit ruler and he vowed to avenge the insult, a personal vendetta which was to have an important influence on the subsequent course of Central Asian history (Katib i, 157).

Dost Muhammad reached Qataghan around August 1840, just over a month after Khulm and Qunduz had signed the treaty in Kabul. He was warmly welcomed and, accompanied by five thousand cavalry from the region, travelled onwards to Aibak where the Mir Wali, still recovering from the humiliation of the Sar-i Pul fiasco and the treaty with Shah Shuja', raised the flag of *jihad*. Amidst rumours that Dost Muhammad Khan would make concessions to the Uzbeks, including appointing the Mir Wali as his wazir if Kabul were recaptured from the invaders, hundreds of Uzbeks flocked to the Amir's standard (Katib i, 157-8; Yapp 1962, 511-2). Thus, within a matter of weeks,

the treaty between Qataghan and Kabul was not worth the paper it had been written on.

After assembling at Aibak, the force, consisting mainly of Uzbeks, Tajiks and Turkmans, marched south and attacked the British outpost at Bajgah in such strength that Dr. Lord had to retreat to Bamiyan (Stocqueler, 91ff.; Yapp 1962, 511-3 & 1980, 358). However, shortly after this success, the Mir Wali became extremely suspicious about Dost Muhammad's intentions, particularly in respect of Balkh. Both he and Murad Beg, therefore, withdrew support for him and set out to mend their bridges with the British and Shah Shuja' al-Mulk. On 28 September a second treaty between the rulers of Qataghan and the Kabul government was signed, which contained far more favourable terms for the Mir Wali, as it provided for the return of Kahmard and, eventually, Saighan (Yapp 1962, 512-3).

This agreement signalled the end of Khulm and Turkistan's direct involvement in the First Anglo-Afghan War. Not only so, but it was to be the final nail in the coffin of Lord's 'Forward Policy', although his frontier philosophy continued to permeate British attitudes to Balkh for the next century. By the winter of 1840, Bamiyan had been abandoned and Charikar, in the Koh Daman valley, was the most forward British position in 'Northern Afghanistan' (Macrory, 115; Yapp 1980, 359).

The withdrawal of support by the Uzbek amirs of Qataghan left Dost Muhammad Khan in limbo. Qandahar, Jalalabad and Kabul were occupied by British troops and he was cut off from his natural supporters, the Afghan tribes. Behind him, the Uzbeks of Qataghan and Lesser Turkistan had realised that there was nothing to be gained by helping the Amir to regain power, for a weak, central government was very much in their interests. Nor could Dost Muhammad expect any help from Shah Kamran, the Sadozai ruler of Herat, for he was in receipt of an extremely generous British subsidy and was not eager to slay the goose which continued to lay so many golden eggs. Caught between the upper and nether millstones, the Amir-i Kabir had to make a difficult decision.

In the end, Dost Muhammad Khan probably reckoned that it was too risky to try and make a dash for the Qandahar region, yet he could scarcely hope to seize Kabul without a sizeable army whose racial and tribal loyalties were predominantly the same as his own. With only a few followers left and the icy, mountain winter approaching, Dost Muhammad tried, unsuccessfully, to win over the Hazaras, and

merely succeeded in alienating the Mir Wali even further (Katib i, 157-8; Yapp 1962, 512-3).[166]

Next he tried his luck with the Afghan amirs of Kohistan, who had shown signs of discontent with the regime of Shah Shuja'. Unrest in Koh Daman had led to a British force being sent to the area where, as a consequence of the activities of the ubiquitous Alexander Burnes, a series of confrontations ensued between the invaders and local amirs. Encouraged by reports and letters which hinted that, if the Amir came to the area, the whole district would rise in his favour, Dost Muhammad Khan headed for Charikar. On 2 November 1840, at Parwan Darra, there was an indecisive encounter with a British force, during which Dr. Lord, and a number of other officers, were cut to pieces when Shah Shuja''s native cavalry refused to charge the enemy's ranks (Yapp 1960, 516-9). The following day Dost Muhammad Khan, in what was probably one of the most extraordinary decisions in an extraordinary war, rode into Kabul, virtually unaccompanied, and voluntarily signified his submission to British authority by placing his forehead against the stirrup of the astonished British envoy, Sir William Macnaughten, who was out for his evening ride (Katib i, 158-9; Macrory, 116; Stocqueler, 138).

The 'Surrender' of Dost Muhammad Khan

The significance of the Amir-i Kabir's action, and the reason for his most puzzling decision to abandon the armed struggle, has excited little comment from scholars, who either record the bare details of Dost Muhammad Khan's arrival in Kabul and his subsequent exile to India before passing on to other matters (e.g. Stocqueler, 138-9; Yapp 1980, 359), or offer a variety of explanations, some quite bizarre, for the Amir's unexpected action (e.g. Dupree 1978, 382; Fraser-Tytler, 115).

Not unexpectedly, British historians of the last century, and the more populist writers who follow uncritically in their wake, use this occasion to indulge in jingoistic propaganda. According to this school of thought, the Amir, "deeply impressed" by the bravery (*sic*) of the British officers at Parwan Darra, and despairing that he and, by implication, the Afghan nation as a whole, could withstand the rising

[166] The Amir's representative, Mirza Sunni Khan, remained in Khulm throughout the period of Dost Muhammad Khan's exile, during which time he "acquired considerable influence over the Uzbeks and Turkmans," *Memorandum on the Northern Boundaries of Affghanistan*, 1869.

star of the British with their superior technology and organisation, decided to accept the inevitable and surrender, a belief which, it is argued, was reinforced by his subsequent exile in India (e.g. Edwardes, 60; Norris, 4-5; Macrory, 115, *et al.*). Yet the recent military operations in the Koh Daman had starkly exposed the vulnerability of Shah Shuja''s native troops and demonstrated that, if the British wished to keep him in power, it could only be achieved by committing a large number of their own, regular troops to Afghanistan, and that for the foreseeable future. Subsequently, a number of letters of support for Dost Muhammad Khan from Afghan tribal leaders fell into the hands of the British, further indication that the Amir was far from beaten or defeated (Yapp 1960, 517-9).

Others explain the Amir's action by claiming that Dost Muhammad Khan was worried about his family, who had been surrendered to the British by the Mir Wali earlier in the year (Yapp 1980, 359), even though the Amir had previously declared that, when it came to resisting the invaders, it was as if he had no family. Fraser-Tytler, on the other hand, merely dismisses the whole matter by asserting that the Afghan leader had "shot his bolt" (Fraser-Tytler, 115)

Dupree, though admitting that Dost Muhammad Khan's action continues to puzzle both western and Afghan historians, advances the theory that his surrender was rooted in "the tribalism of Afghan cultural patterns" (Dupree 1978, 382). It does not require a great deal of knowledge of Pushtun tribal tradition to realise how hollow this explanation sounds, though one must give Dupree credit for recognising that something of profound significance in the history of Afghanistan had taken place. Even a passing acquaintance with Pushtu *landai* poetry, the verse of Khushhal Khan Khattak or, more recently, the Afghan tribes' almost suicidal resistance to the Soviet occupation of their country, shows that no self-respecting Pushtun gives up the fight just because he is outnumbered, or his enemy is better armed and organised. Custom, religion, tribal law and his own honour demand that the enemy, especially if he is an infidel, must be expelled, even if this means the loss of all material possessions or even martyrdom.

All the evidence from Dost Muhammad Khan's life suggests that he was of the same persuasion. Only a matter of months prior to his 'surrender' he declared, in his famous phrase, that he was like a wooden spoon which, though tossed hither or thither, remained unharmed by the experience. Such a statement indicated an unflinching resolve to continue the struggle whatever the odds. Nor is there the

slightest suggestion, either by western or Afghan historians, that the Amir's submission was an act of capitulation or betrayal. Yet we cannot dismiss the Amir's grasping of the stirrup as some oriental eccentricity, even if Macnaughten or British colonial historians tended to regard it as such.

If we are to seek an explanation for Dost Muhammad Khan's decision in the context of the indigenous culture, as Dupree rightly suggests, then we must find it not in some untenable notion that the Amir felt honour had been satisfied, but in the attitude that, in any apparent compromise with the enemy, the goal must remain the same. It is just that different, and perhaps more subtle, means are being employed. As far as the end that Dost Muhammad Khan had in mind, we know that his lifelong ambition had always been to strengthen the emerging Afghan monarchical system and unite the country under a single leader. His dealings with Macnaughten, therefore, have to be seen as the use of somewhat different means to this end.

No historian, apparently, has yet commented on the significance of the actual action of Dost Muhammad Khan grasping Macnaughten's stirrup. Yet the key to understanding the reason for Dost Muhammad's decision to go to Kabul, lies in this act. In the context of Central Asian culture, this custom is never associated with the unconditional surrender of a defeated foe. Depending on the relationship of the conquered to the conqueror, the extent of the defeat suffered, the terms demanded by the conquering power, and so forth, various protocols were observed. At the very extreme, rebellious feudatories, when finally brought to heel, would often present themselves before the Imperial Presence clothes in a shroud and with a sword or noose hanging from their necks, to symbolise that they recognised they were worthy of death (e.g. Juzjani i, 36-7). On such occasions the petitioner, more than likely heavily guarded and manacled, would fling himself at the feet of the conqueror and sue for mercy. In the case of lesser offences, the petitioner would still not dare to approach the throne until granted permission, or might offer to kiss the victor's shadow or feet.

Rikab g(e)riftan, within the Central Asian system of protocol, symbolises a quite different sort of master-servant relationship and has nothing to do with the capitulation, defeat or surrender of an enemy. Persian has several phrases (*rasmi rikabi, rikabi homayun*, etc.) which juxtaposes the Persian word for 'stirrup' with the supreme authority and position of the Emperor, Sultan or Shah. These phrases all refer

to the political relationship which pertains between the superior, sovereign, or imperial power and authorities of a subordinate, or subordinated, kind.

In the Turco-Mongolian world a similar pattern can be detected. The nobles at the court of Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni were said to be "in attendance at his [i.e. the Sultan's] stirrup" (Juzjani i, 118). In the seventeenth century, whenever Nazr Muhammad Khan, the great Tuqay-Timurid wali of Balkh, was visited by, or visited, his elder brother, Imam Quli Khan, Nazr Muhammad dismounted and walked at the side of the Khan's horse, whilst, at the same time, holding his brother's stirrup in his hand (Burton, 26-7; see also Juzjani ii, 1052). In so doing, Nazr Muhammad Khan symbolised his acceptance of Imam Quli's superiority as the Supreme Khan. Even though Nazr Muhammad had the right of life and death within the Balkh appanage, he sought to reassure his elder brother that, when it came to ultimate sovereign authority within the Chingizid realms, Balkh was the inferior power. Nazr Muhammad thus indicated publicly that he had no wish to challenge his brother's position and that he continued to uphold the Chingizid order. In such instances there is no suggestion of the stirrup-holder being under threat of punishment for rebellion; on the contrary, it indicated that the individual held an important position within the empire. Dost Muhammad Khan's action can be only interpreted in the light of these ancient and widely-held rules of oriental protocol. After all, before the Afghans became independent they had been subjects of both the Safawids and Mughals and were familiar with the etiquette which obtained at both Imperial courts.

It would seem reasonable, therefore, to suggest, that Dost Muhammad Khan neither capitulated nor surrendered to Macnaughten, nor was his action an admission of defeat (see Katib i, 158-9). Had this been so, we could have expected the Amir to have lost all public sympathy and credibility amongst the Afghans. It is interesting, in this context, to note that, unlike Shah Shuja' al-Mulk and, to a lesser degree, subsequent Amirs of Afghanistan, Dost Muhammad's reputation, in respect of his dealings with the British, has emerged untarnished despite this act which the British and colonial historians generally interpreted as unconditional surrender.

Dost Muhammad Khan's grasping of Macnaughten's stirrup was his means of signifying his acceptance of the fact that the mantle of supreme sovereignty over India and Central Asia had fallen on the British and, like the Mughal Emperors whom they had surplanted, the

East India Company now held the right to appoint the ruler of his country. As a monarch in his own right, Dost Muhammad Khan also indicated to Macnaughten, the supreme representative of British *civil* power in Afghanistan, that he was prepared to co-operate with the 'new world order', rather than to resist it. However, in doing so, he made it plain that he would do so only as a ruler in his own right, and not like the quisling, Shah Shuja', who required the presence of a foreign, infidel, army to keep him on the throne (see Katib i, 159).

It is significant that Atkinson, in his famous and romanticised drawing of Dost Muhammad Khan's submission (Macrory, facing page 192), depicts the Amir adopting not a cowed, feudal posture, before Macnaughten, but as a highly dignified sovereign shaking the British Envoy by the hand. Although the *Siraj al-Tawarikh* records that, following an exchange of greetings and the formal submission, it was Macnaughten who offered Dost Muhammad Khan his hand (Katib i, 159), a casual viewer, unaware of the historical context of the picture, could be forgiven for thinking that Atkinson's sketch was actually depicting the amicable conclusion of a treaty of friendship between an oriental potentate and a British envoy. The symbolism of the handshake is thus as significant, in terms of European iconography, as is the grasping of the stirrup to Central Asian protocol.

Even before the occupation of southern Afghanistan, Dost Muhammad Khan had demonstrated to Burnes his willingness to sign a treaty with the British, doubtless realising even then that in order to unite the Afghan tribes he needed to live in peace with his powerful southern neighbour. The stumbling block was, that there was no honour in signing an agreement which was all to the advantage of the other side, and the Burnes negotiations were broke off. The Amir's flight to Khulm, following the British occupation, meant he was a refugee in what was still, for an Afghan, a foreign country. The region was governed by amirs whose linguistic, tribal, historical and political affinities were totally different from his own. He represented the new, Durrani, order; the Uzbeks were the inheritors of the half millennium of Chingizid supremacy, a supremacy which the Afghans had long chafed and suffered under when subjects of the Mughals. Thus, the coolness of Dost Muhammad's reception in Bukhara cannot come as a surprise, for Nasrullah Khan was the most powerful, living representative of the rival Chingizid order. Neither the amirs of Balkh, nor the Manghits, had the remotest interest in helping re-establish a strong, centralising Afghan ruler in Kabul, for this would pose a

serious threat to their own interests in Balkh and, possibly, in Transoxiana as well. Dost Muhammad Khan's forefathers had all interfered, to one degree or another, in the affairs of Balkh and only a matter of months previously, Dost Muhammad Khan had sent his army across the Hindu Kush and dealt a mortal blow to the power of Murad Beg of Qunduz. Not only so, but he had even threatened Bukhara's control over Balkh. The antipathy between Nasrullah Khan and Dost Muhammad Khan, therefore, can be traced much further back and ran far deeper than the treatment meted out to the Amir and his relatives during his short period of exile. Underlying the bad blood was a power struggle for the possession of one of the most productive regions of Central Asia, the province of Balkh and the Hazdha Nahr.

After his return across the Amu Darya, the extent of the Uzbek amirs' assistance to the Afghan's cause was limited to the recapture of Kahmard and Saighan, both places which, historically, had been part of the Tuqay-Timurid dominions, but which had recently been unilaterally annexed to Afghanistan by Dr Lord. Once these ancient possessions were retaken, the amirs left Dost Muhammad to fend for himself. Consequently, the Amir-i Kabir, bereft of support and cut off from the Pushtun heartlands south of the Hindu Kush, was unable to raise an army of sufficient size to march on Kabul. To stay at large in the Hazarajat or Balkh was to run the risk of betrayal, capture or assassination. The only alternative for any long-term future, was to place himself in the hands of the British, knowing they would treat him well, and bide his time until the foreigners were forced to withdraw or abandon their support for the unpopular and aged Shah Shuja', at which time Britain would have to face the issue of the Afghan succession. Provided he showed that his desire for friendship with the British had been unaffected by the invasion and that he was prepared to forget, if not forgive, there was a distinct possibility that the Indian authorities would allow him to return to Afghanistan and fill the power vacuum.

Such an idea may also have been in the minds of the British when Dost Muhammad surrendered. Shah Shuja' had, not unexpectedly, asked for the Amir-i Kabir to be handed over to him for execution (Macrory, 114). Instead, Macnaughten treated Dost Muhammad not so much as a government prisoner but as a state guest. When it came to sending him to India, the British envoy almost apologised to the Amir and requested the administration that he be treated with "all liberality" (Dupree 1978, 382). Indeed, Macnaughten tacitly admitted

that he had a greater respect for Dost Muhammad Khan than Shah Shuja'. When the Amir arrived in India, his treatment was no less regal. Later, Dost Muhammad Khan admitted that this period of exile taught him much about the British and this first-hand exposure to what was happening in India appears to have reinforced his belief that the best way forward was for the Afghans to co-operate with the British rather than live at perpetual war with them (Gregorian, 81; Macrory, 116-7; Stocqueler, 140). Finally, in support of this argument, we must take into account how, following the failure of the expedition in Afghanistan, the British, who had villified Dost Muhammad Khan prior to the invasion, remarkably allowed him to return to Afghanistan and resume the reins of power without, apparently, any formal agreement or treaty. To do so was either an act of supreme folly, or a recognition by the British that their and the Afghan Amir's interests in Central Asia were, essentially, the same.

Britian, Herat and the Chahar Wilayat, 1839-1842

Lord was not alone in his ambition to extend British power to the banks of the Amu Darya. Pottinger and, after him, D'Arcy Todd, the British agents in Herat, also espoused the same cause. After the Persians abandoned the siege in September 1838, Eldred Pottinger stayed on as Political Officer, becoming more and more embroiled in the internal politics of Herat and Badghis. His advocacy of an enlarged Afghanistan was justified on the grounds of moral, economic and political imperatives. Like many of his contemporaries he was appalled at the "abominable traffic"[167] of the slave trade which was conducted by the Uzbek, Turkman and Aimaq states on both sides of the Amu Darya but in which Herat, too, was deeply implicated.[168] The suppression of this trade was, in Pottinger's view, sufficient justification for intervention, but there was also the need to prevent an Uzbek coalition forming against Shah Shuja'. Pottinger too, like Burnes, saw considerable commercial advantages in opening the Amu Darya as an avenue for British goods from India.[169]

During the winter of 1838/9 Yar Muhammad and Pottinger had a series of meetings in which the status of the Chahar Wilayat was

[167] *Pottinger to Macnaughten*, 25 May 1839, ESL:141, encl. 33, no. 3.
[168] According to Conolly, Herat was the main supplier of slaves to the Central Asian markets during 1838-40, Conolly, *Bamiyan to Merve*, 1840.
[169] *Pottinger to Macnaughten*, 25 May 1839.

discussed at some length. It would not have required much intelligence for Yar Muhammad Khan to realise that Pottinger had little time for the independent status of the countries north of the Hindu Kush. In this respect Pottinger and Yar Muhammad had much in common.

The wazir, seeing an opportunity to extend Herat's frontiers, became "very pressing" and urged Pottinger to seek permission from his superiors for the annexation of Maimana and Andkhui.[170] Trusting to British ignorance of the pre-Afghan history of Balkh, Yar Muhammad justified Herat's claim to sovereignty on the basis of the mutual defence treaty which Maimana and other states of the Chahar Wilayat had signed in *c.* 1833. Pottinger, who needed little convincing, wrote to Macnaughten claiming that these territories were "only appendages of the Dourany crown ... ready to drop into the hands of the first army that invades them" and recommending that they should be occupied "immediately." However, he scrupled about Herat acting as proxy for British policy because of the "barbarous troops" and the "ravages" that Yar Muhammad "would be unable to prevent his men making."[171] Instead, Pottinger urged that Britain should pre-empt Yar Muhammad Khan by occupying these states in the name of Shah Shuja'.[172]

Pottinger's plea, coming as it did even before Kabul had fallen to the British army, was ignored and it was only after Shah Shuja' had been established in the Afghan capital that Macnaughten responded to his recommendations. Pottinger was informed that permission for such a radical course of action would require "special instructions from Government" though Macnaughten stated that he had "no hesitation in approving your discussion of the attack meditated upon them [i.e. the Chahar Wilayat] by Yar Mahomed Khan," and accepted unquestioningly the right of Herat to annex the area. Pottinger was ordered to procrastinate further, "without causing serious offence,"[173] pending further orders from India.

The issue of the Chahar Wilayat was but one cause of tension between Pottinger and the rulers of Herat during the spring and summer of 1839. Pottinger had attempted to persuade Yar Muhammad to reform some of the excesses, which had brought distress and anguish to the ordinary citizens of Herat, but had signally failed (Yapp 1980,

[170] *Ibid.*
[171] *Ibid.*
[172] *Ibid.*
[173] *Macnaughten to Pottinger*, 11 Aug. 1839, ESL:144, encl. 37 [red], no. 3.

362). Instead, Yar Muhammad unwilling to, or incapable of, such a reformation became increasingly irritated by the officer's interference. Inevitably, an unpleasant confrontation ensued during which Pottinger, always more a man of action than a diplomat, forcibly expelled a brother of the wazir from his house. This was the last straw as far as his superiors were concerned and, although they were grateful to Pottinger for saving Herat from the Persians, Calcutta was increasingly concerned about his subsequent conduct. Pottinger had effectively taken over the administration of the state and, when relations between himself and the authorities in Herat began to deteriorate, recommended the overthrow of Shah Kamran and Herat's incorporation in Shah Shuja''s realms. Since such actions were contrary to British policy, someone with a great deal more diplomatic experience was sent to replace Pottinger. Major D'Arcy Todd,[174] who had served in Persia under Sir John McNeill, was appointed in Pottinger's place (Yapp 1980, 362-3).[175]

Pottinger returned to Kabul, travelling via Badghis, Maimana, Qurchi, Sar-i Pul and Bamiyan across the Tir Band-i Turkistan. In so doing, he became the first European to traverse this mountain range via the Andarab and Balkh Ab valleys. Unfortunately his private journal of this journey has not survived, though a copy of his annotated map is in the India Office collection.[176] He reached Maimana in the early winter of 1839, probably a short while after Lord's agent, and found Mizrab Khan trying to deal with many conflicting demands that were being made on Maimana. The Persian ambassador, who had been placed in Maimana as a result of the treaty with the Asaf al-Daula, had only just been dismissed,[177] but despite the presence of this

[174] Yapp 1980, 364 calls Todd "inexperienced" but this is not so. For Todd's life, see Kaye 1904, ii, 293-386.

[175] Burnes had originally been offered the job, but he insisted as a condition of acceptance that he be allowed to implement Pottinger's recommendations for Herat's rulers to be overthrown. This pre-condition went against the current policy of supporting the Sadozai monarch. A few weeks after Pottinger had been replaced, Lord Auckland wrote to Macnaughten refusing to endorse Pottinger's strategy for extending Afghanistan to the Amu Darya, *Maddock to Macnaughten*, 2 Sept. 1839.

[176] For his official report, see Pottinger, *Memoir*, 1839. His route map is located at L.XVI.13 [X/3049/2/1-4]. Enlarged copies from the original maps, fifteen in all, are catalogued at X.3049/1/1-15 and include charts of the Herat, Maimana and Sar-i Pul regions.

From Sar-i Pul Pottinger travelled southwards up the Andarab valley, crossed into the upper Balkh Ab river and on to Bamiyan via Dahan-i Kashan ("Zarung"), Sulich ("Zewalup"), Sokhtagi ("Sokhlugy"), Sabz Darra ("Dara Subz"), Deh-i Surkh ("Deh Soorkh/Hoorkh"), and Yakolang ("Yukoolunj"). See also, Kaye 1904, ii, 292ff. This was a different route from Arthur Conolly's the following year.

[177] *Ibid.* In November 1839.

envoy, the wali had continued to correspond with other rulers around him[178] and had recently been approached by the Khan Hazrat of Khiva to provide military help against the Russians (Yapp 1980, 391-2).[179]

Pottinger was the first official representative of British power to visit Maimana and his main concern was to wean Mizrab Khan and his allies from supporting the refugee Afghan Amir, whilst the wali's sole wish was not to "draw the enmity of the powerful"[180] upon himself. Too close an alliance with Shah Shuja', only a few months after he had been put on the Afghan throne by the British, could have meant disaster for Maimana were Dost Muhammad to succeed in throwing out the *farangis* and regaining his throne. The sensibilities of Nasrullah Khan in Bukhara and possible adverse reactions from Yar Muhammad or Khiva had also to be taken into account. On the other hand, Mizrab Khan could not afford to alienate the British lest they use this as an excuse to overthrow him.

The wali's predicament led him to treat Pottinger with distant respect. Discussions between him and Pottinger were conducted through a third party, the officially-appointed *mehmandar*,[181] to avoid any accusation by surrounding rulers that Maimana had made a secret deal with the foreigners. Mizrab Khan distanced himself from Dost Muhammad Khan, informing Pottinger that he had refused the Amir of Kabul permission to travel through his country to the Court of Muhammad Shah of Persia. He publicly disparaged the Afghan ruler and showed Pottinger copies of letters from Dost Muhammad Khan and Murad Beg of Qunduz, the contents of which were hostile to the British. However, Pottinger did not see any of the wali's replies, probably because they revealed much more sympathy for the Amir's cause than Mizrab Khan wished his British guest to know about.

Mizrab's fears about British intentions in respect of the Cis Oxus province were well founded, for Pottinger, unaware that his opinions had been rejected by Calcutta,[182] exploited his journey to reinforce his views on the annexation of Balkh to Afghanistan. In his official report, Pottinger graphically described a country which, he alleged, was

[178] *Ibid. Pottinger to Macnaughten*, 4 Feb. 1839, ESL:139, encl. 18, no. 1122.

[179] Pottinger, *Memoir*, 1839.

[180] *Ibid.*

[181] *Ibid.* The *mehmandar*, or 'host,' was an individual either appointed by the local ruler, or sometimes chosen by the guest/official himself, who was responsible for the entertainment and housing of official and important personages. He was usually a man of considerable influence and wealth.

[182] *Maddock to Macnaughten*, 2 Sept. 1839.

in the grip of anarchy, presided over by debauched, sadistic and corrupt rulers. Mizrab Khan, he recorded, was "dull and inactive, cowardly and time serving;" Shah Pasand Khan Firozkohi was "the most tyrannical of any" of the Aimaq amirs whose subjects had been "alienated by his barbarities;" Ibrahim Khan Firozkohi, another Aimaq amir, he condemned as "an ignorant, tyrannical chief" with "a brutal lust for his own sex," and so on.

Having thus roundly damned these petty rulers as vice-ridden despots, Pottinger extended his condemnation to every ruler on both banks of the Amu Darya:

> They are ignorant, tyrannical and cowardly oppressors, who use their power but to plunder and enslave the weak; while they fear to check the insubordinate, or assert the rights of justice.... The political condition of these countries may thus be briefly summed up. The weak, cruel tyrannies of Bokhara and Khiva, no longer held together by frugal and resolute hands, but governed by weak and debauched princes, inimical to, and afraid of, each other, are tottering, and await but a blow to overset them. The leaders of tribes are in rebellion to their Kings; the Chiefs of Clans are disaffected to them; and the heads of families insubordinate to all; no combination, no unanimity, except in disorder, is visible, while jealousy and suspicion of all around, appears in every action...[183]

It is hardly unexpected, therefore, to read that Pottinger recommended the annexation of these states was a moral obligation which, incidentally, would also prove highly advantageous, commercially and strategically, to Britain.

> The occupation of these countries, under every view, is an absolute necessity, if there be danger of an attack on the British possessions from west or northwest. In a financial point of view, the country is fertile, rich in metals and minerals; is the grand mercantile route to Central Asia from India and Persia, while its inhabitants are rich and industrious, and inclined to commerce; and it promises to aid the Affghan (*sic*) treasury most materially. In a military point, it connects the flanks of our position, if I may so call the extremities of our north-west frontier, Balkh and Herat, by a slight concave line of 400 miles (speaking in round numbers) while our present line of defence extends from Bameean via Cabool and Candahar, to Herat above 700 miles.... Besides, the occupation of them will give us an opportunity of totally suppressing the Slave Trade in these countries. I am the last person to advocate aggression even in that cause, but where the country is so necessary for our defence and the Dooraunee Crown has so undoubted a right, the calls of humanity, if not of justice, demand consideration.[184]

[183] Pottinger, *Memoir*, 1839.
[184] *Ibid.*

Whilst Pottinger journeyed onwards to Kabul, Yar Muhammad Khan set to work on his successor, Major Todd, manipulating him into endorsing his plan to conquer the Chahar Wilayat. His hand was strengthened when Todd, shortly after arriving in Herat, concluded an agreement with Kamran, which extended diplomatic recognition to the Sadozai ruler and an annual subsidy of £30,000. Todd, however, quickly realised this policy had serious flaws, for there was little prospect that Herat would be self-supporting within the foreseeable future. This conclusion presented the distinctly undesirable prospect that Britain would be obliged to prop up a bankrupt Herat with ever-increasing and neverending handouts of Company rupees (Yapp 1980, 361ff.).

The reasons for Herat's poverty were partly to do with the long-term mismanagement of affairs by Shah Kamran and Yar Muhammad, whose brutality had forced many thousands of Heratis to flee to neighbouring states. Furthermore, the recent war with Persia had badly disrupted trade and the area was in the grip of famine, the result not of any climatic deviation, but humanity's obsession with beating ploughshares into swords. On the approach of Muhammad Shah's army, Yar Muhammad had adopted a policy of scorched earth in an attempt to cut off the Persians' supplies and all the villages within a twelve mile radius of the city had been destroyed and their crops burnt.[185] The Persian army's prolonged siege had further exacerbated the situation. Foragers, sent to search for food to feed the army, had scavenged far and wide. Fields for miles around had been stripped bare of crops, trees were cut down for fuel and the network of underground canals (*karez* or *qanats*) had either been filled in, destroyed or collapsed through neglect.

Todd set about making a survey of the economic situation in Herat and reported that a mere eight thousand people, or less than a fifth of the city's estimated population in 1830, were still living within the walls. The defences had been badly damaged by the Persian artillery and, when the population of the city had finally begun to return after the besiegers had departed, they found their houses had been destroyed in the bombardment.[186] To try and relieve some of the immediate effects of the famine, Todd established a famine relief

[185] *McNeill to Palmerston*, 30 Oct. 1837, in *Correspondence Related to Persia and Afghanistan 1834-39*, encl. 7, fols. 13-14, SPDL:A7/1.
[186] Todd, *State of Herat*, 2 Oct. 1839. This report contains details about the Sunni Hazara and other Aimaq tribes of Badghis.

programme, which earned him wide-spread respect from the local populace.

On the political front, however, Todd was forced to conclude that the state of Herat could not survive as an economical entity. For a while, during the winter of 1840, he espoused the policy of Pottinger and advocated the incorporation of Herat into an enlarged Afghanistan. The Governor-General, though, remained adamantly opposed to any such action. Instead, the policy of subsidising Herat was continued and expanded (Yapp 1980, 366). Todd handed over increasingly large sums of money to Yar Muhammad who, realising the strategic importance accorded to Herat by his foreign allies, exploited the situation to the full by demanding frequent cash payments for various projects and hinting that, if he did not find satisfaction from the British, he would turn to Persia (Yapp 1980, 366).[187] Hence, when Yar Muhammad again raised the matter of British assistance in the annexation of the Chahar Wilayat and Sistan, Todd enthusiastically supported the plan as a means of making the state less dependent on subsidies.

Since part of Todd's brief was to resolve outstanding boundary disputes, in February 1840 he forwarded to Macnaughten a detailed report, with map, on the frontier issue which strongly supported Herat's claim to sovereignty over the Chahar Wilayat and Sistan. Sistan, he wrote, had belonged to Herat "from the time of Ahmad Shah," whilst, in the north, Herat's rights to the territory betwen itself and the Oxus, including Badghis, Maimana and Andkhui, were also justified. Not only so, but the state should be allowed to exert some form of authority over the whole Chahar Wilayat, Aqcha and Balkh; "the whole being under the government of Herat in the time of Timur Shah" but which had "been annexed to the Kingdom of Bukhara."[188]

Todd, like his predecessor, took Herat's claims at face value and seemed quite ignorant of the history and geography of the region. Nor did Yar Muhammad's inconsistency in quoting two different historical precedents (the reign of Ahmad Shah Durrani in the case of Sistan

[187] Amongst the surrounding tribes, the subsidy to the ruler of Herat was interpreted in quite a different way from that which the British intended. In 1840, the Hazara amir of Yakolang remarked to Conolly: "They say, God knows with what truth, that he [Yar Muhammad] keeps a feringee at Heraut from whom he draws a lakh of rupees every month." Conolly's bland explanation of Britain's uncomfortable relationship with this ruler has more than a touch of irony about it: "I briefly explained why a British agent was resident at Heraut, and the money, from time to time disbursed through him, was given for the defence and restoration of a place we had engaged to hold at every sacrifice," Conolly, *Bamiyan to Merve*, 1840.

[188] *Todd to Macnaughten*, 26 Feb. 1840.

and Timur Shah in respect of the Chahar Wilayat) as justification for his claims seem to worry either him or his superiors. The issue, however, was not primarily a matter of historical precedent, nor of geographical accuracy, but of political and economic expediency. It was sufficient that Herat had advanced claims which served British interests in the area and which would make the state less reliant on British cash for survival. Whereas Pottinger had moral scruples about allowing Yar Muhammad free rein in the Chahar Wilayat, Todd was not encumbered by such ethical considerations. Macnaughten was simply urged to lend his support to the annexation of the western marches of Balkh, since Herat's revenues were "insufficient in its present borders"[189] and the acquisition of the rich agricultural lands to the north, coupled with being able to control the trade route, would considerably improve Herat's financial situation. Furthermore, Herat, as an ally of Britain, would be in a position to control the affairs of these frontier states and act as policeman in the Chahar Wilayat.

Macnaughten did not reply at once to Todd's recommendations, despite his request for a quick reply since it was "of great importance to urge the claim at the present moment before the season for operations becomes more advanced."[190] After waiting in vain for an immediate response, Todd acted on his own initiative. In April 1840, he wrote a second letter which presented the British Envoy with a *fait accomplis*. Referring Macnaughten to his previous, unanswered, letter and "having no doubt in my own mind of the justice of this claim" he informed his superior that he "found it impossible to refuse compliance with the Minister's urgent request to lend my countenance to [the Chahar Wilayat's] recovery."[191]

Yar Muhammad, Todd claimed, had demanded that Britain allow him to make a show of force in order to counteract accusations that he was a puppet of the *farangi* and "a dying man into whose mouth the English are pouring a few drops of water to defer his dissolution to a convenient moment."[192] Todd had permitted Yar Muhammad to send the Grand *Mufti* of Herat to Maimana with a demand that Mizrab Khan submit, surrender his heir apparent, Hukumat Khan, as a hostage for future good conduct and return some ten thousand Aimaq families who had fled from Herat to Maimana over the last few years.

[189] *Ibid.*

[190] *Ibid.*

[191] *Todd to Macnaughten*, 4 April 1840, ESL:150, encl. 65 no. 3.

[192] *Ibid.*

Todd reinforced these demands by writing his own letter to Mizrab Khan, urging Maimana's submission and even gave the mufti a "loan" of Company rupees for travel expenses. Yar Muhammad, meanwhile, began to mobilise the Sunni Hazaras of Qal'a-yi Nau in preparation for attacking the Chahar Wilayat.[193]

When Todd's second letter reached Kabul, it was far from welcome and once more Macnaughten was obliged to reprimand one of his officers for exceeding instructions and acting contrary to the official policy. Todd was informed that, not only had he gone too far in his support of Herat's territorial ambitions, he had acted in direct opposition to the policy being pursued by Dr Lord in Bamiyan, namely the submission (or preferably annexation) of these territories to the realm of Shah Shuja'. Macnaughten, always a kindly man, agreed that a "moderate degree of support" for Yar Muhammad's ambitions was acceptable, but went on to remark:

> Any such involvement [in the Chahar Wilayat] is opposed to the views of the Secret Committee and it seems especially objectionable at the present on many accounts.... The chiefs of Mimuna, Sirpul, of Andkhoo and of Shiburghan have recently tendered their allegiance to H. M. Shah Shooja ool Moolk. I have advised His Majesty if he sends any reply at all to state that his attention is absorbed in restoring the prosperity of his domains which object would be in a great measure defeated by the extension of its limits. The countries in question are nominally subject to the King of Bukhara whose aid they will probably invoke against any threatened invasion, and in this case, as the Russian force is undoubtedly by this time assured at Khiva, their advance will probably be solicited by the Bukharan ruler to expel the invaders, whilst the uncertain state of our relations with the Persian Court and the great strength which that Court is said to have recently derived from the French by the arrival of a large party of French officers with no less than 30,000 muskets tends to render it excessively desirable that the strength of the Herat Government should not be wasted in attempts to extend the limits of its powers.[194]

Todd, however, was already committed and was unable to recall the Herati ambassador, since he had already arrived in Maimana. Instead Todd seems to have let matters run their course, neither encouraging nor discouraging further action by Yar Muhammad Khan.

The arrival of Herat's Grand Mufti in Maimana with what was in effect an ultimatum, apparently endorsed by the British, added to the confusion about Britain's intentions towards Maimana.[195] Rumours

[193] *Ibid.*
[194] *Macnaughten to Todd*, n.d. (April?) 1840, ESL:150, encl. 65, no. 3.
[195] Conolly, *Bamiyan to Merve*, 1840.

were already rife throughout the province that a British advance into Balkh was imminent and the arrival of Herat's ambassador demanding Mizrab's submission must have been interpreted as the first step in that direction.

Only a month or so earlier, Mizrab Khan had tried to reassure Pottinger that Maimana wished to remain neutral in the conflict between Dost Muhammad and Shah Shuja', yet now the new British agent at Herat was endorsing Herat's claims to his country. Meanwhile, Dr. Lord had been exerting equal, howbeit contrary, pressure on the wali to submit directly to Kabul. Indeed, Mizrab Khan had only recently sent a congratulatory letter to Shah Shuja' in which he had acknowledged the new Amir's overlordship.[196] The intervention of the Mir Wali of Khulm in the affairs of Sar-i Pul, shortly after the mufti arrived, muddied the water even further and one can understand the perplexity of the wali who was trying to make sense of the contradictory signals issuing from Bamiyan and Herat. For the Mir Wali, as we have already seen above, claimed he was acting in the name of Shah Shuja' and, by implication, the British. Yet at the same time a British officer was demanding that Maimana submit to Herat! If this was not enough for Mizrab Khan, Persia, Bukhara and Khiva were also making similar demands. It is no wonder that the wali could not make head or tail of the matter and was at a loss which way to turn.

Arthur Conolly, who, later in the year, went a long way to clearing up this confusion, gives us a graphic account of the anxiety which beset Mizrab Khan during this period:

> The Walee ... began to talk about his political situation which he described with some sorrow, begging to know if we [i.e. the British] could give hope of any arrangement that would enable him to rest under one master. No doubt (he observed) you know the saying that it is difficult for a man to stand with his legs in two boats, but how can a man escape drowning who is obliged to shift them between five, at the word 'changes'.[197] My ancestors were content to serve the King of Cabul, and when members of that house fell into misfortune, they found hospitality here. Shah Shooja is again upon his throne at Cabul but now another Suddozye King [i.e. Kamran Shah] calls upon me to submit only to Heraut and your English Agent advises me to send my son there; on the other hand, the Commander of the Faithful claims my allegiance for Bokhara; the Khan Huzrut [of Khiva] desires me to put myself under him, and you know how I was forced to act when the Persian Ausafoodowleh crossed the Moorghaub.[198]

[196] *Macnaughten to Todd*, April 1840.
[197] A reference to a nineteenth century parlour game.
[198] Conolly, *Bamiyan to Merve*, 1840.

Mizrab Khan's immediate reaction to the mufti's demands was to procrastinate as long as possible. In the end, it was June before the wali finally sent one of his brothers, Abu'l-Nazr Khan, to Herat to "settle the terms of vassalage."[199] Nothing definite, however, was decided at this meeting, except that the eldest son of the wali should reside in Herat. Having been given "handsome presents,"[200] Abu'l-Nazr Khan returned to Maimana to arrange for the departure of Hukumat Khan. This resulted in a further, substantial delay whilst Mizrab Khan consulted with the other rulers of the Chahar Wilayat.

At the beginning of September 1840, Hukumat Khan finally arrived in Herat along with representatives from Andkhui, Shibarghan, Sar-i Pul and Khulm.[201] Hukumat Khan brought with him two hundred and fifty families who had fled to Maimana during the Persian invasion. These refugees arrived in a state of "utter destitution" and Todd advanced them five thousand rupees to assist their resettlement.[202]

The arrival of envoys from all four of the states of the Chahar Wilayat put Todd in a dilemma which was of his own making. His policy of forcing Maimana and Andkhui to submit to Herat had succeeded without going to war, but the immediate claims of Kamran extended only to Maimana and Andkhui. The presence of ambassadors from Shibarghan and Sar-i Pul was, therefore, something of an embarrassment, especially when they informed Todd that, despite frequent internal disagreements, they considered themselves dependent on Maimana in matters of foreign policy. A further difficulty was that Khulm had sent a representative[203] since it had never been Todd's intention to encourage Yar Muhammad to advance claims to the territory of the Mir Wali. Anyway, Khulm lay outside of Todd's sphere of influence, it being the responsibility of Dr. Lord. Having been severely rebuked for encouraging the mission of the Grand Mufti, Todd was as confused as the rulers of the Chahar Wilayat about British policy towards the province and wrote to ask Macnaughten for instructions, admitting that he was "somewhat perplexed ... about the arrangements Shah Shooja would make regarding the Char Wilayat."[204]

[199] *Todd to Macnaughten*, 4 Sept. 1840, ESL:153, encl. 124, no. 47.
[200] *Ibid.*
[201] *Ibid.* Todd confuses the ruler of Sar-i Pul with the ruler of Andkhui, Shah Wali Khan.
[202] *Todd to Macnaughten*, 24 Sept. 1840, ESL:153, encl. 124, no. 47.
[203] *Todd to Macnaughten*, 4 Sept. 1840.
[204] *Ibid.*

Whilst Todd waited for instructions from Kabul, other problems arose. Some time after Hukumat Khan arrived in Herat the heir to the Maimana throne fell seriously ill,[205] which caused some anxiety amongst the ambassadors from the Chahar Wilayat. Their discontent was compounded by Todd, who deliberately drew out the negotiations on the pretext that he was awaiting orders from Macnaughten. The real reason for the delaying tactics, however, was that Todd had heard that Dost Muhammad Khan had re-crossed the Amu Darya and was trying to recruit an army from Balkh for an attack on Kabul. By dragging out the negotiations as long as he dared, Todd hoped that the ambassadors' presence in Herat would make their leaders think twice about joining Dost Muhammad's crusade. In effect, the envoys were held hostage for the good conduct of their rulers, a fact that was not lost on the ambassadors themselves.[206]

Macnaughten's reply reached Herat towards the end of September. Todd was informed that though "the annexation of the Chahar Wilayat to the Heraut ruler would be desirable ... it ... would be better to avoid interference in any arrangement which may be made between them."[207] Having been told to take a back seat in the negotiations, it was another month before an agreement was finally signed between Herat and the envoys from the Chahar Wilayat. In it, Hukumat Khan declared:

> I Whereas my ancestors were formerly servants to the Herat Government, I hereby pledge myself to be in the same manner the trustworthy and faithful servant and friend of that Government, and to perform, at the risk of my life, and with my utmost endeavour, whatever service may be required from me by it.
>
> II Whenever a contingent of horse may be required from us by the Herat Govt. it shall be furnished without delay and at any place appointed.
>
> III With regard to the families of the Jamsheedees and Ferozkhoees who are now in Turkistan, they shall be permitted and assisted to return to the lands they formerly occupied, south of the Moorghab river, whenever they wish
>
> IV Should the Hazarehs and Jamsheedees leave their own country and cross the Moorghab river, they shall not be detained or countenanced by us, we will, in the above-mentioned event, send them back.[208]

[205] *Todd to Macnaughten*, 3 Nov. 1840, ESL:155, encl. 4, no. 10.
[206] *Ibid.*
[207] *Macnaughten to Todd*, 18 Sept. 1840, ESL:153, encl. 124, no. 47.
[208] *Paper given by Hukoomat Khan to Yar Mahomed Khan*, 30 Oct. 1840, ESL:155, encl. 4, no. 10.

Though the other members of the Chahar Wilayat did not sign this document, they informed Todd that they considered themselves "bound to follow the example of Mymunna."[209]

This bland declaration marked a considerable climb down by Todd when compared to the ambitious plan of conquest that he had urged on Macnaughten earlier in the year. For Yar Muhammad, too, this document effectively signalled the end of his plan to obtain British endorsement and funding for the annexation of the Chahar Wilayat. The vagueness of the first, and main, clause fooled no-one. It did not even state categorically that Maimana recognised Herat's present claims to sovereignty, but merely referred to an undefined and vague historical precedent. There was no acknowledgement of Kamran's rights to *khutba* or coinage, nor any undertaking to pay an annual tribute. Finally, a further victory for Mizrab Khan was that Hukumat Khan returned to Maimana with the other ambassadors and was not obliged to reside in Herat as a hostage for his father's good conduct.

The only comfort Todd was able to draw from this document was that it, "may be of use in the event of a claim to the Chahar Vilayuts being urged, hereafter, by Bukhara on grounds of former nominal allegiance rendered by them."[210] This comment is indicative of the cynicism which pervaded Todd's whole approach to the amirs of western Turkistan, which was based merely on colonial expediency rather than constitutional legality.

As the combined attack by Dost Muhammad Khan and the Mir Wali of Khulm in September 1840 signalled the wrapping-up of Lord's 'Forward Policy' in respect of Balkh, so the signing of this document by Hukumat Khan of Maimana marked the demise of Todd's hopes of dominating the same province through Herat. It was not long before Todd, like Lord, was forced to abandon his position and retreat to safer climes.

Whilst Hukumat Khan was still occupied in Herat, Arthur Conolly arrived in Maimana and was finally able to sort out the confusion that the conflicting policies of Todd and Lord had created. Conolly[211] had

[209] *Ibid.*

[210] *Todd to Macnaughten*, 3 Nov. 1840.

[211] For Arthur Conolly's life (1807-1842) and the background to his mission to Khiva, see Yapp 1980, 402-13; Howorth, 795-801; Kaye (1904) ii, 93-203. Yapp calls Conolly's career "futile," and his journey to Khiva and Bukhara "meaningless ... a sad story of continual disillusionment." This is a quite unjustified and prejudiced criticism of an individual who, by Yapp's own admission, had made a profound impression on many influential individuals both in Britain and Central Asia, even though they had little time for Conolly's religious or moral views. Pottinger, writing in 1837 about the impact Arthur Conolly had made during his stay in Herat

been sent to Khiva to report on the intentions of Russian forces that were threatening to march on the Khan Hazrat in retaliation for his enslavement of Russian subjects. The idea for a mission to Turkistan had originated in January 1839, whilst he was still in England, and after his arrival in Kabul he persuaded Macnaughten that such a journey would provide useful information about the state of affairs in Central Asia. After much hesitation by the British Envoy, and several changes of plan, Conolly finally left for Khiva.

several years earlier, stated that, "the conduct of that gentleman has left an incredible impression ... on everyone who knew him. Here no-one speaks of him but in terms of the highest admiration," *Pottinger to McNeill*, 28 Sept. 1837, SLEP:104, fols. 289-90.

Conolly, like many other British officers who played a leading role in Afghanistan during the First Anglo-Afghan War, was a man of deep religious conviction, being a long-standing member of the anti-slavery campaign, and a close friend of Wilberforce and the Evangelical movement. As we have seen, Conolly had already made an important contribution to European exploration of Central Asia (Conolly 1834) and had had an influential role in the development of British policy towards Afghanistan in the early 1830s (see above). Conolly had volunteered to undertake the journey to Khiva and Bukhara, partly to sue for Stoddard's release from a Bukharan gaol and partly to find out what the Russians were doing. He was well aware that, in doing so, he was risking his own life, a danger recognised by Macnaughten who wrote: "the spirited offer of Cpt. Conolly to proceed in person to Bukhara will no doubt be appreciated by His Lordship in Council ... [but] ... the fate of our second envoy might be similar to that of the first, unless his mission were backed up by the actual presence of an adequate force," *Macnaughten to Torrens*, 14 June 1840, ESL:151, encl. 85, no. 37; see also *Maddock to Macnaughten*, 4 May 1840, ESL:149, encl. 46, no. 4; *Deposition of Raja Beg Herautee*, 10 June, 1840, ESL:151, encl. 85, no. 38. Conolly, however, felt that some effort should be made to save Stoddard and the only way possible, short of an invasion, was a personal appeal to Nasrullah Khan by an officer who was familiar with the court protocol and who could command a certain amount of respect from the Khan and his officials. Despite Burnes' previous visit to Bukhara, there was no doubt that Conolly was by far the most suitable person for such a delicate, diplomatic mission.

Just because Conolly's journey to Khiva and Bukhara ended in his own, and Stoddard's, execution, his visit cannot be dismissed as "meaningless." Amongst other things, he was the first European to travel the extremely difficult route from Bamiyan to Maimana via the upper Murghab watershed and the (apparent) loss of his personal journal can only be regretted. Once in Maimana he managed to calm some of Mizrab Khan's worries about British intentions, after the conflicting messages the wali had received from Todd and Lord. Conolly's detailed account of the Khanate of Maimana is the first European account of the Mingid dynasty and became the foundation stone on which all subsequent accounts of the region was based. Conolly was probably also responsible, at least in part, for the settlement of a war between Khiva and Kokand, as Yapp himself admits (Yapp 1980, 409). Finally, Conolly's prison diary, written in his prayer book [IOLR, MSS Eur:B.29], shows no sign that he viewed his journey, or his life, as "a sad story of continual disillusionment." Indeed, the last few pages of his journal, written in the last days before his execution, give an overwhelming impression of a man facing the abrupt termination of his life with resignation and a faith reinforced by affliction. "Nothing," he records, "but the spirit of Christianity can heal the wickedness and misery of these countries. May God soon diffuse it over all the world ... I stand in this faith. It is the only thing that can make a man bear against the trials of this life and lead him to the noblest state of existence in the next" (BL. MSS. Add. 38727, 31, 50). These are hardly the sentiments of a sad, or disillusioned, man.

Conolly chose to travel to Transoxiana via a difficult and uncharted mountain route.[212] After a stay in Bamiyan he travelled westwards through Naiyak, Panjau to Chakhcharan, where he struck north from the Hari Rud into the upper reaches of the Murghab river, via the Darra-yi Khargosh. From the Murghab he crossed the Turkistan mountains to Maimana through Hastomin and possibly Sar-i Haus. It was both an arduous and dangerous journey, involving at least one skirmish with hill tribes near Chakhcharan. Conolly and his party eventually reached Maimana on 13 October 1840. Mizrab Khan, however, was out on his annual hunt and since Hukumat Khan, his eldest son, was in Herat negotiating with Yar Muhammad, they were entertained by Abu'l-Muhammad Khan, a brother of the wali, who gave them "excellent lodgings" and treated the party with much greater respect and warmth than Pottinger had experienced the previous autumn.[213]

When Mizrab Khan finally returned to Maimana, four days after Conolly's arrival, formal visits were exchanged and Conolly presented the wali with a double-barrelled percussion gun which "won his heart."[214] Discussion soon turned to British policy towards the Chahar Wilayat. Mizrab, having explained the dilemma that Maimana had been placed in by the proceedings of the various British agents, stated that his own preference was to submit to Shah Shuja' directly without involving Yar Muhammad Khan and Kamran Shah in Herat. Conolly, however, informed him that:

> Major Todd had given him the best advice for the existing circumstances, namely to submit himself in a complimentary degree to Heraut as he had specially been connected with that province when it formed part of the United Afghan kingdom (*sic*).[215]

[212] Conolly's private journal does not appear to have survived, although he wrote to Macnaughten in April 1841 that he had "dispatched Aukhoon Zadeh Saleh Mohummad ... via Merve and Mymunnah with a packet containing my journal up to that date, copies of former letters which I had reason to suppose intercepted and some minuter geographical memoranda than those precedingly sent for the protraction of our route from Bameean to Merve," *Conolly to Macnaughten*, 11 May 1841, ESL:161, encl. 79, no. 4. In his prison diary of 1841-42 (fols. 22-3, 34 of IOLR transcript), Conolly records that all his papers, except books, were burnt by the Bukharan authorities in 1841, but implies that before this happened, two copies of his journal, one in Greek and one in English, had been sent to India. So far no trace of this journal and the "geographical memoranda" he said he included, has been found. All that survives of details of his journey through the Hazarajat to Maimana is the official report extracted from his private diary, see Conolly, *Bamiyan to Merve*, 1840.

[213] Conolly, *Bamiyan to Merve*, 1840.

[214] *Ibid.*

[215] *Ibid.*

Though this was not to the liking of Mizrab Khan, doubtless the wali drew some comfort from the looseness of the relationship Britain advocated between Maimana and Herat. There was no hint of imminent annexation of the Chahar Wilayat, though when it came to dicussing Britain's long-term plans for the area, Conolly was more ambiguous. The question of the "Dooraunee borders," he told Mizrab Khan, was still being discussed and the matter would "be settled as soon as Shah Shoojah could get leisure from his pressing internal affairs, and Shah Kamran freedom from his Persian claimants." In the meantime, Maimana, "might remain on terms of general amity with all parties concerned in this complete arrangement until it was decided what his situation was to be." In fact, Conolly, like Pottinger and Todd before him, recommended annexation of the area to Afghanistan in his official report.[216]

Mizrab Khan had little choice but to show a willingness to co-operate with the British and told Conolly that his advice "was pretty nearly his own view of the matter and bade us send assurances to Cabul that if in the interim he could in any safe way do service to Shah Shoojah he would cheerfully perform it."[217] Conolly's recommendation was then probably relayed to Hukumat Khan at Herat, who was ordered by his father to settle matters with Yar Muhammad as best he could, lest either Herat or Britain should find any further excuse for interfering in Maimana's affairs. Mizrab Khan also took the opportunity of Conolly's visit to reaffirm Maimana's neutrality in the war with Dost Muhammad. At the time, neither Conolly nor Mizrab Khan would have known that the Amir had made his peace with the British.

> I gave a plain answer both to the Dost and to his supporters.... I told them I had seen enough of petty leagues against the armies of Kings and would not compromise myself for anyone. I had nothing to say to Dost Muhammad Khan when he was in power, why should I take up his cause against one whom God has restored to his former throne?[218]

After leaving Maimana, Conolly journeyed on to Khiva, via Bala Murghab and Panjdeh. Then, after completing his official work, he made the most of his chance and travelled to Bukhara where he sued, unsuccessfully, for the release of Colonel Stoddard who, having

[216] *Ibid.*

[217] *Ibid.*

[218] *Ibid.*

violated Bukharan protocol whilst on an official visit to the Khan, had been thrown into prison for his pains.[219] After a period in the Bukharan dungeons, Conolly and Stoddard were finally put to death by an executioner's sword in September 1842. When news of their deaths broke in England, there was a public outcry which resulted in the bizarre mission of Joseph Wolfe, a converted Jew (Wolfe 1852).

In terms of Britain's Central Asian policy, the unavenged executions of Conolly and Stoddard was to be as important in determining British policy towards the state of Bukhara and Uzbek rulers in general, as the surrender of Dost Muhammad Khan some two years earlier was to prove for the course of Anglo-Afghan relations. The deaths of Moorcroft, Trebeck and Guthrie were already imputed in the British mind to the treachery of the Bukharan governor of Balkh and Shuja' al-Din Mazari. Moorcroft and his party had also been very badly treated by Murad Beg of Qunduz, another Uzbek. Burnes, in his published journals, added to the growing myth of Uzbek decadence whilst the reports of Pottinger, Todd, Lord and Conolly, to name but a few, further damned Uzbek rule in Bukhara and Balkh yet again, often in the strongest possible terms. The executions of two officers thus seemed to merely confirm to the British the barbarous and decadent nature of Uzbek rulers in general and the Manghit dynasty of Bukhara in particular. Fed on such an unrelenting diet of vituperation, British officials were convinced that Central Asia would be a better place without Chingizid rule and therefore endorsed and supported successive Afghan Amirs in their bid to break Uzbek and Turkman power on both sides of the Amu Darya. Indeed, in 1868, Britain secretly connived at the Russian subjugation of Bukhara, even though publicly the government claimed to be opposed to any further expansion of the Tsar's empire in Central Asia.

Meanwhile Yar Muhammad, discontented that Hukumat Khan and the other envoys from the Chahar Wilayat had not been forced to make more than token concessions, persisted in his demands for British support, "to recover complete possession of the Char Vilayut, Ghorian, Seestaun and the Tymunee country" and for "Heraut troops to be subsidised in the field so long as they are engaged in these operations."[220] Todd, in obedience to his instructions, not only refused, but

[219] Charles Stoddard (1806-42) was Military Secretary to McNeill in Persia. He had travelled with the Persian army when it attacked Herat in 1838 and had then gone to Bukhara to negotiate with the Amir about the release of Russian hostages. For details of Stoddard's arrogant conduct in Bukhara, see Edwardes, 70ff.; Howorth, 795-8; Yapp 1980, 409ff.

[220] *Todd to Macnaughten*, 22 Feb. 1841, in, Forrest, 85-9.

remonstrated with the wazir about his continued and blatant misuse of the funds that had already been more than liberally disbursed. Relations between the two went into a steep decline. Finally, Yar Muhammad demanded that Todd pay for his son, Saiyid Muhammad Khan, to undertake a mission to the Sunni Hazaras and Jamshidis. Todd objected to the expense and Yar Muhammad offered to send his "Master of Ceremonies," Faiz Muhammad Khan, in his place. However, instead of going to Qal'a-yi Nau, Faiz Muhammad made his way secretly to Mashhad where he opened negotiations with the Persians which, in March 1841, led to a clandestine agreement between the two states (Yapp 1980, 372ff.).[221]

When Todd was informed of the deception which Yar Muhammad Khan had perpetrated, he lost all patience with the wazir. He demanded that Herat immediately break off all negotiations with Persia and permit a British garrison to be stationed in the city. Yar Muhammad refused and, after many threats against himself and others who had helped him, Todd abandoned Herat without consulting Kabul. This unauthorised action was completely against the grain of British policy towards Herat and Afghanistan (Yapp 1980, 372ff.) and eventually led to Todd's disgrace and removal from the political service. He returned to his regiment, eventually being killed by a cannonball during the First Sikh War (Yapp 1980, 361ff.).

The loss of the British subsidy was a serious set-back to Yar Muhammad Khan's territorial ambitions and his plans had to be shelved for several years until he was able to consolidate his own hold over Herat itself. In August 1841 the struggle between the nominal ruler of Herat, Kamran Shah and his wazir, finally broke out into open conflict. Kamran, for so long dominated and intimidated by his ruthless Deputy, had managed to prevent Yar Muhammad Khan deposing him, mainly because his wazir feared the power of the Sunni Hazara leader, Sher Muhammad Khan. But by 1842, Sher Muhammad was dead and his tribe had been weakened by internal division. In a final, futile, attempt to reclaim his authority, Kamran Shah locked himself in the citadel and expelled all of Yar Muhammad's followers.[222] In retaliation, Yar Muhammad laid siege to the *arg* and eventually forced Kamran to surrender, after swearing on the Qur'an not to plunder the treasury or harm the Sadozai ruler. Once the citadel's gates had been

[221] *Todd to Macnaughten*, 29 Jan. 1841, in Forrest, 79-83.

[222] *Hoozoor Khan to McNeill*, 9 Dec. 1841; *Iskandar Mirza to McNeill*, 24 Dec. 1841, SLEP:121, fols. 13, 21ff.

opened, however, Yar Muhammad confiscated Kamran's treasure and put his patron to death (Champagne, 233).[223]

Balkh and the Afghan Domains, 1841-1844

During the winter of 1841/2 the disaster that had always threatened the British forces in Kabul finally overtook them. The surrender of Dost Muhammad Khan, along with other events during the previous months, such as the neutralising of the Mir Wali, had given a fillip to British morale. Encouraged by a series of transient military and diplomatic successes, Macnaughten became unjustifiably optimistic about the situation in Afghanistan, reporting that "the country is perfectly quiet from Dan to Beersheba" (Kaye 1874, ii, 130). Yet within the British camp there were deep divisions over policy and clashes of personality which were to prove their undoing. The military establishment, bitterly divided between Company and Queen's officers and led by the sixty year old, gout and bed-ridden Major-General Elphinstone, "bickered" and "dickered" amongst themselves (Dupree 1978, 386) and ignored warnings of the pending storm (Yapp 1980, 327ff.).

First Burnes, then Macnaughten, died horribly at the hands of Afghans and, after further humiliations, the British agreed to abandon Kabul and, by implication, Shah Shuja'. As they attempted to force their way through to Jalalabad, thousands perished in the gorges of the Khurd Kabul at the hands of tribesmen and the fierce winter weather (Kaye 1874; Macrory, 197ff.; *et al.*).[224] It is remarkable, given the extent of this disaster, that Shah Shuja', despite being regarded universally by his people as a quisling, managed to hold out in the Bala Hisar in Kabul, along with a tiny force under John Conolly,[225] the brother of Arthur Conolly, until April of 1842.

[223] *McNeill to Earl of Aberdeen*, 9 March 1842(a), SLEP:121, fols. 157-64.

[224] One of the greatest myths of European historical writings on the first Anglo-Afghan War is the belief that only one person survived the massacre in the Khurd Kabul. This is quite untrue. In addition to the famed Dr. Brydon, several British officers, ordinary soldiers and their wives and children, survived as hostages of the Afghans, eventually being rescued by a force sent to Bamiyan by the 'Army of Retribution' in 1842. Some sepoys and camp followers drifted into the British-held Jalalabad fortress after Dr. Brydon, whilst others were later found begging on the streets of Kabul. There was also the garrison in the Bala Hisar under John Conolly which held out until the relief force reached Kabul. The most bizarre, and probably fictitous, survival story to emerge from this 'Signal Catastrophe' was that of John Campbell (Campbell 1862).

[225] The Afghan War was hard on many families, but perhaps the Conolly family suffered the most, losing three members either directly, or indirectly as a result of the invasion. Arthur Conolly was executed in Bukhara in September 1842, Edward was killed in action in Kohistan in September 1840 and John succumbed to fever three days before the British relief force reached Kabul in September 1842. A fourth Conolly brother was later murdered by Moplahs (Yapp 1980, 546; Macrory, 271).

Eventually, though, the unfortunate Shah Shuja' was lured out of the fort under an offer of safe conduct, and assassinated (Dupree 1978, 394; Macrory, 240).

In the aftermath of the *débâcle*, Dost Muhammad Khan was allowed to return to Kabul from his Indian exile, and in 1843 once again resumed the reins of power (Yapp 1980, 438; Hall, 14). Occupied as the British were with the Punjab and Sind, attention in India was turned away from affairs of Afghanistan and the period 1841-45 is a barren one as far as intelligence reports in the India Office archives are concerned.

In the early months of 1842 Yar Muhammad, now undisputed ruler of Herat, once more turned his attention to the tribes of Badghis. Muhammad Zaman Jamshidi, a staunch ally of Yar Muhammad, had alienated himself from his tribe, and been assassinated by Ahmad Beg and Mehdi Quli Khan, Khan Agha, the sons of 'Abd al-Jabbar Khan (Maitland 1891, 62-3). Little love was lost between these new amirs and the ruler of Herat, so Yar Muhammad, in violation of an agreement with Persia not to interfere with the Aimaq tribes (Yapp 1980, 373),[226] invaded their country, placed his own nominee over the tribe and punished the assassins. The Jamshidi capital of Kushk quickly fell, Ahmad Beg and another of his brothers, 'Abdullah Beg, were taken prisoner and some five thousand Jamshidi tribesmen were forcibly relocated in the Herat valley. Allah Yar Beg, son of Muhammad Zaman, fled with six hundred families and took up permanent residence near Mashhad. However, the vast bulk of the Jamshidi clan, numbering some ten thousand households under the leadership of Ahmad Beg, migrated to Panjdeh, from where they succesfully entreated the protection of the Khan Hazrat of Khiva. During the Jamshidis exile from Badghis, which lasted until *c.* 1859, they performed many stirling services for the ruler of Khiva. Ahmad Beg himself was killed whilst fighting the Yomut Turkman on behalf of the Khan Hazrat, whilst his younger brother, Mehdi Quli, was honoured with the title *Khan Agha* for similar services—a name by which he was generally known for the remainder of his life (Maitland 1891, 63).[227]

The same year (1843) Shah Wali Khan, the Afshar ruler of Andkhui, died and was succeeded by his son, Ghazanfar Khan (C. E. Yate

[226] *Todd to Macnaughten*, 29 Jan. 1841; *McNeill to Earl of Aberdeen*, 9 March 1841(a), fol. 165.

[227] *McNeill to Earl of Aberdeen*, 9 March 1841(b), SLEP:121, fol. 165; Appendix V.i.

1888, 347). In January of the following year, Yar Muhammad Khan broke with Persia and entered into a treaty with Bukhara. The intention behind the agreement seems to have been the partition of Afghanistan and Balkh between Yar Muhammad Khan and Nasrullah Khan. According to the sources, Bukhara would try and oust Dost Muhammad Khan from Kabul and Yar Muhammad Khan would formally recognise Bukharan sovereignty over Balkh, Khulm and Kabul. In return, Nasrullah Khan would allow Yar Muhammad Khan a free hand in Maimana and the Chahar Wilayat.[228] During the summer of this year reports suggested that a Bukharan force actually crossed the Amu Darya, forcing Dost Muhammad Khan to send out agents to Qandahar, Ghazni and even Herat to try and recruit troops to counter the threat.[229]

The treaty between Bukhara and Herat alarmed the Mir Wali, who hastened to Kabul to discuss the defence of Khulm with Dost Muhammad Khan.[230] Later, when the ruler of Khulm had himself become a refugee from the very Afghan ruler whom he had once protected from the English, the Mir Wali complained bitterly to the Amir about the way he was received during this time in Kabul. After receiving "repeated, flattering letters" from Dost Muhammad Khan, who even appears to have gone as far as to suggest that the Mir Wali seize Balkh in order to "make it over to me [i.e. Dost Muhammad] as a refuge against the day of adversity,"[231] the ruler of Khulm came to Kabul. However, after discussing the terms of a possible alliance, the Mir Wali requested permission to return to Lesser Turkistan in order to consult with the other leaders. Dost Muhammad in turn made it clear that he wanted the Mir Wali to take an Afghan envoy with him, something which was quite unacceptable, for it would have suggested he was a puppet of the Afghans. When the request was refused, the Amir's demeanour towards the ruler of Khulm changed. Instead of flattering and complimenting him, Dost Muhammad "insulted [the Mir Wali] in every way" and it was only with great difficulty that he finally managed to obtain permission to leave the Afghan capital and return to his own homeland. The result was a complete breach in

[228] *Letter from one of the Herat Princes*, 15 Feb. 1843; *Meerza Aghasee to Yar Mohamed*, March(?) 1843, SLEP:123, fols. 159-60, 219-25.

[229] *PI*, 1-3 July, 15-17 Aug. 1844, ESL:178, encl. 57, no. 16; encl. 63, no. 25

[230] *Ibid. Richmond to Carrie*, 7 Feb. 1844, ESL:177, fols. 165-8; *PI*, 1-3 July 1844.

[231] The adversity being Dost Muhammad's continued fears of a second British invasion of Kabul.

relations between Khulm and Kabul and the two leaders "ceased to hold further intercourse" for a space of some five years.[232]

Meanwhile, in Herat, Yar Muhammad quickly turned the Bukharan concession of sovereignty over the Chahar Wilayat to his own advantage. In the winter of 1843/4 he turned on his former allies, the Sunni Hazaras of Qal'a-yi Nau, and invaded their territory, for their leader, Karimdad Beg, brother of Sher Muhammad Khan, had petitioned the Persian Governor of Khurasan for permission to emigrate to Turbat-i Shaikh Jam.[233] After defeating Karimdad Beg, the wazir attacked Ibrahim Beg, amir of the Taimani Aimaqs,[234] in revenge for the support the Aimaqs had given to Shah Kamran. Despite being outnumbered nearly two to one and the difficulty of the terrain, Yar Muhammad penetrated deep into Ghor, forced the Taimani amir to flee, and set Mustafa Khan, a cousin of Ibrahim's, over the tribe (Maitland 1891, 197-8).[235]

Yar Muhammad Khan's successful operations against the Chahar Aimaq pushed the border of Herat up to the Murghab, thereby securing a firm base for the next phase of conquest, the invasion of Maimana. In this ambition, he was frustrated for a time by the presence of the Persian Governor of Khurasan, the Asaf al-Daula, who opposed further expansion of Herat's power. It was not long, however, before Balkh was plunged into a series of bloody conflicts, which were to change the political and economic map of the region beyond recognition.

[232] *Mahomed Ameer Walee to Edwardes*, 3 May 1854, ESL:220, encl. 33, no. 4.

[233] *Herat Princes*, 16 Feb. 1844, SLEP:125, fols. 206-7. Maitland 1891, 95-6 says the reason for Yar Muhammad's invasion was that Karimdad Khan, lacking the prudence and wisdom of his forefathers, had commenced raiding in Badghis, and Persia had threatened to invade the area if Herat could not keep him in order.

[234] The Taimani Aimaqs are the fourth tribe of the Chahar Aimaqs. They are related to the Kakar Pushtun tribe by virtue of being descendants of Taiman, one of the twelve sons of Sanzar who, in turn, was the fifth in descent from Kak (d. *c.* AD 1200 and buried in Herat near the Juma' mosque), the ancestor of the Kakar Pushtun tribe. Following the internecine strife, Taiman fled to Ghor and established himself in the Darra-yi Khargosh, between Chakhcharan and the upper Murghab river. For the history of the tribe, genealogical charts and a survey of their region, see Maitland 1891, 161-270; Appendix V, iv.

[235] *Sheil to Earl of Aberdeen*, 23 Oct., 14 Dec. 1844, SLEP:126, fols. 501, 714.

already signs that the Afghanistan civil war has developed into a wider conflict which may well lead to a revival of the Pushtunistan issue and threaten the very existence of Pakistan. North of the Hindu Kush, attacks by bands of revolutionary Islamicists across the Amu Darya and the presence of over one hundred thousand Tajik refugees, has already created a serious political and ideological crisis in Tajikistan. Iran's support of the Shi'i Hazaras, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and, more recently, Turkey's alignment with General Dostam and the fact that all the *de facto* amirates are forced to rely heavily on imports from adjacent countries of even the most basic commodities, as well as munitions, make the break-up, or dismemberment, of Afghanistan not merely a possibility, but a serious probability.

For over one and a half centuries, Britain, in particular, sought to mould Central Asia in its own image. In the process, she was indirectly responsible for the untold suffering and agony which was inflicted on all races and peoples in Central Asia. In the short term, her goals were achieved with the imposition of a "hard and bitter peace,"[44] in which the overriding consideration was British self-interest and not the rights and aspirations of the peoples of Afghanistan. Such an ironclad calm could only exist as long as an external power was prepared to underwrite the Amirs, and provide the Afghan ruler with the necessary war *matériel* to suppress, or contain, others whose legitimate rights the imperial authority was determined to ignore. It is no wonder, therefore, in an age which has seen the demise, or at least the decline, of 'Old World' colonialism, that the water which the imperial pump forced to flow uphill, has flooded back into its ancient bedwith such devastating consequences. As the Dari proverb says: "Where the river has once flowed, it will flow again." One can only hope and pray that, in the process, no more innocent lives will be swept away by the raging torrent.

[44] John F. Kennedy, *Inaugural Presidential Address*, 20 Jan. 1961.

APPENDIX I

GLOSSARY OF ANGLO-INDIAN, PERSIAN AND TURKIC TECHNICAL TERMS

ābī: irrigated land.
abjad: numerological system where letters of the Persian alphabet are given numerical values.
ākhūn[zāda]: preacher, theologian, orator.
amīr: commander, Chingizid ruler of an *iqtā'* [*q.v.*]. (N.B. When used with capital letter in text, it refers to the Durrani/Muhamadzai rulers of Afghanistan).
āqsāqāl: Uzbek or Turkman elder, lit. 'white-beard'.
arbāb: (pl. of *rab*); lit. 'masters', but in Afghanistan, village elders, petty governors.
arg: citadel, fort.
'arzbēgī: high official in Chingizid government to whom all petitions were presented.
Asaf al-Daula: title held by the Prince-Regent of Khurasan in the first half of the last century.
atabēgī: guardian, lord; a high government official in the Chingizid government.
atāliq: high civil official under Chingizid system of government.
aulīya': (pl. of *walī*); saints, intercessors.
badal: system of blood revenge under the Pushtun code of honour.
band: dam; barrage; mountain range.
barakat: supernatural power or authority associated with relics, shrines or mystics; 'charisma'.
bēglarbēgī: title of by Uzbek rulers of Sar-i Pul in nineteenth century.
bī (bēg): landlord, merchant. Under the Chingizids, a title equivalent to the Afghan, *khān* [*q.v.*].
chaman: field, military parade ground, battle ground.
chūl: sand, lœss duneland specific to the northern foothills of the Tir Band-i Turkistan.
crore: 10,000,000 (usually rupees), equivalent to 100 lakh [*q.v.*].
dahbāshī: a decurion, or commander of 10 in Mongol/Uzbek military system.
dārūgha: law enforcement officer; garrison commander.

Dārūgha-yi 'Adālat: Chief Judicial Officer; Ombudsman.
daffardar: sergeant of irregular horse.
dak: courier, post officer.
dīwān: government office, a government official.
dīwānbēgī: high government official usually in charge of the revenue affairs of amirid states.
Dīwān-i 'Alā: Prime Minister, *wazīr* [*q.v.*].
dīwān-i khās: Privy Council chamber.
dīwān-i 'ām: public audience hall, especially under Mughals.
durbar: public audience held by Muhammadzai Amirs, the Viceroy of India or Indian native ruler.
fāna wa dāgh: twin torture by wedge and boiling oil.
farangī: alien, foreigner, infidel (lit. 'a Frank').
farash bāshī: government official under Muhammadzais.
farmān: a royal decree, authority.
farsang: linear measurement roughly equivalent to three miles (4.82 km.).
fārsīwān: ethnic group in Afghanistan whose first language is Persian.
farzand: (lit. 'son'); used as an honorific title by various rulers of Central Asia.
fatwa: legal opinion, decision, made on basis of Islamic law, by a *muftī* [*q.v.*](or Shī'ī *mujtahid* [*q.v.*]).
ghāzī: a title assumed by those who have fought in a religious war, or *jihād*, against idolaters.
ghee: clarified butter used in cooking.
ghulām: a slave.
hajj: pilgrimage, especially to the Ka'aba in Mecca.
hājī: A person who has performed the Meccan pilgrimage.
hākim: provincial governor, commander.
hakīm: doctor (herbalist), learned, wise, prudent man; philosopher.
hammām: Turkish bath.
havildar: sergeant of infantry in the Indian army; a cavalryman.
hazāra: a unit of 1,000 men in Chingizid army; a Turco-Mongolian ethnic group of central Afghanistan.
Hazrat: an honorific title (lit. presence, majesty, dignity) used in Islam in association with the prophets and, in Sūfism, with *pīrs* [*q.v.*], *īshāns* [*q.v.*] and *walīs* [*q.v.*].
howdah: ornamental canopy used to carry passengers on elephants.
hukumat-i 'ala: provincial division or district under Ahmad Shāh Durranī
'Īd: religious festival, feast.

'Īd al-Fitr: (also known in Afghanistan as *'Id-i Ramazān*), the feast which celebrates the end of the fast, commencing on 1 Shawwal [*q.v.*].
'Īd al-Azhā (also known in Afghanistan as *'Id-i Qurbān*), the feast of sacrifice which commemorates Ībrāhīm's (Abraham's) willingness to sacrifice his son. Commences on 10 Zu'l-Hijja.
imām: prayer leader in mosque; title used by Shī'ī [*q.v.*]successors to Muhammad and 'Alī b. Abī Tālib.
iqtā' (pl. *ailāt*)*:* a fief or territorial grant held by an *amīr* [*q.v.*] under the Chingizids.
īshān (pronounced as, *ēshān'* in Afghanistan)*:* a *saiyid* [*q.v.*], or Arab descendant of Muhammad, often also a *pīr* [*q.v.*] in Naqshbandī Sūfism.
Ismā'īlī: a branch of Shī'īsm, divided into several sub-sects, which recognises Muhammad, son of Ismā'īl b. Imām Ja'far al-Sādiq and his heirs, as the true *Imām* [*q.v.*].
jagir: the revenue assigned to an individual from government estate(s).
janissary: personal, hereditary household guard of the Ottoman Sultans of Turkey; by association, any royal household guards.
jarīb: a measurement of land equivalent to approximately half an acre.
jemadar: a native officer equivalent, in the India army, to lieutenant.
jezailchī: rifleman.
jihād: holy war; Islamic crusade against non-believers.
jiziya: religious tribute, capitation tax imposed on non-believers (strictly the *Ahl-i Kitāb*, or 'People of the Book') under Islamic law.
Jumādā I: fifth month of the Islamic religious calendar.
Jumādā II: sixth month of the Islamic religious calendar.
kāfir: pagan; idol worshipper; atheist.
kamarband: waistband, belt, sash, girdle.
karamāt: wonder, sign, miracle, of a lesser degree than *mu'jiza* [*q.v.*], performed by mystics and saints.
khadām: (pl. of *khādim*) government ministers; servants.
khāk bād: dust storm.
khalat: robe of honour and/or investiture.
khalīfa: vicegerent, formerly supreme head of Islamic community (Caliph); leader of a Sūfī Order.
Khān: title of the Chingizid supreme ruler; Afghan tribal leader.
Khān Hazrat: title of ruler of Khiva in the last century.
khānaqā: meeting house for performance of Sūfī ritual, or *zikr* [*q.v.*].

kārēz: subterranean canal commonly used in irrigation in Afghanistan and Iran.
khūshbēgī: senior official in Chingizid govenmental system responsible for taxation and security.
khirqa: cloak, robe, mantle, especially worn by prophets or *shaikhs* [*q.v.*].
khutba: the Friday prayer sermon, preceding salāt prayers, in which the sovereign's name is mentioned.
kotwal: magistrate; judge; mayor.
kufr: blasphemy.
lalmī: dryland farming.
loya jirga: assembly of elders or khāns which, under the Pushtun code, elects the *amīr* [*q.v.*].
madrasa: Qur'anic theological college.
mahdī: title of the end-time prophet, descendent of Muhammad, who will fill the world with justice and equity.
malang: a religious mystic, often with heterodox or extreme Sūfī tendencies; a shrine attendant.
māldār: wealthy merchant; a term used to describe Pushtun semi-nomadic tribes of Afghanistan.
mālik: landowner, local ruler.
manzil: rest house or overnight stopping place for caravans.
masjid: A local mosque.
masjid-i jamī': congregational, or 'cathedral', mosque of a city or town.
mazār: a shrine, grave, sepulchre to which Muslims make pilgrimage.
mihrāb: the niche in the mosque which indicates the direction of the *qibla* [*q.v.*].
mingbāshī: commander of 1,000 men; centurion.
mīr: shortened form of *amīr* [*q.v.*] and *mīrzā* [*q.v.*]; used by Afghans to denote a native ruler of a district, or sub-district, in Turkistan.
Mīr Wāli : title of the ruler of Khulm in 18th and 19th centuries.
mīrzā: prince (especially of Timurid line); a scholar, scribe.
muftī: legalist qualified to issue a *fatwa* [*q.v.*], or religious decree.
Muharram: first month of the Muslim religious calendar of special significance to Shī'īs [*q.v.*] as the first 10 days commemorate the death of Husain b. 'Alī b. Abī Tālib at Karbala'.
mujāhid (pl. *mujahidin*)*:* one who fights in a holy war, or *jihād* [*q.v.*].
mujāwar: guardian of a tomb, shrine.
mujtahid: high-ranking Shī'ī legalist.
mu'jiza: highest form of miracle performed exclusively by prophets to authenticate their calling.

munshī: scribe.
murīd: disciple, follower, of a Sūfī *pīr* [*q.v.*].
murshīd: spiritual guide, *pīr* [*q.v.*].
mustufī: Islamic legalist.
mut'a: temporary marriage, marriage of pleasure.
mutawallī: chief trustee or administrator of *waqf* [*q.v.*] foundation.
nā'ib: deputy, viceroy.
nadīm: adviser.
nahr: large canal.
naqīb: high office associated with the court, usually held by an Islamic legalist.
naurōz: Zoroastrian New Year celebrated at spring equinox (21 March) in Central Asia and Persia.
nazr: votive offering.
nazarana: offering, either in cash or kind, presented to a high official or to a *pīr* [*q.v.*].
Nizām al-Mulk: honorific title bestowed by ruler on his *wazīr* [*q.v.*] or other high officials.
Nizām al-Daula: honorific title bestowed by ruler on a high official.
ōnbāshī: commander of 100; centurion.
pādshāh: king, sovereign, monarch.
pādshāhī: the system of centralised, absolute monarchy, particularly under the Safawids and Qājār Persian dynasties.
pīr: spiritual guide, a descendant of a Sūfī saint, a teacher of a *tarīqa* [*q.v.*].
pōstīn: sheep-skin coat traditional worn in Afghanistan.
purda: seclusion, or veiling, of women.
Qa'alkhān: heir apparent to Chingizid throne.
qadamga: a shrine commemorating a miracle (*karamāt*) [*q.v.*] or visitation by a prophet or saint.
qalandar: wandering ascetic who has abandoned the world to pursue a life of contemplation.
qanāt: an underground canal system used for irrigation.
qariyā: village, hamlet.
qāzī: religious judge.
qaum: tribe, clan, extended family group.
qishlāq: village, hamlet.
qizilbāsh: (lit., 'red cap'); crack Turco-Mongolian troops of the Persian army; a term of abused used by Sunnis in Afghanistan and Turkey in respect of Persians generally; the urbanised Shī'īs of Kabul.
quriltāi: general assembly of Chingizid tribes.

Rabī' I: third month of Muslim religious calendar.
Rabī' II: fourth month of Muslim religious calendar.
rāhdārī: road pass, or passport which exempts the traveller from tolls and taxation.
Ramazān: ninth month of the Muslim religious calendar during which Muslims fast from dawn to dusk.
rīsh safēd: tribal elder.
ryot: peasant or cultivator, especially in India.
Sadr-i 'Azam: Prime Minister.
Safar: second month of the Muslim religious calendar.
Sāhib-i Ikhtiyār: collector of taxes.
saiyid: descendant of Muhammad through his daughter, Fātima.
sanad: certificate, or deed, of appointment; permit; official mandate; official authority.
sarai: an inn or lodgings; palace.
sardār: title used by male members of the Barakzai and Sadozai clan; a military commander; general.
sha'bān: eighth month of Muslim religious calendar.
shāh: king, sovereign, especially in Persia.
shāhzāda: prince.
shaikh: leader of a Sūfī Order; shrine guardian; a term applied to any important religious figure.
Shaikh al-Islām: high religious and judicial office.
sharī'a: The corpus of Islamic law.
sharīf: (lit. 'holy') a term applied to important shrines or holders of high religious office.
Shawwāl: tenth month of Muslim religious calendar.
Shī'ī: large and varied religious division of Islam which recognises 'Alī b. Abī Tālib as the legitimate Caliph following Muhammad's death.
silsila: genealogy, particularly the line of transmission of the mystical teaching of a *shaikh* [*q.v.*] or *pīr* [*q.v.*]
sipāh sālār: Commander in Chief of an army; general.
sowar: Anglo-Indian, irregular horse; cavalry.
subedar: native infantry officer, equivalent to rank of captain.
sūfī: member of one, or other, of the mystic Orders of Islam.
sultān: prince; male member of Chingizid line.
sunnī: the largest denomination of Islam which bases itself on the *sunna*, or customs and traditions of Muhammad and his Companions. They reject Shī'ī claims that 'Alī b. Abī Tālib was the first Caliph.
tepa: mound, hill.
tarīqa: teaching and practices of individual Sūfī Orders.

tekke: monastery, or religious retreat, of certain Sūfī Orders.
'ulamā: legalists who decide questions of religious, constitutional or personal law on the basis of the *sunna*.
ūlūs (pl. *ūlūsāt*)*:* tribal unit.
wakīl: ambassador; government agent; commissioner; deputy.
walī: 'guardian', intermediary; title for individuals who are said to have been granted the power of intercession with Allah.
wālī: regent; under the Durranis, governor.
waqf: bequests (of land, shops, etc.) the revenues of which are devoted to the support of religious institutions such as shrines and mosques.
waqfnāma: the *waqf* [*q.v.*] deed, or charter, listing the various donations and their revenues.
Wazīr: Deputy.
wilāyat: province, technically ruled by a *wālī* [*q.v.*]; a district, county or country.
yāsā, yāsān: Chingizid legal code.
yurt: originally the territory ruled by an *amīr* [*q.v.*] or *sultān* [*q.v.*] under the Chingizids; in modern usage, the beehive tent (*ūī*) of semi-nomadic groups in Turkistan.
zakāt: Muslim obligatory alms tax.
zanāna: women's quarters of house or palace forbidden to all men outside of the immediate family; a 'harem'.
ziyārat: a pilgrimage to a shrine (*mazār*) [*q.v.*] and the rituals associated with it; in the vernacular, it is synonymous with *mazār*.
Zu'l-Hijja: twelfth month of Muslim religious calendar.
Zu'l-Qa'da: eleventh month of Muslim religious calendar.

APPENDIX II

UNITS OF CURRENCY, DISTANCE, WEIGHTS AND MEASURES

There was very little standardisation of weights or measures in Central Asian during the eighteenth and nineteenth century. The Kabuli *kharwar* or *ser* not being a universal standard in 'Afghanistan' until much later. Even today, different standards of weights and measures are used. The Mazar *kharwar*, for example, is twice the weight of the Kabuli *kharwar*. Indeed, anyone who has lived in Afghanistan will have got used to having everything from fruit, vegetables and dried goods, to wood and coal, weighed out on home-made pan scales using stones, unidentifiable car parts, etc. Bulk items, e. g. bricks, straw, etc., are still sold by the ass or horse load, rather than by weight or number.

Distances tended to be measured by the time taken to accomplish a journey rather than by any system of standardised measures. When a linear system was used, it was far from precise since it often referred either to how far a camel (or a horse or donkey) travelled in a day, or the distance between *manzil*s or *sarai*s. The following tables therefore, must be treated as only an approximate guide. Where possible, I have included comparisons with Afghanistan's modern, standarised, system and the European metric units.

i. Weights

kharwar: lit. "ass load"; traditionally two-thirds of a *shuturwar*, (camel load) = 560 lbs (254 kg) (McChesney 1991, 200-1).
Modern (Kabuli) *kharwar* = 80 seers; 1248 lbs; 566.0928 kg (Glassman 1976, 346).

mann, maund: 427.5 lbs; 193.914 kg.
Qunduz (1838): 1 *mann*= 8 Kabuli *ser*; 115 lbs 3 oz.
Mazar (1885): 1 *mann* = 4 *maunds* 20 *seer* according to the British Indian standardised system, or about 368 lbs; 166.92 kg (Gazetteer (1895) ii)

pau: Modern (Kabuli) = 0.975 lbs; 442.26 g.

ser : Modern (Kabuli) = 16 pau; 15.60 lbs; 7.076 kg.

ii. Linear measurements

farsang: roughly equivalent to 3 miles; 4.82 km.

gaz: a variable unit, measuring anything between 28 and 50 ins.; 71.12- 127 cm.

jarib: In Afghan Turkistan *c.*1885, 1 jarib = 0.5 acre; 2,420 sq. yards; 2,025 sq. m.
Modern Afghanistan: 1 jarib = 2 hectares; 4.94 acres.

iii. Currency Units and Exchange Rates

During the last century, several currencies were in common use in Afghanistan and Central Asia. This was particularly so in Balkh and the Chahar Wila|yat where Bukharan, Indian, Persian, Russian and British India coinage circulated freely in an open market. There were no fixed exchange rates and the conversion values of the currencies fluctuated wildly in response to economic or political conditions. As the century ran its course both the Afghan and other native currencies tended to become more and more debased and, consequently, were devalued against the 'hard' European currencies (*viz.* the Russian rouble and the Indian silver rupee) and against each other. Consequently, it is impossible to give fixed exchange rates for any of the local coinage for the India rupee or against another, native currency which are valid for the whole period discussed in this work. For example, in the 1830s, 1 Kabuli rupee was equivalent to 1 Bukharan *tila* but by 1885, 1 Kabuli rupee was only worth $\frac{1}{6}$th *tila*.

Where necessary footnotes have been added in the relevant place(s) in chapters giving the exchange rates for the specific period in question. The information below should, therefore, be regarded as a general guide only:

crore: 10 million (usually rupees) in India. In Persia, one *kurur* equalled 500,000 currency units.

lakh(A.I., *lak*): 100,000 (usually rupees).

qran (A.I. *kran*); colloquially in Afghanistan, *qeran*: silver coin equivalent to $\frac{1}{10}$th. of *toman*.

rupee: A silver coin used in both India and, in the last century, as the official currency of Afghanistan. The Kabuli rupee was more debased than its Indian counterpart: e.g. in 1838 in Qunduz it was one eighth alloy.
tanga: approximately one twentieth of a Bukharan *tila*.
tila: A gold coin of Bukhara valued at anything between between 4½ to 7 Indian silver rupees.
toman: Persian gold coin.

Exchange Rates in Qunduz, c. 1838:

1 *tila* = 4½ India (Company) rupees
1 Indian rupee = 5 *tangas*
1 Kabuli rupee = 26 *pul*
15 Kabuli rupees = 9 Indian rupees
(*source*, Dr. P.B. Lord)

Exchange Rates in Afghan Turkistan, c. 1885:

3 *tangas* = 2 *qran/qerans*/1 Kabuli rupee
20 *tangas* = 1 Bukharan *tila*
2.5 *qrans* =1 English (Indian) rupee
20 *qrans* = 5 gold roubles
(*source*, Gazetteer (1895) ii).

APPENDIX III

AMIRID RULERS OF THE CHAHAR WILAYAT

i. *Afshars of Andkhui*

*c.*1730/31-1736	'Ali Mardan Khan (for Nadir Shah Afshar)
*c.*1736-1790	Sulaiman Sultan
1750/1	Mukhless Khan
*c.*1790-1812	Rahmatullah Khan
1812-*c.* 1830	Yulduz Khan
*c.*1830-1835	'Abd al-'Aziz Khan
*c.*1835-1844	Shah Wali Khan
1844-1845	Ghazanfar Khan
1845	Sufi Khan
1845-1847	Ghazanfar Khan
1847	Sufi Khan
1847-1869	Ghazanfar Khan
1869-*c.*1880	Daulat Beg Khan

ii. *Beglarbegis of Sar-i Pul*

*c.*1731-1800	Under Maimana
*c.*1800-1814	Zu'l-Faqar Sher Khan (for Mingids of Maimana)
*c.*1814-1840	Zu'l-Faqar Sher Khan (independent)
1840-1851	Mahmud Khan
*c.*1851-1862	Qilij Khan
1861-1862	Afghan military government
1862-1864	Muhammad Khan
1864-1866	Afghan governor(s)
1866(?)-1875	Muhammad Khan (1867 temporarily under Hakim Khan of Shibarghan)

iii. Hakims of Shibarghan

fl. 1747-1757	Izbasar (for Bukhara)
*c.*1757-1800	Daulat Khan
*c.*1800-1820	Erich Khan
*c.*1820-1829	Manwar Khan
*c.*1829-1851	Rustam Khan
1846	Husain Khan(?)
1851-1855	Hakim Khan, Nizam al-Daula
1854 (Aug)	Mir Wali of Khulm (briefly, for Bukhara)
1855-1859	Sardar Wali Muhammad Khan, Barakzai (Afghan military governor)
1859-1875	Hakim Khan (with Afghan Resident)

iv. Mingids of Maimana

1612-30/1653-6??	Ataliq Uraz Bi Ming b. Baruti Bi
[*lacuna*]	
c. 1731(?)-1772	Haji Bi Khan
1772-*c.*1795	Jan Khan
1795	Eldest son of Jan Khan (unnamed)
1795-1804	Muhammad Rahim Khan
1804-1814	Ataliq Ahmad Quli Khan
1814-1830	'Ali Yar Khan
1830	Persian Regent
1830-1831	'Abd al-Mu'min Khan
1831-1845	Mizrab Khan
1845-1848	Hukumat Khan & Sher Muhammad Khan
1848-1862	Hukumat Khan
1862-1876	Muhammad Husain Khan
Mar. 1876-Sept. 1877	Ghulam Muhammad Reza Khan (Afghan governor)
Sept. 1877-Nov. 1877	Munshi Muhammad Husain Khan (Afghan governor)
Nov. 1877-Feb. 1879	General Muhammad Akbar Khan (Afghan governor)
Feb. 1879-May 1879	Muhammad Husain Khan
May 1879-Nov.1879	Sardar 'Abdullah Jan Khan Nasiri (Afghan governor)

Dec. 1879-Feb. 1880	Civil war between Dilawar Khan and Mir Husain Khan
Feb. 1880-May 1884	Dilawar Khan
1884-1888	Muhammad Husain Khan (with Afghan Resident)
[1888/9	rebellion of Sardar Ishaq Khan; Maimana under Herat]
1889-1892	Muhammad Sharif Khan (with Afghan Resident)

APPENDIX IV

GENEALOGIES OF THE CHINGIZID AND AMIRID DYNASTIES OF BALKH

i. Tuqay-Timurids of Bukhara and Balkh (p. 616)
ii. Manghits (Haidarids) of Bukhara (p. 617)
iii. Afshars of Andkhui (p. 618)
iv. *Beglarbegis* of Sar-i Pul (p. 619)
v. *Hakims* of Shibarghan (p. 620)
vi. Mingids of Maimana (p. 621, 622, 623)
vii. The Gauhari *Ishans* of Qarshi and Balkh (p. 624)
viii. Qataghanids (Qunduz and Khulm) (p. 625)

IV, i TUQĀY-TĪMŪRIDS (ASTRAKHĀNIDS) OF BUKHĀRA AND BALKH

Yār Muḥammad b. Mangqishlāq Khān
Jānī Muḥammad Sulṭān [1599 - 1603/1007 - 1012] married Zahra Khānum daughter of Iskandar
Pīr Muḥammad
'Abbās
Tursūn Muḥammad
Pāyanda Muḥammad
Raḥmān Qūlī
Dīn Muḥammad [1598/1006 - 1007]
Bāqī Muḥammad [1603 - 1606/1012 - 1014]
Walī Muḥammad [1601 - 1606/1009 - 1014] [1606 - 1611/1014 - 1020]
4th. son d. 1602/1011
'Abdullāh d. 1602/1011
Saiyid Imām Qulī [1611 - 1641/1020 - 1051]
Nazr Muḥammad [1611 - 1641/1020 - 1051] [1641 - 1645/1051 - 1055] [1645 - 1651/1055 - 1061]
Rustām Sulṭān
Muḥammad Raḥīm
Iskandar d. 1612/1021
(10 sons)
'Ibādullāh Sultān [1711 - 1713/1124 - 1125]
bd al-'Azīz Khān - 1681/1055 - 1092]
Bahrām
Khusrau Sulṭān
Qāsim Muḥammad
Subḥān Qūlī Khān [1651 - 1681/1061 - 1092] [1681 - 1702/1092 - 1114]
Shamsa-i Banū Khānum married father of:
Ṣāliḥ Khwāja Pārsā'ī [1696 - 1697/1107(8) - 1109]
Jahāngīr Sultān [1713/1125]
Sanjar Sultān [1713 - 1718/1125 - 1131]
(at least 9 sons)
Iskandar [1683/1094]
'Abū'l-Manṣūr [1683 - 1684/1094 - 1095]
'Ibādullāh d. 1683/1094
Ṣiddīq Muḥammad [1684 - 1685/1095 - 1098]
'Ubaidullāh [1707 - 1711/1119 - 1124]
'Abū'l-Faiz Khān [1711 - 1747/1124 - 1160]
'Abd al-Qaiyūm
Muḥammad Muqīm [1697 - 1707/1109 - 1119]
'Abd al-Mu'min d. 1747/1160
'Ubaidullāh [1751 - 1752/1164 - 1165]
daughter married to: Raḥīm BI Manghīt
'Abd al-Ghāzī [deposed 1784/1198]

IV, i TUQĀY-TĪMŪRIDS (ASTRAKHĀNIDS) OF BUKHĀRA AND BALKH


Yār Muḥammad b. Mangqishlāq Khān
Jānī Muḥammad Sulṭān (1599 - 1603/1007 - 1012)
married Zahra Khānum daughter of Iskandar
Pīr Muḥammad
'Abbās
Tursūn Muḥammad
Pāyanda Muḥammad
Raḥmān Qūlī
Dīn Muḥammad (1598/1006 - 1007)
Bāqī Muḥammad (1603 - 1606/1012 - 1014)
Walī Muḥammad (1601 - 1606/1009 - 1014) (1606 - 1611/1014 - 1020)
4th. son d. 1602/1011
'Abdullāh d. 1602/1011
Saiyid Imām Qulī (1611 - 1641/1020 - 1051)
Nazr Muḥammad (1611 - 1641/1020 - 1051) (1641 - 1645/1051 - 1055) (1645 - 1651/1055 - 1061)
Rustām Sulṭān
Muḥammad Raḥīm
Iskandar d. 1612/1021
(10 sons)
'Ibādullāh Sultān (1711 - 1713/1124 - 1125)
'Abd al-'Azīz Khān (1645 - 1681/1055 - 1092)
Bahrām
Khusrau Sulṭān
Qāsim Muḥammad
Subḥān Qūlī Khān (1651 - 1681/1061 - 1092) (1681 - 1702/1092 - 1114)
Shamsa-i Banū Khānum married father of: Ṣāleḥ Khwāja Pārsā'ī (1696 - 1697/1107(8) - 1109)
Jahāngīr Sultān (1713/1125)
Sanjar Sulṭān (1713 - 1718/1125 - 1131)
(at least 9 sons)
Iskandar (1683/1094)
'Abū'l-Manṣūr (1683 - 1684/1094 - 1095)
'Ibādullāh d. 1683/1094
Ṣiddīq Muḥammad (1684 - 1685/1095 - 1098)
'Ubaidullāh (1707 - 1711/1119 - 1124)
'Abū'l-Faiz Khān (1711 - 1747/1124 - 1160)
'Abd al-Qalyūm
Muḥammad Muqīm (1697 - 1707/1109 - 1119)
'Abd al-Mu'min d. 1747/1160
'Ubaidullāh (1751 - 1752/1164 - 1165)
daughter married to: Raḥīm BĪ Manghīt
'Abd al-Ghāzī (deposed 1784/1198)

IV, ii MANGHĪTS (ḤAIDARIDS) OF BUKHĀRA



IV, iii AFSHĀRS OF ANDKHŪĪ, c. 1730-1880

KEY: Appendix IV, charts iii-viii

[ ] = length of reign(s)
( ) = born/died
* = executed
# = poisoned/assassinated
c. = circa
b. = born
d. = died
R. = regent
fl. = *(floruit)* flourished (followed by date)
- female members of families are indicated by italics
- rulers in bold
- dates are AD. dates; where Hijra dates are used, AD dates invariably appear first thus, AD/AH.



IV, iv BEGLARBEGĪS OF SAR-I PUL, c. 1814-1875


sister married to:
Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān Mīng
Atāliq Ẓū'l-Faqār Shēr Khān
[c. 1814 - 1840]
sister married to:
Aḥmad Khān Mīng
Maḥmūd Khān [1840 - 1851]
(c. 1805 - 1853) *
son, unnamed, (fl. 1860s)
daughter married to:
son of Mīr Wālī of Khulm
Mīr Qilīj Khān [1851 - c. 1862]
(d. c. 1866)
Mīr Muḥammad Khān
[1862 - 1864, 1866(?) - 1875]
(d. 1886) *
married daughter of:
Muẓaffar Khān of Bukhara, 1864/5
Mīr 'Abdullāh
Mīr "Bilman" Beg
(fl. 1860 - 1870)
Ḥusain Khān (?) (fl. 1840s)
daughter married to:
'Alī Yār Khān Mīng

IV, v ḤĀKIMS OF SHIBARGHAN, c. 1747-1875


Izbāsar [fl. 1747 - 1757]
Mīr Daulat Khān [c. 1757 - 1800]
Ērīch Khān [c. 1800 - 1820]
Manwar Khān [1820 - 1829]
Rustām Khān [c. 1829 - 1851] *
(b. c. 1805)
married daughter of:
Mirzāb Khān Mīng
"daughter" (sister?) married to:
Mizrāb Khān Mīng
Mīr Ḥakīm Khān, Nizām al-Daula
[1851 - 1855, 1859 - 1875]
(d. 1876/7)
son-in-law of Rustām Khān
Colonel Saiyid Naẓar Khān (d. 1892)
daughter married to:
Amir 'Abd al-Raḥmān Khān
son (fl. 1857)
daughter married to:
Muḥammad Ḥusain Khān Mīng
2 sons survived him

IV, vi MĪNGIDS OF MAIMANA, c. 1731-1892

a


Ūrāz Bī Mīng b. Bārūtī Bī Mīng
[1612 - 1630, 1653 - 16??]
Ḥājī Bī Khān Mīng
[c. 1731 - 1772]
Naẓr Sulṭān (fl. 1750)
Jān Khān [c. 1772 - 1795]
Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān #
[c. 1795 - 1804] #
eldest son,
blinded, 1795
"several sons"
Atālīq Aḥmad Qulī Khān
[c. 1804 - 1814] #
married sister of:
Ẓū'l-Faqār Shēr Khān
'Alī Yār Khān [1814 - 1830]
Miẓrāb Khān [1831 - 1845] #
(b. c. 1798) (by Persian slave)
'Abd al-Mu'min Khān [1830 - 1831] #
(b. c. 1800) (by Turki woman)
'Abū'l-Naẓr (?) (fl. 1840)
Subḥān Qulī (c. 1814 - 1832/3)
married sister of:
Ẓū'l-Faqār Shēr Khān
Abū'l-Muḥammad (fl. 1840)
married daughter of:
Ẓū'l-Faqār Shēr Khān (d. 1831) *
married daughter of:
Īldūz Khān, Andkhui
married daughter(?) of:
Mīr Wālī of Khulm (d. 1831) *
infant heir (b. c. 1803/4)
[d. 1830] *

MĪNGIDS OF MAIMANA

b

Mizrāb Khān Mīng
[1831 - 1845] #

married 'daughter' (sister?) of:
Rustām Khān of Shibarghan

Shēr Muḥammad Khān
[1845 - 1848]

Ḥukumat Khān [1845 - 1862] #

4 sons

Shādmān Khān (?)

daughter married to:
Rustām Khān, Shibarghan

Muḥammad Ḥusain Khān
[1862 - 1876, 1879, 1884 - 1889]
(b. c. 1840/1) *

daughter married to:
Khān Āghā Jamshīdī

daughter married to:
Mīr Dānīyāl Bī Khān,
Ḥakīm of Gurziwān

married daughter of:
Ḥakīm Khan, Shibarghan

half-brother of:
Dilāwar/Muẓaffar Khān

half-brother of:
Dilāwar/Muẓaffar Khān

Dilāwar Khān [1880 - 1884]
(d. 1886) *

Muẓaffar Khān

married daughter of:
'Amīnullāh Khān Jamshīdī

wife (d. 1873)

Muḥammad 'Alī Khān
(d. 1886)

daughter betrothed to:
Sardār Muḥammad Is'ḥāq
Khān

daughter married to:
Mīr Muḥammad Sharīf,
Ṣāḥibzāda of Siyāhwāshān

Sulṭān Aḥmad Khān
(d. before 1892)

Muḥammad Ẓamān Khān
(alive 1885)

Shēr Muḥammad Khān
step-brother

"youngest son" adopted by:
Amīr 'Abd al-Raḥmān Khān

daughter alive, 1892

Muḥammad Sharīf Khān
[1889 - 1892]

Muḥammad A'ẓam Khān
(alive 1885)

daughter married to:
Wāzīr (Huẓār) Beg, Kata Qal'a

daughter married to:
Amīr 'Abd al-Raḥmān Khān

wife, married in 1888

Mīrzā 'Abd al-Laṭīf Khān(?)

MĪNGIDS OF MAIMANA

c

daughter (sister?) of:
Rustām Khān, Shibarghan

Mīrzā Muḥammad Sadīq Khān
(d. 1872)

Mīrzā Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān
(d. before 1884)

2 sons (d. 1876)

Mīrzā Ḥaidar Khān
(fl. 1860 - 70)

Mīrzā Yār Beg
(fl. 1863 - 1874)

cousin
Mīrzā 'Abd al-Faiz Khān — Mīrzā 'Abd al-Faiz Khān,"Arziak",
(son of a maternal uncle) Ḥākim of Qalṣār (d. 1893) *

IV, vii THE GAUHARĪ ĪSHĀNS OF QARSHĪ AND BALKH
(members of the clan are usually referred to as Saiyid...Gauharī)



IV, viii QAṬAGHANIDS (QUNDUZ AND KHULM)


Shāh Murād Qaṭaghān
Beg Murād [c. 1647 - 1657]
Maḥmūd Bī [1657 - 1714]
Sohrāb Bī [1714 - 17??]
Miẓrāb BI
Yūsuf BI (d. c. 1740)
Hazāra BI [1740 - 1753]
Miẓrāb BI [1753 - c. 1800]
Kokan BI [c. 1800 - 1815]
son
son
Murād Beg [1815 - 1846]
son
Muḥammad Raḥīm (alive, 1839)
Khurram Beg (alive, 1867)
Karīm Beg (alive, 1867)
Qilij 'Alī Beg Khān, ruler of Khulm (d. 1817)
(13 sons, 12 daughters)
Sultān Murād Mīr Atāliq [1846 - 1860]
Muḥammad "Umtar" (killed 1853?)
son (alive, 1853)
son (alive, 1853)
Aḥmad (1792 - 1812) poisoned
Muḥammad Amin Beg (1796 - 1855) Mīr Wālī of Khulm [1817 - 1849]
'Alī Mardān (b. 1798)
Sultān 'Alī Murād Beg [1869 - 1888]
Mir Ganj 'Alī Beg (d. 1868, executed)
Mir Ghulām Beg (d. 1868, executed)

APPENDIX V.i: GENEALOGY OF THE JAMSHIDI CHIEFS


1. KHUSHI KHAN
2. Mahmud Khan
(lived in the time of Timur Shah)
3. Yalangtush Khan
(killed in attacking the Hazaras at Qal'a-yi Nau)
4. Mahmud Khan
(received Kushk in jagir. Was killed by Firozkohis and Hazaras near Paiwar)
5. Darwesh 'Ali Khan
(killed in a fight with the Hazaras)
Qara Khan
'Abd al-Jabbar Beg
Muhammad 'Ali Khan
(killed by Muhammad Zaman Khan)
6. Muhammad Zaman Khan
(killed by the Khan Agha c. 1842)
A daughter
(married Wali Muhammad Khan of Karokh)
Murtaza Quli Khan
(turned fakir, no sons)
8. Mehdi Quli Khan
Khan Agha
(killed by Sardar Ayub Khan in 1881. Married to daughter of Darwesh 'Ali Khan)
'Abdullah Khan, Beglar Begi
(dead)
Allah Quli Khan
(died 1883)
Akram Khan
(in Herat in 1885)
Allahyar Khan
(fled to Persia in 1842 or 1843)
7. Mir Ahmad Khan
(killed by Yomuts in Khiva in 1856. No sons)
Wali Muhammad Khan
(put to death at Kabul in 1886)
Nasrullah Khan
(in Kushk in 1885)
'Abd al-Rahman Khan
Muhammad A'zam Khan
(married a daughter of Wali Muhummad Khan of Karokh)
Muhammad Aslan Khan
daughter betrothed to Sardar Ahmad 'Ali Jan, grandson of Amir Sher 'Ali
Zu'l-faqar Khan
(in Mashhad in 1886, Chief of the Persian Jamshidis)
Muhammad 'Azim Khan
10. Haidar Quli Khan
(son of a Jamshidi woman not of the Khan Khel. Was alive at Herat in 1888)
9. Yalangtush Khan
(married daughter of Mirza Sidiq. Mustufi of Herat; also daughter of Wali Muhammad Khan, Jamshidi, of Karokh). Put to death at Kabul in 1886
Aminullah Khan
(put to death at Kabul in 1886)
Daughter married to Sardar Yaqub Khan. Died 1879, leaving two daughters.
Daughter betrothed to Sardar Ayub Khan. Was in Kushk in 1885, aged 18
Muhammad Rahim Khan
Muhammad Karim Khan
Muhammad Khan, born 1875
Ahmad 'Ali Khan
Khan Agha
(believed to have been alive in Herat in 1886)
(believed to have been put to death with their father)

Adapted from: "Records of the Intelligence Party," vol. 4, *Reports on the Tribes*. Simla. 1891. 57.
(N.B. Transliterations of personal and *some* place names in Appendix V have been modified to conform with orthography of text. Otherwise entries have been retained unchanged from original source)

APPENDIX V.ii: GENEALOGY Of THE QAL'A-YI NAU HAZARA CHIEFS


KAFILAN SULTAN
(first Chief? Lived at the time of Nadir Shah)
Agha Sultan
(who founded Qal'a-yi Nau)
Muhammad Shah Khan
Darwesh 'Ali Khan
(no sons)
Sikandar Khan
Muhammad Khan Beglar Begi
(Was chief in time of Timur Shah Durrani)
Azad Khan
Ibrahim Khan
Qurban 'Ali Khan
Bunyad Khan
(succeeded his brother Muhammad Khan. Was killed by Sher Muhammad Khan about 1820)
Sher Muhammad Khan
(killed Buyand Khan and became chief)
Karimdad Khan, Beglar Begi
(succeeded Sher Muhammad. In his time the Hazaras were dispersed by Yar Muhammad Khan of Herat)
Ahmad Quli Khan
(was chief after the return of the Hazaras from Khurasan)
Muhammad Husain Khan
'Abd al-'Aziz
(no sons)
Muhammad Sadiq Khan
(was killed by Muhammad Khan, Nizam al-Daula)
Mahmud Khan, Beglar Begi
(at Kabul in 1884. No sons)
Muhammad Khan
(present chief, 1884-1886, with title of Nizam al-Daula. No sons. Was summoned to Kabul in 1886)
Sher Muhammad
(was head of the Hazaras on the Murghab in 1884. No sons)
Saiyid Muhammad
(lived at Qal'a Maghur in 1884)
Had two young sons in 1884

Adapted from: "Records of the Intelligence Party," vol. 4, *Reports on the Tribes*, Simla 1891, 87.

APPENDIX V.iii: GENEALOGY OF THE FIROZKOHI CHIEFS

Genealogy no. 1



[1] Put to death by Karar Beg Sultanyari.
[2] Bahram Khan was living at Dara Takht in 1885.
[3] Married Latif 'Ali Beg, son of Arbab Niyaz (a great-grandson of Shah Fulad) and mother of Karimdad Beg, who was the father of Fathullah Beg.
[4] Married Bibi Hajir, daughter of Shah Pasand Khan.

Adapted from: "Records of the Intelligence Party," vol. 4, *Reports on the Tribes*, Simla 1891, 109.

APPENDIX V.iii: GENEALOGY OF THE FIROZKOHI CHIEFS

Genealogy no. 2


HAKIM KHAN ACHAKZAI
Mahmud Khan
Shah Fulad
Tufan Beg
a son
Arbab Niyaz
Lutf 'Ali Beg
(he married a daughter of Urus Khan, grandson of Mir Ibrahim)
Karimdad Beg
Fathullah Beg
(died at Kabul in 1886?)
Niyaz Beg and 9 other sons
A daughter, married Khwaja 'Ali, a Saiyid
Mir Ibrahim
from whom most of the Firozkohi Chiefs of the present day are descended
(*vide* Genealogy no. 1)

Adapted from: "Records of the Intelligence Party," vol. 4, *Reports on the Tribes*, Simla 1891, 111.

APPENDIX V.iv: GENEALOGY OF THE TAIMANI CHIEFS
Genealogy no. 1: General


TAIMAN
He was one of the sons of Sanzar, who was fifth in descent from Kak, and progenitor of the Sanzar Khel or Saran Kakars of Zhob and Bori. Taiman, having fled from Zhob, settled in the Darra Khargosh. The date given is 973 Hijri (AD 1586).
[several generations]
Shah Ghulam Sultan (about 1680?)
Mir Muhammad Sultan
Said to have first conquered the Ghorat, but appears to have left no male descendants.
Shah Walad Sultan
Sardar Dilawar Khan
Nadir Shah granted him the whole of the present Taiman country, with Sabz[a]war, Farah the Dai Zangi Hazara districts, etc. Date between 1730 and 1740.
Shah Karam Sultan
He was given the Chiefship of the Ghorat by his great-nephew Unab Khan, who was very young on his father's death, and his descendents have held it ever since.
Sardar Amir Khan
Sardar Muhammad Khan
Sardar Ibrahim Khan
"Aka" Mirza Khan
Appears to have gone to Mazandaran as Chief of the families deported by Nadir Shah. There attempted Nadir Shah's life in 1741.
Unab Khan
Succeeded to Tulak, Ishlan, Shaharak, Daulatyar and the Ghorat. Received title of Sahib-i Ikhtiyar from Ahmad Shah Durrani for services at Peshawar in 1776.
Rozi Beg
Bamiyan and the Dai Zangi Hazara country appears to have been his share.
Amir Khusrau Khan
succeeded to the Chiefship of Farsi and Sabz[a]war. Was Hakim of Obeh and Shahfilan in Ahmad Shah's reign (1770 to 1776).
Hazara Muhammad Khan
Sahib-i Ikhtiyar, Chief of the four districts named above, but not of the Ghorat.
Nur Muhammad Khan
He settled altogether in Bamiyan, where were then 1,000[1] families of Taimanis.
Sardar Ghafur Khan
Chief of the Ghorat. Was killed (by accident) in 1879.
Sardar Ambiya Khan
Sueceeded his brother. Was Chief of the Ghorat in 1886, and the most important man in the Taimani country.
(SEE GENEALOGY No. 4)
Sardar Gadai Khan
Chief of Farsi only (1790)
A daughter
Married Amir Qilij Khan the great Temuri Chief.
Muhammad Khan
Sahib-i Ikhtiyar: Chief of Tulak, Ishlan and Shaharak.
'Abd al-Rahman Khan
Chief of Daulatyar.
Sardar Azad Khan
(1835)
Muhammad Khan
Sahib-i Ikhtiyar.
Hasan Khan
Sardar Ata Muhammad Khan
(1853 to 1875)
Dost Muhammad Khan
Sahib-i Ikhtiyar. Was deprived of his Chiefship after the accession of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan. Was living in retirement at Kaminj in 1886.
Muhammad Khan
Was Chief of Daulatyar in 1886.
Sardar Sultan Muhammad Khan
Was Chief of Farsi in 1886, and then 27 years of age.
(SEE GENEALOGY No. 2)
(SEE GENEALOGY No. 3)

[1] Or possibly 4,000. The original is very difficult to read at this point.

Adapted from: "Records of the Intelligence Party," vol 4, *Reports on the Tribes*, Simla 1891, 163.

APPENDIX V. iv: GENEALOGY OF THE TAIMANI CHIEFS
Genealogy no. 2: The Elder (Farsi) Branch


"AKA" MIRZA KHAN
Eldest son of Sardar Dilawar Khan (see Genealogy no. 1).
He or his eldest son, Khusrau Khan, succeeded to Farsi, Sabz[a]war and whatever districts had been held by Dilawar Khan in the Hari Rud valley.
Amir Khusrau Khan (see Genealogy no. 1)
Shah Rustam Khan (no sons?)
Nagintaj Khan
Rahimdad Khan (no sons?)
Sadar Gadai Khan
Khudadad Khan (no sons?)
Muhammad Gul Khan
Islam Khan
6 sons: Din Muhammad; Nur Muhammad; Samandar; 'Abd al-Rahim; Sikandar; Dilawar.
Dilasa Khan
Shah Pasand Khan
Jan Muhammad
Sher Muhammad
Dildar Khan
Sardar Azad Khan
Halat Khan[1]
"Aka" Mahmud[2]
"Aka" Bunyad[2]
Shah Pasand Khan (no sons?)
Abdullah Khan
Muhammad Ya'qub
Mustafa Khan
Akram Khan (no sons?)
Sardar Ata Muhammad Khan (died 1875)
"Aka" Muhammad Khan
Mahmud Khan
Muhammad Khan
"Aka" Ahmad
"Aka" Ibrahim
"Aka" Isma'il
"Aka" Ahmad
Samandar
Khan Muhammad
Muhammad Karim
Muhammad Akram
Sher Muhammad
Mehrdil
Purdil Khan
Muhammad Khan
Ahmad Khan
Muhammad 'Omar Khan lives in Tagao Ishlan.
Din Muhammad
Dost Muhammad
Rasul Khan
Nur Muhammad
Din Muhammad
'Omar Khan lives in Farah.
Muhammad Sadiq Khan[3]
Dost Muhammad Khan Lives at Tulak.
Nizam
Akzam
A'zam
Muhammad 'Abbas
Muhammad Rafiq
Muhammad Azim
An obscure branch, although Dildar Khan is described in the Intelligence Branch genealogies as being the eldest son of Sardar Gadai Khan.
Faiz Muhammad Khan Was Chief and Hakim of Tulak, but deposed at the same time as Muhammad Sadiq for some reason. Lives in retirement at Tulak.
Zaman
A'zam
Ata
2 sons: Muhammad Akbar; Afzal.
2 sons: Muhammad; Murtaza.
Rahimdil
Sher Muhammad Khan (11 years old in 1885)
Ahmad 'Ali Khan
Sardar Sultan Muhammad Khan Chief and Hakim of Farsi and Chad-rud. Is married to a daughter of Ambiya Khan of Taiwara.
A daughter married Muhammad Sarwar Khan, who was governor of Herat, 1883-87
Amir Khan
'Alam Khan
Jalal al-Din Khan
These three were youths in 1885. They lived in the Chad-rud (Merk).
Are adherents of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan.

The members of this younger branch seem to be all obscure. Nagintaj Khan, their ancestor, does not even appear in Merk's genealogy. Muhammad Karim, the eldest representative of the branch, was a man of not more than 50 years of age in 1885.

[1] [This family] belong to the party of Ayub Khan. It was Sadiq Khan and Faiz Muhammad who seized Mehdi Quli Khan, Jamhsidi (the Khan Agha), and delivered him to Ayub Khan at Herat, who put him to death.

[2] The members of these junior branches (the families of "Aka" Mahmud and "Aka" Bunyad) are all obscure. "Aka" Muhammad does not appear at all in the Intelligence Branch genealogies

[3] Was Chief and Hakim of Ishlan, but deposed in 1882 for joining the party of Ayub Khan, and now lives in retirement at Qal'a-yi Ishlan.

Adapted from: "Records of the Intelligence Party," vol. 4: *Reports on the Tribes*, Simla 1891, 165.

APPENDIX V.iv: GENEALOGY OF THE TAIMANI CHIEFS

Genealogy no. 3: The Younger (Shaharak) Branch


UNAB KHAN
Younger son of Dilawar Khan. He inherited Tulak, Ishlan, Shaharak, Daulatyar, etc.
These he retained, but handed over the Ghorat to his grand-uncle, Shah Karam Sultan.
He received the title of Sahib-i Ikhtiyar from Ahmad Shah Durrani.
Sardar Hazara Muhammad Khan, Sahib-i Ikhtiyar
Sardar Muhammad Khan, Sahib-i Iktiyar
'Abd al-Rahman Khan
'Abd al-Hamid Khan
Mahmud Khan, Sahib-i Ikhtiyar
Muhammad Azim Khan
"Aka" Ibrahim
"Aka" Ahmad
Hasan Khan
'Abd al-Fateh Khan
"Aka" Ahmad
Muhammad Azim Khan
"Aka" Ibrahim Hakim of Kajurbash
Muhammad Sadiq Khan
"Aka" Isma'il
A daughter married Purdil Khan, eldest son of Ibrahim Khan, Firozkohi of Kucha.
"Aka" Murtaza Khan
"Aka" Ahmad Khan
"Aka" Din Muhammad Khan Lives at Kaminj
Zaman Khan Killed by Firozkohis
Haji Ata Khan
"Aka" Rahimdil Hakim of Shaharak
'Abd al-Azim Khan
Sardar Muhammad Khan of Daulatyar
"Aka" Dost Muhammad
"Aka" Isma'il Hakim of Siyahchob
Muhammad A'zam Khan
"Aka" Akram
Muhammad Azim Khan
"Aka" Nizam
Yar Muhammad Khan
Muhammad Akbar Khan
Muhammad Afzal Khan
"Inaiatulla" Khan
Aka Muhammad and 4 others
Muhammad Haidar Khan
Lal Husain Khan
Muhammad Akbar Khan
Husaini Khan
Muhammad Yusuf Khan
Dost Muhammad Khan, Sahib-i Iktiyar, of Kaminj. Holds no office, but is considered Chief of all the Taimanis by right of descent, and is greatly respected.
Akram Khan
Muhammad Khan
Ibrahim Khan
Abu Bakr Khan
"Inaiatulla" Khan
Din Muhammad Khan
Muhammad Akram Khan
A daughter married to her first cousin, "Inaitulla" Khan, son of Purdil Khan, Firozkohi
Ataullah Khan
Muhammad Yusuf Khan
Muhammad Azim Khan was about 17 in 1885
Allahdad Khan
Muhammad 'Omar Khan
Muhammad A'zam Khan
Muhammad Sarwar Khan
Sarfaraz Khan
Muhammad Khan
Mahmud Khan
Muhammad Rafiq
A daughter married to Mullah Gadai, Zai Raza Firozkohi
'Abd al-'Aziz Khan
Ahmad Khan
Muhammad A'zam
A daughter married to Sardar Ambiya Khan of Taiwara
Mehrdil Khan
Muhammad Khan
Muhammad 'Alam Khan
Muhammad Azim Khan
A daughter married to Ambiya Khan of Taiwara.
Purdil Khan
Muhammad A'zam Khan
Muhammad Akram Khan
"Burzd"(Burzerg) Khan

Adapted from: "Records of the Intelligence Party," vol. 4, Reports on the Tribes, Simla 1891, 167.

APPENDIX V.iv: GENEALOGY OF THE TAIMANI CHIEFS

Genealogy no. 4: The Ghorat (youngest) Branch


SHAH KARAM SULTAN
Uncle of Dilawar Khan. He was given the Chiefship of the Ghorat by Unab Khan, Dilawar Khan's younger son, when an old man.
Sardar Amir Khan
Sardar Muhammad Khan
Sulaiman Khan
Sardar Ibrahim Khan
died about 1852 (Merk). He had fourteen sons.
Rasul Khan
five sons: Muhammad Khan; Saif al-Muluk; Sultan; Ghulam and 'Ali Jan.
Muhammad Khan
Two sons: 'Osman Khan and 'Omar Khan.
Isma'il Khan
Yar Muhammad Khan
"Aka" Muhammad Khan
Yusuf Khan
Dilawar Khan
Mustafa Khan
Mentioned by Ferrier as having betrayed Sardar Ibrahim Khan to Yar Muhammad Khan at Herat (1845). Was killed by Sardar 'Abd al-Ghafur about 1856.
Yunus
Has one son, Muhammad
Yusuf
Has 4 sons: Jahan; Aslam; "Abram"; Jan Muhammad
Khudadad
Two sons: Sherdil and "Kohzadil"
Muhammad
One son
Ahmad
one son, 'Abd al-Hamid
(1)Sardar 'Abd al-Ghafur Khan, Killed by accident in 1879
(2)Muhammad Husain Khan
Muhammad A'zam Khan Hakim of Nili and Zarni under Ambiya Khan.
(3)Sardar Ambiya Khan of Taiwara Chief of the Ghorat.
'Abd al-Rahman; Hasan; Husain; Khair Muhammad; Muhammad, etc. The eldest was about 15 in 1885. A daughter is married to Sultan Muhammad Khan of Farsi.
(4)Muhammad Mustafa Khan Hakim of Chahardar, under Ambiya Khan.
(5)Mehrdil Khan (Dead?)
Has 3 sons: Muhammad; Yusuf; Murtaza.
(6)Isma'il Khan Is Ambiya Khan'sNa'ib at Taiwara.
(7)Dost Muhammad Khan. Lives at Taiwara, is paralysed.
(8)Haidar Shah Khan Hakim of Sanai under Ambiya Khan. (two young sons)
(9)Muhammad Musa Khan
(10)Abu Bak[a]r Khan Lives in Sakhar.
(11)Muhammad Yusuf Khan
'Omar Khan Lives at Farsi.
(12)Ata Muhammad Khan dead
(13)Turabaz Khan at Taiwara
(14)Jurabaz Khan at Taiwara
Saiyid Muhammad Khan killed in fighting against Ambiya Khan.
Has two sons; 'Abdullah and Ata Muhammad. Eldest was about twelve in 1885.
Din Muhammad Khan Hakim of Sakhar. Was present at Maiwand.
Has one son, Muhammad Nazar, a child in 1885.
Dost Muhammad Khan
Fakir Muhammad Khan
live at Sakhar
Isma'il Khan
Abdul Khan
Muhammad A'zam Khan
Live with their mother's relations at Farsi and are of the faction of Ayub Khan.
Dost Muhammad Khan
Was Hakim of Sangan and Yaman (under Ghafur Khan), and was present at Maiwand. Expelled by Ambiya Khan in 1881, and lives in retirement at Shahfilan in the Herat valley.
five sons: Mustafa; Ya'qub; Sadiq; Haidar and Yusuf
Ata Khan
Yar Muhammad Khan Lives somewhere in the Hazarajat.
Sarfaraz Khan
These younger branches are obscure

Note—These younger branches are obscure. According to Merk's genealogy, Isma'il Khan was a brother, not a son, of Ibrahim Khan, and his sons are given as: (1) Muhammad (2) Rasul and (3) Yusuf. Yar Muhammad Khan does not appear at all, but Yusuf Khan is credited with two sons, Azim and Dilawar.

Note—Sardar 'Abd al-Ghafur Khan was the eldest son of Ibrahim Khan by a wife of the Farsi branch. He, together with Abu "Bakar" (10), and Ata Muhammad (12), belonged to the party of Ayub Khan. Their sons are still opposed to Ambiya Khan. Abu "Bakar's" family are maintained in Sakhar as a sort of counterpoise to Ambiya Khan.

Note—Muhammad Mustafa Khan (4), Isma'il Khan (6), and Dost Muhammad Khan (7), are full brothers of Ambiya Khan, their mother having been a relative of Samandar Khan Zuri of Nezgan. Ambiya Khan has married (a) a daughter of "Aka" Isma'il of Siyahchob; (b) a daughter of Dost Muhammad Khan, Sahib-i Ikhtiyar, of Kaminj.

Adapted from: "Records of the Intelligence Party," vol. 4: *Reports on the Tribes*, Simla 1891, 169.

APPENDIX VI

THE DURRANI (ABDALI) AMIRS OF AFGHANISTAN, 1747-1901

1747-1773	Ahmad Shah
1775-1793	Timur Shah
1793-1800	Zaman Shah
1800-1803	Mahmud Shah
1803-1809	Shah Shuja' al-Mulk
1809-1817	Mahmud Shah (second reign)
1817-1822	Muhammad 'Azam Khan
1822-1826	Habibullah Khan
1826-1839	Dost Muhammad Khan
1839-1842	Shah Shuja' al- Mulk
1841-1842	(Regent) Zaman Khan
1842-1863	Dost Muhammad Khan
1863-1866	Sher 'Ali Khan
1866-1867	Muhammad Afzal Khan
1867-1868	Muhammad Az'am Khan
1868-1879	Sher 'Ali Khan
1879	Ya'qub Khan
1880-1901	'Abd al-Rahman Khan

Sadozai Amirs of Herat, 1817-1863

1817-1829	Mahmud Khan
1829-1841	Kamran Mirza
1841-1851	Wazir Yar Muhammad Khan
1851-1855	Saiyid Muhammad Khan
1855	Muhammad Yusuf Khan
1855	'Isa Khan
[1856	Persian occupation]
1857-1863	Sultan Ahmad Khan Barakzai
1863 onwards	Under Kabul

APPENDIX VII

AFGHAN GOVERNORS OF BALKH *c.* 1780-1895

*c.*1780-1793	Unnamed Afghan governors
fl. 1793	Muhammad Khan Siya Mansur
1809-1817	Sardar Najibullah Khan Surkhani
[1817-1837/8	Ishan Parsa Khwaja Naqib Gauhari of Qasan]
[1837/8-1840	'Abd al-Jabbar Bi]
[1840-1850	Ishan Saiyid Muhammad Uraq Gauhari]
1850-1852	Sardar Muhammad Akram Khan
1852-1864	Sardar Muhammad Afzal Khan
1864-1865	Sardar Fath Muhammad Khan
1865-1867	Sardar Faiz Muhammad Khan
1867-1868	Beglarbegi Mir Muhammad Khan of Sar-i pul
1868-1876	Sardar Na'ib Muhammad 'Alam Khan
1876-1878	Shahghasi Sherdil Loynab Khan
1878-1879	Shahghasi Khushdil Loynab Khan
1879-1880	General Ghulam Haidar Khan Wardaki
1880-1888	Sardar Muhammad Ishaq Khan
1888-1890	Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan (direct rule)
1890-1892	Sardar Nazr Muhammad Sarwar Khan
1892-1895	Sardar 'Abd al-'Aziz Khan

[ ] = Ruler appointed by, and ruling in name of, the Manghits of Bukhara (names and dates in italics).

APPENDIX VIII

AFGHAN RESIDENTS AND GOVERNORS OF MAIMANA, 1884-1892

Afghan Political Residents

1884-1886	Sardar Auliya Khan Barakzai
1886-1888	Sardar 'Aziz Khan b. Shams al-Din Khan
1888-1889	Rustam 'Ali Khan (military governor)
1889-1892	General Ghaus al-Din Khan (military governor)

Afghan Governors

1892-1896	Sardar Muhammad Sarwar Khan
1896-1899	'Abd al-Rahim Akhunzada Kohistani
1899-1902	Sardar Saleh Muhammad Khan

APPENDIX IX

OFFICIAL CORRESPONDENCE , THE 'TURKISTAN ATROCITIES'

i. Translation of a letter from SAYYID DIWAN MUHAMMAD, Munshi to the British Agency at Kabul to the address of the Native Attacheé, Foreign Office, Kabul, 13 July 1889, L/P&S/7/58, fol. 145.

[after compliments] ... I beg to say that I have received your letter, dated 3rd July 1889, saying that in some of my diaries, it is mentioned that the Turkistan prisoners are subjected to much oppression, and that they are put to death with great cruelty; thus some of them have their eyes gouged out; some are strangled and beheaded; some are buried after being cut to pieces; others bayonetted to death, &c; that therefore it is enquired whether these reports are in accordance with reports of reliable persons, or mere bazar gossip.

All those who were beheaded and put to death by being cut to pieces were so treated under the gallows which is erected at a spot opposite the Agency building and about 800 paces from it. The Agency servants used to go to witness these executions, and they have seen them with their own eyes. I have also see the same.

As regards those who were put to death by being strangled and those whose eyes were gouged out, I heard these reports from respectable persons, and I have mentioned them after making careful enquiries of reliable persons, who had personally witnessed these executions and operations.

Without ascertaining facts from three or four sources, I do not write these reports. I take all possible precaution to verify reports which seem doubtful or uncertain. I never write bazar gossip or reports given by common people, because reports of common people are, in the majority of instances, false, and only in few instances correct.

This is Afghanistan; there are such foolish and groundless reports circulated among the common people and in the bazars, that they are beyond one's imagination and sober thoughts.

It would be wrong to write bazar gossip, because it is not reliable. Whatever news is received from respectable men, is further tested, and is then communicated.

ii. *Colonel R. Warburton, Political Officer in the Khyber, to Sir H.M. Durand, K.C.I.E, C.S.I.*, 21st July 1889 (Confidential), L/P&S/7/58, fols145-147

I have received your letter of the 17th July, and hasten to reply to it at once. For a very long time news has reached me at frequent intervals of the executions carried out by Amir Abdur Rahman Khan both at Kabul as well as Herat, but these circumstances I never entered in my diary, as there was no good to be gained in mentioning such matters in a document that had to pass through so many hands and become known to so many people. It is an open secret that, after our Afghan Boundary Commission returned from Kabul to India and Kazi Sad-ud-Din got back to Herat, all the people who had come to our officers whilst in that province, or who had shown any attention to, or received any favours from, our people, were all swept out of the way. The murder of Yalantush Khan, the Jamshedi Chief, and his brother Aminulla Khan, who were secured on a slight excuse, hurried to Kabul and slain there, was a very bad case indeed, since these men suffered for having stood by Yate and his party at Panjdeh, when the Afghan soldiery were routed by the Russians, and conducted their charge in safety towards Killa-iMaur.

The executions carried out by the Amir in former years, numerous and bad enough as they were, were conducted with a certain amount of secrecy and desire to put a shadow over these matters. Only the worst and most dangerous characters were put to death publicly, whilst the others were secretly despatched, and reports circulated that they had died in prison. The public knew what had really occurred, and made no further comments on them. But ever since the revolt of Sardar Muhammad Ishak Khan, and the arrival of Abdur Rahman Khan in Afghan Turkistan, affairs have changed, and the prisoners are now sent out of this world in such numbers, and with such publicly brutal measures, that the news could hardly be credited, were it not told by men who were eye-witnesses of the scenes they were relating,

and who were in no way biassed (*sic*) by any enmity against the Amir, or friendship for Ishak Khan or the sufferers, in spreading mischievous reports against the ruler of Afghanistan.

When the Amir arrived at Mazar-i-Sharif, he managed in time to secure a list of the names of those chiefs, maliks, officers and soldiers of his Turkistan army, who had salaamed to Sardar Muhammad Ishak Khan, joined their fortunes with his, and had fought against Ghulam Hyder Khan, Orakzai. Those who could escape across the Oxus did so, but a large number could not, and they remained behind at their homes, trusting that in the crowd they might escape observation. A box was also discovered in Sardar Muhammad Ishak Khan's house at Mazar-i-Sharif, which disclosed the names and agreements made by a large number of Chiefs, who had promised to support Ishak Khan, and letters which incriminated others. In Afghanistan, he who is in correspondence with any opponent or enemy of the Amir knows what his fate will be, if he is captured by any of the Afghan officials and brought before their master. Captives and prisoners were made on all sides, and large numbers of men were put to death in Mazar-i Sharif, and no one was to be spared whose name figured in the above list.

Lately the Turkistan prisoners have been despatched in large batches to Kabul, gangs of them arriving there twice or three times a week. Sardar Habibulla Khan being too fond of releasing prisoners, has been directed by the Amir not to interfere with these for the future, and the punishment has been entrusted to the hands of Parwana Khan and Mir Sultan Naib of the Kabul Kotwali. There are several ways in vogue at Kabul of getting rid of these captives:-

(i) Certain men are led out at night, and their throats cut at the graveyard name "Jubba" below the Bala Hissar, and their bodies buried in that cemetery.

(ii) Another batch are treated in the same way within the Bala Hissar, but their bodies are thrown into the Siah-Chah within that fortress.

(iii) Others are interred alive in a second well also called Siah-Chah and inside the Bala Hissar, and there left to perish from hunger.

(iv) Certain men are hanged at night on gallows erected near Siah-Sang.

(v) Those that are blown away from guns, meet their death on the Chaman, two hundred paces from the Peshawar Gate of Kabul City.

(vi) Others who are ordered to be hanged during the day, are executed on the gallows erected close to the Amir's stables, facing Mahalla Murad Khani in the Kizilbash quarter.
(viii) The soldiery, who had saluted Ishak Khan, and were brought down captives to Kabul, were suspended alive by their feet in batches near the gallows facing Murad Khani and hacked to pieces by swords.
(viii) A gang of 120 Mujawars of the Ziarat at Mazar-i-Sharif had prayed that Ishak Khan might become Amir of Afghanistan. These were all secured and sent down to Kabul. These unfortunates were taken out in parties of 25 at a time, placed between two planks which were tied with ropes at either end, and then divided in two by a saw. This scene was also carried out at the spot mentioned in VI and VII.

The events noted in VII and VIII were usually carried out at 8 A.M. in the morning, in the presence of thousands of residents of Kabul, and of the hamlets outside, who cared to come and witness the dreadful spectacle. There was no attempt made to keep these executions secret, or to debar people from coming and becoming spectators. A man who is now in my verandah witnessed these scenes for the 25 days he was at Kabul, except that the unfortunate Mujawirs (sic) were finished off in five days. Five others from this locality, who were also in Kabul, testify to the same. But these facts are substantiated by numbers of people who have come down from Kabul from various places and with different kafilas. All testify to the reign of terror which the present Amir has been enacting with such open barbarity at that city. Subtracting even to the utmost on account of exaggerations, there remains enough to horrify most people as to what is going on now and has been carried out at Kabul for some time past.

P.S. The executions mentioned in I, II, III, of course no one knows about, as they are not public exhibitions.

iii. *Memorandum on the disposal of the Turkistan Prisoners by the Amir*, C. L. Griesbach, 13th August 1889, L/P&S/58, fols 147-149.

The first batch of rebel prisoners, which reached Kabul after the outbreak of the revolution in Turkistan last year, consisted of the men who were taken at Shashburja in the Karmard valley. Amongst them were Najm-ud-Din Khan (the father-in-law of Ishak Khan), Dilawar Khan (Chief of Doab-i-Shah Pasand), and several others, besides a number of Khassadars. The principal prisoners were all cruelly tortured in Kabul to extort confessions. They seemed to have little to

reveal, however, and their properties were for the time beyond the Amir's reach. The two persons named, with a few others, were then sentenced to be publicly starved to death, and wooden cages suspended from high flagstaffs, were erected for them on the Chaman opposite the British Agent's house. After these arrangements were repeatedly blown down by successive storms, the Amir altered their sentence into one of hanging, which was carried out, excepting with regard to Dilawar Khan. This man, after having been carried along as a prisoner during our march over the Hindu Kush in the autumn of 1888, was speared to death at Doab-i-Mekhzari-17th. November.

The next batch of prisoners from Turkistan reached the Amir's camp at Charikar on the 28th October of last year. They consisted of some 250 men and officers, and, amongst the latter, some civilians, hakims and others. They were immediately disposed of by the Amir. Two were there and then blown from guns; one had his nose cut off; 50 were ordered to be hanged in Kabul, and the rest to be kept in chains during the Amir's pleasure.

When the Amir reached Mazar-i-Sharif (26th December 1888), the officers and havildars of the rebel army, who were up to then under surveillance in Takhtapul, were at once put into irons and divided amongst the officials and body servants of the Amir, whose duties are to keep and examine prisoners.

Those amongst the prisoners who were suspected of possessing property fared the worst. They were nightly tortured, often in the most inhuman and fiendish manner.

The Amir mentioned to me on several occasions that the total number of men, who would have to be put to death for participation in Ishak's rebellion, would not exceed a thousand; that is, about 450 officers of regiments, and the remainder either civil officers, who allowed themselves to be taken, or villagers, who had assisted Ishak with supplies or money.

Eventually, I believe that number was somewhat increased by various men, against whom charges were found of being in debt to the former Government of Amir Sher Ali Khan. Many of those, who could not pay up, were detained in prison, and even tortured, but I do not believe any of them were executed.

Some 80 or 100 men were killed in Mazar-i-Sharif during the last winter and spring to my certain knowledge, but stories reached me of many more men who were secretly put to death, as is the general custom in Afghanistan.

The Amir intended that other places should share in the benefits of the deterrent examples afforded by such spectacles, and accordingly some few prisoners were sent to Tashkurghan and Khanabad to be executed in those cities.

Amongst the executions carried out in Mazar were some of specially atrocious nature.

I have seen four men on two occasions lashed to posts outside the Amir's Palace, where, exposed to the severest frosts and snowstorms, they were left to die by slow degrees. One of these men lived in this manner more than four days, and his tortures would not have ended even then, if a man on sentry duty had not taken pity on him and strangled him.

Another rebel prisoner was tied to a gate-post close to the Darbar, and whilst a withering snowstorm was raging, was being dashed with buckets full of water. He died in a few hours.

The most frightful scenes could always be seen in the Farashbashi's place, close to the Darbar. On one occasion seven men were nailed to the wall at that place; all the unfortunates were disembowelled.

On another occasion I noticed a number of naked men pegged down to the ground in the Farashbashi's enclosure; that functionary, with his assistants, was busy sprinkling the poor fellows with boiling oil by means of a broom dipped into the boiling liquid which stood in a large cauldron over a fire close by. Of course all these men must have died.

Amongst the cases which came to my special notice is that of the unfortunate family who formerly owned the house which I occupied in Mazar. The family consisted of an old man, his two sons, and nephew, with their haramserais. One of the sons had fled with Ishak to Bokhara, but the rest were all taken prisoners. The Amir ordered the old man's mouth to be cut open, which was done in Durbar: the victim died in a couple of hours. The remaining son and nephew, after being tortured, were sent to Kabul to be executed there. Several of their women were frightfully tortured to extract from them confessions as to property. One of them, a young girl of 15 years of age, was tortured for five days until her ankle and legs were completely crushed. What happened to them later on I do not know.

Finally, the Amir decided to send the remaining prisoners to Kabul. It is said that he was warned that a great misfortune would befall him, if he continued his executions near the sacred tomb of Ali.

The prisoners were forwarded in relays of from 2 to 300 at a time, being chained together by their necks in gangs of 20. When I left Mazar-i-Sharif on the 22 June of this year, most of the officers and havildars of Ishak's army had been forwarded to Kabul.

But there remained still a large number of Khawanins, Khassadars and rebellious villagers in confinement, all of whom, I was told, would have to march to Kabul.

The women and children, many hundreds of them, belonging to these prisoners, have also been sent to Kabul within the last few months. I was told they were to be kept in prison till bailed out in heavy sums by their friends.

There are already thousands of such unfortunate women in the various prisons in Kabul, all of whom have to undergo the most atrocious treatment possible to imagine.

When passing through Kabul I found that large numbers of prisoners had already been killed off there by the Amir's orders, and that the rest were to follow.

I understand that every day some 30 men were executed. Two were blown from guns, four were suspended from the gallows by their feet, and then gradually cut to pieces, and the rest were killed in the usual manner in the Bala Hissar by cutting their throats.

Thursdays and Fridays no executions take place.

The process of cutting to pieces of prisoners is performed on the drill ground overlooked by the windows of the British Agent's house in the Murad Khani, now occupied by Colonel Ata-ulla Khan's Persian Munshi and his party.

Some few rebel officers have been killed in Kabul lately by a still more fiendish process. One amongst them, a Colonel of one of Ishak's regiments, was disembowelled in front of the ark, and he remained alive in this dreadful condition for more than three days, conscious to the last.

I have not been a witness to these recent Kabul executions, and, in fact, during my last stay there of four days, no executions took place. But both the party living at the British Agency and other trustworthy informants vouch for the accuracy of these statements.

The Afghan Agent at Simla, General Amir Ahmed Khan, estimates the number of men recently executed at Kabul at about 4 to 500.

iv. *His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India to His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its Dependencies,* Simla, 10th. September 1889, L/P&S/5/58, fols 149-151 [extract only].

My Honoured and Valued Friend
There is a matter in regard to which I feel constrained to address you without loss of time. The relations between the Government of Her Majesty and Your Highness render it necessary that mutual confidence should prevail between Your Highness and the Representative of Her Majesty in India, and that I should give you timely advice with regard to any occurrences which might have the effect of diminishing my power of being of use to Your Highness.

The matter of which I speak is this. During the past spring the Russian Press contained frequent references to the severity with which Your Highness was punishing those of your subjects who had taken up arms against you under Sardar Ishak Khan. Not only was this the case, but the Russian officials on the frontier sent home to their Government alarming telegrams on the subject, and the matter was brought to the notice of the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg. I did not address Your Highness at the time, as I hoped that after Your Highness had made a few examples, and felt the stability of your rule was restored, you would be disposed to deal more mercifully with these misguided men. In this hope, however, I have been disappointed; for during the past few months I have continued to receive reports from many quarters that great cruelties have been perpetrated upon your subjects, if not by your orders, by those of persons professing to act as your agents, and so regarded by the public. In some cases offenders have been, it is said, put to death by slow torments, under which they have lingered for many days before death ended their sufferings. In other cases prisoners have, I am told,. been confined or sent from one part of Your Highness' dominions to another, under conditions which caused many of them to succumb to the rigour of their treatment. It has recently been stated that, in one instance, a large number of captives, imprisoned in Kabul, who were believed to be meditating an attempt to escape from prison, had their eyes put out. This is alleged to have been done under orders from Your Highnesss' son, Sardar Habibulla Khan, to whom you had entrusted the administration of affairs at Kabul during your absence.

I wish to point out to Your Highness that such actions as these are calculated to produce a bad impression, not only upon the Government of India, but upon the Government and people of England. These practices are abhorrent to the ideas of civilized nations. They have long been abandoned by the great Powers of Europe, and it would be regarded as a just reproach to England, could it be said that she supported actively and encouraged by her good-will and practical assistance a Ruler by whom such things were habitually done.

Already the reports of these occurrences have reached the ears of the Government of the Queen, and inquiries have been addressed to me in regard to them. I trust Your Highness will be able to assure me that the statements of which I have spoken have been exaggerated, or that, if some of your subordinates have been guilty of such conduct, you will discourage it in future.

Your Highness will not misunderstand me in regard to this matter. I am well aware that it may be necessary for the Ruler of Afghanistan to be, at times, severe, as well as just, and I am ready to admit that we should not measure events occurring in Afghanistan by the standards which prevail in countries more advances than that of which Your Highness is the chief. Again, I can well understand that, after the recent revolt in Turkistan, it should have been necessary to punish in an exemplary manner those who were implicated in it. But this could have been done without barbarities as shocking to contemplate as those about which I am writing.

It is necessary that Your Highness should be extremely careful to do nothing which might alienate from you the good-will of the British people, or which might enable those who are ill-disposed to Your Highness to say that your conduct was such as to render you unworthy of the friendship of a humane and enlightened Nation....

v *Translation of a letter from His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its Dependencies to the address of His Excellency the Viceroy,* 4th Safar 1703 (30th. September 1889, L/P&S/7/58 fols 511-514 [extract only].
... When I reached Turkistan, I considered it necessary to punish those men who had been implicated in this affair [i.e. Ishaq Khan's rebellion] and who deserved punishment, because it is highly necessary for a Government to mete out timely punishment. This is particularly so in the dominions of Afghanistan.

During the reign of Peter the Great who introduced a new form of Government, were not lakhs of people put to death, and launched into oblivion (literally, placed their feet from the circle of existence into

the land of oblivion), so that the state of order of the territories and troops of the said power has reached such a degree that the whole world is trembling before their awful strength and grandeur? The high officials of the Russian Government should call to minds the times of their former Emperors, during whose mismanagement uproar and mischief were in existence; and have they now forgotten the mischief and disturbances of those times that they find fault with me? My work is like that of old times, and so I am reducing the disorderly people to a state of new order. If I were to treat lightly the evil which is created by mischievous people in Afghanistan, and were not to call them to account, how is it possible for the country to be reduced to a state of order? This finding fault with me (literally, this finger of objection), which interested people are doing or have done is out of place. I now explain the real cause in a thorough manner. All the pains taken during the past nine years to secure friends for themselves, and thus to clear the road, have been lost to the Afghan people.

The mischievous breaches I have efficiently closed up, and at the outset of their designs and thoughts, I have raised a new wall and a strong barrier. They must therefore give rise to, and spread, alarming reports. What they have said or will say is owing to the pain they feel in their hearts, but I cannot help introducing good administration in my territory. There is no necessity for Your Excellency being disappointed in the matter.

As regard those whom I have expelled from this place and whom I sent to other directions, I have considered their deportation from the frontier, as contributing to the welfare of my Government and country; because if they had remained here they would not have refrained for a moment from sending news to the Russian Government and to those persons, who having perpetrated severe crimes have fled and taken refuge in Russian territory; and they would have kept sending information to them. On this account I have sent them away from the frontier; and the chief official and the troops, whom I shall place on the frontier, will, by the help of God, be no source of anxiety. Those who were blinded have not been made so without cause. In addition to their rebellion they have perpetrated other improper deeds, for which it was necessary to punish them in this manner; the object of putting out their eyes was to convey a lesson to the evil minded people of Afghanistan ....

... I beg to say, firstly, that my proceedings will be approved by the European Powers, at a time when I should become a double tongued

and double faced person. What concern have I with the people of Europe, whether they speak evil or good of me so long as I entertain perpetual friendship with the Illustrious British Government with whom I have entered into an engagement of friendship and unity? Secondly,—at the time when the tribesmen of Afghanistan wrote and sent to me letter at Khanabad, requesting me to come, and before I had entered Kabul, they had struck the rupee coin in my name as Amir, at Charikar, and the good people of Afghanistan wished me for their Ruler and King....

... I am personally unable to consent to anything which is distasteful to the people of Afghanistan.... I have alone borne, up to this day, the burden of friendship, and have made the lives of the servants and good people of Afghanistan a shield to the arrows of calamity of an enemy like the Russian Government, and I have been daily keeping the Afghan people ready for what I have intimated. Therefore in such times it is not necessary to listen to false rumours and lying informers, because the informers of the Russian Government want to again create bad feeling between the British Government and the people of Afghanistan; but so far as my endeavours go, God willing, they shall not be able to do so. But I expect the high officials of the Illustrious British Government not to listen to the writing of interested people. May the remaining days of Your Excellency's honour and glory continue permanent!

APPENDIX X

KEY TO FOOOTNOTED RECORDS IN THE INDIA OFFICE LIBRARY

i Annual and Departmental Files, Collections and Series

BSP	*Bengal Secret Proceedings*
CPC	*Calendar of Persian Correspondence*
ESL	*Enclosures and Secret Letters from India* (L/P&S/5)
HC	*Home Correspondence* (L/P&S/3)
H. Misc.	*Home Miscellaneous*
P	*Proceedings Series*
P:BSC	*Proceedings: Bengal Secret Consultations*
P:IFPC	*Proceedings: India, Foreign & Political Consultations*
P&S	*Political and Secret Department Annual Files and Records* (L/P&S series)
MEIR	*Miscellaneous East India Company Records* (L/P&S/19) [e.g. MEIR:A/17]
MIL	*Military Department Records* (L/MIL/17 mainly)
MSS Eur.	*European Manuscripts*
PSDL	*Political & Secret Department Library* (L/P&S/20) [e. g. PSDL:A/27C]
PSM	*Political and Secret Memoranda* (L/P&S/18)
SLEI	*Secret Letters and Enclosures from India* (L/P&S/7)
SLEP	*Secret Letters and Enclosures from Persia* (L/P&S/9)
V	*Official Publications*
W, X	*Map Collections*
[black]/[red]	refers to the coloured tags found in early volumes of L/P&S/5 and L/P&S/7 series. [black]: Dispatches from the Governor-General [red]: Dispatches from The President in Council

ii Key to abbreviations of news letters, etc. in Political and Secret Department Files(alphebetically, by country/region).

AFGHANISTAN

Kabul

ACI	*Abstract of Cabul Intelligence*
ACN	*Abstract of the Cabul News(-letter)*
ACNC	*Abstract contents of (a) News(-letter) from Cabul*
ADCV	*Abstract from Diary of the Cabo(u)l Vakeel*
ANC	*Abstract of (a) News(-letter) from Cabul*
ATCN	*Abstract Translation of the Cabo(u)l News(-letter)*
ATNC	*Abstract Translation of (a) News(-letter) from Cabul*
CD	*Cabul Diary (for latter part of century see, KD)*
CI	*Cabul Intelligence*
CMD	*Cabul Moonshee Diary*
CN	*Cabul News(-letter)*
CNP	*Cabul News received at Peshawar*
CVD	*Cabul Vakeel's Diary*
DBEK	*Diary of the British Embassy, Kabul*
DCV	*Diary of the Cabo(u)l Vakil*
DKA	*Diary of the Kabul Agent*
ECC	*Extract(s) from Cabul Correspondence*
ECD	*Extract(s) from Cabul Diary*
ECMD	*Extract(s) from Cabul Moonshee's Diary*
ECN	*Extract(s) from the Cabul News(-letter)*
ECVD	*Extract(s) from Cabul Vakil's Diary*
EDCV	*Extract(s) from the Diary of the Cabul Vakil*
EDCVM	*Extract(s) from the Diary of the Cabul Vakeel's Moonshee*
EDMCC	*Extract(s) from the Diary of the Moonshee at the Cabul Court*
EDMGD	*Extract(s) from the Diary of Monshee Gopal Dass*
EDOVC	*Extract(s) from the Diary of the Officiating Vakil at Cabul*
EJVC	*Extract(s) from the Journal of the Vakeel at Cabul*
EOCN	*Extract(s) from the Ordinary Cabul News*
IC	*Intelligence from Cabul*
ICI	*Items of Cabul Intelligence*

ICN *Items of Cabul News*
IIC *Items of Intelligence from Cabul*
KD *Kabul Diary*
KM *Kabul Munshi: Letter from Sayyid Diwan Mohamed, Munshi of British Agency in Kabul*
KNL *Kabul News(-letter), or, Extract(s) from (translation of) a Letter from Lt. Col. Afzal Khan (or his successors).*
LCM *Letter from the Cabul Munshee*
NC *News Letter from Cabul*
NKVT *News-letters from Kabul Vakil with the Amir in Turkistan (1888-1890 only)*
ONC *Ordinary News(-letter) from Cabo(u)l*
TCI *Translation of Cabul Intelligence*
TCN *Translation of Cabul News(-lettter)*
TEDCV *Translation of an Extract from the Diary of the Caboul Vakil*
TIC *Translation of Intelligence from Cabul*
TLCV *Translation of a Letter from the Cabul Vakil*
TNC *Translation of a News(-letter) from Cabul*
TPLRC *Translation of a Persian Letter received from Cabul*

Bala Murghab

BMNL *Bala Murghab News-letter/News-letter from Haji Mohamed Hussain at Bala Murghab and Panjdeh*

Herat

ELH *Extract(s) of/from a Letter from Herat*
HC *Herat Correspondent*
HN *Herat News*
HNL *Herat News Letter/(Absract) Translation of a letter from Mirza Muhammad Takki Khan/Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, news-writers at Herat*
LH *Letter from Herat*
THL *Translation of Herat Letter*
THN *Translation of (a) Herat News(-letter)*
TLH *Translation of a Letter from Herat*

Jalalabad

AIJ *Abstract of Intelligence from Jallalabad*
EJN *Extract(s) from Jallalabad News(-letter)*
NGAJ *(Confidential) News-letter from the Goverment Agent at Jallalabad*

Qandahar

[N.B. Qandahar is usually transliterated as Candahar or Kandahar in the IOL records. To distinguish between newsletters from the Kabul and 'Kandahar', Cabul and 'Candahar' wakils, the Qandahar series have been prefaced by 'Q']

ATNLQ *Abstract Translation of a News-letter from Kandahar*
DQM *Diary of the Kandahar Mission*
DQR *Diary of the Kandahar Residency*
DSAR *Diary of the S. Afghanistan Residency*
JSAFF *Journal of the Southern Afghanistan Field Force*
QD *Kandahar Diary*
QN *Kandahar News*
QNL *Kandahar News-letter/(Abstract) Translation of a Letter from Mir Hashim Khan (from 1880)*
TLNQ *Translation of a Letter from the News-writer at Kandahar*
TQN *Translation of Kandahar News(-letter)*

PERSIA (mainly L/P&S/9)

Tehran/general

PWD *Persia Weekly Diary*

Mashhad

AM *Agent at (in) Meshed*
ELAM *Extract(s) of a letter from the Agent at Meshed*
ELCM *Extract(s) of Letter from a Correspondent in Meshed*
ELM *Extract(s) of a Letter from Meshed*
ELMA *Extract(s) of a Letter from the Meshed Agent*

ELPCM *Extract(s) of a Letter from a Private Correspondent at Meshed*
LAM *Letter from the Agent at Meshed*
MA *Meshed Agent*
MANL *Meshed Agent's News-letter*
MNL *Meshed News-letter*
TELMA *Translation of Extract(s) of a Letter from the Meshed Agent*
TLAM *Translation of a Letter from the Agent at Meshed*
TLMA *Translation of a Letter from the Meshed Agent*
TLMV *Translation of a Letter from the Meshed Vakeel*

Sarrakhs

SC *Sarrakhs Correspondent (1885 on)*

TURKISTAN AND CENTRAL ASIA

General

ICAN *Items of Central Asian News*

Ashkhabad

ANL *Translation of a (News-) Letter from Syud Hakim (or others), the Amir's official at Ashkhabad to the address of His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan, etc.*

Merv

(MV is used to distinguish these records from those of the Mashhad agent)
MVC *(Translation of a Letter) from the (a) Merve Correspondent*
MVCN *Merv Confidential News-letter/Confidential News(-letter) from Merve*
MVNL *Merve News-letter (Ibrahim Beg, etc.)*
TLMV *Translation of a Letter from Merve*

INDIA

(North West Frontier, Peshawar, Baluchistan, Punjab, etc.)
DIKNL *Dera Ismail Khan News-letter/(Confidential) News-letter from Dera Ismail Khan*
GD *Gilgit Diary*
KPD *Khyber Political Diary*
LD *Lahore Diary*
NLGAP *(Confidential) News-letter from the Government Agent at Peshawar*
PCD *Peshawar Confidential Diary*
PGR(LPD) *Punjab Government Records; Lahore Political Diaries (with individual volume number)*
PI *Punjab Intelligence/Abstract of Intelligence from the Punjab*
PPD *Peshawar Political Diary/Political Diary of ... (containing Intelligence from Cabul)*
TFJ *Trans-Frontier Journal, or Journal of Political Events on the W. & N. W. Frontier*

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Printed Books and Articles

Adamec, L. W., *Afghanistan, 1900-1923* (Berkeley 1967).
———, (ed.), *Historical and Political Gazetteer of Afghanistan* (reprint of Afghan Boundary Commission's Gazetteers - see below).
———, vol. 1, Badakhshan and N. E. Afghanistan (Graz 1972).
———, vol. 2, Mazar-i Sharif and N. Central Afghanistan (Graz 1979).
———, *Who's Who of Afghanistan* (Graz 1975).
———, *A Biographical Dictionary of Contemporary Afghanistan* (Graz, 1987a).
———, *Historical Who's Who of Afghanistan* (Graz, 1987b).
Afghan Boundary Commission, *Records of the Intelligence Party of the Afghan Boundary Commission* (Simla 1888-1891) 5 vols.
vol. 1-2, *Diary of Major Maitland* (1888).
vol. 3, *Diary of Major Peacocke* (1887).
vol. 4, *Reports on the Tribes* (1891).
vol. 5, *Miscellaneous Reports* (1888).
(see also under individual surveyor's reports).
———, *Routes and Maps*: vol. 1, *Daolatyar* (1888); vol. 2, *Herat* (1888).
Aitchinson, C. U. (ed.), "Treatise, Engagements and Sanads," vol. XIII, *Persia and Afghanistan* (Calcutta 1933).
Akiner, S., *The Islamic Peoples of the Soviet Union* (KPI, London 1986).
Alder, G., *Beyond Bukhara; The Life of William Moorcroft, 1767-1825* (Century, London 1985).
Alder, G.; Dalby, R., *The Dervish of Windsor Castle* (London 1979).
Amir Khan; Shahzada Taimus, "Journey through Gurziwan and the Country South of Maimana, 1885," *Reports of the Intelligence Party*, vol. 5, (Simla 1888) 231-41.
———, "Reconnaissance from Maimana by the Darzab Road to Sar-i Pul, etc., 1886," *Reports of the Intelligence Party*, vol. 5 (Simla 1888) 242-61.
Anderson, Maj. W., "Notes on the Geography of Western Afghanistan," *J R A S B* XVIII, i (n.s. no. XXX) (1849) 553-94.
———, "Ibn Hawkal's account of Khorasan," *JRASB* XXII, ii (1853), 152-93.
Atkinson, J., *The Expedition into Afghanistan; Notes and Sketches* (Allen 1842).
Babur, Zahir al-Din, *Babur Nama* (*Memoirs of Babur*), 2 vols. transl. Annette Beveridge (Sang-e Meel, Lahore 1979).
Ball, W., *Archaeological Gazetteer of Afghanistan*, 2 vols. (Paris 1982).
Barfield, T. S., *The Central Asian Arabs of Afghanistan, Pastoral Nomadism in Transition* (Texas 1981).
Barger, E., "Exploration of Ancient Sites in N.W. Afghanistan," *GJ*, XCIII (1939) 377-8.
Barrow, Maj. E. G., *The Military Geography of Afghanistan* (Simla 1893):
part I, Badakhshan.
part II, Afghan Turkistan.
Barthol'd, V., *Turkistan down to the Mongol Invasion*, 4th ed. (Gibb Memorial Trust, Luzac & Co. 1958).
Basu, P., *Oudh and the East India Company* (Lucknow 1943).
Bausani, A. *The Persians* (Book Club Assoc., London 1975).

Beasley, E.; Harverson, M., *Living with the Desert* (Aris and Philips 1982).
Bennigsen, A.; Lemercier-Quelquejay, *Islam in the Soviet Union* (London 1967).
Benson, A. C.; Esher, Viscount, *The Letters of Queen Victoria, 1837-1861*, 3 vols. (Murray 1908).
Bivar, A. D. H., "Seljuk Ziyarats of Sar-i Pul, Afghanistan," *BSOAS*, 27, iii (1974) 46-64.
Bodansky, Y., "Soviet Military Involvement in Afghanistan," *Afghanistan, the Great Game Revisited* (New York 1978).
Bosworth, C. E., *The Ghaznavids* (Edingburgh 1963).
———, "The Medieval History of Ghor," *The Medieval History of Iran, Afghanistan and Central Asia*, (Variorum reprints, London 1977), ch. IX.
Boulger, D. C., *Central Asian Portraits, or the Celebrities of the Khanates and Neighbouring States* (London 1880).
Boyce, Mary, *A History of Zoroastrianism*, 3 vols. (Leiden 1975-1991).
Browne, E. G., *A Literary History of Persia*, 4 vols., 7th ed. (Cambridge 1976).
Bukhari, Mir 'Abd al-Karim, *Histoire de l'Asie Centrale*, edited and translated by C. Schefer (Paris 1876).
Bulliet, R.W., "Nawbahar and the Survival of Iranian Buddhism," *IRAN*, XIV (1976) 140-45.
Burnes, Lt. A., *Cabool* (London 1843).
———, *Travels into Bukhara*, 2 vols (London 1834).
Burnett, A.C.; Yule, H., *Hobson-Jobson* (RKP reprint, London 1985).
Burslem, Captain R., *A Peep into Toorkisthan* (London 1846).
Burton, J. Audrey, "Nadir Muhammad Khan, Ruler of Bukhara (1641-1645) and Balkh (1645-1651)," *Central Asiatic Journal*, 23, i-ii (1988) 19-33.
Byron, R., *The Road to Oxiana* (London 1937).
Cambridge History of Iran, vols. 5, 6 (Cambridge 1968, 1986).
Campbell, J., *Lost among the Afghans* (London 1862).
Caspani,; Cagannaci, *Afghanistan Crocevia dell' Asia* (Milan 1951).
Chaffetz, D. *A Journey through Afghanistan, a Memorial* (Chicago 1981).
Champagne, D.C., *The Afghan-Iranian Conflict over Herat Province and European Intervention, 1796-1863, A Reinterpretation* (Ph.D. diss., Ann Arbor 1981).
Clarkson, J.D., *A History of Russia from the Ninth Century* (Longman 1962).
Colledge, M., *The Parthians* (Thames & Hudson 1967).
Conolly, A., *Journey to the North of India, Overland from England through Russia, Persia and Affghaunistan*, 2 vols (London 1843).
Czaplica, M.A., *The Turks of Central Asia* (Curzon Press 1973).
Daud Khan, *An Account of Daud Khan's visit to Afghanistan and Khorasan* (Simla 1873).
Delavand, C. C., "Mise et valeur d'un Piemont dans le Turkistan Afghan province de Maimana," *AG* (1960) 135-56.
Dilworth, H.W., *The History of the Life and Suprising Transactions of Thamas Kouli Khan* (London 1758).
Diver, K.H.M., *The Judgement of the Sword* (2nd ed., London 1924).
Dughlat, Muhammad Haidar, *A History of the Moghuls of Central Asia, being the Tarikh-i Rashidi of Mirza Muhammad Haidar, Dughlat*, transl., ed., N. Elias (London 1972).
Douglas, W.O., *West of the Indus* (New York 1958).
Dupree, L. "Archaeology, Recent Research in Afghanistan," *EJ*, 47, ii (1969) 84-93.
———, "Ghar-i-Mordeh Gosphand," *Science*, 167 (1970) 1610-2.
———, *Afghanistan* (2nd ed., Princetown 1978).
Dupree, Nancy Hatch, *An Historical Guide to Afghanistan* (Kabul 1977).
———, *The Road to Balkh* (Kabul 1967).
Edwardes, E., *Playing the Great Game* (London 1975).
Elias, Ney, "Report on a journey from Yarkand across the Pamirs ... and through Afghan Turkistan," *Records of the Intelligence Party*, vol. 5 (Simla 1888) 267-302.
Elphinstone, M., *An Account of the Kingdom of Caboul*, 2 vols. (reprint, Karachi 1972).

Erskine, W., *A History of India under Babur* (reprint, Karachi 1974).
Farid al-Din Attar, *Tadhkirat-i Auliya'*, transl., ed., A. J. Arberry (London 1966).
Ferrier, J. P., *Caravan Journeys and Wanderings in Persia, Afghanistan, Turkistan and Baloochistan* (London 1857).
———, *History of the Afghans* (London 1858).
Forrest, G.W., *Selections from the Travels and Journals Preserved in the Bombay Secretariat* (Bombay 1906).
Forster, G.A., *Journey from Bengal to England*, 2 vols. (London 1789).
Fraser, J., *The History of Nadir Shah, formerly Thamas Kuli Khan* (London 1742).
Fraser-Tytler, W. K., *Afghanistan, a Study of Political Developments in Central and Southern Asia* (Oxford 1967).
Freeman-Grenville, G., *The Muslim and Christian Calendars* (London 1977).
Gardiner, "Abstract of a Journal kept by Mr. Gardiner during his travels in Central Asia," ed. Edgeworth, *JRASB*, n.s. III (1853) 283-305.
Gibb, H.A.R.; Kramers, J.H. (ed.) *Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam* (Leiden 1974).
Glassman, E., *Conversational Dari*, 4th ed. (Wheaton & Kabul 1976).
Govt. of India, *Papers related to Military Operations in Afghanistan, 1841-43* (Simla 1843).
———, *Gazetteer of Afghanistan*, part I (ii) (Calcutta 1882).
———, *Gazetteer of Afghanistan:*
vol. 1, *Badakhshan* (Calcutta 1895)
vol. 2, *Afghan Turkistan* (Calcutta 1895, 1907, 1919).
vol. 3, *Herat* (Calcutta 1910).
———, *Afghanistan and Nepal, extracts from the Imperial Gazetteer of India* (Sang-i Meel, Lahore 1979).
Gray, J.A., *At the Court of the Amir* (London 1895).
Gregorian, V., *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan* (Stanford 1969).
Grenet, F.; Lee, J.L.; Pinder-Wilson, R., "Les monuments aciens du Gorziwan (Afghanistan du NordOuest)," *SI* 9 (1980) 69-104.
Grenet, F., *Les Practiques Funeraires dans l'Asie Centrale Sedentaire* (Paris 1984).
Griesbach, C.L., "Journey from Chaharshamba through Maimana, Belcheragh and the Hill Country etc., 1886," *Reports of the Intelligence Party*, vol. 5 (Simla 1888) 185-215.
Grodekoff, Col., *Colonel Grodekoff's Ride from Samarkand to Herat*, transl., C. Marvin (London 1880).
Grötzbach, E., "Aktuelle Probleme der regionalentwicklung und Stadtgeographie Afghanistan," *AS* 14 (1976) 225-44.
———, *Städte und Bazare in Afghanistan, Eine Städtgeographische Untersuchung* (Tübingen 1979).
Gupta, H.R., "Timur Shah's army in 1793," *JIH* XX, i (1941) 100-5.
Hall, L., *A Brief Guide to the Sources for the Study of Afghanistan in the India Office Records* (India Office Library 1981).
Hamilton, Dr. Lilias, *A Vizier's Daughter, Tales of the Hazara War* (London 1900).
Hansard, *Debates and Questions on Indian Affairs 1890 session* (London 1890).
Harlan, J., *A Memoir of India and Avghanistan* (Philadelphia 1842).
———, *Central Asia; A Personal Narrative of General Josiah Harlan, 1823-41*, ed., F.E. Ross (Luzac & Co 1939).
Hastings, E., *Geneological Table Showing the Kabuli and Herati Sardars and Others* (Kabul Field Force 1880).
Herzfeld, Ernest, *Zoroaster and His World*, 2 vols. (Princetown 1947).
Hillil, Rabbi David d'Beth, *Unknown Jews in Unknown Lands; the Travels of Rabbi David d'Beth Hillil, 1824-1832*, ed. W.J. Fischel (N.Y. 1973).
Hira Singh, "First Journey in the Taimani country," *Records of the Intelligence Party*, vol. 4 (Simla 1891) 205-11.

———, "Journey in the Firozkohi Country," *Records of the Intelligence Party*, vol. 4 (Simla 1891) 142-60.
Holditch, Maj. T.H., "Geographical notes on the Afghan Boundary Commission," *PRGS*, VII, i (1885) 39-43; VII, iii (1885) 160-66; VII, v (1885) 273-91.
Howorth, Sir H., *History of the Mongols*, part II (ii) "The Mongols of Russia and Central Asia," (London 1888).
Holdsworth, M., *Turkistan in the Nineteenth Century* (Oxford 1959).
Holt, F.L., *Alexander the Great and Bactria* (Leiden 1988).
Hudud al-'Alam, The Regions of the World, transl. V.M. Minorsky (Gibb Memorial Series, XI, London 1970).
Humlum, J., *La Geographie de l'Afghanistan* (Copenhagen 1959).
Ignat'ev, N. P. *Mission to Khiva and Bukhara, 1858*, trans., ed., J.L.Evans (Oriental Research Partners, Newton, Mass. 1984).
Imperial Russian Government, *Délimitation Afghan Negociations entre la Russia et la Grand-Bretagne, 1872-1885* (St. Petersburg 1886).
Imam Sharif, "Report on a journey from Shibarghan through the districts of Sar-i Pul, etc.", 1886, *Reports of the Intelligence Party*, vol. 5 (Simla 1888) 216-30.
Inayat Khan, *Shah Jahan Nama*, transl. Belgey & Desai (Oxford in Asia, Delhi 1990).
Ingram, E.(ed.), *Two Views of British India, the Private Correspondence of Mr. Dundas and Lord Wellesley, 1798-1801* (Bath 1969).
Izzat Ullah, Meer, *Travels in Central Asia, 1812-13*, transl. Maj. Henderson (Calcutta 1872).
Jarring, G., "An Uzbek view of Andkhoi," *Ethnos*, ii (1939) 61-80.
———, *On the Distribution of Turk Tribes in Afghanistan* (Lund 1939).
Jebens, A., *Wirtschafts und Sozialgeographische Untersuchung über das Heimgewerbe in Nordafghanistan* (Tübingen 1983).
Jewish Encyclopædia, ed. Funk & Wagnells (1925).
Jones, W.H., *The History of the Life of Nader Shah* (London 1773).
Juzjani, *Tabaqat-i Nasiri*, 2 vols., transl. Maj. H. Raverty (London 1970).
———, *Tabaqat-i Nasiri, Tarikhi Kamil-i Iran wa Islam*, ed. Qazi M. Saraj (Tehran 1934/1343).
Kakar, M., *Afghanistan, a Study in Internal Political Development, 1880-96* (Kabul 1971).
———, *Government and Society in Afghanistan, the reign of Amir Abd al-Rahman Khan* (Texas 1979).
Katib, Faiz Muhammad, *Siraj al-Tawarikh*, 3 vols (Kabul 1913-15/1331-1333).
Kaye, Sir J. W., *History of the War in Afghanistan*, 2 vols, 3rd ed. (London 1874).
———, *Lives of the Indian Officers*, 2 vols., 2nd ed. (London 1904).
Khafi, Mirza Ya'qub 'Ali, *Padshahan-i Muta'akhirin-i Afghanistan*, 2 vols. (Kabul 1956/1334).
Khalfin, N. A., "The rising of Ishaq Khan in Southern Turkistan, 1888," *CAR* VI, iii (1958) 253-63.
Khanikov, *Bokhara, its Amir and its People* (London 1845).
Klass, R. (ed.), *The Great Game Revisited* (N.Y. 1987).
Kohi, Muhammad Nasr, *Armaghan-i Maimana* (Kabul 1939).
Leitner, G. W., *His Highness Amir Abd-ur-Rahman Khan, Amir of Afghanistan, and his relations to Great Britain* (Oriental University Institute, Woking 1894).
Lal, Munshi Mohun, *Life of Amir Dost Muhammad Khan of Kabul*, 2 vols (London 1846).
Lambton, A. K. S., *Persian Grammar* (Cambridge 1971).
Lee, J.L., "Afghanistan's Artisan Tanners," *Leather* 182 (London 1980) 19-20.
———, "Ferrier's Journey from Sar-i Pul to Daulatyar," *EW* 432, i-iv (1982) 99-120.
———, "The History of Maimana, N.W. Afghanistan, 1731-1893," *IRAN* XXV (1987) 107-24.
———, "'Abd al-Rahman Khan and the '*Maraz ul-muluk*,'" *JRAS* I, ii (1991a) 209-42.
———, "Edward Stirling of 'Stirling Castle'," *Journal of Société Jersiase* (1991b) 490-501.
Le Strange, G., *The Lands of the Eastern Caliphate* (Cambridge 1904).

Lockhart, L., *Nadir Shah, a Critical Study* (London 1938).
Lumsden, Sir P., "Countries and Tribes Bordering on the Koh-i Baba Range," *PRGS* VII, ix (1885) 561-82.
Lunt, J., *Bukhara Burnes* (N.Y. 1969).
McChesney, R.D., "The Amirs of Seventeenth Century Muslim Central Asia," *JESHO* XXVI (Leiden 1983) 33-70.
———, *Waqf in Central Asia* (Princetown 1991).
Macrory, P., *Signal Catastrophe* (London 1966).
MacGregor, C., *Gazetteer of Central Asia*, part II, Afghanistan (Calcutta 1871).
Mahmud b. Amir Wali, *Bahr ul-asrar, Travelogue of South Asia*, transl., ed., Riazul Islam (Karachi 1980).
Mahmud, ibn Ibrahim al-Husain, *Tarikh-i Ahmad Shahi*, 2 vols., ed. Dost M. Saiyid Muradov (Moscow 1974).
Maitland, Maj., *Diary*, 2 vols. (Simla 1888).
———, (ed.), "Reports on the Tribes," *Records of the Intelligence Party*, vol. 4 (Simla 1891).
Malcolm, J., *The History of Persia*, 2 vols. (London 1815).
Malleson, Maj., *Herat, the Granary and Garden of Central Asia* (London 1900).
Martin, F., *Under the Absolute Amir* (London 1907).
Marvin, C., *The Disastrous Russian Campaign against the Akhal Teke Turcomans* (London 1880).
———, *Merve, the Queen of the World and the Scourge of the Man-stealing Turcomans* (London 1881).
———, *The Russian Advance towards India, Conversations with Skobeleff, Ignatieff, etc.* (Saeed Books, Peshawar 1984).
———, *The Russians at Merve and Herat* (London 1883).
Marwat, F.R.K., *The Basmachi Movement in Soviet Central Asia* (Peshawar 1985).
Massie, R. K., *Peter the Great, His Life and World* (Gollancz, London 1981).
Merk, C. S., "Report on the City of Maimana, 1885," *Records of the Intelligence Party*, vol. 5 (1888) 262-66.
Mingana, A., "The Early Spread of Christianity in Central Asia and the Far East," *BJRL* 9/2 (1925) 3-67.
Mitford, G.N., *The Chronicles of a Traveller, or a History of the Afghan Wars with Persia ... being a translation of the Tareekh-i-Seeah* (London 1840).
Modhi, J. J., "A Few Materials for a Chapter in the early History of Bactria Collected from some Iranian Sources," *JRAS (Bombay)* XXIV (1915) 1-13.
Moorcroft, W.; Trebeck, G., *Travels in the Himalayan Provinces of Hindustan and the Punjab, 1819-25*, 2 vols. (Oxford in Asia, Karachi 1979).
Napier, Cpt. G.C., *Journals and Reports on Persia* (London 1876).
National Archives of India, *Calendar of Persian Correspondence*, VIII (1788-89); X (1792-93) (New Delhi 1949).
Niedermeyer, O. von, *Afganistan* (Leipzig 1924).
Norris, J., *The First Afghan War, 1838-1842* (Cambridge 1967).
Noorzay, M.S., "Soviet Economic Interests and Policies in Afghanistan," *Afghanistan, the Great Game Revisted* (New York 1987) 71-96.
Pasley, R., *Send Malcolm* (BACSA, London 1982).
Peacocke, Cpt., "Diary of Capt. Peacocke," *Records of the Intelligence Party*, vol. 3 (Simla 1887).
Philips, Sir C.H., *Correspondence of Lord William Bentinck*, 2 vols. (Oxford 1977).
Pottinger, G., *Afghan Connection* (Edinburgh 1983).
Prasad, S.N.(ed.), *Fort William and India House Correspondence*, XVIII (1797-1800) (National Archives of India, New Delhi 1974).
Prinsep, H.T., *A General Register of the Hon. E. India Co. Civil Servants of the Bengal Establishment, 1790-1842* (Calcutta 1844).

Poullada, L.B., *Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan, 1919-29* (Cornell 1973).
Qazani, Mirza Muhammad, *Tarikh-i Jahangir, or the History of the World-Conqueror of Mirza Muhammad Qazani*, transl., J. A. Boyce, 2 vols. (1958).
Royal Commission on Historical Manuscripts, *Record Depositories in Great Britain* (HMSO, London 1982).
Rasul Amin, A., "The Sovietization of Afghanistan," *The Great Game Revisted* (N. Y. 1987).
Ramchandran, N.; Sharma, Y.D., *Archaeological Reconnaisance in Afghanistan, Preliminary Report of the Indian Archaeologicial Delegation* (New Delhi 1956).
Ridgeway, Lt. Col. J.W. (ed.), *Records of the Intelligence Party*, vol. 5, "Miscellaneous Reports" (Simla 1888).
Ries, E., Die *Stadt Maimana und ihr Bazar* (Lünburg 1974).
Rubin, B.R., "Human Rights in Afghanistan," *Afghanistan, the Great Game Revisted* (N.Y. 1987) 336ff.
Schinasi, May, *Afghanistan at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century*, Series Minor III (Naples 1979).
Schurmann, H. F., *The Mongols of Afghanistan* ('S-Gravenhage 1962).
Singh, Ganda, *Ahmad Shah Durrani, Father of Modern Afghanistan* (Bombay 1959).
Skrine, F.H.; Ross, E.D., *The Heart of Asia* (London 1899).
Soboleff, Maj. Gen. L.N., *The Anglo-Afghan Struggle*, transl. W.E.Gowan (St. Petersburg 1885).
Steingass, F., *Persian-English Dictionary* (Sang-i Meel, Lahore 1981).
Stirling, E. H. "Notes on the Manners and Habits of the Toorkoman Tribes," *JRASB* X, i (1841) 290-300.
———, *Some Considerations on the Political State of the Intermediate Countries between Persia and India* (London 1835).
———, *The Journals of Edward Stirling in Persia and Afghanistan, 1828-1829*, ed., J.L.Lee (Naples 1991).
Stocqueller, J. H., *Memorials of Afghanistan, 1838-42* (Saeed Books, Peshawar 1983).
Strizower, S., *Exotic Jewish Communities* (N.Y. 1962).
Stuckert, R., *Errinnerungen an Afghanistan, 1940-1946* (Liestal 1994).
Sultan Muhammad Khan, *The Life of Abdul Rahman Khan, Amir of Afghanistan*, 2 vols (London 1900).
Tapper, N., "The Advent of Pushtun Maldars in North-Western Afghanistan," *BSOAS* XXXVI, i (1973) 55-79.
———, "Acculturalisation in Afghan Turkistan, Pushtun and Uzbek Women," *JRSAA* 70, i (1983) 35-44.
———, *Bartered Brides, Politics, Gender and Marriage in an Afghan Tribal Society* (Cambridge 1991).
Tarn, W.W., *The Greeks in Bactria and India* (New Delhi 1980).
———, *Alexander the Great*, 2 vols. (Cambridge 1948).
The Country of the Turkomans; an Anthology of Exploration, Extracts from Proceedings and Journals of the Royal Geographical Society of London (London 1977).
Thornton, E., *A Gazetteer of the Countries Adjacent to India on the North West, including Scinde, Afghanistan, Belouchistan, the Punjab and Neighbouri+ng States*, 2 vols. (London 1844).
Toepfeer, Dr. H., "Bazaar Centres of the Capitals of Three Afghan Provinces," *GRA* (May-Aug. 1971) 17-23.
Toynbee, A. J., *Between Oxus and Jumna* (Oxford 1961).
Tuchman, Barbara, W., *Bible and Sword* (Macmillian 1985).
Vambery, A., *Travels in Central Asia* (London 1864).
———, *History of Bukhara from the Earliest Period Down to the Present* (London 1873).
Wahidi, Dr. Y., "The Historical Geography of Jouzjanan," *Afghanistan* 30, iii (1977) 80-5; 30, iv (1977) 92-8; 31, i (1978) 72-83.

Wathern, W.H., "Memoir on the Uzbek State of Kokand, properly called Khokend (the ancient Ferghana) in Central Asia (an account of Behadur Khan, Khush Begi of Kokand)," *JRASB*, iii (1884) 369-78.
Wiebe, D., "Probleme stadtgeographischer Forschung in Afghanistan. Wandel und Beharrung afghanischer Provinzstädte," *NFA* (1981).
Wellhausen, J., *The Arab Kingdom and its Fall* (Rahim Bros, Karachi 1980).
Wheeler, J. Talboys, *Memorandum on Afghanistan from A.D. 1700* (Calcutta 1869).
Wheeler, S. E., *The Amir Abdur Rahman Khan* (London 1895).
Wolfe, J., *Narrative of a Mission to Bokhara* (London 1852).
Wyne, H. Le Peor, *Narrative of Recent events in Afghanistan, 1868-1871* (Calcutta 1871).
Yapp, M., "Disturbances in Eastern Afghanistan 1839-42," *BSOAS* XXV (1962) 499-523.
———, "Disturbances in Western Afghanistan, 1839-41," *BSOAS* XXVI (1963) 288-313.
———, "The Revolutions of 1841-2 in Afghanistan," *BSOAS* XXVII (1964) 333-381
———, *Strategies of British India; Britain, Iran and Afghanistan* (Oxford 1980).
Yate, A.C., *England and Russia Face to Face in Asia; Travels with the Afghan Boundary Commission* (London 1887).
Yate, C. E., *Northern Afghanistan* (London 1888).
———, *Khorasan and Sistan* (London 1900).
Yavorski, I.I., *Journey of the Russian Embassy through Afghanistan and the Khanates of Bukhara in 1878 and 1879*, 2 vols. (Calcutta 1885).
Zaehner, R. C., *The Dawn and Twighlight of Zoroastrianism* (London 1975).
Zvi, Isaaq ben, *The Exiled and the Redeemed, the Strange Jewish 'tribes' of the Orient*, transl. I. A. Abbady (London 1985).

India Office Library: Records, Memoranda and European Manuscripts

[N.B. For a list of abbreviations used for IOL Records, see Appendix IX. Many individual Records, Letters, Diaries and Memoranda have been used in this work; those listed below are but a selection of the most important, or extensive. For individual news-letters, *wakil* diaries, etc. from Afghanistan and Frontier areas, consult footnotes in individual chapters. Manuscripts are listed by author(s) whenever possible.]

'Abd al-Rahman Khan, *Exhortation to Afghans being a Speech given by the Ruler of the Faithful, a translation of, Izah ul Biyan fi Nasihatub Afghan*, etc., 2 Sept. 1889, SLEI:L/P&S/7/58, 387-90.
———, "Turkistan Atrocities, the Amir's Reply," *Translation of a Letter from His Highness the Amir to His Excellency the Viceroy*, 4 Safar 1307 (30 Sept. 1889), SLEI:L/P&S/7/58, 511-14.
———, "Proclamation by H.M. the Amir of Afghanistan," in *Letter from British Agent*, Kabul, 9 Oct. 1893, SLEI:L/P&S/7/55, 709-10.
———, *Translation of Pamphlet by Amir Abdul Rahman Khan*, 30 Aug. 1893, SLEI:L/P&S/7/73, 427ff.
Afghan Boundary Commission, *Telegraphic Communications, 1884-86*, 6 vols, PSDL:L/P&S/20/MEM03/AH.
Allah Bakhsh, Mir, *Memorandum from Mir Allah Bakhsh to Col. C. S. MacLean*, Meshed, Nov. 1886, SLEI:L/P&S/7/49, 529-31.
Burnes, Lt. A., "Herat, with a Sketch of the State of Affairs in the Surrounding Countries," Feb. 1838, in *Political, Geographical and Commercial Reports and Papers (1835-37)*, MEIR:L/P&S/19/90; ESL:L/P&S/5/130, 122-31.
———, *Report on the Countries between India and Russia*, 4 vols. 1838, MEIR:L/P&S/19/78-82 & 91.
Cabinet Papers, vol. I, "Afghanistan, 1839-40," PSDL:L/P&S/20/G10/1.

———, vol. III, "Miscellaneous, 1839-41," PSDL:L/P&S/20/G10/3.
———, *Correspondence relating to Herat*, 1841, PSDL:L/P&S/20/G10/3.
———, *Correspondence and Political Papers Relating to Persia and Affghanistan, 1834-39*, PSDL:L/P&S/20/A7/1.
———, *Colonel Stoddard and Captain Conolly, 1838-1844*, PSDL:L/P&S/20/A7/2.
Chapman, Cpt. E. F., *Who's Who in Eastern Turkistan*, 1874, SLEI:L/P&S/7/4, part 2, 349-88.
Christie, Lt. C., *Memoir of a Journey through a part of Beloochistan, Seistan, Khorasan and Persia*, 1811, MSS. Eur., Box 13, nos. p-t.
Conolly, A., *Prison Diary, 1841-1842*, MSS. Eur., B.29. See also BL, Mss. Add. 38725 [G13:438].
———, *Account of a Journey from Bamiyan to Merve*, 16 Nov. 1840, ESL:L/P&S/5/156, no. 34, encl. 4; V/27/69/3 [censored report].
———, *Account of the Relations of England with India, Affganistan, Persia and Russia as they Bear on the Affairs of Turkistan*, 11 May 1841, ESL:L/P&S/5/161, 10-26.
Conolly, A.; Trevelyan, C. E., *Papers on the Trade of Affghanistan and the Country between the Indus and the Caspian*, 1831, MEIR:L/P&S/19/59.
Curzon Papers, *Russian Advances in Asia*, vol. V, "1882-84," MSS. Eur., F.111/138.
———, *Papers on the Afghan Boundary Commission*, 7 vols., 1884-86, MSS Eur., F.111/60.
Durand, Sir. M, *Report on a Recent Mission to Kabul*, 20 Dec. 1893, SLEI:L/P&S/7/73, 7-26.
Elahi Bakhsh, *Report by Assistant Surgeon Elahi Bakhsh on Special Duty to Col. C. Maclean*, 2 Oct. 1886, SLEI:L/P&S/7/49, 440.
Faiz Bakhsh, Munshi, *Translation of a Report on Badakhshan, Balkh and Bokhara*, 1872, ESL:L/P&S/5/270, 152-90 (see also, 'Ghulam Rabbani'; 'Pundit Munphool').
Forsyth, T.D., "Epitome of Events in Afghanistan since Dost Mohammad's Death," *Umballa Papers*, 2 vols, 1869, PSDL:/L/P&S/20/B17/A.
Futteh Mohamed, *Narrative of a Journey through Toorkistan*, 1855, ESL:L/P&S/5/225, no. 59, encl. 11.
'Ghulam Rabbani' (Faiz Bakhsh), *Journey from Cabul to Peshawar, 1865-66*, ESL:L/P&S/5/260, 849-67
Ghulam Serwar, *Report of Ghulam Serwar, Native Agent of the Hon. East India Co. on Special Mission to the Country of Shah Zemaun, 1793-1795*, 7 June 1797, P:Bengal Secret Consultation, vol. 41 (1797).
Griesbach, C. L., *Report on a Recent Journey from Chahrshambe to Bamiyan*, Aug. 1886, SLEI:L/P&S/7/48, 327-52.
———, *Afghan Field Notes, 3rd series, Geological Survey of N. W. Afghanistan*, 19 July 1887, SLEI:L/P&S/7/49, 11-35.
———, *Memorandum on the Disposal of the Turkistan Prisoners by the Amir*, 13 Aug. 1889, SLEI:L/P&S/7/58, 145-49.
———, *Journeys in Afghanistan from 7 Feb. 1888 to 6 July 1889*, 2 vols., MEIRL/P&S/19/TN/139 [IOR: NEG 5425].
Griffin, Lepel, "Principal Events in Affghanistan, 1875-76," *Papers Related to Afghanistan, 1876-1878*, PSDL:L/P&S/20/MEM04/3.
———, *Northern Afghanistan*, PSDL:L/P&S/20/MEM03/P.
Griffith, Dr., *Productions of Affghanistan*, 1809, MSS Eur. D.159.
Hamilton, Dr. Lilias, *The Power that Walks in Darkness*, 1900(?), MSS Eur. C.375; WIHML: PP/HAM/A.21.
Hira Singh; Maitland, J.P., *Account given by Hira Singh of his Tour in the Firozkohi Country, 1886*, SLEI:L/P&S/7/47, 49-63.
Holditch, Lt. Col. T. H., *Report on the Survey Operations in W. & N.W. Afghanistan, 1884-86*, 1887, PSM:L/P&S/18/A77.
Hossain Khan, Meer Mahomed, *Letter from Meer Mahomed Hossain Khan, Meer of Maimena, to Naib Mahomed Alum Khan*, n.d., ESL:L/P&S/5/273, part 1, 59.
Hussain Khan, Muhammad, *Report on the Hazarajat*, 1886, SLEI:L/P&S/7/49, 415-27.

Ibrahim Khan, Bahadur, *Report on the Haibak District*, 1886, SLEI:L/P&S/7/49, 43-44.
Imam Sharif, *Report on a Route Survey from Obeh to Zarni and thence to Daulatyar*, 1886, SLEI:L/P&S/7/47, 949-54.
———, *Report on the Districts of Astarab, Pangan, Kachan and Sangcharak in Afghan Turkistan*, 1886, SLEI:L/P&S/7/48, 221-27.
India Office Memoranda & Miscellaneous Reports, Political Department Papers, 1834-1839, PSDL:L/P&S/20/A7/37.
———, *Umballa Papers*, 2 vols., 1869, PSDL:L/P&S/20/B17/A.
———, *Memorandum on the Northern Boundaries of Affghanistan*, 1869, ESL:L/P&S/5/263, 71-7.
———, *Statement Regarding the Recent Political Status of Maimena and the Petty Fiefs between Balkh and the Oxus and Budukhshan*, 1872, ESL:L/P&S/5/270, 191-6.
———, *Memorandum Related to the Demarcation of Russian and Afghanistan Borders in Central Asia*, 30 Nov. 1881, SLEI:L/P&S/7/31, 85-7.
———, *Memorandum of the Visit of the Amir of Afghanistan to India*, March 1885, SLEI:L/P&S/7/44, 175-81.
———, *Remarks made by the Amir after his Departure from Peshawar*, 15-16 April 1885, SLEI:L/P&S/7/44, 219-36.
———, *Diary of Events at Panjdeh*, March 1885, SLEI:L/P&S/7/44, 313-315e.
———, *Correspondence Respecting the Demarcation of the N. W. Frontier of Afghanistan from the Hari Rud to the Oxus*, 1884-86, 6 vols., PSM:L/P&S/18/A53.
———, *Chronological Tables of Events in Central Asia & Afghanistan, 1885-87*, Calcutta, 1888, PSM:L/P&S/18/A/69.
———, *A History of Ishak Khan's Rebellion*, 12 Nov. 1888, SLEI:L/P&S/7/55, 943-6.
———, *Draft Memorandum to Foreign Office on Atrocities Perpetrated in Turkistan and Kabul under the Amir's Orders*, 16 Sept. 1889, HC:L/P&S/3/297, 913-18.
———, *'Turkistan Atrocities', The Amir's Reply*, 11 Nov. 1889; *Amir to Viceroy*, 30 Sept. 1889, L/P&S/7/58, 503-14.
———, *Memorandum: Afghanistan, Establishment by Amir of a Monopoly of the Sale of Fruit, etc.*, 13 June 1893, SLEI:L/P&S/7/70, 455.
———, *Memorandum and Papers Regarding the Creation of Trade Monopolies by the Amir of Afghanistan, 1894-1895*, 16 Oct. 1895, SLEI:L/P&S/7/83, no. 202 (Frontier), n. pag.
Irvine, Lt. F., *Memoir on the Climate, Soil, Products, Husbandry of Afghanistan and the Neighbouring Country*, 1809, Home Misc. 659, iv.
Imperial Russian Government, *Translation of General Kurpatkin's Plan for a Russian Advance on India*, St. Petersburg, SLEP:L/P&S/7/186, 489-507.
James, H. R., *Memorandum on Kunduz*, 9 June 1859, ESL:L/P&S/5/254, 764-72.
Logan, Dr.; Todd, Maj. D'Arcy, *Statement on the Condition of the Poor at Herat*, ESL;L/P&S/145, no. 7, encl. 8.
Lord, Dr. P.B., *Report on the Bazaar of Koondooz and Prospects of Trade with Toorkistan*, 1838, ESL:L/P&S/5/130, 494-514.
———, *Report on the Political Conditions between the Oxus and the Hindu Kush*, ESL:L/P&S/5/145, no. 6, encl. 13.
Lumsden, Maj. H.B., *Report on a Mission to Candahar*, 1858, ESL:L/P&S/5/258, 204-34.
———, *Memorandum on Russian Boundary Proposals*, 3 Sept. 1885, PSM:L/P&S/18/A69.
MacCartney, Lt., *Memoir of a Map of Caboul and the Adjacent Country*, 1818, MSS. Eur. F.88 box 13, nos. n-r.
Maitland, Maj. J. P., *Exploration and Survey Operations in the Country from the Hari-Rud Valley to Balkh, including the Bamiyan Pass*, 1886, SLEI:L/P&S/7/46, 1473-89.
Moorcroft, W., *Bukhara and the Return from Bukhara, July-Aug. 1825*, MSS Eur., D.254.
Moore, A.W., *Narrative of Events in Afghanistan, Aug. 1878-Dec. 1880*, PSM:L/P&S/18/A43.
Napier, Capt. G. C., *Memorandum on the Condition, Resources, etc. of the Perso-Afghan Border with some Notes on the Herat Territory*, 1875, SLEI:L/P&S/7/4, part 1, 217-53.

Pelly, Lt. L., *Journey from Persia to India*, 1860, MSS. Eur., F.126/30 & 31.
———, *Drafts of Letters, 1860-1861*, MSS. Eur., F.126/33.
———, *Memorandum on the Defeat of the Persian Force at Merve and on the Present Condition and Prospects of the Persian Eastern and Herat Northern Frontiers*, 14 Oct. 1860, P:IFPC/204/61, 79-83.
Pollock, F., "List of Chief Officers of the Amir Shere Ali Khan," *Umballa Papers*, 2 vols., 1869, PSDL:L/P&S/20/B17A.
Pottinger, Lt. Eldred, *Memoir on the Country between Herat and Kabul, the Paropamisian Mountains and the Amoo*, 1839, ESL:L/P&S/5/145, no. 7 [black], encl. 20.
Proceedings of the Foreign Dept. *Central Asia*, part 1, 1869-72.
'Pundit Munphool' (Faiz Bakhsh), *Khokand, Russia and Bukhara*, 1867, ESL/L/P&S5/260, 507 ff. (pagination exists for report only).
Punjab Goverment Records, *Lahore Political Diaries, 1846-9*, India.
Raja Beg Herati, *Note of a Deposition by Rajah Beg Herautee, Servant to Col. Stoddard*, 1840, ESL:L/P&S/5/151, no. 85, encl. 38.
Rawlinson, Sir H., "Memorandum on the Frontier of Afghanistan," 18 June 1869 (and associated letters), *Umballa Papers*, 1869.
Raverty, Maj. H.G., *The History of Hiri, or Herat, and its Dependencies*, 7 vols., 1902(?), MSS. Eur., C.83-89.
Ridgeway, W. *Panjdeh, the Military Situation*, 16 March 1885, SLEI:L/P&S/7/44, 315e-316.
Roberts, Gen. Sir. F., *Memorandum (On Russia and Britain in Central Asia)*, 22 May 1885, SLEI:L/P&S/7/64, 30 (pp. 11-18 of enclosure).
Roe, Surgeon-Major, *Memorandum of State of Health of H.H. the Amir of Afghanistan*, March 1885, SLEI:L/P&S/7/44, 1901-1.
Sa'ad al-Din Khan, *List of Claims against Russian Frontier Officials presented by the Govt. of Herat*, 1893, SLEI:L/P&S/7/72, part 3, 691-2.
Skobeleff, General, *Report of the Siege and Assault of Denghil-Tépé*, transl Lt. Julian John Leverson, 1881, L/MIL/17/14/84.
Stracey, Col. R.L., *Memoir on the Revenue and Trade of Caubul*, 1811, Home Misc. 659, ii.
Taylor, Maj. R.L., *Memorandum on Herat*, 1 Jan. 1858, ESL:L/P&S/5/253, 845-55.
———, *Memorandum on Meimeneh*, 1 Feb. 1858, ESL:L/P&S/5/253, 866-71.
———, *Narrative of Events at Herat from the death of Yar Muhammad Khan to the Present*, ESL:L/P&S/5/253, 931-50.
———, *A Tabular Statement of the Tribes Adjoining the Neighbourhood of Herat*, 1858, ESL:L/P&S/5/253, 854-5.
Todd, Maj. D'Arcy, *Observations on the Military Memoir of Captain Burnes on Afghanistan*, 2 July 1837, SLEP:L/P&S/9/102, 420-463.
———, *Report on the Results of Observations and Enquiries upon the State of Herat*, 2 Oct. 1839, ESL:L/P&S/5/144, 420-65.
———, *Translation of a Paper given by Hukoomut Khan, Eldest Son of the Vali of Mymuna to the Vuzeer of Herat, Yar Mohamed Khan*, 1840, ESL:L/P&S/5/155, no. 4, encl. 10.
Warburton, Col., *Colonel Warburton to H. M. Durand* ('Turkistan Atrocities'), 21 July 1889, SLEI:L/P&S/7/58, 145-7.
Watson, R., *The Boundaries of Persia*, 15 Dec. 1864, SLEP:L/P&S/9/167, no. 1 of 1865.
Williams, H. Le Peor, *History of Seistan and Lash-Jowain*, 1870, ESL:L/P&S/5/265, 21-101.
Wyllie, J. S., *Summary of Information regarding Events in Afghanistan from the Death of Dost Muhammad to the Battle of Shekhabad, 1863-1872*, 4 vols., PSDL:L/P&S/20/B9/a.
Wyne, H. L., *Recent Events in Afghanistan, continuation of Mr. Wyllie's Précis*, [up to 1868], PSDL:L/P&S/20/B9/b.
———, *Narrative of Recent Events in Afghanistan from the Recovery of Candahar to the Conclusion of the Rebellion of Yacoob Khan, 1871*, PSDL:L/P&S/20/B9/b.
———, *Continuation of Précis of Events in Afghanistan, 1871-72*, PSDL:L/P&S/20/B9/b.
———, *Recent Events in Afghanistan, 1866-68*, PSDL:L/P&S/20/B11.

Yate, C.E., *Notes on the Fortifications and Troops of Herat, Badghis and Northern Afghanistan*, 25 May 1893, SLEI:L/P&S/7/70, 1787-94.
Yate, C. E.; Taki Khan, *Herat and its Provinces*, 1887, SLEI:L/P&S/7/49, 1163-1270.

India Office Library: Maps and Drawings

The IOL map collection is currently being reclassified, references below commencing with L refer to the original India Office catalogue system as found in, *Map Catalogue*, part 2, 1878 (pp. 471-82 particularly). X refers to the new classification of these L series maps. Where the X number is known, the new reference follows the L classification in square brackets. The earliest maps of Central Asia and Afghanistan, including many from the First Afghan War, are found only in the L [or X] series. Maps of the region classified under W in the IOL map collection date from the second half of the century. Many maps (often original, hand-drawn ones) from all periods of the nineteenth century can be found bound with the individual intelligence report to which they relate in L/P&S/5; L/P&S/7; P:IFPC and (less frequently) L/P&S/9. Some of the most fragile and rare charts and drawings, however, have been removed and placed in the W or L [X] collections. Maps from the period of the Second Anglo-Afghan War and the Afghan Boundary Commission surveys can also be found in L/MIL/17 and the Curzon Collection (MSS Eur. F.111 & F.112). A number of maps produced as a result of the Afghan Boundary Commission work are housed in the PRO or the Map Collection of the Royal Geographical Society. The RGS map collection now includes all of the 1:100,000 series maps produced by Russian and American surveyors in the 1950s-60s.

A considerable number of drawings and sketches by Sir Mortimer Durand (some of which are reproduced in this book) and Atkinson (First Anglo-Afghan War) are housed in the India Office Collection [W/2129].

Burn, Maj. H. P., *Map of the Area of Balkh and the Present Position of Akram's Army*, Peshawar, 28 Oct. 1850, ESL:L/P&S/5/205, no. 39, encl. 9.
East, Capt. C J., *Map of Central Asia*, 1869, 1 inch=65miles, L.XIV.33 [X/3016].
Holditch, Maj., *Map of Oxus*, 1887, W/LPS/21/C10/1-5.
MacLeod, Capt. W. C. (ed.) *Map of Toorkistan and Western Tartary*, 1 inch=36 miles, 1841, L.XIV.27 [X/3008].
Weimar Geographischen Instituts, *Central Asien*, 1835, 1 inch=75 miles, L.XIV.32.
Wood, Lt. J., *Burnes' Route through Afghanistan, Bukhara and Central Asia*, 1838, L.XVI.3 [X/3035]; map iii: *Bamiyan, Khooloom and Bulkh* [X/3035/2]; map iv: *The Canals of Bulkh* [X/3035/3].
Central Asia and Russian Conquests, 1866, 1 inch=68 miles, L.XIV.30 [X/3011].
Map of Region North of the Hari Rud, 1885, W/LPS/H15.
Map of Affghanistan, Annotated by Lt. Eldred Pottinger, 1840, 4 sheets, 1 inch=8 miles, L.XVI.13 [X/3049/2/1-4]. At [X/3049/1/1-15] there are 15 enlarged maps taken from Pottinger's original sketches: Sheet 1, *Herat*; Sheet 2, *Maimana and the Moorghab*; Sheet 3, *Sir-i Pool and Khooloom*.
Map of the Area betweeen British and Russian Possessions, 1885-1910, 4 sheets, W/LPS/21/C8/1-4.
A Map of the Kingdom of Caubul and some Neighbouring Countries, revised 1838 (from Elphinstone Mission in 1809), 1 inch = 40 miles, L.XVI.10 [X/3046].
Map to Illustrate Talboy Wheeler's Memorandum, 1869, W/LPS/H2.
Northern Afghanistan, 1885, W/LPS/H14.
Sketch of the Countries between Hindustan and the Caspian Sea, revised 1877, 1 inch=64 miles, L.XV.3a.
Turkistan, 1868, revised, 1878, by Col. Walker, 1 inch=24 miles, L.XV.1a.

British Library

Conolly, Capt. Arthur, *Prison Diary, 1841-1842*, BL Mss. Add., 38725, G13:438.

Public Record Office

Russia's Proceedings in Central Asia, PRO, FO 65.

Archives of the Royal Geographical Society

Stirling, Edward, *Journals and Miscellaneous Papers, 1828-1834*.

Archives of the Wellcome Insitute for the History of Medicine

Hamilton, Dr. Lilias, *Papers and Letters*, PP/HAM/A.1-3;A.18-31.a.

Newspapers

Civil and Military Gazetteer.
Pioneer of India.
Times of London.

INDEX

Ab-i Maimana, 3, 45, 127, 351, 443
'Abbas Khan Mingbashi, 423
'Abbas Mirza Qajar, 147
'Abbasid Revolution, 11
Abbot, Maj., 228
  assassination of, 131f.
  dispute with Shibarghan, 141f.
  with Maimana, 134, 135, 142
'Abd al-'Aziz, amir of Andarab, 271
'Abd al-'Aziz, amir of Andkhui, 128
'Abd al-'Aziz Khan, Tuqay-Timurid, 43, 48f., 53f.
'Abd al-Baqi Mingbashi, 425, 433, 442, 443, 458, 459
'Abd al-Faiz, Mirza, 455, 456, 494, 519, 522, 592, 593
'Abd al-Ghani Khan, amir of Andkhui, 441, 442, 443
'Abd al-Ghazi Khan, Tuqay-Timurid, 93
'Abd al-Hakim, Shaikh 'Alisalam, 88
''Abd al-Jabbar Bi, 164, 172
'Abd al-Jabbar Jamshidi, 203
'Abd al-Latif Khan, sardar, 93
'Abd al-Malik Manghit, 334, 338, 461, 464
'Abd al-Muhammad Ming, 142, 198
'Abd al-Mu'min b. 'Abdullah, 36, 37
'Abd al-Mu'min Khan Ming, 104f., 107, 114, 134
'Abd al-Mu'min Khan, Tuqay-Timurid, 73
'Abd al-Qudus Khan, 388f., 410f., 414, 426f., 429, 430, 435, 581
'Abd al-Qayyum Khan Wardaki, 516, 518, 535, 558
'Abd al-Rahim Khan, Mirza, 347, 349, 354
'Abd al-Rahman Khan, Amir, 230, 236, 291, 311, 378, 388, 389, 425, 445
  early campaigns in Turkistan, 236, 237, 247, 249, 263f., 272, 273, 290, 291
  in Qataghan and Badakhshan, 365f., 271f., 273, 291
  war with Sher 'Ali Khan, 292, 298f., 300, 309, 310, 311, 363, 367, 441f.
  Bukharan exile, 300f., 332, 340, 341f., 349, 350, 375, 453, 454, 557
  Bukharan relations, 304f., 306, 307, 318, 327, 396, 464
  ally of Faiz Muhammad Khan, 304f.
  takes Kabul, 309
  Turkistan campaign (1867-8), 312f.
  siege of Minglik (1868), 319f., 328, 552
  siege of Maimana (1868) 322f., 325f., 352, 525
  Maimana relations, xxii, 320f., 342, 361, 365, 367, 375, 381f., 393, 395f., 412f., 418f., 421f., 429, 432, 436, 438f., 443f., 450, 452f., 455f., 460, 461, 470, 489, 495, 496, 500, 505, 514f., 519, 521, 525f., 533f., 541f., 585f., 589, 591, 594
  dispute with A'zam Khan, 312, 321f., 327, 328, 411, 505
  returns to Afghan Turkistan (1880), 392f.
  as Amir of Afghanistan, xif., xxii, xxxv, 74, 360, 388, 397, 398f., 453, 467, 495, 500, 503, 505, 506f., 526f., 530, 544, 559, 566, 568, 569, 572, 574f., 581, 585,
  Afghan Turkistan policy, 395, 411, 413, 414, 415, 418f., 457, 459, 460, 463f., 471, 484, 496, 499, 500, 521, 529, 530f., 537, 538f., 542, 544, 559f., 565, 566, 568f., 581, 582f, 596, 598
  and Aiyub Khan, 399f., 409, 410, 411, 413, 420f., 426, 433f., 477
  and Britain, xxiif., xxv, xxxix, 316, 317, 360, 388f., 396f., 413, 418f., 421, 423, 436, 450, 453, 460, 463f., 467f., 475, 493, 494f., 530f., 543, 544f., 553, 562f., 564, 565f., 574f., 582, 589, 599
  and Russia, 375, 378, 396, 397, 414, 422, 423, 454, 461, 475, 476, 477, 494, 505, 508, 528f., 530, 561f., 564f., 569f., 572, 574, 584, 585, 589, 598
  and Peter the Great, xxii, 569
  Panjdeh crisis, 463f., 470, 473f., 492, 562, 576

  and Ishaq Khan, 388, 395, 411f., 436, 445, 456f., 475, 477, 482, 495, 497f., 506, 533f., 542
  rebellion of Ishaq Khan, 411f., 457, 458, 461f., 491f., 505f., 519, 521, 533, 534, 564, 565, 566, 596
  attempted assassination, 540
  other revolts, 489, 491f., 495, 498, 499, 500, 503, 542, 560, 577f., 581
  atrocities, xxivf., 307, 320, 331f., 394f., 399, 415f., 432, 459, 467, 475, 491, 492, 494, 496, 500, 505, 506, 508, 510, 526, 529, 529f., 533f., 543f., 558f., 578, 580f., 583, 589, 592f., Appendix IX
  deportations, 481, 483f., 488, 495, 496, 507f., 510, 578, 580, 585, 590, 595, 597f.
  and Chahar Aimaq, 408, 427f., 435, 440, 473f., 492, 577f., 584
  defence of his government, 569f., 572, 574f., 582, Appendix IX,v
  'Afghanisation', xx, 431f., 458, 471, 476f., 480f., 484f., 490f., 495, 496, 560f., 595, 597, 598
  Hazara revolts and Shi'i persecution, 531, 532, 545f., 550, 551, 570f., 577, 581f., 585, 586, 589, 595f.
  maladministration, 471, 487, 490, 509, 557, 559, 561, 569, 571, 583, 596
  character and beliefs, 497, 504f., 540, 546, 569f., 572, 574f., 581, 589
  illnesses, xxii, xxiv, xxvii, xxviii, 288, 467, 495, 500, 501, 503f., 508, 514, 527, 530, 540, 542, 545f., 550, 571, 575f., 581
  death, 598
  family of, 320, 337, 371, 485f., 498, 503, 506, 514, 533, 541, 542, 554, 556f., 557f., 581 (see also individual names)
  historical writings about, 306, 311, 505f., 544f., 556, 566
'Abd al-Rahman Khan Ushun, 43, 47, 48
'Abd al-Rahman Turkman, Khalifa, 154
'Abd al-Wahab Khan, 401, 402f., 408f.
Abdalis, 60f., 62f., 72, 83, 147
'Abd'l-Nazr Ming, 142, 194
'Abdullah b. Iskandar, 35f.
'Abdullah Beg Jamshidi, 203, 276, 277
'Abdullah Bi Qipchaq, 42
'Abdullah Jan Khan Nasiri, 344f., 347, 351, 364f., 377, 405
  in Maimana, 363f., 381f.
'Abdullah Khan Abdali, 60
'Abdullah Khan, General, 430
'Abdullah Khan Qipchaq, 157
'Abdullah Khan Tokhi, 412, 502, 504, 507, 509, 510, 511f.
'Abdullah al-Ma'mun, 11
abjad, 137
Abu Nasr b. Muhammad, 12
Abu Nasr Parsa, Khwaja, 56, 102, 119
Abu Yazid Bastami, 20, 24
Abu'l -'Abbas-i Ma'mun Farighun, 12
Abu'l-Bilal, *Dar al-Anab*, 11f.
Abu'l-Faiz Khan, Tuqay-Timurid, 57, 59, 64f., 67, 73, 80f., 90, 144
Abu'l-Hasan, Tuqay-Timurid, 59, 63f., 68
Abu'l-Khair Khan, 32, 36, 38
Abu'l-Mansur b. Subhan Quli Khan, 55
Achæmenids, xviii, 2, 5, 7, 9
Achakzais, 479, 486, 520
'Adil Bi, amir, 57f., 59
Adina Bahadur Ming, 58
Afghan Boundary Commission, 375, 418, 453, 456, 458, 460f.,464f., 471f., 474, 475, 476, 479, 492, 493, 497, 531, 538, 567
  and 'Afghanisation', 476, 479, 483
  reports and surveys, xliii, 26, 78, 105, 125, 126, 151, 163, 359, 446f., 462, 465, 469, 536, Appendix V
  statistical inaccuracies, 480f.
Afghan Turkistan, xxii, xxviif., xxxi, xxxiii, xxxv, xliii, 1, 232, 242, 264, 267, 280, 286, 289, 294, 317, 318, 331, 334, 343, 345, 347, 360, 376, 377, 404, 419, 446, 495, 519, 530f., 565 (see also Balkh Wilayat, Turkistan, Lesser Turkistan)
  origins of term, xiii, xxxi, xxxii, 1, 336f.
  governors of 297, 298, 303, 309, 337f., 360, 361, 364, 368, 371, 378, 381, 388, 392, 393, 395, 412f., 457, 464, 495, 500, 525f., 552, 581, 596, 600, Appendix VII (see individual names)
  Afghan army in, xxxiii, 67, 81, 96, 101, 224, 225, 229, 233, 234, 261, 271, 273, 286, 300, 304, 307, 309, 321, 322, 324, 327, 347, 349f., 363, 372, 380f., 384f., 386, 389, 394, 411f., 413, 419, 420, 423f., 454, 461, 480, 498, 499, 502, 508, 509, 533f., 539f., 545, 546, 549, 552, 558, 559, 582f., 585, 596

revolts and mutinies, 231f., 246f., 270f., 282, 290f., 292, 301f., 304f., 317, 342, 347f., 361, 373, 378f., 380f., 382, 386, 388f., 392, 393f., 398, 404f., 411f., 419f., 469f., 495f., 502, 505f., 519, 525f., 534, 539, 540, 542, 577f., 583, 585f., 594, 596
Bukharan campaigns, 235f., 239f., 250f., 256, 265f., 267, 269f., 272f., 289, 292, 297, 304, 306, 338f.
and civil war, 289f., 292, 294, 296f., 300f., 304f., 309f., 312f., 317f., 325f., 331f., 340
declares for 'Abd al-Rahman Khan, 390, 393
'Turkistan Atrocities', xxivf., xxviii, 543f., 558f., 562f., 580f., 589, Appendix IX
deportations, 481, 483, 484, 500, 502, 507f., 559f., 597f.
and 'Afghanisation', 480f., 496, 499, 502, 560f., 597
population, 447, 466, 477, 480f., 483, 484, 489, 508, 541, 545, 560f., 582f., 596, 597, 598
economy, 1f., 322, 420, 447, 448f., 451f., 470f., 502, 560f., 583, 596f., 598 (implied)
revenues, 233, 245, 307, 309, 310, 311, 323, 337, 342f., 349, 367, 368, 369, 371, 373, 382, 397, 411f., 421, 451f., 470, 499f., 502, 509, 537f., 559f., 561f., 578, 583, 596
geological survey, 531
Afghanistan, xvii, xxvi, xxx, 74, 78, 92, 122, 142, 143, 145, 175, 187, 198, 240, 242, 256, 268, 269, 280, 287, 288, 298, 317, 355, 391, 439, 465f., 474, 477, 492, 506, 533, 541, 571, 582, 598f., 601f.
Amirs of, xiv, xv, 174, 180, 187, 245, 288, 295, 308, 380, 383, 384, 388f., 396, 397, 398, 399, 434, 505, 528, 530, 544f., 564, 566, 569, 570, 573, 575, 599, 600, 602. Appendix VI (see individual names)
army, xxxiii, 381, 559, 563, 569, 585
and Britain, xiv, xv, xix, xxi, xxiif., xxv, xxxix, 74, 77, 78, 97, 142f., 147, 167, 168, 174, 177f., 184, 186f., 198, 203, 206, 218, 224, 225, 235, 239f., 252f., 255, 256, 261f., 270, 271, 277f., 282, 288, 295, 316, 317, 333f., 359, 360f., 371f., 375f., 380, 382f., 388f., 391f., 396f., 399, 415f., 418f., 433, 436, 459f., 474, 530f., 543, 544f., 559, 562f., 582, 599, 602
and Bukhara, 74, 90, 95, 101, 113, 122, 175f., 182f., 192, 196, 204, 220, 221, 223, 224, 226f., 229, 238f., 242, 250f., 256f., 260, 261, 265f., 269f., 271f., 276, 288, 289, 291, 292, 301, 303, 306, 308, 316f., 318, 327f., 334f., 460, 464
and Russia, xiv, xxxi, 160, 334f., 347, 360, 371f., 373, 375, 376f., 378, 396, 414, 416, 418, 422f., 432, 454, 460, 462f., 472, 475, 476, 492f., 494, 559
Soviet invasion of, 179, 221, 600f.
frontiers of, xii, xiii, xiv, xvi, xxi, xxii, xxvi, xxviii, xxxi, xxxii, xxxviii, 1, 74, 75, 76, 77, 83, 99, 101, 112f., 123, 142f., 145, 167, 168, 174, 175, 177, 184, 186, 190f., 198, 206, 219, 224f., 226, 240, 241, 242f., 244, 268, 275, 277, 280, 282, 287, 298, 333, 334f., 337, 340, 343, 346, 347, 359, 375, 377, 384, 396, 398, 400, 414f., 418f., 422, 430f., 436, 439, 446f., 454, 458, 459f., 465f., 472f., 476, 490, 492f., 494f., 500, 541, 561f., 564f., 567, 571f., 577, 583f., 589f., 595, 597, 599, 601f.
wars with Lesser Turkistan, xxxiii, 54, 68, 81f., 86, 101, 114, 167, 173, 174, 183, 211, 214, 216f., 226f., 230f., 239f., 245f., 260f., 271f., 275, 289f., 349f., 359, 552
civil wars in, xiv, 100f., 107f., 289f., 295f., 300f., 304f., 308f., 317f., 332, 467, 505f.
governmental system, xiii, 180, 224f. 242, 274, 299, 300, 361f., 366, 459, 544f., 566f., 571, 575, 599, 600f.
treaties, xv, xx, 90, 96f., 101, 147, 182, 223, 227, 240, 242, 244, 250, 254, 262f., 268, 270, 316, 322, 325, 327, 343, 353, 371, 372, 376, 383, 384, 385, 398, 412f., 493, 572, 589
revenues and economy, 1, 228, 233, 471, 531, 537f., 562f., 563, 564, 566, 571
population, 480f., 543, 572, 598, 600, 601, 602
Afshar tribe, 63f., 128, 333
Agha Khan, 413

Ahad Khan, Brigadier, 579, 595
Ahmad Beg b. Qilij 'Ali Beg, 113,
Ahmad Beg Jamshidi, 203
Ahmad Jan, Sayyid, 319, 320
Ahmad Quli Khan Ming, 104f., 111f., 130f.
Ahmad Shah Durrani, Amir, xii, xiv, xvi, xvii, xxxiii, xlv, 43, 72, 73, 74, 77f., 85, 86, 87, 90, 91, 92, 96, 136, 143, 144, 190, 224, 288, 414
Ahnaf b. Qais, 10
Ai Khanum, 9
Aibak, 20, 24, 35, 59, 82, 113, 118, 123, 171, 176, 177, 220, 227f., 294, 296, 306, 312, 313, 332, 509, 510
Aimaqs (see Chahar Aimaq)
Aiyub Khan, Sardar, 348, 383, 388, 405, 413, 437
as governor of Herat, 364, 380, 391, 395, 396, 399f., 403, 408, 413
and Britain, 397, 399, 402, 405f., 433,
and 'Abd al-Rahman Khan, 399, 409, 410, 411
Herat mutinies, 382f., 384f., 396, 399f., 403f., 406
campaigns against Qandahar, 386f., 399f., 407, 409f.
Battle of Maiwand, 399f.
war with Chahar Aimaq, 400f., 405f., 412, 475, 477
executes Khan Agha Jamshidi, 401f., 474
defeat and flight, 411f, 426f., 496
intrigues from exile, 420f., 424f., 433, 436, 439, 441f., 489, 585f.
arrest and deportation, 425, 433f., 441, 489
Ajar Valley, 27, 222f.
Alexander II, Tsar of Russia, 256
Alexander the Great, xiv, xviii, 1, 2, 9, 75, 145, 335, 599
and classical historians, xviii, 1, 74f.
'Ali b. Abi Talib, xxxiv, 23f., 56, 58, 250, 264, 302, 310, 379, 497, 504, 513 (see also Shah-i Mardan)
'Ali Mardan Afshar, amir, 63f.
'Ali Mardan Beg, Mir Wali, 118f., 122, 134, 143, 169, 178, 229, 331
campaign against Murad Beg, 167
and Bukhara, 164, 172f., 204, 210, 219, 220, 221, 225, 234, 236
and Dost Muhammad Khan, 167, 169, 175f., 182, 196, 204f., 208, 209, 210, 217, 219f., 222f., 225, 228, 235, 257
and Britain, 169f., 172f., 174, 175, 202, 227, 228, 235, 240, 242
and Chahar Wilayat, 172f., 176, 193, 210f., 234f.
and Yar Muhammad, 194, 214, 217
submits to Shah Shuja', 175, 176, 177
and Afghan invasion, 204, 216, 217, 223f., 227f., 230, 234f.
surrender and death, 238f.
'Ali Yar Khan Ming, 92, 104f., 112, 114f., 119, 122f., 127, 128, 130f., 134, 135, 210
'Alikozais, 86, 87, 400
Alikhanoff, Colonel, 462, 474, 519, 520
'Alim 'Azizan, Shaikh, 40.
'Aliwardi Khan, amir of Qataghan, 113
Allah Berdi, Hazrat Sufi al-Islam, 109f.
Allah Berdi Tauz of Qurghan Tepa, 95
Allah Nazr Khan, ataliq, 87f.
Allah Yar Beg Jamshidi, 203
Allah Yar Khan Abdali, 60, 62f.
Almar, 22, 27, 28, 41, 43, 124, 156, 345, 380, 418, 443, 448, 452, 488, 531, 590
Alti Khwaja (Alti 'Azizan/Asab al-Qaf), 154, 442
Aminullah Khan, Amir, 600
Aminullah Khan Jamshidi, 402, 432, 475, 478
*amir*s, xxii, xxvi, xxxiii, 32f., 39, 43, 49, 53, 56, 58, 68, 80, 86, 95, 143, 182, 268, 273, 295, 296, 309, 310, 312, 322, 335, 340f., 346, 347, 353, 362, 366, 367, 368, 373, 381, 394, 395, 398, 399, 475, 500, 503, 508, 534, 535, 552, 558, 599, 600
Amirs of Afghanistan, 19, 72, 116, 398, 399, 601f. (see under individual names)
Amir-i Kabir, see Dost Muhammad Khan
*amir*id system, xii, xiii, xlvii, 19, 32f., 36, 49, 53f., 59, 72, 73, 96, 602
Amu Darya (see also Oxus), xif., xviii, xxii, xxviii, xxx, xxxi, 2, 3, 16, 20, 26, 28, 31, 34, 35, 40, 42, 43, 45, 56, 65, 67, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 80, 93, 95, 96, 97, 101, 110, 114, 118, 123, 141, 147, 148, 162, 163, 165, 169, 170, 172, 175, 176, 184, 186, 188, 195, 217, 218, 219, 224, 226, 227,

228, 231, 234, 236, 239, 242, 248, 249, 257, 259, 261, 262, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 271, 276, 288, 289, 302, 303, 309, 315, 317, 318, 333f., 337, 358, 371, 373, 376, 377, 378, 383, 392, 393, 394, 446, 460, 463, 472, 482, 501, 511, 512, 524, 525, 564f., 572, 583, 599, 600, 601
Anbar, 12
Anbiya Khan Taimani, 400f., 406f., 427, 478
Andarab, 186, 270, 507, 510
Andkhui (Andakud, Indakud, etc.), 7, 12, 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, 28, 31, 40, 42, 43, 44, 46, 50, 51, 52, 59, 63, 64, 66, 69, 87, 90, 103, 104, 124, 128, 134, 135, 145, 170, 203, 208, 247, 248, 254, 261, 323, 328, 339, 341, 342, 376, 390, 423, 434, 438, 447, 448, 472, 521f., 524, 534, 540
amirs of, 19, 23, 63f., 112, 123, 128, 133, 210f., 213, 264f., 313, 332, 350, 459, 508, 522, 524, 541, 583, Appendices III,i; IV,iii (see individual rulers)
and Maimana, 135f., 209f. 247, 272, 440, 517, 583, 594
and Shibarghan, 210f., 247, 272, 274
and Bukhara, 211, 250, 339, 342
and Yar Muhammad Khan, 184, 190, 192, 194, 212f.
and Afghans, 216, 233, 238, 241, 264f., 269, 274, 282, 294, 339, 353, 389, 420, 424, 499, 521f.
rebellions at, 247, 273f., 331f., 389, 412, 512, 588, 594
and Russia, 461, 464, 473, 489, 520
native army, 140, 208
revenues and economy, 127, 128, 140, 470, 538
population, 128, 140, 208, 239, 247, 435, 473, 525, 547, 551
earthquakes at, 303, 307, 597
Anglo-Afghan Treaties, xvf., xxf., xl, 182, 240f., 242f., 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 263f., 270, 316, 371, 372, 376, 383, 398
Anglo-Afghan Wars, xxxi, 44, 75, 82
First (1839-42), xvi, xix, xxi, xl, 143f., 147, 159, 167f., 177f., 202f., 228, 257, 335
Second, 359f., 371f., 376f., 383f., 388, 391f., 399f., 416, 453, 475, 484
Angurak, 125f.
Ansari clan, 25, 70, 120, 370, 497, 538f., 550, 553f., 567f. (implied)
Ansari, Khwaja 'Abdullah, 25, 116f., 288, 497
appanage system, xxxii, 1, 32f., 59, 60, 71, 77, 98
Aq Guzar, Battle of, 522f., 524, 540
Aq Robat, 237
Aqcha, xx, xxxiii, 5, 40, 51, 52, 93, 95, 96, 97, 101f., 119, 123, 155, 164, 165, 208, 217, 221, 223, 248, 251, 259, 261, 265, 274, 305, 322, 331, 340, 342, 349, 392, 393, 447, 471, 479, 499, 510, 524, 538
and Ishans Sudur and Uraq, 172, 175, 226, 228f., 232, 233, 294, 301, 308, 312, 313, 318f., 331, 339, 395
Mir Wali attacks, 236f.
and Bukhara, 87f., 271, 315, 318
and Herat, 190, 214
Afghan campaigns against, 87f., 216f., 226f., 231f., 513
under Afghan governors, 225, 229, 232f., 246, 248, 290, 303f., 306, 331, 338, 389, 448, 454, 588
attacked by Turkmans, 303
Arab conquests, 6, 10
'Arab Khana Gate, 351, 357
Arab tribes, 108, 138, 274, 541
Ardvi Sura Anahita, 2, 5, 8f., 23
Arlat tribe, 7, 18, 22, 23, 27, 46, 351, 357, 358
Armenians, xxix, 484, 496
'Army of the Indus', 167f.
Artaxexes II, 8
'arzbegi, 115, 130
Asadullah Khan Sadozai, 60
Asaf al-Daula, see Yar Muhammad Khan
Ashkhabad, 416, 422, 424, 256, 437, 459
Ashnas, *Ustad-i Shish*, 11
Asiyar, 45
Astana, 35 (see also Shah Aulia')
Astrakhan, 37
Astrakhanids, see Tuqay-Timurid Dynasty
ataliq, 20, 33, 36, 40, 43, 48, 56f., 64, 87, 89, 112, 113
'Ataullah Khan, Mirza, British *wakil*, xxxix, 531, 532, 533, 536, 545, 546, 547, 548, 553, 556, 558, 559, 563, 567, 568, 572
'Ataullah Khan, Saiyid, 86, 89
'Ataullah Khan Turkman, 80, 85f.
Auckland, Lord, 175, 186
Auliya Khan, 452f., 455, 469, 470, 498, 513
Aurangzeb, Mughal Emperor, 51f., 56

Ayaz Khan Ghuriyani, 279
A'zam Beg, amir of Darzab, 470
'Aziz Khan b. Shams al-Din, 470, 498, 516
'Aziz Khan, Mullah, 516, 517, 518, 520, 521, 522f., 524, 540

Baba Beg b. Qilij 'Ali Beg of Khulm, 118, 294
Baba Sang, see Hazrat Ishan Baba Wali
Babrak Karmal, 552
Babur, Zahir al-Din, xvii, 26f., 30f., 210
Bactra, xviii, 2, 9.
Bactria, xviii, 2, 5, 8f., 75, 335
Bactrus River, 2, 9 (see also Balkh Ab)
Badakhshan, xxii, 2, 21, 27, 43, 50, 54, 59, 71, 86, 90, 97, 174, 221, 227, 235, 241, 242, 243, 267, 268, 269, 270, 272, 273, 291, 298, 307, 310, 375, 376, 392, 393, 394, 412, 481, 499, 500, 502, 504, 507, 509, 538, 547, 600, 601
Afghan campaigns against, 245, 271, 291, 309f., 347, 527
Badghis, xvi, xvii, xxvi, xxxiii, xliii, 4, 6, 11, 15, 26, 17, 19, 20, 27, 28, 32, 34, 41, 43, 46, 48, 49, 52, 60, 63, 66, 108, 109, 113, 117, 126, 136, 156, 157, 160, 162, 184, 186, 190, 277, 285, 346, 374f., 403, 404, 405, 407, 408, 418, 423, 447, 461f., 465, 472, 490, 494f., 521, 567, 581, 583, 584, 585, 587, 588, 595
tribes of, 150, 151, 203, 205, 231, 276f., 346, 373, 374, 375, 403, 404, 426, 431, 432, 436, 437, 446, 460f., 473f., 492, 577, 587 (see also Chahar Aimaq, Ishaq-zais, Ghilzais, Turkmans)
attacks by Yar Muhammad, 203f., 254f.
colonisation programme, 429f., 471, 473, 476f., 482, 485f., 490f., 495, 595
economy, 126f., 148, 470f., 491, 597
Badi' al-Zaman Mirza, 25f.
Bagh-i Murad, 51
Baghlan, 1, 35, 264, 265, 266f., 290, 481, 484, 509, 510, 547
Bahadur, 59
Bahr al-Asrar, xliii, xliv, 17, 34, 43
Bahram Khan, 110
Bahram Khan Firozkohi, 428, 478
Bai Sangar fort, 579f.
Baiqara, Sultan Husain, xvii, 22f., 27, 57, 120, 288, 497
Bairam Khan of Jam, 127
Bairam Khan Karamantu, 30
Baisunqur b. Shah Rukh, 20f.
Bajgah, 171, 177, 293, 294, 295
battles at, 295f., 392
Bala Hisar (of Kabul), 202, 331, 344, 370, 384, 385, 386, 548, 549, 555
Bala Murghab, xliii, 10, 28, 46, 48, 124, 125, 126, 151, 153, 154, 215, 276, 277, 279, 280, 287, 375, 427, 435, 437, 438, 462, 465, 468, 470, 474f., 491, 584, 591
Afghan garrison, 430f., 458, 469f., 489, 520f., 524, 587, 590
Aimaq colonisation, 429f., 435, 458, 473, 475, 532
'Afghanisation', 431f., 476f., 486, 490
Balkh Ab, xliii, 2, 3, 4, 9, 186 (see also Bactrus River)
Balkh city, district, xxxiii, xxxvii, xliv, 14, 21, 26, 31, 43, 45, 66, 98, 113, 114, 119, 123, 124, 125, 127, 145, 208, 227, 242, 264, 290, 300, 305, 312, 329, 331, 332, 339, 364, 375, 471 (see also Bactra)
Bukharan attacks on, 165, 236
Persian threat to, 155f., 161, 162, 166, 255
Herat claims to, 190, 214, 218
taken by Akram Khan, 216, 224
population, xxix, 2, 3, 4, 165, 481, 484
rebuilding, 2, 208, 264
Balkh appanage (*wilayat*), xif., xviii, xxii, xxviif., xxxi, xxxii, xxxvii, 1, 3, 10, 14, 25f., 30, 34, 35, 36, 38, 40, 42, 44, 47, 48, 50, 51, 52, 53, 58, 59, 63, 64, 69, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 87, 90, 92, 96, 97, 99, 111, 118, 121, 123, 142, 155, 162, 180, 181, 183, 232, 233, 269, 288, 293, 335, 362, 367, 398, 500, 600 (cf. Bactria, Lesser Turkistan, Turkistan. For Afghan period see Afghan Turkistan)
under Nadir Shah Afshar, 68f., 76, 79, 90, 144, 506
Afghan campaigns, xix, xx, xxi, xxxiii, 80, 83, 85f., 90, 95f., 114, 121, 167f., 177, 216, 217, 219f, 224f., 226f., 246f., 260f., 271, 288, 349f., 359, 594, 599
Afghan governors of, 82, 93, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 113, 114, 118, 224, 225f., 230, 245, 332, 334, 361f., 391, 392, 600
Afghan rule, 225, 229, 242, 245, 334f.,

359, 599
Afghan garrisons, xxxiii, 96, 97, 102, 103, 233, 300, 306, 349f., 384f., 549
and British policy, xix, xx, xxi, 76, 142f., 168f., 174, 187, 193, 194, 200, 227, 235, 240f., 242, 253, 255, 317, 333f., 335f.
and Bukhara, xix, 73, 80, 81, 90, 93, 101, 112, 117f., 121, 122, 128, 144, 162, 175, 183, 190, 204, 223, 224, 226f., 238, 239f., 247, 250f., 255, 256, 257f., 259, 263, 268, 271, 302
economy, 1f., 5, 15, 16, 23, 51, 68, 69, 84, 102f., 127, 139, 165f., 188, 598
population, xxxiii, 3, 5, 15, 69, 71, 122,
revenues, 71, 80, 82, 86, 102f., 163, 340
climate, 3, 225, 228a
Baluch, 142
Baluchistan, xx, 100, 360, 564
Bamiyan, xxxiv, xli, xliii, 42, 113, 124, 167, 169, 174, 177, 186, 188, 192, 193, 197, 198, 219, 222, 223, 228, 293, 295, 307, 309, 313, 331, 349, 392, 429, 507, 509, 511, 531, 546, 578, 581
Bandar, 151, 428, 429, 431, 448, 470, 491
Bannu, 332
Baqi Muhammad Khan, 38f., 41
Barakzais, 74, 116, 146, 148, 159, 161, 216, 219, 221, 223, 234, 237, 247, 249, 288, 289, 300, 329, 359, 380, 453, 485, 500, 558
barber, 127
Barlas tribe, 18
Barmakids, 5
Baruti Bi Ming, 39
Basmachi movement, 600
Basus, 9
Behbub Khan, 400, 403
Behsud (of Sar-i Pul), 173
Belcheragh, 7, 8, 25, 40, 52, 135, 285, 323, 381, 423, 424, 426, 439f., 510, 515f., 586f., 593
Bentinck, Lord, 145
Bi (beg, begi), xlvii, 33
Birjand, 109, 139, 332
Black Death, 18
Bolan Pass, xv
Bolsheviks, 599
Borrows, General, 399
Britain, 33, 97, 600
Afghanistan policy, xiiif., xix, xxi, xxv, xxxi, xxxvii, xxxviii, 1, 44, 75, 77, 142f., 160f., 183, 184, 186, 187f., 200, 206, 220f., 224, 228, 235, 240f., 243, 244, 255, 277, 282, 287, 316, 317, 333f., 359, 371f., 376, 377, 380, 384, 385, 388, 391f., 396f., 405, 415f., 418f., 445, 459f., 464f., 483, 494f., 559, 563, 564f., 566, 568f., 571, 575, 576, 584, 599, 600
and Balkh, Afghan Turkistan, 170f, 184f., 187f., 197, 198, 235, 243, 253f., 317, 333, 334f., 347, 357, 360, 377, 391, 392, 405, 415f., 418f., 423, 436, 453, 459, 462, 474, 478, 483, 530f., 562f., 564, 565, 568
and Bukhara, 74, 90, 174, 196, 199f., 224, 241, 256f., 261, 271, 288, 315f., 317, 333f., 398, 460, 501
in Central Asia, xiv, xv, xxii, 44, 76, 77, 78, 129, 142, 145f., 197, 200, 206, 228, 235, 282, 316, 317, 333, 335f., 377f., 418, 599, 602
Persia and Herat, 144, 148, 159, 186, 192, 201, 217, 240, 251f., 255, 282, 287, 380, 391, 433f., 460, 464f., 478, 570, 582
annexes Punjab and Peshawar, 144, 203, 220, 240, 243
Russia and threat to India, xiv, xv, 129, 142f., 145f., 160, 162, 206, 235, 240, 317, 333, 336, 360, 371f., 373, 375f., 396, 416, 418f., 459f., 465f., 483, 493f., 501, 508, 531, 563, 564f., 571, 575, 585, 587, 589
and 'Reign of Terror', 494, 543, 545, 553, 562f., 576, Appendix IX
Bronze Age, xxix, 7, 9
Brydon, Dr. 202
Buddhism, 9, 10, 23
Bukhara, xxxvii, 38, 41, 42, 49, 50, 53, 56, 58, 64, 65, 68, 72, 73, 84, 108, 109, 110, 118, 120, 121, 123, 127, 130, 145, 172, 175, 188, 193, 196, 199f., 204, 208, 209, 210, 242, 260, 269, 273, 286, 311, 312, 318, 323, 342, 348, 369, 383, 389, 391, 418, 448, 471, 482, 501, 541, 553 (see also, Tuqay-Timurids; Manghit Dynasty)
and Afghans, Afghanistan, xxi, 74, 90, 91, 96, 109, 113, 114, 116, 119, 155, 159, 168, 175f., 180, 182f., 187, 190, 196, 214, 220, 221, 224, 227, 229, 238, 239f., 243, 250, 253, 254, 255f., 259, 260, 261, 265f., 269f., 276, 282, 288, 292, 301, 302f., 306, 308, 314, 316, 317, 318, 327f., 332, 334, 488
campaigns in Balkh, Afghan Turkistan, xix, 2, 58f., 80, 81, 84, 87f., 93, 94f., 97, 100f., 112, 117f., 122, 125, 150, 163f., 210f., 217, 221, 224, 225, 226f., 235f., 239, 247, 250f., 261, 263, 265f, 282, 289, 290, 298, 302, 304f., 338f.
Shahr-i Sabz rebellion, 176, 227, 231, 235, 239, 249f., 273, 276, 318
and Britain, xiv, 76, 174, 192, 196, 199f., 224, 240f., 250, 256f., 261, 270, 271, 288, 333, 335f., 460
and Persia, 256, 261, 263, 315f.
and Russia, xiv, xxxii, 192, 200, 234, 254, 263, 270f., 302f., 308, 314f., 318, 327, 328, 332, 333, 376, 420
frontiers, xxxii, 67, 90, 112, 125, 192, 223, 224, 226, 269f., 292, 302, 305, 306, 333, 335, 460
Burnes, Alexander, 54, 75, 78, 122, 124, 129, 139, 159, 163, 178, 184, 186, 445
travels to Bukhara, xxvii, 145f., 168
official reports, xxi, 146, 165, 200, 465, 472
Todd's criticism of, xxxviif., 146
in Kabul, xvi, 147, 154, 160f., 182
death, 202
Butkhak (of Kabul), 554
Butkhak (of Namusa), 125
Butkhak Incident, 492f.

Campbell, Colonel (alias Muhammad Khan), 222
Campbell, John, 142, 202
Cavagnari, 360, 377, 384, 391, 396, 549
death of, 383, 385f.
Central Asia, xxxvii, 6, 74, 75, 91, 122, 145, 160, 162
maps of, xxviii, 102, 186, 190, 227, 335f., 383f.
Chaghatai tribe, 17, 19
Chahar Aimaq xvi, xxix, xxxiii, 29, 62, 80, 107, 108, 110, 111, 117, 125, 126, 149, 150, 151, 152f., 154, 156, 159, 160, 166, 184, 188, 189, 191, 212, 231, 285, 294, 336, 343, 346, 349, 350, 400f., 407, 412, 423, 426f., 440, 446, 448, 466, 473f., 480, 516, 577, Appendix V (see individual tribes)
resettlements of, 203, 428f., 435, 473f., 477f.
Chahar Bagh, 99
Chahar Shanbeh, 22, 154f., 479, 486
Chahar Wilayat, xvi, xxxi, 7, 44, 80, 85, 95, 97, 98, 106, 112, 113, 118. 119, 122, 123, 127, 132, 139, 140, 141, 142, 147, 149, 150, 155, 156, 159, 164, 165, 169, 171, 173, 175, 184f., 194, 196, 198, 199, 200, 204, 206, 207, 209f., 212, 215, 218, 227, 234, 235, 238, 239, 242, 250, 251, 258, 261, 263, 269, 272, 273, 280, 290, 291, 294, 295, 298, 307, 315, 318, 326, 330, 331, 333, 338, 339, 340, 342, 343, 346, 347, 349, 350, 351, 353, 362, 366, 371, 373, 376, 378, 379, 389, 412, 454, 477, 499, 503, 519, 522, 527, 528, 542, 550f., 586
Lord's proceedings, 170f., 174, 184, 186, 192, 193, 196, 200, 235
Todd's proceedings, 188f., 194f., 196, 198, 199, 200
chaharganah (quadrapartite) tribes, 39
Chaharsada, 381, 430, 440f., 470, 521, 577f., 580, 587f.
Chahrda Ma'sum shrine, 24
Chakhcharan, xliii, 47, 151, 198, 205, 407, 408, 414, 440, 491, 521, 578, 579, 580, 595, 597
Chaman railway, 565, 569
Chaman-i Bed, 150, 158, 160
Charikar, 177, 178, 219, 398, 531, 559, 570
Charjui, 67, 73, 270, 334, 376, 420, 564, 583
Charles XII of Russia, 570
Chashma-yi Shir, 266
Chattar Singh, 219
Chel Zina, 410
Chelghazi, 306, 339
Chichaktu, 20, 26, 27, 28, 41f., 46f., 51f., 63f., 66, 153, 155, 212, 285, 448
Chilak Sardaba, 305
China, 3
Chinese Turkistan, 334, 336, 541
Chingiz Khan, xii, 7, 15, 16, 22, 37
Chingiz Muhammad, Tuqay-Timurid, 59
Chingizids, xiii, xviii, xx, xxii, 18, 25, 37, 61, 64, 73, 76, 77, 93, 120, 163, 464, 599, 600, 601
of Balkh, xi, xiii, 1, 14, 16, 32, 59f., 68, 72, 81, 83, 114, 118f., 182, 224, 235,

336, 358f., 395, 533, 559f., 594, 599f.
governmental system, xii, 19, 32f., 35, 44, 59f., 62, 68, 91, 118f., 136f., 180, 200, 258, 451, 483, 599
Chiras, 381, 440f., 521, 579, 580
Chitral, Mir of, 310
cholera, 104, 130, 209, 210, 311, 345, 373, 471, 504, 552, 562, 597
chul, 4, 127, 139, 327, 444
Cis Oxus Territory, xxxii, 16, 187, 336f.
Clarendon, Lord, 333
Conolly, Lt. Arthur, xxi, 34, 44, 74, 75, 78, 80f., 92, 93, 104f., 112, 116, 131f., 165, 171, 202f., 208
travels in Persia, 145f., 196f.
Afghanistan policy, 145, 193, 200
journey to Khiva, xliii, 142, 186, 190, 193, 196f.
imprisonment and death, 168, 197, 200, 202, 241, 316f., 555
prison diary, 197f.
loss of Turkistan journal, 198
his death and British policy, 200, 316f.
Conolly, Edward, 202
Conolly, John, 202f.
Crimean War, 240
Cross, Viscount, 399, 570f.
currency, 84, 112, Appendix II (see also exchange rates)

Dahan-i Ghuri, 35, 264f, 305f., 331, 547
al-Dajjal, 70
Dalhousie, Lord. 220, 240, 244
Daniyal Bi Khan, Tuqay-Timurid, 89f., 120
Daniyal Khan, Deh Miran, 440
Daniyal Khan Khwaja, 87f.
Darra-yi Bum, 27, 150
Darra-yi Gharchistan, 43
Darra-yi Jauz, 26, 31, 42, 45, 49
Darra-yi Khargosh, 198, 205
Darra-yi Shakh, xlv, 3, 16, 135
Darra-yi Yusuf, 42, 118, 552
Darra-yi Zang, xlv, 3, 15, 16
Darugha-yi 'Adalat, 86, 89
Darwish 'Ali Khan Jamshidi, 117, 126
Darwish 'Ali Khan Timuri, 108
Darzab, 42, 404, 405, 412f., 448, 470, 533
Dasht-i Abdan, 260
Daulat Bi, ataliq, 89f.
Daulat Beg, amir of Andkhui, 19
Daulat Beg b. Ghazanfar Khan, 332, 338 (implied), 341f., 347, 350, 353, 366, 459, 507
Daulat Khan, hakim of Shibarghan, 112, 313
Daulatabad (of Balkh), 552
Daulatabad (of Faryab), 125, 289, 366, 434f., 437, 440, 442, 448, 510, 517, 520f., 591
Daulatyar, 10, 206, 209, 409, 410
Deh Afghanan, 483
Deh Miran, 19, 440
Deh-i Jauz, 441
Dehdadi, 310, 347, 349, 390, 560, 580
Delhi, xiv, 16, 50, 65f.
Dengil Qal'a, battle of, 416f.
Dera Isma'il Khan, 360, 361
Deragaz, 35
dhimmi, xxix
Dilaram, 61
Dilawar Khan, amir of Shaikh 'Ali Hazaras, 531, 546
Dilawar Khan Ming, Wali of Maimana, 215f., 232, 239, 276, 375, 382, 461, 489, 519, 533
exiled, 285, 343
as Wali of Maimana, 359f., 364f., 381, 395, 434
local opposition to, 343, 345f., 350, 364f., 388, 419f., 422f., 434f., 443, 458
and 'Abd al-Rahman Khan, 382, 390f., 395f., 404f., 412f., 418f., 421f., 433f., 436, 438f., 459
and Ishaq Khan, 404f., 412f., 421f., 434f., 526
Darzab dispute, 404f., 412f.
correspondence with British agents, 405, 415f., 418f., 433
intrigues with Aiyub Khan, 420f., 424f., 433f., 439, 441f.
and Russia, 414, 416, 420, 422f., 435f., 442f., 469
and Chahar Aimaq, 402f., 405, 406, 412, 427f., 431, 435, 437, 440
and Herat, 218, 278f., 414, 435
Afghan invasion, 437f.
surrender and execution, 444, 459, 496, 498, 513
family of, 283, 284f., 364, 402, 404, 413, 421, 423, 425, 426, 436, 439, 442, 459, 469, 499, 533, 600
Dilbarjin, 88

Din Muhammad b. Jani Muhammad, 37f. 42
Din Muhammad b. Pir Muhammad, 36
diwanbegi, 33f., 52, 56, 115, 130, 131, 137, 138, 206
Diwan Muhammad, Saiyid, Kabul *munshi*, 547, 548, 549, 551, 554f., 559, 561, 563
report on 'Turkistan Atrocities' 566f., Appendix IX
Dost Muhammad Khan, Amir, xvi, xix, xxi, xxii, xl, 74,78, 121, 142, 178, 187, 199, 214, 230, 232, 245, 263, 274, 297, 378, 445, 453
and Mir Wali of Khulm, 118, 167, 169, 174f., 182, 195f., 204f., 208, 210, 216, 217, 219, 220f., 223, 225, 228
Ango-Afghan War and relations with Britain, xvi, xix, xx, 146, 160f., 178f., 204, 217, 220, 224f., 228, 235, 240f., 250, 255, 258f., 262f., 270, 277, 282, 287
flight and detention in Bukhara, 175f., 182, 241, 259
'surrender' and Indian exile, 178f., 183f., 200, 202, 225, 259, 453
resumes reign, 203f., 219f., 453
and Sikhs Wars, 219f.
campaigns against Balkh, xx, 85, 161, 167f., 177, 183, 219f. 224f., 232, 233, 238f., 243, 271, 275f., 279f., 282, 295, 464, 558
campaign against Qataghan, 233f., 245f., 259, 260f., 270, 293
campaign againt Badakhshan, 268, 273
relations with Maimana, 269, 270, 273f., 279f., 286, 322, 414, 453
rivalry with Bukhara, xlii, 130, 176, 183, 204, 210, 219, 220, 221, 223, 238f., 241, 243, 250, 255, 258f., 261, 269f., 271, 272, 282, 316, 464
the Sunni alliance, 256f., 260, 261, 264f., 269f., 303
and Indian Mutiny, 258f.
and Herat, 116, 161, 177, 193, 204, 209, 217, 218, 244, 251, 253, 276, 279f., 286f., 288
and Chahar Aimaq, 277, 280, 287
conquest of Qandahar, 244, 248, 251, 282, 288
illnesses and death, 230, 249, 288, 467
Dost Muhammad Khan Taimani, 427
Dostam, General Rashid, 1, 600, 602
Duab, 296, 309, 531, 546
Dupree, Louis, 179, 180
Durand, H.M., 445, 465, 494, 495, 571f., 595, 601
Durranis, xxxi, 6, 33, 44, 72, 76, 77, 79, 83, 85, 90, 93, 110, 113, 144, 182, 184, 188, 220, 244, 258, 431, 476, 477, 485, 486, 489, 490, 491, 558, 574, 599, 600, Appendix VI (see also 'Abdali, Barakzai, Muhammadzai, Sadozai)
earthquakes, 57, 59, 303
East India Company, xiii, xix, 75, 102, 122, 129, 145, 161, 182, 240
Edwardes, Maj. H, 235, 236, 241, 242
Elias, Ney, 242, 268, 446, 582
Elphinstone, Maj. Gen. W., 202
Elphinstone, Mountstuart, xv, xxxvii, 94f., 102, 106, 112, 145
epidemics, xxviii, 18, 20f., 135, 483, 552, 556, 562, 597 (see also cholera, Black Death)
Erich Khan, hakim of Shibarghan, 112, 128
Ersari Turkmans, 165f., 520
Evangelical Movement, 197
exchange rates, 137, 323, 449f., Appendix II (see also currency)
exploration of C. Asia, xv, xvii, xxxvii, xxxviii, xli, xliii, 75f., 117, 120f., 128, 129, 143, 145f., 168, 171, 186f., 196f., 206f., 242, 254f., 285, 337, 353, 375, 378, 446f., 531 (see also individual explorers and surveyors)

Faiz Bakhsh (Ghulam Rabbani, Pundit Munphool), 58, 304f.
Faiz (Faizullah) Muhammad Khan Ishaqzai, 355, 364, 386f., 399
Faiz Muhammad Khan, Sardar, 290, 303, 326
defects to 'Abd al-Rahman Khan, 304f.
governor of Afghan Turkistan, 307, 311, 317f.
declares for Sher 'Ali Khan, 309f.
death at Khinjan, 312
Faizabad, 43, 54, 310
Fakhr al-Din Kurt, 17f.
famines, 135, 189, 209, 221, 253, 295, 310, 340, 345, 373, 471, 479, 482, 483, 487, 490, 502, 596
Farah, 17, 61f., 215, 282, 286, 287, 402, 431, 491
Farighunid Dynasty, 12

farsiwan, xxxiii, 112
Faryab, xxxiv, 1, 6, 13, 15, 16, 27, 42, 43, 438
Fath 'Ali Shah Qajar, 108, 110, 126
Fath Khan Barakzai, 109, 116, 390
Fath Muhammad Jawanshir, 241f.
Fath Muhammad Khan, Sardar, 303f., 310
Fathullah Beg Firozkohi, 402, 408, 410f., 427f., 478, 486, 492
Ferghana, 26, 62, 68, 73, 210, 303f., 376
Ferrier, J.P., xxxviii, 10f., 112, 139, 206f., 210, 214, 255, 285
Filawar, 151
Firoz al-Din Shah Durrani, 109, 110f., 116
Firoz-Koh, 16, 151
Firozkohi Aimaq, 151f., 154, 157, 188, 195, 276, 381, 402, 407, 427f., 440f., 470, 478, 490f., 577f., 587f., 594, Appendix V,iii
  resettlements, 428f., 473f., 477, 486, 578, 580
  amirs of, see individual names
Firoz Shah, Shahzada, 294
Forward Policy, 75, 168, 175, 177, 196, 333, 335, 371, 564
Fraser-Tytler, W. K, 75, 76, 159, 179
Fuladi, 119

Gandamak, Treaty of, 383f.
Ganj 'Ali Beg b. Mir Wali, 227, 229, 331
Gauhari shaikhs xxx, xxxv, xlv, 119f., 301f., 319f., 552, 600, Appendix IV,vii (see also Muhammad Uraq, Ishan Saiyid Parsa Khwaja Naqib, Ishan Sudur)
Gharchistan, 10, 12, 15, 16, 18, 31, 35, 41, 42, 44, 45, 47, 403, 409
Ghaus al-Din Khan, General, 430f., 432, 437, 438, 468, 469f., 486, 489, 491, 511, 520, 524, 543, 578, 584, 586f., 588, 590, 591, 594
  correspondence with Russians, 462, 589
Ghazanfar Khan, amir of Andkhui, 24, 203f., 264f., 268, 269, 338
  war with Sufi Khan, 210f.
  and Yar Muhammad Khan, 213f.
  and Afzal Khan, 231, 233, 290
  joins Hakim Khan's revolt, 247f.
  made Nizam al-Daula, 233
  rebellions, 238, 272f., 290
  supports Sher 'Ali Khan, 294, 313, 320f.
  execution, 332, 340
Ghazni, 43, 69, 204, 232, 248, 297, 331, 367, 453, 509, 552, 564
Ghaznigak, 227, 508, 522, 524
  battle of, 511f., 527, 546
Ghilzais, 60, 62, 73, 277, 381, 400, 428, 506, 520
  and 'Afghanisation', 476, 479, 483, 486, 490, 591, 597f.
  revolt of, 489, 491f., 495, 498f., 509, 565, 587
Ghiyas al-Din Kurt, 18
Ghiyas al-Din Muhammad Ghori, 16
Ghor, 6, 10, 12, 42, 43, 107, 117, 125, 150, 151, 205, 280, 401, 403, 407, 409, 485, 491, 600
Ghorband, 413
Ghorid Dynasty, 16
ghulam, ghulambacha, 128, 136, 140, 454
Ghulam Ahmad Khan, Na'ib, 296f.
Ghulam Beg b. Mir Wali, 170, 331
Ghulam Haidar Khan Orakzai, 509f., 524, 583, 588
Ghulam Haidar Khan Wardaki, 219, 226f., 240, 241, 244, 245, 364, 380, 381, 385, 388f., 391, 392, 395, 442
  executes Muhammad Sarwar Khan, 389
  opposes 'Abd al-Rahman Khan, 392f.
  flight of, 394
Ghulam Mohai al-Din Khan Ghilzai, 361, 381, 389f., 394, 396
Ghulam Muhammad Khan, Sardar, 290
Ghulam Muhammad Mosawar, xxx, 425
Ghulam Muhammad Reza Khan, 358, 360f., 365, 371, 373, 438
Ghulam Sarwar, xxxviii, 84, 96, 102f.
Ghulbiyan, xlv, 9, 14, 16
Ghuriyan, 46, 60, 200, 251, 279, 434, 489
Gilgit, 360, 380
Gilimbaf, 441, 443
Girishk, 207, 324
Gök (Kok) Tepa, massacre of, 295, 416f., 430, 460
Golden Horde, The, 17, 25
Granville-Gorchakov Treaty, 333, 347, 357
Gray, Dr. J., 571, 575f., 581
Great Game, The, xivf., xxi, xxx, 74, 142, 147, 454, 599, 601
Griesbach, C.L., xxxviii, xliii, 446f., 497, 531, 545, 546, 548, 549, 553, 554, 559, 566f., 568, 573, 574, Appendix IX.iii
Griffin, Lepel, 396f.

Grodekoff, 375, 378f.
Gujerat, 220
Gul Augan, 310
Gul Muhammad Mohmand, 552
Gul-i Sukh festival, 24f.
Gulran, 108, 487
Gurziwan, xxxiv, xlv, 3, 4, 8, 12, 13, 14, 18, 19, 22, 26, 27, 41, 42, 45, 48, 125, 135, 285, 434, 440f., 446, 448, 471, 516, 518, 587f., 593, 594f., 596
Guthrie, George, 122, 124, 200
Guzargah, 117
Guzgan (Guzganan/Guzarwan), 4, 8, 10f., 16, 17

Habibullah Khan, Amir, xvi, xxx, 291, 297, 485, 500f., 505, 514, 547, 552, 553, 556, 557, 581, 598
Habibullah Khan Barakzai, 360
Hafizullah Khan, *sipar salar*, 383
Haidar Quli Khan Jamshidi, 475, 479f., 517, 510, 522, 579
Haidar Tura Khan Manghit, 109, 112f., 116, 119f., 122
Haji Bi Ming, Wali of Maimana, 44, 62, 73, 78f., 83, 85f., 90, 92, 105, 107, 136, 144, 359, 414
hakim, 32, 79, 81, 82
Hakim Khan, amir of Shibarghan, 231, 234, 239, 303, 339, 356
  as Nizam al-Mulk, 233
  aids Mir Wali, 236f.
  and Bukhara, 236
  and Afghans, 245, 264f., 268f., 274, 279, 286, 337f., 343, 346f.
  and Afghan civil war, 294, 296, 307, 311, 313, 320, 324f.
  rebellions, 213, 235f., 246f., 257, 260, 272f., 275f., 307
  deposed and exiled, 353, 367
  death, 370f.
  family of, 252, 320, 337, 371, 379, 542
Hakim Khan Mingbashi, 437
Hamilton, Dr. Lilias, 545f., 573, 575, 576
Hari Rud, 11, 12, 17, 42, 111, 198, 408, 410, 461, 579
Harlan,'General' Josiah, 118, 121, 140, 163
Hashim 'Alikozai, Mir, 216f.
Hashim b. Hakim, Al-Muqanna', 11
Hashtomin, xlv, 138, 198, 448
Hazara Bi, amir of Qataghan, 72, 74, 79, 85
Hazara tribes of Hazarajat, xxxiii, 29, 52, 74, 79, 107, 124, 125, 126, 135, 139, 161, 173, 177, 190, 222, 223, 285, 295, 307, 413, 446, 466, 477, 480, 481, 510, 602
  persecution and rebellions, 531, 532, 545, 546, 547, 550, 552, 559, 570f., 577, 581f., 585, 586, 589, 595f.
Hazarajat, xliii, 6, 27, 125, 198, 219, 307, 384, 447, 509, 550, 551, 585f. 588, 600
Hazhda Nahr, 2, 4f., 8, 24, 122, 163, 164, 166, 172, 183, 223, 224, 238, 313, 339, 471, 562
Hazhda Nahr regiment, 374f., 454
Hazrat Imam, 98, 265, 267, 268, 562
Hazrat Ishan Baba Wali (Baba Sangu), 18f., 20, 69
Hellenism, 9
Helmand, 108, 324, 399
Herat, xvii, xxix, xxxvii, xxxviii, xliii, 14, 17f., 20, 28f, 34, 35, 37, 48, 80, 84, 100, 102, 108, 118, 123, 145, 150, 159, 204, 207, 276, 324, 329, 343, 375, 378, 380, 446, 447, 500, 510, 547, 600
  under Timurids, 19f., 22f.
  Afghan rulers, governors, 60, 98, 100, 107, 108, 109, 110, 116f., 243, 250, 282, 288, 293, 306, 317, 383, 398, 399, 400, 411, 426f., 478, 496, 519, 521
  and Persia, xl, 30, 34, 42, 44f., 59, 62f., 117, 149, 169, 199, 201, 203, 204, 217, 218, 243, 244, 246, 250, 251f., 288, 298, 400, 570
  Persian campaign of 1807, 110f.
  campaign of 1833, 148
  seige of 1837-8, xvi, 147f., 159, 160, 167, 184, 186, 189, 194, 200
  occupation of 1856, 250f., 255, 287
  and Dost Muhammad, 216, 217, 224, 241, 251, 253, 276, 277, 279, 280, 282, 286f., 288
  and Britain, 107, 119, 143, 146, 148, 168, 169, 189f., 193, 198, 200f., 244, 251, 253, 255, 277f., 287, 317, 375, 376, 391, 397, 398, 399, 405f., 416, 445, 460f., 462, 464f., 468, 478, 570
  and Chahar Wilayat, Badghis, 136, 139, 142, 148, 184f., 189, 191f., 194f., 198, 200f., 206, 215f., 218, 227, 242, 248, 252f., 275f. 280, 282, 285, 286, 298, 301, 345, 348, 359, 361, 363f., 366, 381, 395f., 400f., 414, 423f., 432f., 435, 437,

440, 445, 475f., 487, 488, 515f., 533, 540, 541, 543, 578f., 584, 588, 591f.
army and garrison, xxxiii, 148, 361, 362, 363f., 372, 374, 382f., 384f, 386f., 391, 400, 434, 445, 489, 510, 515, 517f., 541, 578f., 580, 588, 590, 595
under Ya'qub Khan, 294, 298, 307, 310, 314, 321, 345
under Aiyub Khan, 364, 382f., 397, 399f., 406f., 411, 413, 426, 433f., 478
economy, 6, 127, 139, 148, 184, 189f., 313, 418, 432, 561
population, xxix, 147, 189, 253, 348, 383, 387, 418, 429f., 463, 468, 532, 580, 581f., 595
Herat regiments, 349f., 354., 356, 358, 362f., 540, 590
Herodotus, xviii, 75
Hind, 227, 240, 242
Hindu(s), xxix, xxxiii, 84, 94, 127, 138, 242, 285, 358, 448f., 509
Hindu Kush, xv, xix, xxi, xxxii, 3, 30, 31, 50, 52, 61, 63, 70, 74, 76, 80, 94, 97, 101, 113, 122, 125, 141, 143, 145, 151, 162, 167, 168, 169, 183, 219, 223, 225, 242, 243, 335, 336, 360, 375, 377, 379, 383, 399, 466, 468, 481, 501, 597, 602
Hirak, 442, 479
Hisar, 30, 53, 58, 267, 292, 437
Historical writings critiqued, xv, xviif., xxi, xxiiif., xxviiif., xxxviif., xli, 1, 34, 44, 54, 62f., 74f., 91, 98, 111, 119, 121, 124, 142, 144, 145, 159, 178f., 188f., 196f., 202, 208, 222, 224, 232, 236, 283, 291, 297, 301, 304f., 306f. 325f., 329, 330, 335, 357, 359, 360, 381, 395, 424, 465, 480f., 496, 500, 503, 525f., 544, 556, 558, 562, 565, 575
Homayun b. Timur Shah Durrani, 99, 100
Homayun b. Zahir al-Din Babur, 35
Hudud al-'Alam, xliii, 7, 12
hukumat, 32
Hukumat Khan Durrani, 96, 101, 103
Hukumat Khan Ming, 156, 191, 193 (implied), 213, 244, 251, 282, 343
disputes succession, 206f, 209, 211f.
and Herat, 194f., 198, 199, 248, 276f., 279f.
Yar Muhammad's invasion, 209f., 214f.
beseiged by Herat, 215f., 217f., 227
and Persia, 156f., 252, 269, 275
and Chahar Aimaq, 277f.
and Afghan Turkistan, 227, 232f., 280
and Afghan invasion, 238, 269, 274f., 278, 282
and Afzal Khan, 252f., 269, 272, 274f., 322f., (implied)
aids Hakim Khan, 247f., 272, 275, 279
and Ishan Uraq, 248f.
appeals for British aid, 253f.
illness of, 195
assassination, 283f., 513
character, 206, 286
family of, 142, 206, 283, 284f., 343, 345, 359, 364, 388, 513
Husain Khan of Shibarghan, 211

'Ibadullah b. Subhan Quli Khan, 55
'Ibadullah Sultan, Tuqay-Timurid, 59
Ibrahim Chapuk, 31
Ibrahim Beg Firozkohi, 188
Ibrahim Beg Taimani, 205
Ibrahim Khan b. Sher 'Ali Khan, 361
'Id al-Azha ('Id-i Qurban), 296, 323, 354, 539, 586
'Id al-Fitr ('Id-i Ramazan), 99, 250, 292
Ignat'ev, N. P., 256, 270
Il-Khanids, 16f.
Ilbars, amir of Khiva, 65f., 85
Imam Quli Khan, Tuqay-Timurid, 38, 40, 42f., 47, 49, 53
Imam Reza, 52
Imam Sahib, 514
India, xiv, 17, 31, 65, 74, 76, 85, 94, 102, 107, 123, 124, 125, 127, 162, 168, 179, 180, 184, 219, 258, 260, 285, 295, 307, 312, 317, 333, 334, 340, 373, 375, 376, 384, 386, 388, 391, 405, 418, 562
India Office Records, xxxvf., xxxix, xli, xlii, 203, 257, 270, 280, 360, 395, 446f., 486, 563, 567, 568, 574, Appendix X
Indian Mutiny, xlii, 257f., 294
Indus, xiv, 77, 102, 108, 109, 144, 145, 146, 445, 599
Inush, amir of Khiva, 55f.
iqta', 32, 35, 43
Iran 288, 601, 602 (see also Persia)
Iron Age, 6
irrigation, xxviii, 3f., 13, 44, 115, 128, 138f., 210f., 438, 472, 484, 522, 562 (see also Hazhda Nahr)
'Isa Khan, wazir of Herat, 251

Isfahan, 61f., 80
ishans, 19, 69, 119, 120, 164, 305, 310, 318, 506, 541, 552, 554, 559, 566
Ishan Aiyub of Maimana, 284
Ishan Bedil of Maimana, 355
Ishan Qul Khan, 586
Ishan Saiyid Parsa Khwaja Naqib, 119f., 163f., 172
Ishaqzais, xxvi, 400, 431, 485f., 490f.
Ishkamish, 43, 264
Iskandar b. Subhan Quli Khan, 55
Iskandar Khan b. Sultan Muhammad Khan, 400
Iskandar Ahmad Jamshidi, 276
Iskandar Khan, Persian general, 152, 153
Islam Qal'a, 62
Isma'il Khan b. Ishaq Khan, 399, 502, 510, 515f., 522, 524, 527, 542
Isma'il Beg Taimani, 408f.
Isma'il, Shah Safawi, 29f., 31
Isma'ilis, 531
'Ismatullah Beg Qipchaq, 70f.
Izbasar, hakim of Shibarghan, 87f.
Izzat Ullah, Mir, xxxviii, 106, 129

Ja'far Beg, amir of Shaikh 'Ali Hazaras, 531
Ja'far Quli Khan Kurd, 156
jagir, 79, 84, 103, 136, 141, 238, 268, 298, 302, 414, 435
Jahandad Khan of Badakhshan, 291, 309f.
Jahangir, Mughal Emperor, 47
Jahangir b. 'Ibadullah, Tuqay-Timurid, 59
jahangir gun, 213, 253, 254, 267, 270, 324, 326
Jahangir Mirza b. Kamran Mirza, 117, 175
Jahangir Mirza b. Saiyid Muhammad Sultan, 39f.
Jalalabad, xxxiii, 99, 177, 202, 297, 381, 500f., 508, 560
Jami, Maulawi 'Abd al-Rahman, 218
Jamshidi Aimaq, 46, 117, 125, 126, 150, 152, 154, 195, 201, 203, 274, 276f., 280, 287, 326, 400f., 426f., 478, 483, 516, 517, 520, 521, Appendix V,i
and Bala Murghab, 431f., 473f.
removal and break up, 477f., 491
amirs of, see individual rulers
janda bala, xxxiv, 24
Jan Muhammad Khan Ming, 92f., 103f., 107, 112
Jani-Begid Dynasty, 32, 34, 36, 57
Jawan-i Siyaposh, 436
Jawand, 45, 158, 217, 490
Jaxartes, 76
Jews, xxix, xxxiii, 6, 84, 94, 127, 138, 253, 431, 448f., 462, 481
jihad, 111, 148, 167, 175, 176, 200, 220, 258, 285, 314, 334, 360, 372, 397, 505, 508, 514, 552, 573
Jizakh, 120, 315, 318
jiziya, 138
Jumjum Qal'a, 442
Juzjan, 1, 8, 42

Kabul, xii, xix, xxii, xxiii, xxvii, xxxiii, xxxvii, xxxviii, xxxix, , xliii, 6, 27, 31, 35, 42, 48, 52, 82, 86, 92, 94, 97, 99, 100, 101, 102, 109, 112, 113, 114, 116, 123, 124, 145, 147, 161, 162, 167, 168, 175, 176, 177, 188, 189, 191, 193, 195, 196, 202, 203, 204, 225, 227, 229, 233, 236, 242, 245, 248, 249, 255, 261, 262, 282, 285, 286, 288, 290, 292, 293, 295, 298, 302, 307, 310, 311, 312, 313, 317, 322, 324, 328, 331,332, 336, 339, 340, 343, 344, 345, 348, 351, 353, 358, 359, 365, 367, 368, 371, 372, 375, 376, 377, 383, 384, 387, 409, 412, 419, 421, 423, 425, 484, 491, 503, 504, 506, 508, 513, 516, 527, 531, 542, 546
Kingdom of, 102, 116, 168, 181, 219, 241, 317, 391, 392, 600
and 'Reign of Terror', 459, 546f., 553f.
and British occupations, 167f., 260f., 360, 376f., 385f., 391, 396, 564
and Burnes mission, 146, 160f.
Kabul regiments, 233, 234, 282, 306, 351, 353, 355, 357, 382, 384, 386, 387, 427, 539, 540, 541
kafir(s), xxix, 74, 75, 288, 313, 466, 477, 506, 559, 581 (see also pagan enclaves)
Kafiristan, 596
Kahmard, 1, 42, 46, 49, 98, 167, 169f., 177, 222f., 392, 481, 510, 524
Kakars, 205
Kalat, 144
Kaminj, 427
Kamran Shah Sadozai, xvi, 79, 108, 110, 116f., 125, 136, 142, 147f., 163, 175, 177, 186, 189, 193, 198, 201f., 205
Karez (of Qataghan), 266
Karim Beg Mingbashi, 422, 437

Karimdad Beg, amir of Sunni Hazaras, 205f., 212
Karmina, 120
Karramiyya, 11f.
Karukh, 111, 590
Kashan, 472
Kashmir, 116, 220, 599
Kaufmann, General, 371, 376, 378
Kazakhs, xxxiii, 29, 38, 45, 418
Kerman, 61
Khaf, 108
Khairabad, 125, 213, 285, 289, 293, 346, 350, 365, 366, 448, 455
Khalfin, 501f., 503, 527f.
Khalil Sultan b. Miran Shah, 20
Khalq Party, 601
Kham-i Ab, 413, 473, 536
Khan (Afghan), 33, 63f., 81, 558
Khan (Chingizid), xiif., 32, 35, 37, 38, 54, 58, 60, 63f., 73, 93, 203
Khan Agha Jamshidi, 203 (see Mehdi Quli Khan)
Khan Hazrat of Khiva, 157, 166, 187, 197, 203, 256
Khan of Kokand, 210, 302, 305, 314f.
Khanabad, 56, 58, 267f., 271, 289, 290, 298, 397, 507, 510
Khanjan Khan, Sardar, 85
kharwar, 68, 138f., Appendix II
Khesht Pul (Pul-i Kheshti) of Maimana, 443f., 587
Khinjan, 312, 507, 509, 510
khirqa, 91f.
Khiva, xxviii, xliii, 6, 55, 65, 67, 68, 85, 146, 148, 150, 166, 187, 188, 192, 193, 196f., 199, 203, 242, 332, 376, 462
Khojand, 94, 315
Khost, 597
Khuda Nadida Pass, 579
Khuda Nazar Bi Qunghrat, ataliq, 39
Khujam Quli, diwanbegi, 52
Khulm, 24, 42, 51, 53f., 58, 82, 90, 97, 98, 99, 103, 104, 113, 114, 115, 118f., 123, 124, 167, 169, 170, 173, 174, 178, 194, 204f., 208, 210, 214, 220f., 223, 242, 246
falls to Akram Khan, 223f., 238
Afghan government of, 175, 225, 227, 228, 231, 242
Khurasan, xvi, 1, 6, 11, 14, 16, 17, 20, 34, 36, 43, 46, 48, 49, 57, 60, 61, 62., 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 84, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 115, 126, 146, 147, 148, 150, 159, 205, 212, 217, 233, 269, 287, 332, 348, 582
Khurd Kabul, 202
Khurram, 295, 297, 361
Khush Robat, 58
Khushdil Loynab Khan, Shahghasi, 378, 380, 409, 411, 427, 437
Khushhal Khan Khattak, 179
Khusrau Beg b. Nazar Bi Naiman, 50
Khusrau Sultan, Tuqay-Timurid, 43, 48
Khwaja 'Abd al-Ghaffar, 53
Khwaja Ghor, xlv
Khwaja Kenti, 153, 154, 160, 403, 442, 444
Khwaja Khair, 23
Khwaja Khizr, 110
Khwaja Ni'mat Ansari, 70
Khwaja Saleh, 77, 463, 472
Khwaja Tak, 108
Khwarazm, 16, 148, 234, 371, 376, 492
Khwarazmian Shahs, 14
Khyber Pass, xv, xix, xx, xxxvii, xli, 75, 144, 220, 333, 419
Kilift, 95, 96
Kirghiz, 210
Kistan Qara Sultan, 35
Koh Daman, 48, 177, 178, 179, 309, 312, 532
Kohandil Khan Barakzai, 243
Kohistan (of Kabul), 178, 202, 515, 535, 559
Kohna Nokar, 96f., 480
Kok Mirza Turkman, 395
Kok Tepa, see Gök Tepa.
Kokan Beg, amir of Qataghan, 114
Kokand, 197, 210, 260, 266, 271, 273, 276, 302, 305, 314, 315, 317, 376
Kokcha, 3
Kokdad Mirza, 98
Kufa, 23
Kulab, 43, 71, 248, 267, 271, 273, 292, 293, 334, 337, 418, 459
Kunar, 549, 550, 551, 559
Kuropatkin, General, 463, 591
Kurram Beg, Mir, 309
Kurt Dynasty, 16f.
Kushk, 150, 203, 374, 400, 401, 403, 404, 406f., 410, 427, 431, 460, 474, 479, 480, 491, 585
Kushka river, 66, 158,

Laghman, 560
Lahore, 315

Lall Khundil Khan, Sardar, 520f.
Lall Muhammad Khan, Sardar, 338f.
lalmi (dry land) farming, 4, 138f.
landai poetry, 179
Langar, 22, 448, 455, 490
Lansdowne, Lord, 563f., 568f., 573f.
Latif Sultan Aghacha, 22
Laulash, xlv, 151, 428, 448 (see Bandar)
Lesser Turkistan xxif., xxvi, xxxif., 1f., 68, 90, 103, 112, 139, 143, 144, 155, 173, 177, 207, 220, 221, 223, 225, 231, 236, 242, 257, 282, 289, 294, 303, 318, 325, 331, 334, 345, 354, 360, 404, 506, 543 (see also Afghan Turkistan, Balkh appanage, Turkistan)
amirs of, 235, 332, 340, 342, 358, 552
linear measurements, Appendix II
locusts, 209, 471, 479, 487, 502, 597
Logar, 532
Lomakin, General, 416
Lord, Dr. P.B., xxi, xxxviii, 137, 155, 160f., 168, 171, 177
and Chahar Wilayat, 170f., 186, 192, 193, 200
plans invasion of Balkh, 169, 171, 196
and Mir Wali of Khulm, 174, 235
seizes Saighan and Bajgah, 170f.
defeat at Bajgah, 176
death at Parwan Darra, 178
Lumsden, Sir P., 458, 461f., 465
Lytton, Lord, 75, 371, 377f., 384, 391f. 397f.

Macnaughten, Sir William, xvi, xx, 168, 169, 170, 171, 174, 175, 178, 180f., 185, 192, 194f., 196, 197, 202, 287
MacNeill, Sir John, 148
Mahdi-ism, 68f., 575
Mahmud b. Amir Wali, 17 (see also *Bahr al-Asrar*)
Mahmud b. Mir Wais Ghilzai, 60
Mahmud Bi, amir of Qataghan, 54, 56f., 72, 98
Mahmud Khan, amir of Sunni Hazaras, 383, 378
Mahmud Khan, Beglarbegi of Sar-i Pul, 171, 221, 252
entertains Ferrier, 208
and Khulm, 172f., 210f.
opposes Afghan invasion, 218, 231f.
imprisonment and death, 229, 232
character, 208
Mahmud Shah Durrani, 99f., 107f.
Maida Yughlun, battle of, 315
Maimana, xxxii, xli, xliii, xlv, 11, 34, 35, 60, 66, 73, 84, 88, 89, 92, 104, 105, 106, 107, 109, 110, 111, 114, 115, 116, 119, 123, 124, 125, 126, 128, 130, 131, 137, 139, 141, 142, 145, 154, 155, 186, 197, 198, 206f., 215, 242, 246, 247, 252, 254f., 283, 284, 285, 294, 320, 328, 353, 374, 380, 390, 393, 405, 420, 447, 499, 583, 599, 600,
Walis of, Appendices II,iv; III,vi (see Mingid Dynasty and individual rulers)
origins of name, 6f.
under Mongols, 16
under Timurids and Shaibanids, 22f., 27f., 34f.,
under Tuqay-Timurids, 39, 41f., 48, 50f.
Mughal invasion, 51f.
and Nadir Shah Afshar, 63f.
and Ahmad Shah Durrani, 78f.
and Khans of Bukhara, 97, 112, 250, 263, 269, 270, 286, 289, 327f., 340, 369, 420, 460
and Afghans, Afghanistan, 78f., 90, 113, 115, 147, 173f., 185, 193, 238, 241f., 252f., 261, 269, 270, 274, 275f., 279f., 282, 288, 290, 294, 295, 297, 298, 306, 310, 311, 313, 322f., 327, 340f., 345, 347f., 359, 361f., 373, 379, 395, 404f., 413f., 418f., 422f., 432f., 444, 445, 450, 454f., 457f., 461, 469, 483, 496, 502, 505, 507, 510, 513f., 521, 525f., 533f., 561, 586, 588, 594
and Persia, 30, 63, 155, 156, 158, 161, 165, 186, 193, 217, 231, 233, 234, 244, 251, 252, 254, 263, 269, 275, 280
and Herat, 117, 185f., 190, 192f., 195f., 198f., 204, 206, 211f., 216f. 219, 242, 244, 253, 276f., 279, 280, 282, 285, 297, 298, 301, 306, 343, 347, 348, 359, 361, 363f., 381f., 384f., 386f., 395f., 402f., 406, 412, 414, 434, 435, 445, 487, 498f., 513, 515f., 522, 540, 541
and Russia, xxxi, 347, 349, 350, 357, 373, 375, 378f., 412f., 418f., 420, 422f., 435f., 442f., 454, 460, 461, 463, 468f., 472, 483, 489, 492f., 519,f., 528f., 534, 564f., 572, 583f., 587f., 590, 594, 595

frontiers of, 98, 112f., 125, 135, 136, 138, 207, 213, 275, 278, 285, 297, 340, 347, 359, 395, 403, 404, 413, 416, 423, 426, 435f., 437, 438, 439, 442, 445f., 447, 448f., 459, 460, 461, 468, 470f., 491, 492f., 495, 500, 515, 520, 565, 577, 589f.
Afghan residents, governors, 358, 359f., 363, 366, 373, 379, 381, 386, 421, 425, 435, 444, 445, 452f., 460, 470, 488, 496, 498, 516, 537, 543, 572, 578, 586f., 588, 591, 594, 595, 596, 597, Appendix VIII
Afghan garrisons in, 358, 359, 361, 362f., 364, 372, 374, 380, 381, 386, 414, 419, 422, 436, 441, 452, 454, 460, 470, 489, 491, 499, 502, 516, 517f., 520f., 528, 533, 534f., 539f., 558, 572, 578, 580, 584, 586f., 590, 594
garrison mutinies, 362, 364, 378, 382f., 384f., 386, 391, 489, 515f., 521f., 534f., 539f., 577, 585
Afghan colonisation, 458, 483, 484, 488, 591
indigenous rebellions, 363f., 381f., 404f., 414f., 419f., 427, 429f., 432f., 469, 577, 586f., 594, 595, 596
sieges, 216f., 227, 277f., 282, 320f., 328f, 344f., 349f., 359, 365, 368, 395, 404, 424, 436, 442f.
arg and defences, xxix, 128, 131, 136, 140, 155, 156, 20, 255, 283, 284, 286, 325, 326, 328, 336, 340, 350f, 354, 356, 357, 359, 362f., 366, 417, 420, 422, 437, 448, 452, 453f., 457, 586, Plates I, II, IV
native army, 128, 136, 140, 150, 207, 255, 278, 325, 326, 413, 423f., 439, 452, 493, 516, 520, 521f., 540, 549, 586, 587, 590
population, xxix, 22, 60, 108, 126f., 139, 140, 163, 207, 231, 255, 285, 329, 351, 366, 431, 440, 447, 451, 452, 454, 480f., 483, 492, 537, 547, 550, 577, 587
economy, xxix, 4, 6f., 13, 16, 79, 83f., 103f., 126f., 136, 137f., 216, 269, 285, 358, 375, 446f., 448, 451f., 458, 470f., 480, 488, 490, 531
revenues, taxation, tribute, 103, 127, 137f., 140, 311, 322, 323, 342f., 344, 345, 349, 353, 366, 368, 369, 371, 373, 413f., 420, 421, 426, 437, 348f., 451f., 458, 470, 535f., 537f., 543
district governors, 136, 455f., 549, 558
schools, 425
public health, 447f., 597
Maitland, Maj. 357, 369, 474
reports of, 469, 480f., 483, 484, 497, 538
Maiwand, 380, 399f.
Malcolm, Sir J., 120, 145
Malik Mirza Firozkohi, 579f.
Malik Sharif Firozkohi, 579f., 588, 594f.
Manghit (Haidarid) Dynasty of Bukhara, xiii, xlii, 57, 58, 60, 65, 73, 91, 96, 97, 109, 110, 120, 122, 163, 164, 165, 200, 227, 276, 289, 305, 599
Khans of, Appendix IV,ii (see individual rulers)
and Afghanistan, xlii, 80, 90, 91, 94f. 116, 122, 182, 226, 250, 261, 270, 272f., 292, 301, 303f., 306, 316, 327, 338, 599
Mangqishlaq, 37
Manwar Khan, hakim of Shibarghan, 112, 115, 128, 131
Marichaq, 17, 41, 42, 45, 46, 48, 60, 62, 63, 64, 66, 126, 150, 154, 285, 432, 436, 462, 463, 468, 472, 476, 584
Martin, L., 556
Mashhad, xli, 21, 29, 36, 49, 62, 63, 124, 127, 128, 154, 170, 201, 203, 207, 217, 218, 242, 253, 360, 415, 420, 425, 433f., 441, 449, 486, 489, 582, 585
Masson, Charles, 146
Ma'sum Khan Manghit (see Shah Murad)
Maududi clan of Firozkohi Aimaq, 157
Mayo, Lord, 282, 333
Mazar-i Sharif, 2, 5, 123, 124, 131, 166, 219, 224, 228, 249, 294, 306, 310, 313, 314, 331, 337, 338, 341, 346, 347, 348, 353, 362, 363, 374, 376, 378, 380, 393, 394, 404, 434, 435, 439, 459, 484, 491, 492, 499, 507, 508, 512, 517, 527, 528, 529, 580, 583, 588, 595
'Abd al-Rahman Khan at, 533f., 546f., 553, 557, 562, 564, 566, 567, 578
disturbances at, 231, 232, 233, 248, 299, 505
fire at shrine, 440
shrines of, xxxiv, 23f., 35, 51, 54, 56, 57, 70, 71, 91, 97, 102, 114, 115, 120, 121, 124, 163, 166, 220f., 232, 233, 250, 264, 298, 299, 309, 337, 368, 370, 379, 394, 412, 497, 498, 504, 505, 506, 513, 538f., 546, 550, 552, 553f., 559, 568

oaths sworn at, 298f., 300, 308, 310, 368, 503
Medina, 53, 54, 118
Mehdi Quli Khan, Khan Agha Jamshidi, 126, 142, 203, 400f., 402, 474, 476, 517
Merk, C.S., xliii, 283, 357f., 360, 449, 450, 453, 480f., 538
Merv, xxviii, 3, 6, 23, 29f., 41, 52, 93, 110, 127, 198, 214, 234, 242, 254, 263, 276, 373, 376, 395, 407, 418, 419, 425, 437, 459, 460, 462, 519, 536, 595, 597
Meteorologica of Aristotle, 76
migrations and resettlements, 126, 139, 148, 163, 165f., 191f., 194, 195, 203, 211, 224, 253, 265, 274f., 277, 318, 337, 348, 366, 373, 418, 428, 429f., 432, 434, 458, 461, 468, 476f., 479f., 482, 486f., 490, 492, 502, 510, 532, 536, 537, 541, 560, 571, 578, 580, 581, 585, 588f., 590, 593, 595, 597f., 600, 602
millennialism see Mahdi-ism
Ming tribe, 33, 43, 53f., 58f., 72, 73, 79, 83, 413
mingbashis, 136, 291, 331, 426, 440, 455, 456, 457, 492, 493, 515, 516, 533, 535, 536, 549, 558
Mingid Dynasty of Maimana, xii, xiii, xviii, xxii, xlv, 34, 43f, 53f., 60, 64, 78, 80, 82, 85, 86, 89, 97, 106, 113, 119, 133, 155, 173, 197, 282, 341, 346, 358, 359, 363, 364, 365, 368, 370, 414, 415, 444, 445, 459, 513, 534, 537, 539, 577, 591, 597, 599, Appendices III,iv; IV,vi
Walis of, see individual rulers
internal disputes, 130ff, 136, 206, 253, 283f, 343, 345f., 363f., 387f., 422f., 439f., 498f., 513f., 518f.
chronology of, 104f., 359f., 387
Minglik (Qal'a-yi Hazhda Nahr), 208, 209, 216, 232, 259, 306, 322
seiges of, 225f., 236, 308, 314, 319f., 328, 331, 339, 417, 552
Mir 'Alim Khan Manghit, 599
Mir Ataliq (see Sultan Murad Beg), 221, 313, 319
Mir Wali, 118 (see 'Ali Mardan Beg)
Miran Shah b. Timur Lang, 19
Mirana Beg of Qataghan, 304
Mirza Ahad Khan, 293
Mirza Shukur, amir of Sunni Hazaras, 584f.
Mirza Wali, 157
Mirza Wulang Pass, 10, 115, 151, 172, 323, 350, 381, 423, 442
Mirza Ya'qub Ming, 283, 284, 285, 301
Mithraism, 9
Mizrab Bi b. Hazara Bi, 85
Mizrab Khan Ming, 34, 78, 105, 106, 107, 112, 114, 116, 192, 209f., 211, 212, 213, 445, 447
seizes power, 131f.
succession opposed, 132, 135f.
administrative reforms, 136f., 148
native army of, 136, 150
war with Sar-i Pul, 132f., 134f., 141f., 172f.
and Andkhui 135, 142
alliance with Shibarghan, 141f., 165, 172
relations with Herat, 194f., 198f., 205, 369
opposes Persia, xvif., 146, 148, 150f. 154f., 164, 165, 166, 186, 193
and Dost Muhammad, 199
and Shah Shuja', British, 170, 173, 174, 186, 187, 191f., 193f., 198f.
and Bukhara, 163, 164, 165, 204
death, 206f
character, 136f., 188
family, 131f., 133f., 141f., 206, 283, 365, 388, 600
Mohmunds, 96
Mongol invasions, xi, xvii, 7, 13, 14f., 20, 32
monopolies, 127, 138
Moorcroft, William, xxxviii, 104, 118, 120, 121, 122f., 124, 125, 128, 129, 200, 208
Morley, Lord, 564
Mughals, xiii, xvii, xxx, 26, 30f., 35, 43, 48, 50f., 61, 66, 68, 180, 182, 294, 484, 538f., 601
Muhammad 'Abd al-Rahim Khan, *wakil*, 345f.
Muhammad Afzal Khan, Amir, xxii, 233, 291, 390
takes Mazar-i Sharif, 231
as governor of Afghan Turkistan, 230, 239, 240, 249, 261, 264, 272, 273, 276, 289f., 292, 295, 297f., 302
attempted assassination, 252
and Khulm, 235f., 238
and Hakim Khan of Shibarghan, 246f., 264f., 269, 274, 276, 279
and Ghazanfar Khan of Andkhui, 264f., 269, 274, 290

and Maimana, 232, 250, 252f., 254, 269, 275f., 277, 278, 279, 280, 282, 285, 286, 287, 289, 290, 295
and Qataghan, 244f., 260f., 273, 290f., 293
and Sar-i Pul, 231f., 273f., 285, 297
and Aimaqs, 276f.
Maimana treaty, 322, 325, 327
and Bukhara, 250, 256, 257, 270, 271f., 289, 290, 292, 314, 316, 317, 318
recalled to Kabul, 325, 245, 246
and succession, xxii, 208, 218, 219, 245f., 272, 383, 397
and civil war, 289f., 293f., 298f., 306, 309f.
defeat at Bajgah, 295f.
Tashqurghan negotiations, 297f.
imprisoned, 300f., 303
becomes Amir of Kabul, 309f., 314
issue of Britain's recognition, 316f.
death, 311f.
Muhammad Ahmad Beg b. Qilij Beg, 118f.
Muhammad Akbar Khan, Col., 362, 365
Muhammad Akbar Khan, Sardar, 176
Muhammad Akram Khan, Sardar, 72, 167, 216, 218, 219, 221, 227, 228, 229, 259, 303
Balkh campaign, 220f., 480
takes Khulm, 223f.
as governor of Balkh, 223, 225f.
Muhammad 'Alam Khan, Sardar, 290, 347, 499
defeats A'zam Khan, 332
as Na'ib of Afghan Turkistan, 332, 334, 340, 344, 348, 353, 359, 365f., 367f., 370, 537, 538
and amirid rulers, 337f., 339f., 342f., 347f., 350, 353, 358, 365f.
revolt and sack of Maimana, 340f., 344f, 350f., 359, 365f., 421, 440, 442f.
disgrace and death, 366f., 369f.
Muhammad 'Ali Bi, 170
Muhammad 'Ali Khan Ming, 425, 442
Muhammad 'Ali Khan, Sardar, 294f., 299f., 303
Muhammad Amin Khan, Sardar, 226, 228, 235, 237, 303
Muhammad Aslam Khan, Sardar, 261
Muhammad A'zam Khan Ming, 455
Muhammad A'zam Khan, Sardar, 258, 261, 265, 267, 270, 271, 272, 309, 311, 317, 325, 383, 388, 389, 454, 505
war with Sher 'Ali Khan, 289, 292f., 295, 297, 307, 310, 313, 320f., 323, 327f.
as Amir of Kabul, 312
dispute with 'Abd al-Rahman Khan, 312, 321f., 327, 328, 411
flight and death, 331f.
Muhammad 'Aziz Khan b. A'zam Khan, 412
Muhammad 'Aziz Khan b. Dost Muhammad Khan, 324
Muhammad al-Zaman Mirza, 31
Muhammad Bi Khitai, 45f.
Muhammad Husain Khan Ming, xlv, 142, 279, 425
assassinates Hukumat Khan, 283f., 346, 364
government of, 282f., 362f., 364, 365, 381, 382, 440, 445f., 454f., 519
and Afzal Khan, 286, 287, 289, 290, 325
and Sher 'Ali Khan, 289, 294, 298, 301, 306, 307, 310, 311, 313, 323, 324, 326, 343, 380, 456
besieged by 'Abd al-Rahman Khan, 322, 323f., 327f.
and Na'ib 'Alam Khan, 338, 340f., 344f., 347f.
and Herat, 286, 294, 298, 301, 343, 445, 498f., 513
and Bukhara, 327f., 340, 373
and Russia, 349, 461, 469, 492f.
internal opposition, 284f., 343, 345f., 350, 364f., 388, 419f., 422, 439f., 498f., 513f., 518f.
denounces Na'ib 'Alam Khan, 368
campaigns to regain Waliship, 362, 363, 381f., 388, 439f., 442f.
imprisonment and exile, 382, 357f., 365, 366f., 382, 419
Wali for 'Abd al-Rahman Khan, 444f., 458, 469f., 492f., 498, 514f., 525f., 534, 542
relations with Afghan resident, 453, 455, 475
appeals to Britain, 382, 453
opposes Ishaq Khan, 456, 458, 498f., 502, 505, 513f., 526, 528f., 533, 534
arrest and execution, 513f., 528, 533, 536

character and health, 447f., 455f.
family of, 283, 284, 324, 338, 345f., 349, 354, 355, 360, 364, 367, 423, 455f., 470, 491f., 498, 499, 513, 514, 516, 519, 533, 537, 542
Muhammad Husain Khan, Munshi, 361f., 365
Muhammad Ishaq Khan, Sardar,
intrigues against 'Alam Khan, 338f., 340,
incursions into Afghan Turkistan, 388f., 392f.
and 'Abd al-Rahman Khan, 331, 332, 333, 411f., 414, 436, 445, 456f., 461, 464, 495f., 497, 506f., 513, 526, 528, 538, 559, 596, 599
as governor of Afghan Turkistan, 395, 411f., 420f., 470, 495f., 507f., 525f., 529, 538
and Maimana, 365, 381, 395f., 404f., 412f., 421f., 429f., 433f., 436, 438f., 445, 457f., 492, 496, 498f., 502, 513f., 520f., 525f., 536, 594
Darzab dispute, 404f., 412f., 470
and Russia, 464, 470, 492, 501f., 508f., 519, 527f., 564, 594
campaign against Aiyub Khan, 408f.
rebellion, xxivf. 321, 411f., 450, 457, 458, 481, 484, 491, 495f., 525f., 530, 542f., 547, 549, 553, 554, 558, 559, 567, 572, 576, 599
defeat at Ghaznigak, 511f., 513, 546, 563
flight and exile, 512, 524, 525, 533, 542, 583, 585, 594, 596
character, 457, 496f., 506, 526
family of, 426, 508, 546, 547
Muhammad Isma'il Khan, Sardar, 324f., 329, 331
Muhammad Jan Beg Firozkohi, 440f.
Muhammad Karim Beg Qataghanid, 309
Muhammad Khan, Beglarbegi of Sar-i Pul, 171f., 294, 303, 307, 347, 362, 382
flees to Bukhara, 301f.
made Na'ib of Turkistan, 313
and 'Abd al-Rahman Khan, 320f., 326, 389
and 'Alam Khan, 338, 343, 344, 348, 355
attacks Sar-i Pul, 363, 381, 389, 396
imprisonment and death, 353, 367, 459
character, 343, 353
family of, 320, 321, 379, 459, 498
Muhammad Khan, Saiyid, Sunni Hazara, 402 420, 427f., 430f., 435, 478f., 492
Muhammad Khan Siya Mansur Khan, 101
Muhammad Muqim b. Iskandar, Tuqay-Timurid, 57f.
Muhammad Murad Beg, 268
Muhammad 'Omar Jamshidi, 276f.
Muhammad Parsa, Khwaja, 315f.
Muhammad Rahim Khan Ming, 104f., 111f., 128, 132f.
Muhammad Rahim Sultan, Tuqay-Timurid, 42
Muhammad Sarwar Khan, governor of Maimana, 591, 595f.
Muhammad Sarwar Khan, Sardar, 309, 361, 388, 393
arrest and execution, 389f., 394f.
Muhammad Shah Qajar, 111, 147f., 149, 153, 157, 159, 160, 162, 166, 187, 189, 217, 218
Muhammad Sharif Khan Ming, xlv, 321, 450, 455, 456, 492f., 535, 541
as Wali of Maimana, 514, 516, 524, 534, 535, 537, 539, 542, 543
and Ishaq Khan, 514f., 529
and Herat, 515f., 517f,. 533
and 'Abd al-Rahman Khan, 533f., 537f., 541f., 549, 586
internal opposition, 515, 518f.
rebellion, xif., 437, 477, 585f.
flees to Panjdeh, 587f., 590
defeat and surrender, 590, 591, 594
prisoner in Kabul, 591f.
family of, 519, 533, 534, 536, 539, 542, 588, 591f., 600
Muhammad Sharif Khan, Sardar, 235, 261, 271, 290
Muhammad Sultan, Tuqay-Timurid, 59
Muhammad Tahir Mingbashi, 343
Muhammad Uraq, Ishan, xxxv, xlv, 119, 120, 208, 211, 217, 218, 219, 221, 223, 224, 226, 257, 339, 303
flees to Khulm, 163
takes Balkh, 172f.
aids Ghazanfar Khan, 210
opposes Akram Khan, 216f., 222, 227f.
imprisoned, 229, 232, 261
escapes from Qandahar, 248
joins Hakim Khan's revolt, 248f., 260
defeat and recaptured, 249, 251, 256
released by Sher 'Ali Khan, 294f.
flees to Bukhara, 301f.
as Bukharan ambassador, 304f., 314, 339

intrigues with Lesser Turkistan, 304f., 312, 317f., 342, 349
joins Sher 'Ali Khan, 308, 318f., 321, 326, 331, 342, 347(?), 349(?)
and Ishaq Khan, 338f.
execution, 552
family of, 308, 310, 319, 320, 342, 362, 379, 552, 600 (see Gauhari shaikhs)
shrine of, 552, Plate VIII
Muhammad Yusuf, Shahzada, 243f., 250f.
Muhammad Zaman Beg Jamshidi, 126, 150, 151, 154, 156, 203
Muhammad Zaman Khan Ming, 455
Muhammad Zaman Khan, Sardar, 231, 232, 236, 237, 248, 249, 268, 271, 290, 294, 297
Muhammadzais, xxxiii, 297, 383, 464, 506, 532, 537, 556, 557, 558, 581, 600
Mukhless Khan Durrani, 80
Mullah Gul Muhammad, 88
Mullah Muhammad Khan, 454
Multan, 63
al-Muqanna', see Hashim b. Hakim
Murad Bakhsh b. Shah Jahan, 50f.
Murad Beg, amir of Qunduz, 54, 98, 114, 118f., 121, 122, 123, 155, 163, 164, 166, 167, 169, 170, 175, 177, 183, 187, 200, 221, 233, 265, 266, 268
Murad Khana, 554, 568
Murghab, xxxiv, 11f., 16, 19, 27, 40, 42f., 48, 52, 60, 80, 117, 124, 125, 148, 150, 151, 153, 157, 174, 186, 195, 197, 198, 199, 205, 212, 241, 252, 254, 278, 285, 287, 294, 343, 346, 364, 373, 375, 403, 405, 408, 418, 429, 432, 461, 485, 520, 577
Murray, Sir Charles, 244
Musa Jan Khan b. Aiyub Khan, 410f., 420
Musa Khwaja, 87f.
Mustafa Beg Taimani, 205
mutawalli, 25, 70, 71
Muzaffar al-Din Pir Muhammad, 22
Muzaffar Khan Manghit, 120, 276, 288, 289, 464
and Lesser Turkistan, 291, 292, 301, 302f., 317, 318, 338f.
and Maimana, 289, 340, 342
and Afzalid pretenders, 300f., 314, 316f.
breach with 'Abd al-Rahman, 307, 318
and Ishan Uraq, 301f., 304
envoy to Sher 'Ali Khan, 308, 318
envoy to 'Abd al-Rahman, 327
family of, 302
and Russia, 302f., 304f., 314f., 318f., 327
appeals to Britain and Turkey, 315f.
submits to Russia, 318 , 328
internal opposition, 318, 334
Muzaffar Khan Ming, 284f., 343, 345f., 365, 388, 399, 515, 518f., 525, 533
executes Husain Khan, 513f.

Nadir Mirza Sadozai, 149, 154f.
Nadir Shah Afshar, xiiif., xviii, 62f., 73, 77, 79, 80f., 90, 112, 125, 144, 147, 506
Nadir Shah, Amir of Afghanistan, 19, 425, 552, 600
"Nafas" (Nafs?) Beg Mingbashi, 455, 494
Nahr-i Shahi, 23, 24, 163
Nahrin, 268, 290
Nairatu (Qal'a-yi Naraiman), 11
Najibullah, President, 1, 552, 600
Najibullah Khan Surkhani, Sardar, 114
Najm al-Din Khan, Sardar, 510f., 531, 546, 553, 558
Najm al-Din, Khwaja, 305, 314
Nakhjaristan Plateau, 150
Namusa, 448, 455, 456, 492
Nangahar, 597
Napoleon, xiv, 144
naqib, 24, 56, 120, 302
Naqshbandi Sufism, 19, 119, 120, 284, 318, 496, 559
Nasrullah Khan Manghit, xxi, 74, 75, 155, 163f., 169, 187, 197, 210, 211, 220, 224, 239, 241, 250, 259, 272, 273
and Afghan Turkistan, 162f., 226, 234f. 250, 255, 263f., 265f., 270, 271f., 274
detains Dost Muhammad Khan, xxi, 130, 175f., 181, 259
executes Conolly & Stoddard, 552, 199f., 241, 316f., 555
and Mir Wali, 234, 236f.
treaty with Yar Muhammad Khan, 204
submission of Ishan Uraq, 174f.
and Qunduz, 263f., 265f. 267
snubs Persian envoy, 256
advocates Sunni alliance, 253, 256f., 260f., 264, 265f., 269f., 303, 316
death of, 276
Nau Bahar, 2, 5, 9, 14, 23f.
nauroz, 24, 62, 237, 292, 294, 343, 367, 396 (implied), 393, 498, 500, 534, 535, 578
Nauroz Tepa, 443

Nauzad, 485
Nava Vihara, 5, 9, 23f.
Nawab Jabbar Khan Barakzai, 223, 230
Nawab Khan, Sardar, 87f.
Nazar Bi Naiman, 50
nazarana (turtuq), 82, 103, 119, 164, 254, 322, 450
Nazir al-Din Khan, 522f.
Nazir Haidar Khan, 293
Nazr Muhammad Khan, Tuqay-Timurid, xxviii, xliii, 17, 33, 38, 40f., 50, 83, 84, 180, 202, 228, 235, 242, 599
Nazr Muhammad Sarwar Khan, Sardar, 581f.
Nazr Sultan b. Haji Bi Ming, 89, 92
Nebuchadnezzar, 6
Neolithic, 7
Nestorian Christianity, 10
Nikudari tribes, 17, 18, 42
Nimazga Gate, 355
Nisak-i Miyanak, 7
Nishapur, 47, 63
Niyaz Beg Firozkohi, 428f.
Niyaz Khan, 68, 70f.
North West Frontier, xiv, 145, 258, 397, 564, 572, 601f.
Northcote, Lord, 316
Nur Muhammad Khan, 392
Nur Muhammad Khan Qizilbash, 392
Nuristan, xxvi
Nurzais, 486

Obeh, 42, 44f., 63, 68, 69, 154, 401, 402, 428, 480, 585
'Omar(?) Khan, amir of Andkhui, 583
'Omar Khushbegi, Manghit, 95
Oxus (see also Amu Darya), xiii, xviii, xx, xxi, xxxii, 5, 8, 18, 67, 75, 76, 146, 168, 270, 273, 292, 316, 335, 336, 377, 388, 464, 466, 564f.

"Pada Kaj," battle of, 151f.
padshah(i), xiii, 33, 180f. (implied), 224f., 485, 503, 505
Padshahan-i Muta'akhirin-i Afghanistan, xl, xliii, 312f., 329
pagan enclaves, 10, 207 (see *kafirs*, Kafiristan, Nuristan)
Paghman, 504, 598
Pakistan, 601f.
Palæolithic, 7
Pand Nama, xliii, 329
Panjdeh, xvi, xxviii, xxxii, 28, 48, 150, 157, 165f., 199, 203, 285, 326, 402, 403, 404, 406, 407, 408, 410, 425, 432, 436, 437, 468, 470f., 475, 479, 520, 576, 583, 595, 597
Russian occupation, xxvi, 366, 407, 432, 454f., 459f., 461f., 464, 468, 469, 473, 489, 492f., 584f., 587f., 590
British reaction, 462f., 465f., 472f., 584
local impact, 470f., 562
Panjsher, 312
Panturkism, xxxiii
Parcham Party, 601
Pari Khana prison, 555, 559
Paropamisus, xviii, 2, 76, 125, 465
Parwan, 552
Parwan Darra, battle of, 178
Parwana Khan, Na'ib Kotwal, xl, 457, 539, 547f., 552, 555f., 588, 592
Parwaz Khan, General, 361, 374, 425, 433
Payinda Khan Barakzai, 110
Peacocke, Cpt., 480
Pelly, Lt. Lewis, xxxviii, 207, 210, 277f., 372
Persia, xiii, 20, 29, 34, 39, 44, 51, 57, 62, 72, 126, 130, 218, 231, 246, 252, 269, 276, 340, 411, 425, 504, 560
and Afghanistan, xiv, xix, 6, 33, 68, 80, 109, 116f., 169, 234, 244, 252, 255, 261f., 263, 277, 280, 298, 334, 391, 420, 433f., 490, 570, 573, 582f., 598
and Britain, xiv, 144f., 147, 159, 206, 235, 242, 251, 253, 282, 433, 570, 582
and Bukhara, xiv, 144, 234, 250, 263
and Russia, 147, 263, 378
and Turkmans, 234, 254, 256, 275, 276
and Herat, xvi, xl, 34, 40, 44f., 60f., 62, 65, 117, 159, 169, 190, 199, 201, 204, 205, 243f., 246, 250f., 282, 287, 288, 348, 369, 400, 433f., 570, 582
campaign of 1807, 110f.
campaign of 1833, 147f.
siege of 1837/8, xvif., 146f., 159, 167, 186, 189, 194, 200, 218
occupation of 1856/7, 251f., 253, 255f.
persecution of Herati Jews, 253
Peshawar, xix, xx, xxxvii, xli, 100, 102, 108, 109, 110, 161, 219, 220, 240, 244, 258, 317, 371, 405, 590, 599
British annexation, 144, 240, 243
British agents in, 235, 241, 563
Peter the Great of Russia, xxii, 569

pir, 19, 53, 119, 120, 164, 559
Pir Muhammad b. Jahangir, 20, 37
Pir Muhammad b. Jani Beg, 35f.
Pir Muhammad b. Jani Muhammad Sultan, 35
Plutarch, 1, 9, 75
Pottinger, Eldred, xvi, xvii, xxi, xxxviii, xliii, 104, 132f., 136f., 152, 159, 171, 172, 188, 190, 193, 196f., 200, 253
and Chahar Wilayat, 185f., 191, 199
journey through Turkistan, 186f., 198
Ptolemy, xviii
Pul-i Khesti (of Panjdeh), 462, 473
Pul-i Khumri, 264
Pul-i Malan, 386f.
Punjab, xiii, xiv, xix, 144, 203, 207, 208, 220
Pusht Rud, 478, 486, 488, 490, 491, 532
Pushtun (Afghan) tribes xv, xx, xxxiii, 31, 60, 62, 63, 75, 86, 92, 142, 177, 179, 182, 183, 202, 205, 225, 231, 258, 274, 282, 381, 391, 397, 398f., 447, 468, 471, 476, 480f., 485f., 503, 504, 507, 527, 532, 546, 548, 550f., 558, 560, 564, 572, 587, 597, 601f. (see Barakzai, Sadozai, Ishaqzai, Ghilzai, Kakar, etc.)
Pushtunistan, 602
Pyne, Sir S., 572

Qadir Khan, governor of Shibarghan, 389, 394
Qadis, 15, 151, 429, 486, 490, 491
Qa'in, 109, 115, 130, 139
Qaisar, 16, 17, 22, 27, 28, 43, 60, 151, 155, 156, 157, 374, 437, 441f., 448, 455, 456, 488, 587, 590
Qaisar Mirza, b. Zaman Shah, 108, 110
Qajar Dynasty, xiii, 110f., 147, 154, 155, 157, 164, 169, 276
Qal'a-yi Bashlamas, 442
Qal'a-yi Kohna, 401
Qal'a-yi Nau, xvii, 117, 125, 149, 150, 151, 158, 164, 192, 201, 205, 211, 403, 468, 474, 590, 591, 595, 597
Russian occupation, 581f., 586f.
Qal'a-yi Niyaz Beg, 443
Qal'a-yi Wali, 207, 285, 422, 437f., 440, 441, 520, 448, 479, 486, 488
qa'alkhan, 55, 57, 114
Qandahar, xiv, xxii, xxiii, xxxiii, 43, 47, 60, 63, 65, 72, 74, 79, 80, 83, 84, 86, 91, 92, 100, 108, 109, 110, 113, 144, 145, 148, 159, 161, 168, 177, 188, 204, 216, 220, 225, 243f., 248, 255, 285, 303, 308, 310, 311, 313, 317, 321, 322, 324, 325, 327, 328, 329, 361, 362, 364, 372, 380, 391, 397, 398, 407, 408, 409f., 415, 420, 431, 445, 477, 478, 484, 491, 500, 510, 547, 561, 584, 592, 600
and British occupation, 167, 363, 376, 386, 393, 396, 399, 400, 405f., 468, 564
taken by Dost Muhammad, 224, 244, 248, 251, 282, 288
Qandahar Mission, 260
Qandahar regiments, 274, 282, 351, 353, 358, 383
Qara Khan, amir of Qataghan, 113f.
Qara Sultan b. Ishan Sudur, 301, 312f., 319f.
Qara Tepa, 66, 149, 150
Qara Turkmans, 64
Qarakhanids, 12
Qaraqul, 67
Qarqi, 67, 226, 239, 272, 302, 334, 336, 338, 342, 389, 437, 461, 508f., 564, 583, 589, 594
Qarshi, 30, 40, 52, 57, 65, 119, 164, 250, 257, 266, 272, 298, 412, 471
Qasan, 119, 164
Qasim Khwaja Jan, Pirzada, 123
Qasim Sultan, Tuqay-Timurid, 43, 50, 53
Qata Khan, 113
Qata Qal'a, 442, 443
Qataghan, xx, xxxvii, 113, 114, 121, 122, 163, 170, 174, 176, 177, 224, 230, 231, 273, 274, 289, 301, 305, 309f., 321, 331, 393, 538 (see Qunduz)
*amir*s of, 33, 51, 53, 55, 56, 58, 59, 71, 72, 73, 74, 79, 80, 81, 82, 85, 86, 90, 98, 111, 114, 118f., 164, 167, 223, 264, 265, 271, 290, 298, 304, 313, 338, 339, 395, Appendix IV,viii (see individual amirs)
Afghan campaigns against, 245, 260f., 269, 270, 271, 290f., 507, 511
Qilij 'Ali Beg of Khulm, 82, 97f., 113f., 118f.
Qilij Beg, amir of Saighan, 170
Qilij Khan Timuri, 108
Qilij Khan b. Zu'l-Faqar Sher, 172, 229, 232, 273f., 276, 294
Qipchaq tribe, 43, 59, 70f., 157, 207, 210
qizilbash, 29, 30f., 40, 46, 80, 85, 111, 139, 154, 156, 161, 242, 381, 389, 391, 466, 504, 509, 554, 581
Quetta, 415, 584

Quintus Curtius Rufus, xviii, 75
Qunduz, 1, 4, 26, 30, 31, 40, 51, 54, 72, 79, 84, 94, 95, 97, 98, 103, 104, 121, 122, 123, 155, 162, 165, 169, 175, 176, 187, 219, 228, 242, 248, 265 (see Qataghan)
and Afghans, 233f., 236, 245f., 270, 292, 293, 296, 297, 310f., 321, 347, 393, 395
annexation of, 259f., 269, 293
taken by Jahandad Khan, 309f.
amirs of, 113, 118, 122, 183, 200, 221, 227, 233, 304, 395, 508, 527, Appendix IV,viii (see individual amirs)
economy, 137
population, 481, 580
Qurchi, 115, 125, 135, 172, 186, 517, 521
quriltai, 20
Qurmach, 126

Rafiq Khan, 295
Rahim Bi Manghit, 57f., 59f., 65, 67, 73, 80, 81, 87, 89
Rahim Dad, amir of (Sunni?) Hazaras, 153
Rahmat Khan Sulaimankhel, Brigadier, 539, 543, 586
Rahmatullah Khan, amir of Andkhui, 112, 128
Rahmatullah Khan, Sardar, 96, 101
Ramazan fast, 292, 385, 537
Rasul, Hazrat Ishan, 68f., 506
Rasul Pahlawan, 600
Raverty, Maj. H., xliii, 17, 34, 36
Rawlinson, Sir H., xxxi, xxxii, 325, 335, 466
Reka Khan, Saiyid, 339
Reza Quli b. Nadir Shah Afshar, 63f., 72
Ridgeway, Col. W. 465, 476, 478
rikab g(e)riftan (*rasmi rikabi*, *rikabi homayun*) 180f.
Roberts, General, xxiv, 360, 385f., 391, 392, 393, 396, 400, 465f., 570
Rui, 296
Russia, 33, 75, 317, 327, 561f., 570, 600
and Afghanistan, xxv, 142, 147, 162, 241, 334, 371f., 373f., 391, 396, 397, 436, 462, 464, 469, 471f., 501, 528f., 581f., 584f., 589, 591, 598, 600, 601
and Balkh/Afghan Turkistan, xix, xxxi, 241, 333f., 342, 347, 349, 350, 373, 375, 377, 378, 412, 415, 420, 422f., 435f., 442f., 454f., 459, 460f., 464, 472, 475f., 489, 501f., 508f., 519f., 561, 564f., 572, 584, 587, 588f., 591, 594, 595
and Bukhara, xiv, xxxii, 192, 200, 263, 270f., 302, 314f., 318f., 327, 332, 333f., 375, 464
and Britain, xiii, xiv, xv, xxii, 74, 75, 142, 145, 147, 160f., 162, 200, 206, 240, 242, 316, 317, 333f., 347, 371f., 373f., 377f., 396, 397, 415, 416, 418, 424, 460, 462f., 471, 488f., 501, 508, 564f., 571, 572, 585, 587, 589
C. Asian conquests, xiii, xiv, xv, 74, 75, 78, 147, 187, 192, 197, 200, 234, 240, 263, 302f., 314f., 317, 318, 327, 333f., 375f., 414, 416f., 454, 460, 462f., 472, 474, 528, 581f., 584f.
surveys in Afghanistan, 160, 360, 375, 378f., 404, 407, 420, 461, 489, 492, 520, 577
and 'Turkistan Atrocities', 564, 566, 589
Russian Turkistan, xxv, xxviii, xxxii, 333, 502, 519, 541, 560, 583
Rustam 'Ali Khan, General, 440, 491, 512f., 517f., 521f., 527, 529, 572
Rustam Khan, amir of Shibarghan, 208
alliance with Maimana, 131, 141f., 165, 211
wars with Andkhui, Sar-i Pul, 141f, 165, 172f., 209f.
and Yar Muhammad Khan, 215
prisoner in Bukhara, 211
maltreatment of Turkmans, 165f.
and Afghan invasion, 226, 229
Rustam Khan, *mutawalli* of Mazar-i Sharif, 312, 320, 337, 341, 347, 348, 362, 366f., 368, 370
deposed and murdered, 353, 370
family of, 379
Rustam Muhammad Sultan, Tuqay-Timurid, 42, 44f., 59
Rustaq, 268

Sabzawar, 108, 287, 402
Sadiq Beg Mingbashi, Mirza, 322, 343, 345, 456
Sadiq Beg Taimani, 401
Sadozais, 60, 74, 98, 116, 119, 146, 148, 149, 162, 167, 177, 186, 189, 193, 201, 276, 288, 359, 380
Safawid Dynasty, xiii, xvii, xxx, 29, 39, 40, 43f., 48, 51, 59f., 62, 84, 147, 180, 288
Safi Quli, amir, 60
Sahib-i Ikhtiyar, 81, 82

Saighan, 1, 167, 169, 177, 219, 222, 295, 309, 392, 481, 509, 510, 550
St. John, Maj., 386, 400, 402, 405f., 408
St. Petersburg, xxv, 305, 314, 318, 333, 378, 418, 566, 589
saiyid, 19, 69, 559
Saiyid 'Abbas, *mirza*, 78, 105 (implied)
Saiyid 'Khan' Ming, ataliq, 64, 70, 72
Saiyid Muhammad Khan b. Yar Muhammad, 201, 243
Saiyid Shah Khan, Brigadier, 509, 510
Saiyidabad, 388, 389
Saleh Khwaja, Tuqay-Timurid, 56
Salim Sultan b. Pir Muhammad II, 39
Salor Turkmans, 64, 492
salt trade, 104, 127
Sam Khan Ilkhan, 251
Samangan, 1, 223, 525
Samarkand, xxii, 20, 21, 26, 27, 30, 31, 38, 42, 120, 273, 315, 332, 375, 453, 464, 471, 484, 501, 502, 512, 583, 594
Russian conquest of, 318, 327f.
Sangcharak, 27, 51, 338, 538
Sar-i Haus, 45, 198
Sar-i Pul, xliii, 1, 4, 7, 10, 11, 44, 51, 106, 123, 124, 125, 128, 133, 145, 155, 170, 171f., 175, 186, 192, 194, 206, 108, 214, 223, 331, 342, 343, 344, 347, 350, 351, 376, 381, 390, 414, 421, 423, 424, 425, 433, 491, 510, 518, 588
amirs of, 112, 115, 216, 229, 232, 301, 321, 353, 355, 362, 363, 367, 380, 381, 389, 395, 396, 459, 498, Appendices III,ii; IV,iv (see individual amirs)
internecine wars, 172f., 214
and Mir Wali, 172f., 176, 193
Afghan campaigns against, 231f., 273f. 276, 282, 285, 320f., 413, 521f.
under Afghan governors, 273f., 294, 297, 313, 361, 362, 381, 389, 394, 396
Afghan garrisons in, 290, 304f., 306, 361, 374, 424, 426, 454, 455, 470, 515f., 522, 525, 578, 594
native army, 140
defences, 209, 274, 499
frontiers, 135, 285, 448, 577
population, 140, 360, 458, 484, 552
mineral resources, 531
earthquake, 303
Sar-i Sang, 170
Sarchakan, 7, 441
sardar, 86, 87, 100
Sariq Turkmans, 375, 418, 430, 437, 474, 479
Sarrakhs, 23, 124, 127, 239, 242, 254, 269, 326, 458, 461, 492, 493
Sasanids, 5, 9-10, 14
Sayad, 172
Shadman Bi, 45f.
Shadyan, 499, 503, 504, 513, 514, 518
Shaflan, 411, 480
Shah 'Abbas I, 37, 39, 40, 47, 52
Shah 'Abbas II, 51f.
Shah 'Abbas b. Timur Shah Durrani, 100, 114
Shah Aulia', shrine, 35
Shah Beg Foladchi, 40
Shah Jahan, Mughal Emperor, 48, 50, 52
Shah Mahmud Sadozai, 82, 116, 117, 118
Shah Murad Khan Manghit, 87, 90, 91, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 100, 109
Shah Nama, 8
Shah Nawaz Khan Barakzai, 276, 277f., 282, 287, 306, 433
Shah Pasand Khan Firozkohi, 151, 152, 153, 188
Shah Rukh Afshar, 72
Shah Rukh b. Timur Lang, 10, 20f.
Shah Wali Beg of Andkhui, 135, 136, 194, 203f., 210
Shah Wali Khan, wazir, 90
Shah-i Mardan, 69, 115f., 231, 302, 559 (see also 'Ali b. Abi Talib)
shahghasi, 360, 362
Shahr-i Sabz, 19, 93, 94, 176, 235, 239, 250, 273, 276, 318, 388, 424
Shahrabad, 302
Shahrak, 408
Shaibanid Dynasty, xvii, 21, 25f., 31, 32, 34f., 37, 39, 40, 41, 84
Shaibanid Khan, 26., 27f. 29f., 31
shaikh, 19, 23f., 56, 109, 559
Shaikh 'Ali Hazaras, 413, 507, 510, 511, 531f., 546, 547, 550, 551, 559
Shams al-Din Khan, 261
Shams al-Din Muhammad Timuri, 108
Sharbat Khan, General, 439, 440f., 454, 455
rebellion and death, 514f., 517, 535, 536
Sher 'Ali Beg of Kokand, 210
Sher 'Ali Khan, Amir, xxii, 271, 272, 274, 334, 394, 424, 441, 445, 585
civil war, xxi, 289f., 293, 295, 300f., 303f., 307f., 309f., 325f., 338f., 349
amirid alliance, 294f., 298, 300f., 310, 312, 318f., 326, 328, 338f., 343, 345f., 349, 353, 362, 368, 379f., 558
and Lesser Turkistan, 294, 297, 303, 308, 309, 310, 312f., 334, 340f., 343, 344, 347f., 359, 361f., 365f., 368, 379, 413f., 456, 537
oath to Afzal Khan, 297f., 308
imprisons Afzal Khan, 300, 303
and 'Abd al-Rahman Khan, 298f., 305f., 309f., 312f., 322f., 558
Qandahar and death of sons, 303, 308
flees to Afghan Turkistan, 310
reiterates oath at Mazar, 310, 318
takes Qandahar, 313f., 321, 323f., 325, 327, 328, 329
takes Kabul and resumes reign, 328, 333f.
and Na'ib 'Alam Khan, 339f., 348, 366f.
and Faiz Muhammad Khan, 304f., 309, 310, 312
and Persia, 298, 334
and Russia, 371, 375, 376f.
Britain and Anglo-Afghan War, 317, 333f., 359, 360 (implied), 362, 363, 372f., 377f., 382f., 391, 397, 400
and Ya'qub Khan, 345, 348
abdicates, 308, 379
illnesses, 293, 300, 303, 308f., 324, 377
final flight and death, 362f., 379f., 383
Sher Muhammad b. Shah Wali Khan, 100
Sher Muhammad Khan, amir of Sunni Hazaras, 125, 165, 201, 205
and Persian seige of Herat (1837/8), xvif., vxii, 125f, 149f., 153, 156, 159
Sher Muhammad Khan Ming, 142, 206, 209, 211f., 217, 238
Sherabad fort, 232
Sherdil Loynab Khan, Shahghasi, 360, 361, 362, 365, 368, 371, 378
Sherpur, 384, 391
Shibab al-Din Barakzai, 306
Shibarghan, xxx, 7, 12, 15, 17f., 20f., 26, 36, 39, 40f., 46, 48, 51, 55, 57f., 64, 69, 87f., 90, 103, 115, 142, 170, 174, 194, 215, 310, 320, 324, 328, 339, 341, 342, 344, 346, 347, 348, 350, 374, 376, 413, 421, 423, 434, 440, 510, 511, 517, 522, 527, 600
hakims of, 87f, 112, 128, 131, 210, 264f., 312, 343, 353, 356, 367, 395, Appendices III,iii; IV,v (see individual names)
and Bukhara, 87f., 165, 210f., 236, 315, 342
and Afghans, 216, 226f., 239, 245, 246f., 261, 264f., 269, 274, 282, 290, 294, 295, 296, 307, 313, 320, 321, 322f., 337, 339, 343, 389, 393, 420, 424, 426
Afghan governors of, 381, 389, 394
rebellions, 213, 235f., 246f., 272f., 307, 331, 412, 513
native army, 128, 140, 208, 276
defences, 236
economy and revenues, xxviii, 2, 13, 127, 128, 141, 208, 210f., 538
population, 140, 165f., 208, 239, 525
earthquake at, 303
Shignan, 547
Shi'i, 11, 24, 30, 39, 69, 94, 125, 127, 130, 161, 338, 380, 391, 545, 581, 595, 602 (see also Qizilbash)
of Herat, 139, 383, 581f.
Shirabad, 300, 305, 337, 512
Shirin Tagab (river), 8, 52, 115, 125, 135, 172, 350, 363, 413, 421, 423, 438, 442, 443, 471, 521, 522, 587
Shirin Tagao (settlement and district) 448, 454, 472, 600
shrines, xxxiv, 19
Shuja' al-Din Khan, Sardar, 237
Shuja' al-Mulk, Shah, xv, xxi, 110, 113, 114, 116, 145, 160, 162, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 186, 187, 193, 194, 198, 202f.
Shuja' al-Din, *mutawalli* of Mazar-i Sharif, 120f., 164, 175, 200, 210, 211, 220, 222
family of, 224, 231, 249, 250, 263, 331, 337, 370
Siddiq Muhammad b. Subhan Quli Khan, 55f.
Sigistan, 17
Sikh Wars, 201, 219, 220
Sikhs, xiv, xix, 144, 160, 167, 168, 207
Simla Declaration, 167
Sind, 203, 220
Sir Darya, 75, 76
Siraj al-Tawarikh, xvii, xxxii, xl, xliii, xliv, 119, 149, 151, 154, 159, 182, 219, 221, 222, 223f., 228, 232, 236, 265, 272, 273,

291, 294f., 297, 300, 301, 304f., 306, 307, 230, 329, 364
Sistan, 37, 108, 110, 148, 190, 200, 217, 280, 325, 332, 494
Siya Chah, 176, 555, 557, 567
Siya Chob, 408, 409
Skobeleff, General, 417
slavery, slave trade, 66, 72, 74, 75, 112, 115, 124, 126, 127, 130, 131, 132, 139, 140, 147, 148, 163, 166, 184, 188, 197f., 206, 209, 214, 235, 254, 257, 279, 283, 285, 348, 374, 418, 452, 477, 488, 532, 557, 558, 562, 579 (see also *ghulam*)
Soboleff, L.N., 388, 389, 464
Sogdiana, 9, 75, 335
Sogdians, 1, 9
Stalin, xxvi
Stirling, Edward, xxxviii, xliii, 75, 104, 105, 106, 112, 122, 124f., 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 138, 151, 353
Stoddard, Col. C., 74, 75, 150, 154, 168, 197, 200, 208, 241, 317, 555
Stolietov Mission, 375, 376, 377
Subhan Quli Khan Ming, 106f., 133f.
Subhan Quli Khan, Tuqay-Timurid, 53f.
Sudur, Ishan, 119, 172, 208, 210, 214, 217, 221, 222, 229, 232, 233, 248, 261, 293, 308, 312, 314,. 318, 319, 320, 552
Sufi Khan, amir of Andkhui, 210, 211, 213
Sufi Khan b. Shuja' al-Din Mazari, 249, 331
Sufi Nekbashi, 284
Sufism, xxix, 284, 428
Sulaiman Khan, amir of Andkhui, 112, 128
sultan, xii, 32, 37, 55f.
Sultan Ahmad Khan Barakzai, 251, 253, 254, 275, 276, 279, 280, 282, 285, 286f.
Sultan Ahmad Khan Ming, 344. 349
Sultan Akhunzada, general, 217f.
Sultan Husain Safawi, 61
Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni, 10, 12, 180
Sultan Mingbashi of Tashqurghan, 331
Sultan Muhammad Ibrahim Shaibani, 38
Sultan Muhammad Khan Ming, 594
Sultan Murad Beg, Mir Ataliq (the elder), 221, 230, 231, 252, 266, 296, 298, 320
  campaigns against Afghans, 233, 235, 236, 245, 246, 259, 260f., 271, 273, 293
  and Chahar Wilayat, 261, 263
  and Nasrullah Khan, 263f.., 267, 270
  defeat at Dahan-i Ghur, 266
  flight, 268f., 271
  family feuds, 233, 246, 260, 267f., 309
  death, 304
Sultan Murad Beg (the younger), 290f., 293 (implied), 294, 310, 332
  succeeds his father, 303
  and 'Abd al-Rahman Khan, 305, 392f., 511
  captured by Jahandad Khan, 309f.
  defects to Sher 'Ali Khan, 311, 313f., 331f.
  under Na'ib 'Alam Khan, 339, 347
  and Ishaq Khan, 395, 457, 508, 527
Sultan Sanjar, Samanid, 23, 93
Sultan Sanjar b. 'Ibadullah, 59
Sunni Khan, Mirza, 178
sunnis, 24, 30, 31, 39, 130, 148, 150, 152, 153, 154, 155, 157, 159, 160
Sunni Hazaras of Qal'a-yi Nau, xvi, 117, 125, 126, 149f., 165, 166, 189, 192, 195, 201, 205,177, 178, 179, 196, 211f., 326, 402, 403, 408, 410,427f., 430f., 474, 477, 478, 483, 489(?), 516, 520, 583, 584f., 586, 590, 595
  amirs of, Appendix V,ii (see individual names)
Surkabi, Maryam, 425
Switzerland, xi, 600
synagogues, xxix

Tahir Bi, 41
Tahmasp Isma'il Safawi, 62
Tahmasp, Shah, 34
Tahmat Bi, amir, 95
Taimani Aimaq, 108, 154, 200, 205, 400f., 406, 407f., 426f.
  amirs of, Appendix V, iv (see individual names)
Taiwara, 400, 407, 408, 409
Taj al-Din 'Osman-i Marghini, 16
Taj al-Din, Saiyid of Andkhui, 24
Taj Muhammad Khan, Qari, 454
Tajik(s), xxxiii, 19, 121, 142, 177, 206, 265, 285, 466, 481, 484, 496, 550, 559, 601, 602
Tajikistan, 334, 600, 601f.
Taju Khan Ishaqzai, 431, 437f., 485f., 490, 491
Takhtapul, 208, 260, 264, 265, 272, 278, 280, 286, 289, 295, 297, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 306, 311, 314, 319, 330, 332, 337, 339, 379, 380, 393, 458, 540, 578, 588

Takhtapul Gate, 351
Taki Beg Mingbashi, 442
Talash Khan Hills, 325, 326, 351, 354
Taliqan, 52, 123, 265, 268, 271, 273, 298, 309, 310, 393
Talqan (of Faryab), 12, 15, 17
Taraki, Nur Muhammad, xxxiv
Taraki tribe, 532
Tardi 'Ali Qataghan, 52
Tarikh-i Ahmad Shahi, xliii, 73, 79, 80, 83, 86, 87, 92
Tarkan Durman, 41
Tarkhanoff, Colonel, 493, 494
Tarn, W.W., 76
Tarnovsky, Lieutenant, 583, 584, 588
Tashkent, 38, 302, 305, 315, 349, 376, 378, 424, 501, 528
  Russian annexation of, 304f., 314
Tashqurghan, 236, 261, 263, 265, 271, 297, 299, 306, 311, 312, 313, 318, 332, 393, 510, 511, 512, 524, 527, 528, 538, 547
Tatary, xxxi
Taylor, Maj., xxxviii, 210, 212, 251, 253f.
Tehran, xxxvii, xli, 129, 148, 217, 231, 244, 251, 277, 380, 391, 404, 405, 415, 433
Tekke Turkmans, 275, 276, 418
Termez, 43, 51
Timur Lang, xvii, 18f. 24, 69, 108, 119, 120, 335
Timur Shah Durrani, Amir, xiv, 84, 92f., 104, 105, 108, 113, 145, 190f., 224, 227
Timurabad, 52
Timuri Aimaq, 108f.
Timurid Dynasty, xvii, xxx, 19f. 25f.
Tir Band-i Turkistan, xxxiv, xlv, 3f., 8, 80, 128, 150 (implied), 151, 153, 160, 186, 198, 208, 441, 474, 480, 521
Todd, Maj. D'Arcy, xxi, xxxvii, xxxviii, 253
  and Chahar Wilayat, 173, 184, 189f., 194f., 196, 198, 199, 200
  and Burnes, xxxvii, xxxviii, 146
  at Herat, 184f., 196, 198
  report on Herat, 1899f.
  and Macnaughten, 191
Tohrab Khan, Col., 339
Tokhis, 232
Tora Bakhti Gate, 351
Tora Khan Mingbashi, 320, 422, 437, 441, 442, 443, 517
Transoxiana, 18, 20, 75, 183, 198, 241, 276, 316, 317, 340, 347, 348, 371, 373, 435
Treaty of Paris (1857), 251, 253, 254
Trebeck, George, 122, 124, 200, 208
Trevelyan, Charles, 145
Tribal Territory, 601f.
Tulak, 401
Tuqay-Timurid Dynasty, xiii, xxviii, 17, 37f., 41, 44, 52f., 57f., 59, 72, 81, 180, Appendix IV,i
  Khans of, see individual rulers
Turbat-i Shaikh Jam, 126, 149, 205
Turkey, 315, 317, 602
Turkistan, xxxi, xxxii, xxxiiif., 63, 74, 80, 82, 83, 85, 86, 90, 95, 98, 123, 124, 127, 142, 144, 148, 166, 168, 177, 195, 196, 197, 206, 209, 223, 224, 229, 230, 232, 233, 242, 252, 257, 271, 273, 291, 292, 295, 313, 314, 329, 336, 368, 377 (see also Afghan Turkistan, Balkh appanage, Lesser Turkistan)
Turkistan (Hazrat Sultan), 302
'Turkistan Atrocities', xxv, xxvii, xl, 459, 531f.
Turkistani/Turkistanian, xxxiii, 80, 218, 224, 248, 313, 314, 340, 348, 349, 366, 379, 399, 502, 527
Turkman(s), xxx, xxxi, xxxiii, 19, 26, 55, 61f., 64, 67, 74, 75, 94, 140, 142, 177, 178, 184, 203, 225, 239, 247, 254, 270, 285, 301, 303, 305, 325, 326, 327, 330, 335, 338, 342, 343, 351, 366, 378, 381, 388, 389, 391, 395, 397, 400f., 405, 410, 412, 413, 416f., 418, 420, 422, 423, 425, 434f., 437, 460, 461, 472, 473, 481, 482, 484, 492f., 519, 522f., 525, 559, 601 (see, Ersari, Salor, Tekke, etc.)
  Black and White Sheep, 21f., 29
  of Badghis, xvi, 44, 107, 126, 149, 150, 153, 154, 156, 157, 159, 207, 212, 244, 285, 326, 346, 369, 373, 374f., 403, 407, 429, 432, 436, 437, 446, 463, 469, 471, 473, 474, 476, 477, 479, 483, 488, 492, 584
Turkmenistan, 66, 416, 432, 473, 600

'Ubaidullah Khan b. Abu'l-Faiz, 73
'Ubaidullah Khan b. Imam Quli Khan, 57f.
'Ubaidullah Khan Shaibanid, 34, 35
Ulugh Beg b. Shah Rukh, 20f.
ulus(at), 33, 57, 70
Umballa Conference, 333f., 335
Uratepa, 36, 315

Uraz Bi Ming, xii, 43, 51, 83
Urganj, 85, 127, 150, 234, 239, 241
Uruzgan, 585, 586
USSR, xxvi
Uyghur, xxxiii
Uzbek(s), xxxiii, xxxiv, 19, 21, 25, 26, 27, 30, 31, 36, 40, 44, 46, 48, 49, 51, 56, 60, 61, 64, 65, 67, 71, 72, 79, 80, 82, 85, 96, 98, 109, 112, 114, 121, 123, 124, 126, 127, 131f., 133, 136, 137, 140f., 147, 149, 150, 153, 154, 159, 170, 178, 209, 219, 223, 241, 247, 252, 266, 267, 301, 321, 335, 349, 350, 355, 356, 362, 363, 424, 437, 516, 519, 520, 541, 550f., 559, 586, 600f.
  British perceptions of, 74f., 142, 168, 184, 200f., 240f., 266, 315f., 335, 466, 481, 483, 484
  and Afghans, 33, 54, 62, 78, 79, 80f., 97, 175f., 182, 223, 224, 225, 229, 241, 242, 243, 256, 258, 259, 261, 268, 274, 279, 282, 288, 290, 291, 300, 303, 314, 317, 319, 320, 327, 329, 338, 356, 366, 381, 395, 397, 413, 414, 419, 429, 452, 464, 469, 477, 481, 482, 483, 484, 489, 502, 509, 536, 546, 548, 560, 590
  military organisation, 141, 208
Uzbek Khan, 26
Uzbekistan, 600, 602

Vambery, A., xxxviii, 283, 285f.
Victoria, Queen, xxv, 315, 566
Vitkevich, Capt., 160, 162
Vishtaspa, 8

wakils and *wakil* diaries, xxiiif., xxxiif., xxxv, xxxviif., xlf., 97, 120, 257, 349, 351, 356, 359f., 363, 364, 365, 369, 372, 376, 387, 419, 453, 486, 487, 497, 507, 519, 531, 532, 533, 535, 545, 546, 548, 552, 553, 556, 558, 559, 562f., 564, 566, 572, 575, 585
Wakhan Corridor, 43
Wales, 76, 83
wali, 54
Wali Khan, Sardar, 392
Wali Muhammad Khan Jawansher, 87
Wali Muhammad Khan, Sardar, 232, 233, 234, 237, 245, 246, 295
  defeats Hakim Khan 247
  besieged by Mir Wali, 236f.
  campaign against Ishan Uraq, 248f.
Wali Muhammad Khan, Tuqay-Timurid, 39, 40, 41f., 59
Wali-yi Balkh, 57, 73, 79, 81f., 88, 93, 98, 113, 118f., 123
Wali-yi Maimana, 78, 79, 81f., 103, 105, 141, 359
walnuts, 8, 127, 449
waqf, 24, 102, 103, 231, 370, 450, 497, 538
Warburton, Col., 545, 553, 565, 567, 573f., Appendix IX
Wardak, 173, 532
Warushan, 9
Waterfield, Col. 415f., 419
weights and measures, Appendix II
Wilayat-i Shamal-i Afghanistan, 1, 600
Wilberforce, William, 197
Wolfe, Joseph, 200

Yabaghu, 48
al-Yahudiyya, al-Yahud(iy)an, 6f., 12
Yakh Darra, 441
Yakolang, 186, 190, 586
Yalangtush Bi Alchin, 42, 46f.
Yalangtush Khan b. Khan Agha Jamshidi, 402f., 406f., 410f., 412, 427, 428, 432, 437, 438, 492
  colonisation of Bala Murghab, 430f.
  defends Panjdeh, 462f., 473f.
  deposed and reinstated, 474, 475
  arrest and execution, 478, 479
Yalangtush Khan b. Mahmud Khan Jamshidi, 126, 276
Yalatan, 407, 436, 443, 471
Yangi 'Aruq, 237, 304
Yangi Qal'a (Akhal Oasis), 416f.
Yangi Qal'a (Balkh), 13
Ya'qub Khan, Sardar, 294, 322, 323, 325, 328, 380, 386, 410
  and Chahar Aimaq, 294, 365
  as governor of Herat, 298, 314
  and Chahar Wilayat, 307, 347, 348, 363, 381
  rebellion of, 345
  as Amir of Afghanistan, 362, 364, 379f., 383
  and Britain, 385f., 391, 397
  Treaty of Gandamak, 383f.
  death of Cavagnari, 383f.
  exiled to India, 386, 388, 391
Yar Ahmad Khuzani, Najm-i Sani, 320f.

Yar Muhammad Khan, Asaf al-Daula, 139 160, 161, 162, 168, 193, 205, 211f.
  campaign in Badghis, xvi, xvii, 147, 149f., 159f., 186
Yar Muhammad Khan, Wazir of Herat, 143, 243, 400, 403
  government, 148, 184f., 189, 212
  and Kamran Shah, 148, 149, 201f.
  and Bukhara, 204, 217
  Persian siege of Herat, xvi, 148, 159, 189
  attacks Aimaq, 201, 203f., 211f.
  and British agents, 184f., 189f., 194f., 200f.
  and Chahar Wilayat, 98, 157, 184f, 187, 190f., 198f., 205f., 209f., 218f., 254f.
  siege of Maimana, 215f., 217f., 227
  and Dost Muhammad Khan, 216f.
  Persian intrigues, 201, 203f., 217, 368f.
Yar Muhammad b. Mangqishlaq, 37
Yate, C.E., 24, 476, 480, 482, 483, 492, 595
Yavorski, 380
Yazdan Quli Khan, 437f., 440, 442, 459, 461, 469, 489, 519f., 583, 584, 597
Yulduz Khan, amir of Andkhui, 123, 128
Yusuf 'Ali Beg, amir of Badakhshan, 273

Zahir Shah, Amir, 1, 552
Zakariya' Khana Sarai prison, 459, 549, 554f.
Zaman Shah Durrani, 96, 99, 100f., 107, 108, 109, 110, 113, 114, 115, 243
Zamin Dawar, 43, 108, 491
Zaranj, 135
Zariaspa, Azar-i Asp, 2, 8f., 23
Zarshui, 350, 440
Zeleonoi, General, 458, 461
Zerabulaq, battle of, 318
Zinish Khan Uzbek, 34
Zoroaster, 8f.
Zoroastrianism, 10, 11, 24
Zu'l-Faqar Khan Abdali, 62f., 72
Zu'l-Faqar Pass, 460, 461, 463
Zu'l-Faqar Sher Khan, Beglarbegi of Sar-i Pul, 112, 115, 133, 135, 171, 211
  war with Maimana, 133f., 141
  and Shibarghan, 141, 165
  family, 133f., 171f., 273
Zulmabad, 278
Zu'ulnun Beg, amir, 28

MAPS



Map 1. Central Asia

Map 2. Afghanistan and Surrounding Countries



Map 3. Afghanistan



Map 4. Balkh and lesser Turkistan



Map 5. Maimana and the Chahar Wilayat



Map 6. The Hazhda Nahr (Eighteen Canals) of Balkh (from McChesney, 1991)



Map 7. Map to illustrate the operations between Samur and Géok Tépé (Skobeleff, 1881)